Confucian Meritocratic Democracy:A Comparative and Philosophical Study of Confucian Meritocracy and Democracy by Hong, Cheng
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 

















Confucian Meritocratic Democracy 
A Comparative and Philosophical Study of Confucian Meritocracy and Democracy  
 






























Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ..................................................................................................... 6 
Note on Translations and Transliterations ............................................. 7 
The Annotated Timeline of Some Chinese Dynasties and Key 
Confucian Events Relevant to this Thesis ............................................... 8 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Theoretical Background ..................................................................................................... 13 
1.11 The Development of Confucianism ............................................................................. 13 
1.12 Modern Relevance of Confucianism ........................................................................... 15 
1.2 Contemporary Confucian Political Theory ........................................................................ 18 
1.21 Confucian Democrats ................................................................................................. 18 
1.22 Confucian Meritocrats ................................................................................................ 21 
1.23 A Philosophical Thought Experiment ......................................................................... 24 
1.3 A Note on the Central Claim and Scope of the Thesis ...................................................... 28 
1.31 Classical Confucianism............................................................................................... 28 
1.32 Political Confucianism ................................................................................................ 30 
1.33 Two Definitions of Democracy ................................................................................... 33 
1.34 Two Approaches towards Justifying Democracy ........................................................ 35 
1.4 A Philosophical Approach to Study Classical Confucianism ............................................ 39 
1.41 Jiezhejiang .................................................................................................................. 40 
1.42 New Text School .......................................................................................................... 42 
1.43 Hermeneutic of Restoration ........................................................................................ 44 
1.5 Chapter Outline .................................................................................................................. 45 
2. Confucian Meritocracy and Ren ....................................................... 49 
2.1 The Junzi and the Confucian Ren Statesperson ................................................................. 49 
2.2 Ren in Classical Confucianism .......................................................................................... 51 
2.21 The Meaning of Ren .................................................................................................... 52 
2.22 Equal Potential Capacities to Become Confucian Ren Statespersons ........................ 54 
2.23 Self-cultivation and ‘Return to Li’ .............................................................................. 57 
2.3 Confucian Meritocratic Beliefs .......................................................................................... 61 
2.4 Political Truths of Ren ....................................................................................................... 62 
2.41 Truths in Normative Political Theories....................................................................... 63 
2.42 Proceduralist View of Political Truths ....................................................................... 65 
3 
 
2.43 Pursuing Ren ............................................................................................................... 71 
3. Political Authority ............................................................................ 75 
3.1 The Political Authority of the Confucian Ren Statespersons ............................................. 75 
3.2 The ‘General Acceptability’ Approach to Political Authority ........................................... 79 
3.21 Confucian Moral Persuasion ...................................................................................... 81 
3.22 Acceptability and Acceptance ..................................................................................... 90 
3.23 Expert/Boss Fallacy .................................................................................................... 95 
3.3 Serve the Well-being of the Citizens ................................................................................. 98 
3.4 ‘Control View’ of Political Authority .............................................................................. 101 
3.41 Autonomy .................................................................................................................. 102 
3.42 Paternalism ............................................................................................................... 108 
3.5 Reciprocity ....................................................................................................................... 112 
3.51 My Own Judgement ................................................................................................... 113 
3.52 My Own Benefit ......................................................................................................... 115 
3.6 Confucian Political Authority: Service and Reciprocity .................................................. 117 
3.61 The General Acceptability of Confucian Political Authority .................................... 117 
3.62 The Practical Aim of Confucian Political Authority ................................................. 119 
4. Political Rights .................................................................................. 122 
4.1 Political Rights and Classical Confucianism ................................................................... 122 
4.2 Early Confucian Views on Self-interest and Human Nature ........................................... 126 
4.21 Li 利 (self-interest) vs. Yi義(righteousness) ............................................................. 127 
4.22 Is Human Nature Good or Evil? ............................................................................... 128 
4.3 Individualism and Modern Democracy ............................................................................ 133 
4.4 Reasonable Citizens ......................................................................................................... 138 
4.41 Political Participation............................................................................................... 139 
4.42 Educative Programs .................................................................................................. 140 
4.43 A Large State ............................................................................................................. 141 
4.5 Harmonious Community .................................................................................................. 143 
4.6 Confucian Political Rights: Making Political Decisions about Strictly Local Matters .... 147 
4.61 The Possibility of Confucian Political Rights ........................................................... 148 
4.62 Fidelity Desideratum and Universal Acceptability of Confucian Political Rights ... 150 
4.63 Confucian Political Rights and Democratic Rights .................................................. 153 
5. Political Equality .............................................................................. 155 
5.1 Political Influence ............................................................................................................ 156 
4 
 
5.11 Absolute Political Influence ...................................................................................... 157 
5.12 Realising Political Values ......................................................................................... 159 
5.13 The Equality of Political Influence ........................................................................... 164 
5.2 Equal Social Relationship (ESR) ..................................................................................... 166 
5.21 The Definition of ESR in Theory .............................................................................. 166 
5.22 The Value of ESR in Practice .................................................................................... 169 
5.23 Early Confucian Views of Social Equality ................................................................ 173 
5.3 Social Equality and Political Equality ............................................................................. 180 
5.4 Political Equality and Democracy .................................................................................... 185 
5.41 Direct Political Influence .......................................................................................... 185 
5.42 Indirect Political Influence ....................................................................................... 186 
5.43 No Decisive Political Influence. ................................................................................ 189 
5.44 Equality and Freedom ............................................................................................... 191 
5.45 Rule of Law ............................................................................................................... 192 
5.5 Confucian Political Equality: Equal Participation in Political Reflections ...................... 195 
5.51 Rule of Ren and Political Equality ............................................................................ 196 
5.52 Requirements of Ren and Social Equality ................................................................. 198 
5.53 Two Insulting Notions ............................................................................................... 199 
5.54 Equal Participation in Political Reflection. .............................................................. 201 
5.55 Possible Objections ................................................................................................... 204 
6. Political Institutions .......................................................................... 207 
6.1 Confucian Civic Education .............................................................................................. 209 
6.11 Cultivation of Relationship-based Virtues ................................................................ 210 
6.12 The Legitimacy of Moral Cultivation ........................................................................ 213 
6.13 Confucian Academy .................................................................................................. 216 
6.2 The Merits of the Confucian Ren statespersons ............................................................... 217 
6.21 Intellectual Ability ..................................................................................................... 220 
6.22 Emotional Intelligence .............................................................................................. 222 
6.23 Moral Ability ............................................................................................................. 224 
6.3 Confucian Examination ................................................................................................... 227 
6.31 The Development of the Keju .................................................................................... 227 
6.32 Practicality of Confucian Examination ..................................................................... 229 
6.33 Evaluating Morality .................................................................................................. 232 
6.34 Possible Dissatisfactions........................................................................................... 234 
6.4 Confucian Parliament ....................................................................................................... 238 
6.5 The Normative and Practical Aim of Confucian Meritocratic Democracy ..................... 242 
5 
 
7. Conclusion ......................................................................................... 247 
7.1 Theoretical Contributions to Modern Democracy ........................................................... 247 
7.2 Potential Contribution to Political Reform in Mainland China........................................ 251 







Contemporary Confucian political theory is noticeable for two politically distinctive and 
epistemologically similar schools: Confucian democrats and Confucian meritocrats. They 
both attempt to revitalise Confucianism in modern political theory and practice by 
advocating various forms of Confucian democracy and Confucian meritocracy. However, 
there is little effort among the theorists of both schools to provide a comprehensive 
examination of how far Confucian meritocratic thought may be relevant concerns for 
modern democratic theorists. 
 
This thesis represents a comparative and philosophical study of classical Confucianism 
and academic democratic theories. It argues that it is possible to develop a political theory 
pertaining to a Confucian meritocratic form of democracy.  Such theory, which stresses 
the importance of helping citizens to make reasonable political decisions, contributes to 
the justification of the superiority of democracy and assists addressing some challenges 
modern democracy are facing. 
 
The argument has three stages. The first is to explore the ideas of Confucian meritocracy 
by elucidating and reconstructing some early Confucian political discourses. Such 
exploration relies upon an analytical and critical reading of some texts in the Confucian 
classics, especially those concerning Ren 仁. The second is to investigate some theoretical 
and practical problems with the core normative democratic principles in the justification 
of the superiority of democracy. These normative principles are related to political 
authority, political rights and political equality and are often deployed to justify the 
intrinsic values of democracy. The third is to reconcile Confucian meritocracy and 
modern democracy by exploring the viability of Confucian Meritocratic Democracy or 
CMD. CMD, which is discussed as an ideal form of government, is founded upon 
Confucian conceptions of political authority, political rights and political equality. This 
thesis argues that while such conceptions preserves some political, meritocratic principles 
critically derived from classical Confucianism, they are compatible with the practical 
aims of democracy. This thesis also elaborates upon some hypothetical institutional 
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The Annotated Timeline of Some Chinese Dynasties and Key Confucian Events 
Relevant to this Thesis 
 
Ca.? -2100 BCE Tang and Yu ( 唐
虞)Dynasties 
Dynasties before the Ancient Three 
Dynasties (San Dai 三代), thought to 
have been ruled by sage kings—Yao 
(Tang Yao唐堯) and Shun (Yu Shun虞
舜 ). Most Confucians believe that 
during this period, Ren government 
(Ren zheng 仁政 ) was implemented 
and the people flourished. 
ca. 2100-1600 BCE   Xia夏 Dynasty     Ancient Three Dynasties, or San Dai 
三代 (Xia夏, Shang商, and Zhou周), 
thought to mark the beginning of 
Chinese civilisation. Characterised by 
some ancient books, poems, the 
practice of divination, music and 
rituals in various ceremonies. Most of 
these later became the source of 
classical Confucianism and were 
thought to have been recorded and 
edited by Confucius in several 
Confucian classics. 
ca.1600-1050 BCE   Shang 商 Dynasty 
ca. 1046-256   BCE    Zhou 周











Spring and Autumn 
(chunqiu 春秋 ) Period 
(770-ca. 475 BCE) 
 




 (ca. 475-221 BCE)   
 
Mencius孟子 (ca. 372 – 289 BCE) 
Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 313-238 BCE) 
221-206 BCE   Qin (秦) Dynasty  Unified China, standardisation of the 
writing system. A centralised 
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(221BCE marks the 
beginning of Imperial 
China) 
administration followed the principles 
of ‘legalism (Fajia 法 家 )’ and 
implemented the rule of law by harsh 
means: including the suppression of 
Confucianism and other schools of 
thought. 
206 BCE-220 CE   Han (漢) Dynasty    Confucianism was established as 
orthodoxy and as the political ideology 
of Imperial China. The Keju 科舉 
(Imperial civil examination) was 
introduced. Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 
(179– 104 BCE) advocated Confucian 
political tradition (the Gong yang公羊
tradition). The rise of and debate 
between two commentarial traditions 
on Confucian classical texts— ‘New 
Text Confucianism (jinwen jingxue今
文經學)’ and ‘Old Text Confucianism 
(guwen jingxue古文經學)’ 
 
581-618 CE Sui (隋) Dynasty Keju was fully established. Cultural 
prosperity and territorial expansion 
occurred. The beginning of the Neo-
Confucian tradition. 
Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824), Li Ao 李翱 
(772-841) 
618-906 CE Tang (唐) Dynasty 
960-1279 Song (宋) Dynasty Neo-Confucianism thrived. The 
Confucian spiritual tradition (Spiritual 
Confucianism or Confucian Mentalism 





1368-1644 Ming (明) Dynasty Cheng-Zhu School of Neo-
Confucianism: Cheng Hao 程 顥 
(1032–1085), Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–
1107), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130－1200). 
 
Lu-Wang School of Neo-
Confucianism:  
Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139–1192), 
Wang Yangming 王陽明  (1472—
1529) 
1644-1912 Qing (清) Dynasty 
 
The Changzhou School of Thought 
(Changzhou xuepai常州學派) revived 
the Confucian political tradition 
(gongyang 公羊 tradition). Prominent 
scholars in this school: 
 
Liu Fenglu 劉逢祿 (1776—1829) 
Song Xiangfeng 宋翔風 (1776-1860) 
Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858– 1927) 
 
Keju was abolished in 1905, a year 
which marks the collapse of 
Confucianism as the imperial 
orthodoxy. 
1912-1949 Republic Period 
(1912 marks the end of 
Imperial China) 
The beginning of New-Confucianism 
(xinrujia新儒家)  
Prominent New Confucians: 
Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968)  
Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1887-1969) 
Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893-1988) 
Feng Youlan馮友蘭 (1895-1990) 
Mou Zongsan牟宗三 (1901-1995) 
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Xu Fuguan徐複觀 (1904-1982) 
Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909-1978) 
1949-present People’s Republic of 
China 
Confucianism was generally 
demonised during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976).  
 
New-Confucianism, profoundly 
influenced by the Confucian spirituals 
tradition of the Song and Ming 
dynasties, has been developed by 
modern Confucian scholars in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and the USA. 
 
Since the early 21st century, some 
Confucian scholars in mainland China, 
especially those who belong to 
Mainland New Confucianism (dalu 
xinrujia 大陸新儒家 ) have been 










A large body of theoretical and empirical studies has demonstrated that the problem of 
unreasonable voters has become increasingly obvious in modern democratic societies 
(Sears & Funk 1990, Denver & Hands 1990, Ackerman and Fishkin 2004b, Hardin 2009: 
235; Bovard 2005:13, Somin 2010: 258, Caplan 2011: 34, Guerrero 2014: 173). Some 
scholars have considered the costs and benefits of voting in modern representative 
democracies and have gone so far to argue that it is irrational and immoral for voters to 
spend time on improving their voting competency (Arneson 2009: 202, Hardin 2009: 235). 
  
Two groups of contemporary democratic theorists commonly emphasise the problem of 
public ignorance in modern democracies: Deliberative democrats and Platonist democrats. 
Deliberative democrats propose deliberation as an educative strategy for improving the 
political competence of voters, while Platonist democrats contend that only those whose 
expertise is sufficiently proven ought to participate in politics (Caplan 2011, Gutmann & 
Thompson 2009, Fishkin 2009, Dryzek 2000, Cohen 1997).1 Deliberative democrats and 
Platonist democrats both exemplify a certain readiness to reject an equal participation of 
all the citizens in the political decision-making process. Many regard this as a radical 
stance, which risks violating some core normative democratic principles; i.e., those 
pertaining to the allocation of political authority, basic political rights and minimal 
political equality.  
 
However distinct the radical positions assumed by both schools may be, they both 
resonate with certain aspects of early Confucian political and ethical thought. The 
meritocratic and democratic political proposals found in classical Confucianism are 
premised upon the notion that while the state should provide every citizen with the 
opportunity to gain a high-quality education, those who participate in political decision-
making should be well-educated, and should already have achieved a high degree of self-
cultivation. Given its resonance with contemporary democratic theories, classical 
Confucianism is worthy of some serious contemplation and discussion. 
                                                          
1 Since Plato, democracy has been criticised for failing to bestow an adequate degree of political power to 
those who are in a better position to make reasonable political decisions. In The Republic, Plato defended 
the idea that a minority of moral experts should rule. In Politics, Aristotle restricted citizenship to well-




1.1 Theoretical Background 
 
Confucianism is the most important philosophy, religion and tradition in most East Asian 
countries and regions. Many generations of scholars have studied this tradition; but what 
does ‘Confucianism’ really mean? There is no universally agreed definition of 
Confucianism. This is not merely because Confucianism is a rich and complex tradition, 
but also because the meaning of Confucianism has varied considerably throughout history. 
As Nathan Sivin says, ‘It is hard to think of any idea responsible for more fuzziness in 
writing about China than the notion of Confucianism’ (Sivin 2001: xxi). Moreover, there 
are also many disagreements about whether or not Confucianism can play a constructive 
role in modern societies. 
 
1.11 The Development of Confucianism  
 
Confucianism is a dynamic tradition, and it has been constantly developing and evolving 
for more than two thousand years (Yao 2000: 3-5). The development of Confucianism 
from the time of Confucius until now can be understood as encompassing four periods. 2   
 
The first period is the period of classical Confucianism, which started in the Zhou dynasty 
(1046-256 BCE). During this early stage of Confucian tradition, Confucius interpreted, 
continued and refined the ancient tradition of the Tang and Yu 唐虞 (Ca.? - 2100 BCE), 
Xia 夏 (2070 -1600 BCE), Shang 商 (1600-1046 BCE) and Zhou 周 dynasties (1046-256 
BCE).3 Early commentarial traditions taught that Confucius was either the author or the 
editor of many early Confucian texts, including the well-known Five Confucian Classics: 
                                                          
2 Qian Mu錢穆 contends that there are ‘six periods.’ These are the ‘classical period,’ the ‘Han period,’ the 
‘Xuanxue Revival period,’ the ‘Tang period (the Emergence of Neo-Confucianism),’ the ‘Song, Yuan and 
Ming dynasty (the development of Neo-Confucianism)’ and the ‘Qing dynasty.’  Mou Zongsan牟宗三, Tu 
Weiming 杜維明 and various other ‘Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas new Confucians’ support ‘three 
periods.’ These are the ‘classical period,’ the ‘Song Ming period’ and the ‘20th-century modern period.’ Gan 
Chunsong幹春松, one of the leading Mainland New Confucian philosophers, has a different opinion; he 
speaks of ‘three periods.’ Gan combines the ‘Han dynasty’ with the ‘Song-Ming period.’ He believes that 
Dong Zongshu董仲舒 represents the end of the ‘classical period,’ while Kang Youwei 康有為 represents 
the start of the ‘Modern period.’ Gan even proposes an alternative schema of two periods: the ‘pre-Kang 
Youwei period’ and the ‘post-Kang Youwei period’ (Gan 2015: 10-25). In this thesis, the development of 
Confucainism is understood mainly in terms of a series of distinct historical periods, rather than in terms of 
any particular Confucian scholar. 
3 In his book Understanding Confucian Philosophy, Liu Shuxian 劉述先 states: ‘The Confucian tradition 
does not start with Confucius’ (Liu 1998: 3). Confucian tradition draws upon earlier civilizational resources: 
those of the ancient Three Dynasties, or San Dai 三代 (Xia夏, Shang商, and Zhou周). 
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The Classic of Poetry, The Book of Documents, The Book of Rites, The Book of Changes, 
and The Spring and Autumn Annals (Yao 2000: 52-54, Nylan 2001: 8-10). Most of 
Confucius’s teachings were compiled in the Analects, a book which has profoundly 
influenced the moral values and way of life of countless people in China and other Eastern 
Asian countries. After Confucius’s death, his thought was developed further by Mencius, 
Xunzi and other Confucians; prior to the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE).  
 
The second period began in the early Han dynasty (202 BCE -220 CE), when Dong 
Zhongshu 董仲舒  (179BCE-104BCE) advocated ‘privileging Confucianism and 
abandoning other schools (bachu baijia duzun rushu 罷黜百家獨尊儒術).’ Dong’s 
campaign marks the establishment of Confucianism as the orthodox worldview and 
political ideology of Imperial China. This period also witnessed the rise of two rival 
schools of commentary: ‘New Text Confucianism (jinwen jingxue今文經學)’ and ‘Old 
Text Confucianism (guwen jingxue古文經學).’ Both rival traditions represent serious 
hermeneutical engagements with the Confucian classics; they will be discussed in more 
detail later in the rest of this chapter. 
 
The third period is the time of Neo-Confucianism, which originated with Han Yu 韓愈 
(768-824) and Li Ao李翱 (772-841) in the Tang dynasty.  In the Song and Ming dynasties, 
Neo-Confucianism became an even more significant force; it was further developed by 
Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085), Cheng Yi程頤 (1033–1107), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130－1200), 
Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472—1529) and other Confucian scholars. 
 
The fourth period is the modern era. The modern period emerged from the late Qing 
dynasty (1644-1912CE). This is the time when the Keju (Imperial civil examination) was 
abandoned,4 and Imperial/Institutional Confucianism collapsed. Kang Youwei 康有為 
began thinking about how Confucianism could meet the challenge posed by Western 
values, as well as about how to defend and preserve Confucian teachings in modern China. 
After this, several generations of ‘Modern New Confucians (xiandai xinrujia 現代新儒
                                                          
4 The Keju was an examination system used for recruiting political officials in Imperial China (206 BCE –
1905). It was similar to the civil service examination found the China of today; but its curriculum was 
mainly composed of the Confucian classics. The bureaucracy of Imperial China did not recognise the 
modern distinction between civil servants and political officials. Chapter 6 of this thesis will further discuss 
the Keju system. 
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家)’ endeavoured to modernise, revitalise and creatively reconstruct Confucianism, in 
order to make Confucianism serviceable for modern societies.  
  
1.12 Modern Relevance of Confucianism 
 
It is reasonable to ask whether the political and philosophical problems that the early 
Confucians discussed more than two thousand years ago can still be relevant today; or 
whether, on the contrary, such problems were limited to the particular time, region or 
country of figures such as Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi.  Indeed, unlike modern 
political philosophers, the early Confucians never had the opportunity to encounter a 
variety of forms of governance. Nor had they ever heard of democracy, political equality, 
human rights and other modern (Western) political values. These facts may easily give 
rise to the impression that Confucianism is merely a relic of antiquity; an outdated 
irrelevance which has little to do with the modern lives of people today, in their own 
individual socio-political contexts.  
 
This objection appears to be one of the most common challenges posed to those who 
advocate Confucianism in modern societies. If it is considered impossible for today’s 
society to return to some lost Golden Age, then it is necessary to respond to this challenge 
directly.  Otherwise, it is difficult to make a convincing case for the political relevance 
and importance of Confucianism in today’s world. 
  
It is necessary here to formulate a response to those scholars who believe that a 
progressive vision of political philosophy must necessarily disqualify Confucianism from 
any serious reinterpretation and application in the world today. It must firstly be 
emphasised that most of the problems found in political philosophy are part of a repertoire 
of persistent problems that defy any attempt to seek a final and comprehensive resolution. 
Throughout history, the social and political praxis of human beings has necessitated 
repeated engagement with these questions. Because of this, it is inappropriate to be 
excessively dismissive of a political philosopher, purely because they have made a much 
earlier entrance to the world stage.  
 
It is difficult to deny that the manner of expression of such political, philosophical 
problems is influenced by variations in time, locale, and communicator. However, the 
various manifestations of fundamental problems in political philosophy nevertheless 
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retain certain mutual ‘family resemblances,’ regardless of any differences of time, space, 
and person. It is possible that such family resemblances may be ultimately rooted in the 
shared ‘lifeworlds’ of the participants (Habermas 1987). Either way, it is fair to say that 
even if the ‘solutions’ offered to such problems tend to look mutually distinct or even 
incompatible, it is nonetheless possible that some individual thinkers may have been 
reproducing or ‘re-contextualising’ an earlier approach that actually belongs to the given 
repertoire of philosophical approaches to the issues under discussion (Yu 2013).  
 
More importantly, the true significance of political philosophy cannot be reduced to 
certain external factors; like the social environment, economic conditions and political 
structures of any one society. Mark Bevir contends that ‘no matter how much society 
influences what individuals say, we still cannot reduce what individuals say to facts about 
their social locations’ (Bevir 2012: 32-34). The ideas of the great political philosophers 
are fundamentally derivable from their intentions, and not primarily from any attendant 
social or political conditions. If this characterisation of political philosophy is deemed 
acceptable, then the ultimate significance of a political philosopher has little to do with 
whether he or she comes to the world stage earlier or later. On the contrary, the true value 
and importance of their thought lies in its profundity. 
 
But are the ideas of early Confucians sufficiently profound to justify the view that such 
ideas deserve serious consideration in modern societies? Hsiao Kung-Chuan 蕭公權
contends that the ‘profundity’ of Confucianism can be understood as a type of adaptability:  
 
With all the schools of philosophy that had existed from pre-Qin times, it was 
their ability to adapt to the new historical environment [of the imperial age] 
that determined their prosperity or decline. The Confucians’ adaptability was 
greatest; hence the transmission of their teachings continued longest, and their 
real power and influence were strongest. (Hsiao 1979: 20-21)  
 
Hsiao believes that Confucianism has proven highly adaptable to changes of environment; 
and that this has enabled Confucianism to influence China and some other East Asian 
countries for over two thousand years, right up to the present day. 
  
Another important consideration is that the political problems faced by early Confucians 
and modern Western political philosophers share many important similarities. One such 
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similarity is the disappearance of a hierarchical and hereditary feudal system. Such system 
included a particular kind of ruling structure, resembling a pyramid. The king ruled over 
a handful of princes, princes over lesser lords, and so on. This meant that each level of 
the hierarchy represented a small community with a limited number of citizens; even if 
the entire system itself was a huge entity with a large population.   
 
As the older system fell into decrepitude, the need emerged for a new centralised system 
of governance, which could directly handle the affairs of a state that was already handling 
increasingly large-scale tasks. The central government had to rule directly over a 
relatively densely populated territory, whose citizens were fairly mobile, and often in 
communication with one another. These citizens had already gained a substantial degree 
of freedom and equality, on account of the disappearance of the pedigree-based nobility 
system.  Francis Fukuyama points out:   
 
State building in China was driven by the same circumstances that 
necessitated centralized states in early modern Europe: prolonged and 
pervasive military competition. Military struggle created incentives to tax 
populations, to create administrative hierarchies to provision armies, and to 
establish merit and competence rather than personal ties as the basis for 
recruitment and promotion. (Fukuyama 2014: 11) 
 
Because of this, China was required to face a number of ‘modern’ political problems long 
before Europe did. This meant that early Confucians often offered political proposals that 
were similar to those advocated by modern Western political philosophers (Bai 2012). 
Admittedly, there are other times where the proposals offered by early Confucians 
diverged sharply from those of their modern Western counterparts. But in either case, it 
is not reasonable to automatically dismiss the proposals offered by early Confucians.  
 
Such a dismissive attitude has itself been rejected by many Western thinkers. Matteo 
Ricci (1552–1610) famously introduced Confucianism to the citizens of Western 
countries. After this, many Enlightenment philosophers developed a keen fascination with 
Confucian political and ethical thought; among these were Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 
Christian Wolff, Matthew Tindal, and François-Marie Arouet (Voltaire). ‘For some of 
them, the Confucian political blueprint that the state was ruled “in accordance with moral 
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and political maxims enshrined in the Confucian classics” appeared to provide an ideal 
prototype for a modern state’ (Dawson 1964: 9, Yao 2000: 3).  
 
If scholars wish to compare Confucianism with modern democratic thought, it is perfectly 
reasonable to make a genuinely critical and rigorous assessment of Confucian values, for 
the practical purpose of creating a ‘modernistic transformation’ of Confucian tradition 
(Brennan and Fan 2007, Tu 2002, Yang 2004, Cheng 1997). However, it is surely 
inadmissible to treat Confucianism as dispensable in the modern societies of today, purely 
because it is ‘outdated.’ 
 
1.2 Contemporary Confucian Political Theory   
 
In recent years, many modern ‘New Confucians’ and political philosophers have 
conducted philosophical and comparative studies of Confucianism. They aim to ascertain 
how compatible or incompatible Confucianism and modern democracy may be (Ames 
2017, 2011, Kim 2016, 2014, Rosemont Jr 2015, Chan 2014, Fan 2013, 2010, Bell and 
Li 2013, Angle 2012, Elstein 2012, Bai 2012a, b, 2008, Fröhlich 2010, Chen 2007, 
Brennan and Fan 2007, Bell 2006, Ackerly 2005, Yang 2004, Tan 2004, O’Dwyer 2003, 
Tu 2002, Chan 2002, 1999, Li 2001b, He 2001). These scholars can be divided into two 
camps: Confucian democrats and Confucian meritocrats. 
 
1.21 Confucian Democrats 
 
Scholars in the camp of the Confucian democrats generally have a faith in democracy, 
even though some of them are conscious of the deficiencies and imperfections found in 
certain liberal democratic practices or values. Most Confucian democrats are highly 
appreciative of the institutional apparatus of democracy; they also take certain 
instrumental and intrinsic values associated with democracy as foundational premises for 
their political reflection. These scholars are firmly convinced that Confucianism can and 
should be made compatible with modern democratic values. 
 
In 1958, four of the most prominent Confucian scholars of the 20th century co-authored 
A  Manifesto to the World on Behalf of Chinese Culture (Wei Zhongguo Wenhua Jinggao 
Shijie Renshi Xuanyan 為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言) (Chang et al. 1958): Mou 
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Zongsan 牟宗三, Xu Fuguan 徐複觀, Carson Chang 張君勱, and Tang Junyi唐君毅.5 
These four leading scholars used their Manifesto to convey their firmly-held conviction 
that Confucianism embodies ‘democratic seeds’ which are capable of being developed 
into fundamental democratic values. The Manifesto also states that people living in 
nations that have been strongly influenced by Confucianism are in a good position to 
make a principled case for democracy as the best kind of political arrangement for their 
country.  
 
Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 is one of the authors of this Manifesto. He contends that all modern 
and democratic values are plausibly derivable from Confucian values. Mou discusses the 
traditional Confucian ideal of ‘inner sagehood’ (neisheng內聖), i.e. the self-cultivation 
of one’s true humanity and nature in order to realise Ren (仁). He argues that this ‘inner 
sagehood’ can assist in developing (kaichu開出 ) an appropriately modern ‘outward 
kingliness’ (waiwang外王); i.e., democracy.6 Mou believes that it is perfectly possible 
for democratic institutions to emerge from a Confucian cultural tradition, by way of the 
‘self-restriction’ (ziwo kanxian自我坎陷) of the individual conscience (Mou 1991: 59).7  
 
From Mou’s perspective, there are ‘intensional’ and ‘extensional’ aspects of rationality. 
Confucians have already succeeded in generating the ‘intensional’ aspect of rationality, 
or the ‘spirit of a syncretic fulfilment of reason.’ This includes the spirit of democracy; 
such as respect for human rights, and liberal democratic assumptions about human nature. 
Mou contends that what Confucianism lacks is the development of the ‘extensional’ 
aspect of rationality or the ‘spirit of the analytical fulfilment of the human reason.’ The 
latter includes the institutions of modern democracy: such as democratic elections, the 
rule of law and parliamentary systems (ibid. Chapter 3). 
 
Mou tries to establish a connection between democratic politics and the Confucian moral 
consciousness. His insights have shaped the thinking of many ‘Hong Kong and Taiwan 
                                                          
5 For further discussion of this manifesto, see Chen (2007). 
6 For Mou’s discussion of ‘inner sagehood and outward kingliness (內聖外王),’ see Mou (1991: 55-62), Li 
(2001a: 164-165, 1991: 55-62). For some valuable commentary on Mou’s ideas, see Yang (2012, 1994: 15-
29), Li and Cai (1996: 399). 
7 Mou’s complex concept of ziwo kanxian is derived from Hegelian philosophy. This concept is sometimes 
translated as ‘self-negation’ (Angle 2012: 152). Steven C. Angle points out that ‘Self-restriction means to 
understand and accept that there is a type of authority — Mou loosely calls it political authority, but 
constitutional authority might be better — that has a claim on us independently of how things look to us 
ethically’ (Angle 2017: 19). For more detailed discussion about ‘self-restriction,’ see Angle (2012: 26-30).  
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New Confucians (gangtai xinrujia港臺新儒家)’ and ‘Overseas New Confucians (haiwai 
xinrujia 海外新儒家).’ Some of these scholars are Mou’s own students, who have sought 
out Confucian sources that are capable of supporting democracy, and even liberalism. 
They attempt to prove that modern democratic values can be derived from Confucian 
ones. These Confucian democrats believe ‘there is no irreconcilable or fundamental 
contradiction’ between Confucianism and modern democracy (Li and Cai 1996: 187).  
 
However, there is always a tendency among Confucian democrats to propose ‘wholesale 
Westernisation.’ Specifically, some Confucian democrats assume that Confucianism is 
merely a philosophy of personal self-cultivation (xiu shen修身); and that because of this, 
it can only contribute towards the improvement of personal morality, or towards realising 
the innate goodness of individuals. These thinkers believe that Confucian political 
thought is incompatible with democratic values and that on account of this, it should be 
rejected or disregarded in the civil society of today. 8  Thus, in reality, it is liberal 
democratic institutional frameworks that ought to play a dominant role in protecting 
liberal goods, rather than ‘unrealistic’ Confucianism (Tiwald 2011, Bruun and Jacobsen 
2004, Roetz 1999, Engle 1999, De Bary 1998, Cheng 1997, Chang 1995).  
 
Other contemporary Confucian democrats are attempting both to reconceptualise 
democracy and to critically reconstruct Confucianism; in order to render fundamental 
Confucian values and some core democratic principles integral to their proposals of 
‘Confucian democracy’ (Ames 2017, Ames and Hall 2015, Kim 2017, 2016, 2014, Angle 
2012, Tan 2004).  Almost every member of this faction of Confucian democrats has a 
different conception of how to revitalise or modernise Confucianism. However, most of 
these scholars share the conviction that Confucianism cannot be relevant or valuable to a 
modern society unless it can accommodate democratic values. For example, in his latest 
book, Public Reason Confucianism: Democratic Perfectionism and Constitutionalism in 
East Asia, Sungmoon Kim argues that in modern societies, Confucian values should be 
promoted ‘in the service of democratic citizenship under the normative constraints of core 
democratic principles’ (Kim 2016: 68). 
                                                          
8 Some Confucian democrats are influenced by Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin argues that East Asians ought 
to uproot themselves from their traditional Confucian values and embrace democratic values (Dworkin 
1996). Other scholars, such as Amy Chua and Samuel Huntington, acknowledge that Confucian values are 
deeply rooted in East Asia. They argue that as East Asian Countries have been profoundly influenced by 
Confucianism, the modernisation process is likely to result in value conflicts between the East and the West 




In order to defend some version of Confucian democracy, Confucian democrats offer 
various reasons for embracing democracy. For example, democracy is intrinsically 
valuable, on account of its capacity to protect individual autonomy and political equality 
(Kim 2016, Chan 2014, Li 2005). Thus, democratic institutional arrangements ‘are 
required by Confucianism if it is to realize its own goals’ (Angle 2012:  29, 85). 
Democracy is also of instrumental value, as it assists ‘effective and legitimate social 
coordination.’ On account of this, Confucian democrats contend that they take value 
pluralism and the moral conflicts found in modern societies much more seriously than 
Confucian meritocrats do (Kim 2017: 243).9  
 
It appears that most Confucian democrats have merely assumed a priori that democracy 
is of both instrumental and intrinsic value. This assumption appears to derive from their 
recognition of some normative democratic principles; such as appropriate allocation of 
political authority, political equality or the right to political participation. However, these 
scholars rarely discuss the philosophical reasons for their belief in such democratic 
principles. Also, Confucian democrats generally avoid the question of whether 
democratic institutional arrangements are either necessary or sufficient conditions for 
realising the normative values associated with democracy; whether in ideal or non-ideal 
situations. 
 
1.22 Confucian Meritocrats 
 
Confucian meritocrats are generally sceptical about the value of democracy, even though 
some of them have critically endorsed some democratic institutional arrangements. They 
are aware of many of the drawbacks of modern democracy and are motivated to defend 
Confucian meritocracy against liberal democratic ideas.  
 
Today, an increasing number of Sinophone Confucian philosophers in mainland China 
consider themselves to belong to the school of ‘Mainland New Confucianism’ (dalu 
xinrujia大陸新儒家) (Chen 2013, Jiang 2015, Zeng 2016, Zhang 2017, Li 2015, Li et al. 
2016, Wang 2017, Ren 2017). Most of these scholars are firmly convinced of the value 
of traditional Confucianism, and of its applicability to modern societies. Accordingly, 
                                                          
9 The instrumental and intrinsic values of democracy will be further elaborated in the following sections. 
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they reject many democratic principles (Zeng and Guo 2014). Because of this, they are 
viewed by many Confucian democrats as ‘fundamentalists,’ or as ‘radical Confucian 
meritocrats’ (Huang 2016, 2017). 
 
Some of the arguments made by ‘Mainland New Confucianism’ scholars may easily 
appear subjective and unpersuasive. However, their approach to Confucian political 
thought is insightful and novel; especially in comparison to ‘Hong Kong and Taiwan New 
Confucianism (gangtai xinrujia 港臺新儒家),’ such as the authors of the Manifesto and 
their students. This is because, even though the Manifesto acknowledges that classical 
Confucianism is indeed relevant to the field of politics, it mainly focuses on the spiritual 
aspects of Confucianism.  
 
Many Hong Kong and Taiwan new Confucian scholars argue that the internal 
development of the spirit of Confucianism must naturally lead Confucians to embrace 
democracy; or as the Manifesto itself says, ‘progress is orientated towards the attainment 
of moral self-realisation in the fields of politics, of knowledge, and of technology. In other 
words, China needs a genuine democratic reconstruction’ (Zhang 1958: 469). 
 
This spiritual focus draws strength from the opinion, held by all four authors of the 
Manifesto, that Confucianism is mainly a tradition of moral self-realisation, or ‘Learning 
of the Heart-Mind and Nature’ (xinxing zhixue 心性之學). The Manifesto authors still 
retain a belief in the vitality of Spiritual Confucianism (xinxing ruxue 心性儒學), which 
is a product of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song (960-1279) and Ming (1368–1644) 
dynasties. 
 
By contrast, ‘Mainland New Confucianism’ scholars show a keen interest in the kind of 
Confucian philosophy that focuses on political institutions. They do not discuss ‘Learning 
of the Heart-Mind and Nature’ so much. Instead of focusing on the Confucian spiritual 
tradition (Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism), they advocate returning to the Confucian 
political tradition (gongyangxue tradition 公羊學), which was first established by the Han 
dynasty scholar Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179-104 BCE), and later revived by the Qing 




‘Mainland New Confucianism’ follows the school of New Text Confucianism, which 
regards Confucius as a semi-divine Philosopher-King (suwang 素王 ) rather as an 
established historian. Because of this theoretical allegiance, scholars from this school 
attach a high degree of importance to Confucian political thought. They also frequently 
discuss the contemporary relevance of such ideas. They advocate Political Confucianism 
(zhengzhi ruxue 政治儒學), criticising ‘Hong Kong and Taiwan New Confucianism’ for 
uncritically endorsing democracy, and for confining Confucianism within the narrow 
field of Spiritual Confucianism (Huang 2016, Wang 2017). 
 
Jiang Qing 蔣慶, probably the most influential ‘Mainland New Confucianism’ scholar, 
contends that it is neither necessary nor desirable to make Confucianism compatible with 
modern democracy. He believes that modern democracy is tied to Western history and is 
inseparable from Christianity, which is the root of Western culture. Because of this, it is 
impossible to universalise democratic values and institutions. Jiang further argues that 
since China is a Confucian country, it cannot adopt modern democracy, as the latter is 
incompatible with the Chinese tradition. On account of this incompatibility, it is necessary 
for China to develop and adopt a Confucian regime (Jiang 2012, 2003). Even though the 
‘Sinocentric’ position of this camp might easily appear objectionable to liberals, Jiang’s 
reconstruction and revitalisation of Political Confucianism has a certain degree of validity 
and plausibility; this will be explained in more detail as the chapter proceeds.   
 
However, if one wishes to effect a creative transformation of Confucian political thought, 
and to move forward to deal with some real modern political problems, then it would 
seem inappropriate to merely make a ‘faithful’ return to Confucian political traditions, 
such as the Gongyang tradition, or Kang Youwei’s own political proposals. For, to merely 
sustain a general belief in the value of Confucianism is an approach that is very limited 
in value. ‘Mainland New Confucians’ treat Confucian tradition as though it were merely 
another monotheistic tradition. Because of this, it fails to take value pluralism in modern 
societies seriously. In order to make Confucianism relevant and valuable for modern 
societies, Confucian tradition should be made more inclusive, so that it can be made 
possible to advocate a Confucian way of life, while not denying the validity of any other 




Some contemporary Confucian meritocrats who have obtained PhD from Western 
universities are more moderate than many Sinophone Confucian meritocrats from 
mainland China (Chan 2014, 2013, Bai 2013, 2012a, b, Bell 2006, Fan 2013, 2010, Li 
2012). These ‘moderate’ Confucian meritocrats also acknowledge that some democratic 
principles are not self-evidently true, and that some democratic institutional arrangements 
found in modern societies are deficient. However, they embrace democracy to a limited 
degree and attempt to reform Confucianism (Kim 2017: 238).  
 
These scholars are attempting to transform Confucianism into a source of inspiration for 
those involved in the politics of today’s world. At the same time, they are trying to show 
that Confucian political thought can make a positive contribution to democracy, by 
modernising and revitalising some Confucian political conceptions (Chan 2014: 81).  For 
example, Lee Seung-Hwa argues that a democratic moral standard, founded upon a liberal 
understanding of human rights, only protects the ‘negative freedom’ of the citizens, and 
so it may not be a sufficient means to help citizens to achieve flourishing lives. Thus, 
some Confucian meritocratic conceptions, such as ‘Ren 仁’ and ‘Junzi 君子’ might serve 
as more constructive standards for the evaluation of political leaders (Lee 1996: 367-368).  
Chenyang Li李晨陽 also claims: 
 
It is a simple-minded fallacious inference that, since democracy is good, 
anything that is undemocratic must be bad. An argument can be made that in 
the United States and throughout the democratic West, healthy society has 
been threatened precisely by the diminishing of traditional values similar to 
these undemocratic Confucian values. (Li 1997: 189) 
 
Most moderate Confucian meritocrats believe that they can offer a political system that 
is better than the present democratic and undemocratic regimes.  In order to pursue this 
goal, they have sought to re-examine the merits and defects of Confucian and democratic 
values, thereby combining the best of Confucian meritocracy and modern democracy. 
  
1.23 A Philosophical Thought Experiment  
 
I am generally sympathetic to the views of the moderate Confucian meritocrats. However, 
most moderate Confucian meritocrats still focus on the ethical dimension of 
Confucianism; their research often lacks profound and comprehensive engagement with 
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the more political dimensions of Confucianism. More specifically, their critical and 
creative interpretations of the Confucian classics often fail to adequately illuminate the 
political-philosophical meaning of some core Confucian concepts; such as Ren仁 and 
Junzi 君子. At times, these concepts are even conflated with Daoist ideas. 
 
On the one hand, whenever Confucian meritocrats argue against modern democracy, they 
often take the contemporary political reality of Western democratic countries as their 
fundamental point of departure. On the other hand, whenever they defend the positive 
role of Confucian meritocracy in modern societies, their discussions tend to revolve 
around the historical contribution of some meritocratic institutional arrangements in 
Imperial China; or certain controversial or ill-informed examples of political meritocracy 
in East Asian countries and regions. 10  Most Confucian meritocrats rarely offer 
philosophical arguments in their comparative studies of Confucian meritocratic thought 
and academic democratic theories (Kim 2017: 237). 
 
Considering the limitations of current approaches, this thesis encompasses a 
philosophical examination of the degree of conflict and compatibility between classical 
Confucianism and modern democracy. Unlike the writings of many Confucian democrats 
and Confucian meritocrats, this thesis is not primarily a defence of the superiority of any 
particular form either of Confucian meritocracy or of Confucian democracy. This thesis 
intends to philosophically reconcile Confucian meritocracy and modern democracy, by 
exploring the viability of a Confucian meritocratic form of democratic government: 
Confucian Meritocratic Democracy, or CMD.  
 
This exploration is mainly a philosophical thought experiment, rather than a rigorous 
exploration of the feasibility of CMD in modern societies. The actually-existing 
Confucian meritocratic political institutions will be discussed, but such discussions will 
play a relatively minor role in this thesis. The reasons for this are as follows: 
                                                          
10 The eminent contemporary Confucian political philosopher Daniel Bell has put forward a strong defence 
of Confucian meritocracy, while simultaneously critiquing democratic ideals (Bell 2000, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012). He argues that there is a very high risk that most voters in a large, democratic state will be short-
sighted, and lack even a basic knowledge of politics. He is also sceptical of how far democratically elected 
political leaders are inclined to prioritise the common good; rather than their own interests, or that of their 
party (Bell 2012). However, Bell arguably goes too far in his critique of modern democracy, and in his 
defence of the contemporary Chinese political system; as exemplified by his latest book, The China Model: 
Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. The position he takes in this book appears one-sided; 





Firstly, it must be conceded that the kind of CMD envisaged in this thesis is an ideal form 
of government, which has never been practised in human history. CMD is the product of 
a philosophical thought experiment; the feasibility of CMD must be weighed against 
some rigorous empirical studies of existing democratic government that exemplify 
Confucian meritocratic ideals and practices. Given the complexities of real-life political 
practice, a speculative account of CMD is limited in its ability to forecast how far such a 
political system may be applicable in modern societies.  
 
However, as the following chapters will make clear, the discussion of CMD in this thesis 
can still provide theoretical tools for tackling some real political problems in modern 
societies; even if, for the sake of argument, CMD should turn out to be unfeasible in 
practice. The Confucian conceptions of political authority, political rights and political 
equality do have the potential to reflect the aspirations many citizens cherish for adequate 
normative standards, which can be of assistance in evaluating political decisions made in 
modern societies.   
 
Secondly, because of the influence of Confucianism, there were many meritocratic 
institutional arrangements in Imperial China; such as the Keju and the Imperial Academy. 
As discussed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, these institutional arrangements 
had some success in fostering a number of relationship-based virtues in Chinese society, 
and they did make a positive contribution to the Chinese way of life.  However, Confucian 
political thought and the associated meritocratic institutional arrangements have exerted 
some negative influences as well. The history of Imperial China (221BCE-1912CE) 
shows that Confucianism was historically bound up with an endorsement of Chinese 
despotism or autocracy. 
 
Hsiao Kung-Chuan explores the origin of autocracy in the history of Imperial China. He 
points out that the political views of Confucius ‘were conservative. Herein too, lies an 
important reason for the favour that Confucian doctrines found in the eyes of later 
autocratic emperors’ (Hsiao 1979: 98). Because of this, some scholars claim that 
Confucianism is an obstacle to modern democratic values, as they consider Confucian 
political thought to be oriented towards authoritarianism, elitism or the rule of man (Roetz 




More specifically, in Imperial China, most emperors were not intellectually and morally 
superior to the general population; some were even self-indulgent tyrants. Confucianism 
advocates many relationship-based virtues, such as filial piety, fraternal respectfulness, 
sincerity, truthfulness and various rituals. However, such virtues were often wielded by 
unscrupulous emperors and government officials as ideological instruments for 
buttressing the power of these rulers, and for securing absolute obedience from the 
ordinary citizens (Xu 2004: 155-208).11   
 
Besides this, the primary purpose of most meritocratic institutional arrangements in 
Imperial China was to select talented officials who were able to better support the rule of 
the emperors. It was the emperors who were the final authority over the selection and 
promotion of government officials. Thus, to some extent, the meritocratic institutional 
arrangements of Imperial China contributed towards Chinese despotism and assisted in 
maintaining the hierarchical characters of Chinese societies. Because of this, it is not 
reasonable to defend the viability of Confucian meritocracy purely on the basis of the 
historical contributions made by some Confucian meritocratic institutional arrangements. 
 
Thirdly, many political philosophers have tried to argue that some non-liberal forms of 
government may be better than liberal forms of government. For example, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and other communitarian 
political philosophers have provided various arguments in favour of the Aristotelian ideal 
of reciprocity. The latter value is premised upon a community in which members value 
their social roles and attach great importance to the interests of the community (Sandel 
1981, Walzer 1983, MacIntyre 1984, Taylor 1989). However, these scholars sometimes 
make insufficiently convincing arguments, in their attempts to justify non-liberal systems. 
This is certainly true of their attempts to defend pre-modern communitarian concepts, as 
ideals that are both relevant and applicable to modern societies. It is also true of the 
examples they provide of actual existing non-liberal systems, many of which are 
themselves deeply flawed; such as the Indian caste system (Walzer 1983: 313).  
 
                                                          
11 Xu Fuguan 徐複觀 argues that since the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), there had been a tendency for 
some Confucian scholars to revise the Confucian classics for the purpose of pleasing the emperors. It was 
these scholars who over-interpreted the classic sense of filial piety and created the strong association 
between filial piety and loyalty to the emperor (Xu 2004: 180-200). 
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Some contemporary Confucian meritocrats, such as Jiang Qing蔣慶, Daniel Bell and Bai 
Tongdong白彤東, are known for their criticisms of liberal democracy and their efforts 
to defend the significance of Confucian meritocracy in modern societies. These scholars 
are likely to face a similar problem to the one just mentioned, in relation to communitarian 
philosophers (Bai 2012a, b, Jiang 2012, Bell 2016). If relatively controversial or 
misguided examples of meritocratic institutional arrangements are held up as examples 
of Confucian meritocracy, such as those of Imperial China or of some modern-day East 
Asian countries, this risks making any defence of Confucian meritocracy problematic and 
unconvincing. To evade this pitfall, the following chapters are devoted mainly to a 
rigorous theoretical consideration of the viability of CMD, by way of a philosophical 
thought experiment. The desirability of any actual existing meritocratic political systems, 
while an important topic for future researchers to explore, will be treated as a secondary 
empirical consideration in this thesis. 
 
1.3 A Note on the Central Claim and Scope of the Thesis  
 
The central claim of this thesis is that classical Confucianism has the potential to offer a 
political theory. Even though such theory appears to diverge from some normative 
democratic principles, it is compatible with the practical aims of democracy. It is 
necessary, for the purpose of clarity, to explain some of the key terms in this claim. 
 
1.31 Classical Confucianism  
 
In this thesis, classical Confucianism is considered to be a kind of ‘political philosophy’ 
promoted by the early Confucians: Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi.  However, political 
philosophy is a term from Western academia, and it is itself a contested category. Even if 
many ideas in classical Confucianism are commonly considered as having analogues in 
Western political philosophy, such Confucian ideas do not necessarily correspond with 
their Western counterparts directly. Hence, this thesis will use the term ‘classical 
Confucianism’ to refer to the political and philosophical thought of early Confucians, 
rather than ‘early Confucian political philosophy.’  
 




Firstly, classical Confucianism is faithful to the ideas of early Confucians, as found in the 
Confucian classics. It is somewhat more ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ than other schools of 
Confucianism, such as the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasty. Since the 
death of Confucius, the ideas found in the Confucian classics have been reinterpreted and 
modified, in line with many different theoretical tendencies and perspectives. Accordingly, 
many various commentarial traditions have developed within Confucianism.  
 
On the one hand, it is often the case that a key idea associated with a particular passage 
in the Confucian classics has retained a certain stability of meaning over time. On the 
other hand, the deeper significance of the idea in question can resonate in different ways 
with different Confucian scholars, and can also play widely varying roles within 
Confucian thought as a philosophical system; as well as within Chinese culture more 
broadly. Even though early Confucians were capable of creating some of the core ideas 
found in the Confucian classics, they have not been able to direct the development of 
these ideas; for these have become part of the unfolding intellectual history of China. It 
is widely accepted that in the history of the development of Confucianism, some of the 
political ideas found in classical Confucianism have been redefined and even distorted 
for certain instrumental purposes. 
 
Secondly, from the perspective of analytic philosophy, classical Confucianism is less 
‘metaphysical’ than the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties, or the New 
Confucianism of the twentieth century. At the time of classical Confucianism, the 
Confucian teachings had not yet been translated into the metaphysically-charged 
philosophical discourse of later times. Therefore, classical Confucianism has a more 
direct and intimate relationship with certain fundamental philosophical problems. 
Because of this, it is reasonable to characterise classical Confucianism as the kind of 
Confucianism that is more accessible to people with widely varying philosophical views 
or ‘comprehensive doctrines.’12 In terms of the formal structure of its writings, classical 
Confucianism also has more of a dialogical emphasis, especially in Mencius.13  This 
dialogical format has the potential to make classical Confucianism a philosophically 
                                                          
12 Following John Rawls, a ‘comprehensive doctrine’ means a system of philosophical, moral and religious 
beliefs about the good life: a comprehensive explanation of how to live a good life, what kind of virtues 
should be valued most and what kind of relationships citizens should have (Rawls 1996: 59). 
13 It is true that there are many dialogues in the Analects and the Xunzi. However, in these texts, Mencius 
and Xunzi play the role of people who know the truth already; the other participants are merely their 
students, who play the role of passive listeners. 
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satisfying field of inquiry for those who believe that argumentation is the best path 
towards serious philosophical reflection.  
 
Thirdly, classical Confucianism is more concerned with political ethics, in comparison to 
later Confucian traditions. This is especially true of the idea of Ren 仁. Lin Anwu林安
梧 points that the political thought of early Confucians saw a degeneration of the political 
ethics of Ren into an ethics of the absolute authority of rulers. This degeneration is what 
Lin calls the ‘fallacy of the misplaced Dao’ (Lin 2003: v-xiii). Lin argues that the original 
ideas of early Confucians were established upon ‘kinship-based personalistic moral 
connections’ (Lin 1996: 17-32). Because of the influence of imperial rule which was 
created 220 years after the death of Confucius, classical Confucianism was incorporated 
into an ideological system, and the ‘kinship-based personalistic moral connection’ was 
transformed into a ‘domination-based political connection.’ Thus, classical Confucianism 
became an instrument for political and social control (Lin 2003: 119-156). 
 
That is to say: the political ethics of Ren in classical Confucianism became the principles 
of submission to authority, in the name of Ren, or Heavenly Reason (tianli天理). The 
common citizens were compelled to meet the requirements of Ren, rather than the rulers; 
they were asked to renounce their personal interests and desires, in order to benefit the 
community or the state. This resulted in what the Confucian scholar Dai Zheng 戴震 
(1724-1777 CE) calls the phenomenon of ‘killing people in the name of Confucian 
Heavenly Reason’ (yili sharen以理殺人) (Lin 1995: 95-121). 
 
It would thus appear that the later development of classical Confucianism falls short in 
its representation of the political ethics of classical Confucianism; and in particular, of 
early Confucian ideas about Ren government (Ren zheng 仁政). After the Han dynasty 
(206 BC–220 BCE), many emperors and their ‘official’ scholars wielded classical 
Confucianism as an ideological instrument of statecraft. This is the main reason for the 
attacks levied against classical Confucianism in recent times. However, even if the later 
development of classical Confucianism substantially assisted Chinese despotism, this 
does not prove that classical Confucianism is itself detrimental to modern political values.  
 




Some Confucian scholars might worry that this thesis will fall into placing an undue 
emphasis on the political dimensions of Confucianism. They might argue that as this 
thesis represents an attempt to develop a political theory from classical Confucianism, it 
is actually an attempt to politicise Confucianism. Any politicisation of Confucianism 
appears to be problematic. This is because, in Confucianism, there is rarely any clear 
separation of independent political principles from ethical thought (Needham 1956: 9). 
Moreover, some Confucian scholars argue that Confucian ethics plays a much more 
fundamental role in Confucianism than that of Confucian political thought (Hsiao 1979: 
113, Roetz 1993: 77, Liu 2006: 187, Goldin 2011: 20). For example, Sor-hoon Tan 
contends that in classical Confucianism, politics is subordinated to ethics (Tan 2012: 295). 
Joseph Chan argues that some of the most fundamental Confucian concepts, such as ‘Ren 
仁’ and ‘Li禮,’ are ‘ethical norms,’ rather than ‘political norms;’ even though, in the 
Confucian classics, these ethical norms are sometimes applied to specifically political 
contexts (Chan 2014: 49). Some scholars criticise the politicisation of Confucianism 
because, in their view, Confucian political arrangements conflict with modern values. Li 
Minghui 李明輝  even argues that contemporary Confucian studies of Political 
Confucianism (zhengzhi ruxue 政治儒學 ) are meaningless, especially in modern 
democratic societies (Li 2015).  
 
However, this thesis considers Confucian political thought to be no less important than 
Confucian ethical thought for several reasons. 
 
Firstly, the classics of the early Confucians rarely separate discussions of political norms 
from discussions of ethical ideas. Because of this, it is unclear whether early Confucians 
recognise any clear distinction between the maintenance of political order and the moral 
edification of the citizens. However, if one pays close attention to the apparent intentions 
lying behind the ethical proposals of early Confucians, it appears that political concerns 
are no less important than moral concerns.14 For example, 
 
Someone said to Confucius, ‘Why are you not engaged in governing?’ 
Confucius replied, ‘The Classic of Documents (Shu書) says, ‘Oh! Simply by 
                                                          
14 See Analects 1.10, 2.21, 6.8, 13.3, 15.32, 16.2, 19.13, 20.2. Mencius 2B5, 2B13, 3B1, 7B3, 7B4, 7B13, 




fulfilling filial and brotherly duties, a man can influence the government.” In 
so doing, a man is actually engaged in governing.’ (Analects 2.21)  
 
Those who are well-educated should apply themselves to be government 
officials. (Analects 19.13)   
 
Mencius said, ‘Heaven does not yet want to bring peace and order to the world. 
If it wanted to bring peace and order to the world, who is there in the present 
age to bring it about, apart from me?’ (Mencius 2B13) 
 
Mencius said, ‘The principles to which the Junzi adheres are for his own 
personal practice; but through them, peace and order are brought to the world.’ 
(Mencius 7B32) 
 
Based on her reading of the Confucian classics, Louban El Amine contends that for early 
Confucians, ‘political order, not moral edification, is the end and that political order is an 
end in itself, not a means toward virtue’ (Amine 2015: 15). Even if the establishment of 
political order is not the key objective of the early Confucians, it must be acknowledged, 
as per Benjamin Schwartz, that there are two dimensions of Confucian education. These 
are the ethical dimension and the political dimension. The ethical dimension of Confucian 
education serves the purposes of self-cultivation (xiu shen 修身). The political dimension 
of Confucian education serves the purpose of ‘bringing peace and order to the world’ 
(Schwartz 1959: 52). Even though in classical Confucianism the ethical dimension is 
logically prior to the political dimension, this does not imply that the former is prior in 
importance to the latter. 
 
Secondly, as discussed above, there are two traditions in Contemporary Confucian studies: 
Spiritual Confucianism (xinxing ruxue 心性儒學) and Political Confucianism (zhengzhi 
ruxue 政治儒學). Spiritual Confucianism, which originated from the Neo-Confucianism 
of the Song (960-1279) and Ming (1368–1644) dynasties, is still the main focus of ‘Hong 
Kong and Taiwan New Confucianism.’ Political Confucianism, which was first 
established by Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179-104 BCE) and later revived by Kang Youwei 




In recent years, the question of which tradition is more fundamental or more historically 
significant is widely debated among contemporary Confucian scholars (Li et al. 2016, 
Huang 2016, Wang 2017, Chan 2014, Amine 2015, Rosemont Jr 2015, Bell and Li 2013, 
Bell 2012, Bai 2012a, b, Angle 2012). However, to deny the propriety of any political 
tradition in Confucian studies is often deemed unacceptable, especially on the part of 
many contemporary Sinophone Confucian philosophers in mainland China (Jiang 2003, 
Gan 2003, 2012, Chen et al. 2013). Some Anglophone Confucian political philosophers 
also support Jiang Qing’s approach of Political Confucianism and oppose the 
depoliticisation of the Analects (Bell 2010: 176).  
 
This thesis acknowledges the risks of excessively politicised reading of the Confucian 
classics; it is also sceptical of any attempt to artificially impose modern political concepts 
upon Confucianism. However, if Confucianism is ever to fulfil its potential to make a 
positive contribution to the modern societies of today, it is very much worthwhile for 
contemporary Confucians to develop a political theory which can critically preserve core 
Confucian values while responding constructively to the challenges posed by modern 
democratic theories.   
 
1.33 Two Definitions of Democracy 
 
No two Confucian scholars have precisely the same understanding of Confucianism; there 
is also no agreed definition of democracy. Most Scholars who compare early Confucian 
political thought with democratic theories often use their preferred definition of 
democracy as a means of buttressing their positions. Because of this, it is essential to 
provide an adequately concise definition of democracy; so that the arguments in this thesis 
can be more acceptable and persuasive. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to distinguish between normative and 
empirical definitions of democracy. Normative definitions of democracy are more 
common in political, philosophical studies on democracy than in discussions of 
democracy conducted by political scientists. In the context of political philosophy, 
democracy is often defined as a procedural concept which is founded upon some 
normative democratic principles, including those regarding political authority, political 
equality and political rights. These democratic principles are context-insensitive and are 
related to particular democratic beliefs in the intrinsic values of democracy, such as the 
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fairness of the democratic procedure. Such values have been represented by many 
prominent political philosophers: among these are Aristotle, John Locke, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Dewey. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
will discuss in more detail the normative democratic principles incorporated in the 
normative definitions of democracy. Hence, this chapter will not elaborate any further 
upon the topic of normative definitions of democracy. 
 
Empirical definitions of democracy, as commonly applied by political scientists, are 
mainly concerned with democratic institutional arrangements in political practice. Such 
definitions are often related to the instrumental values of democracy, rather than its 
intrinsic values. It should be made clear at this point that it is a fallacy to conflate 
empirical definitions of democracy with normative definitions of democracy, even if 
many political theorists have done so. Such a conflation often confuses what democracy 
actually is in practice with what is theoretically appealing about democracy. To make this 
error is as much as to imply that any endorsement of democratic institutional 
arrangements can only be premised upon certain normative democratic principles; and 
that such arrangements cannot conceivably be justified on the basis of any other plausible 
normative principles.  
 
Moreover, it is inappropriate to only consider normative definitions of democracy, and to 
ignore empirical definitions; even in a purely philosophical study of democracy.  
Normative and empirical definitions both have the potential to provide a variety of distinct 
points of view, in order to illuminate the various features of democracy. However, unlike 
normative definitions of democracy, empirical definitions of democracy carry little 
normative weight and mainly focus on the context in which political practice occurs. For 
this reason, empirical definitions of democracy can serve as a clearer guide for 
distinguishing democracy from other forms of government than normative definitions, 
especially in the context of real political practice. One example of an empirical definition 
of democracy is offered by Joseph Schumpeter, who says that democracy is a system ‘for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter [1943] 2003: 250). This is a 
parsimonious definition, and yet it does provide a concise description of the common 
characteristics of most, if not all, democracies. 15  It also contributes towards the 
                                                          
15 Schumpeter believes that his definition of democracy serves as ‘a reasonably efficient criterion by which 
to distinguish democratic governments from others’ (Schumpeter [1943] 2003, 250). 
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‘proliferation of various substantive conceptions of democracy in which competitive 
election, the minimum requirement of democracy, is entwined with various forms of 
institutional arrangements and social practices’ (Kim 2017: 238).  
 
It is perfectly possible for scholars to remain unconvinced that the existence of 
competitive elections is the minimum requirement of democracy; particularly when they 
consider the political practices of a few ‘transitional countries’ (Carothers 2002: 13). 
Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, an even shorter empirical definition may be more 
appropriate: democracy is ‘rule by the people.’  Here, the word ‘rule’ means that the 
people as a whole choose their rulers and have certain control over policymaking. This 
can be accomplished either directly, by means of a referendum or other purely democratic 
procedures; or indirectly, through representative democratic procedures.  
 
This short empirical definition is not a comprehensive definition, but it is appropriate for 
the purposes of this thesis. This is not only because such definition is easy to 
operationalise but also because it provides a clear and necessary condition for determining 
whether or not a particular political system can be called a democracy. Moreover, this 
minimal, empirical definition carries no normative weight, and is thus compatible with 
any kind of democracy, in any context. For the same reason, ‘democratic institutions’ or 
‘democratic procedures’ in this research will be understood in the minimal sense of fair 
and free practices. These practices serve the purpose of facilitating the equal participation 
of all citizens in the political decision-making process (Beetham 1992).  
 
1.34 Two Approaches towards Justifying Democracy  
 
Contemporary democratic theories are marked by two different approaches towards 
justifying the superiority of democracy. One is the empirical approach or the epistemic 
approach, which seeks to justify the instrumental values of democracy in political practice. 
The other is the normative approach or the non-epistemic approach, which focuses on the 
intrinsic values of democracy. 
 
Scholars who follow the empirical approach emphasise the practical aim of democracy, 
which is to serve the well-being of all citizens (Kolody 2014a: 202-203). They attempt to 
justify the superiority of democracy by arguing that in the long run, democratically made 
political decisions can better achieve such practical aim than the political decisions that 
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have been made in an undemocratic manner (Riker 1982, Sen 1999a, Elster 1997, Boix 
2003, Arneson 2004, 2009, Landemore 2013). 
 
It is necessary here to clarify two concepts relating to this empirical approach. Firstly, 
‘democratically made political decisions’ are political decisions that have been made in a 
democratic procedure. In such a procedure, each citizen enjoys an equal and positive 
opportunity to exert an informed influence over the political decisions relating to one’s 
own well-being. 
 
Secondly, ‘to serve the well-being of all citizens’ represents a very complex area of 
discussion. This is because there are many different possible interpretations of the phrase 
‘well-being.’ The term ‘well-being’ could be considered as referring to the benefits 
experienced by citizens from an objective perspective, rather than from their own 
subjective perspective. Alternatively, it may relate to a fair distribution of the means of 
pursuing one’s own plan of life. Another possibility is that the improvement of the well-
being of the citizens depends upon a particular vision of justice (The meaning of ‘well-
being’ will be further discussed in the following chapters). 
 
In order to prove that democracy can achieve its practical aim of serving the well-being 
of all citizens, scholars who take the empirical approach to justify the superiority of 
democracy often argue that democracy is in a position to ensure either that relatively good 
policies are passed, or that relatively good political representatives are elected. Therefore, 
a democratic form of government can prevent ‘substantial famine’ (Sen 1999b:178-180, 
2009:342-345), and reduce social and economic inequality (Boix 2003).   
 
More specifically, some scholars indicate that democratic political authority is legitimate, 
insofar it is ‘generally accepted,’ and is thereby capable of coordinating the various 
complex social interactions in which the citizens are engaged. Thus, in a pluralistic 
society, democracy is in a better position to resolve moral and political conflicts than any 
alternative form of government. It thus reduces the possibility of social and political 
upheaval or revolutions and enhances social stability (Elster 1997, Przeworski 2003, 
Hardin 2003, Knight and Johanson 2011). Consequently, democracy helps to establish a 




Some scholars argue that under a democratic system, every citizen has political rights 
which permit them to participate in political decision-making. Thus, political decisions 
that have been made democratically are capable of incorporating a wide range of 
diversified perspectives (Knight & Johnson 2011, Landemore 2013). The democratic 
process of political decision-making also motivates the public to care about the opinions 
and interests of the majority of the citizens. Democratic political rights are thus able to 
protect the interests of most citizens from being infringed by those who have political 
power.  
 
Other followers of the empirical approach contend that democratic procedures treat every 
citizen with equal respect. The equal participation of all citizens in the democratic 
procedures is educative, and it helps to improve the characters of the citizens; i.e. their 
autonomous capacities and moral qualities (Mill [1861] 2003, Elster 1997). Democracy 
thus treats all citizens with equal respect, in spite of any inequality of social status, or any 
difference in actual capacities. 
 
There are several problems with the empirical approach towards justifying the superiority 
of democracy. Firstly, in a philosophical thought experiment, it is not difficult to prove 
that an ideal meritocracy is better able to promote the well-being of the citizens than an 
ideal democracy. Those who are familiar with the arguments found in The Republic can 
imagine that in ideal situations, the will of the ‘philosopher king’ from Plato’s Utopian 
Kallipolis will be able to make political decisions that are substantively better than anyone 
else’s. Similarly, it is not difficult to conceive of a scenario where the capabilities of 
intellectually and morally superior technocrats will prove relatively reliable engines of 
political decision-making. 
 
Secondly, when considering real political practice, it would be inappropriate to merely 
use a large number of empirical studies, in order to justify the superiority of democracy 
to other plausible forms of government. The impropriety partly lies in the fact that many 
positive and negative examples of political decisions that have been made via modern 
democratic procedures are potentially tendentious. The other reason for this is that some 
plausible forms of government are ideal projects which have never been realised in human 




Thirdly, there are wide disagreements about questions such as: ‘What does the well-being 
of the citizens mean?’ ‘Which political decisions would best serve the well-being of the 
citizens?’ ‘Which standard should be applied, or who is the ultimate authority in 
answering these questions?’ On account of such disagreements, it seems unlikely that the 
empirical approach alone can serve as an adequate means of justifying the superiority of 
democracy.  
 
Judging by discussion just given of the empirical approach, it is reasonable to say that the 
practical aims of democracy are to serve the well-being of all citizens by establishing a 
responsive and harmonious state; protecting the interests of most citizens from being 
infringed by those with political power and treating every citizen with equal respect. 
However, it is extremely difficult to justify the superiority of democracy purely by 
arguing that democracy can better achieve such practical aim than all other plausible 
forms of government. 
  
Unlike the empirical approach, the normative approach towards justifying the superiority 
of democracy is primarily concerned with democratic procedures, rather than with the 
content of the political decisions that have been made via such procedures. Even if 
democratic procedures are capable of producing political decisions that have various 
instrumental values, scholars following the normative approach believe that the 
superiority of democracy is not justified by such instrumental values; but rather by the 
intrinsic values embodied in the democratic procedures. Many scholars contend that 
democracy is intrinsically valuable because of its egalitarian procedures, independently 
of whether or not its institutional arrangements always lead to desirable consequences in 
practice (Beetham 1999, [1991] 2013, Brighouse 1996,1997, Cohen 1997, Christiano 
2004).  
 
For example, Brian Barry argues that ‘democracy contains no constraints on the content 
of the decisions produced, such as respect for human rights, protection of individual 
liberty, the rule of law, concern for the general welfare, or economic equality—except 
those required by democracy itself as a procedure’ (Barry 1989: 25). In short, according 
to the normative approach, democracy is justified, insofar as political decisions that are 
made in ‘one person, one vote’ are the outcomes of the political autonomy of all citizens 




It appears that one may incur some theoretical and practical risks, whenever applies a 
purely normative approach towards justifying the superiority of democracy. Theoretically 
speaking, the normative approach risks rendering many valuable, admirable and 
substantively good standards for evaluating political systems, such as the public interest 
or the common good, either deficient or nonsensical. This will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. Also, in practice, the normative approach risks overestimating 
the degree to which the intrinsic values of democracy, such as procedure fairness, may be 
important and attractive for citizens. This is particularly true of those who do not have a 
Western cultural background. Sungmoon Kim has discussed democratic countries or 
regions in East Asia, such as South Korea and Taiwan; these areas are deeply influenced 
by Confucianism.  Kim argues that in most of these areas, citizens ‘initially pursued 
democracy mainly for instrumental reasons.’ Also, during the period of democratisation, 
‘nonliberal people, whose cultural and political tradition is completely foreign to 
democracy,’ advocated democratic institutional arrangements without believing in, or 
even having any basic knowledge of, the intrinsic values of democracy (Kim 2017: 240).   
 
The rest of this thesis will elaborate upon the empirical approach and the normative 
approach towards justifying the superiority of democracy. I will show that the intrinsic 
values of democratic procedures are themselves embodied in some normative democratic 
principles which are related to political authority, political rights and political equality. 
This thesis intends to argue that these normative democratic principles are not self-
evidently valid; even though CMD does not adopt such normative democratic principles, 
it is nonetheless compatible with the practical aims of democracy.   
  
1.4 A Philosophical Approach to Study Classical Confucianism  
 
Essays on Confucianism tend to exhibit an approach that is noticeably distinct from essays 
of political philosophy. The approach of Confucian studies is usually more historical and 
interpretative, and less analytical and normative. Essays written by Confucian scholars 
are always filled with idioms and historical references, which are often obscure to 
political philosophers who are less familiar with the Confucian classics. Therefore, this 
thesis will investigate some early Confucian political ideas that are intriguing both to 
modern Confucian scholars and to Western political philosophers. In order to accomplish 
such an objective, this thesis adopts a philosophical approach to study classical 
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Confucianism. More specifically, this approach includes the strategy of jiezhejiang and 
follows the New Text School. It also uses the strategy of Hermeneutic of Restoration. 
 
1.41 Jiezhejiang  
 
The twentieth-century Chinese philosopher Feng Youlan 馮友蘭  has distinguished 
between two different approaches to studying classical Confucianism. The first is  
zhaozhejiang (照著講 ); i.e., studying classical Confucianism in order to create an 
accurate picture of what it was and what it meant at the time. The second is jiezhejiang 
(接著講), i.e., studying it against an ever-changing context, and treating it as a dynamic, 
ongoing tradition (Feng and Mair 2000: 200). It is important to recognise the importance 
of the historical insights brought by zhaozhejiang. However, this thesis relies more on the 
more philosophically creative approach: jiezhejiang  
 
Confucian philosophers always face a dilemma when trying to choose between these two 
approaches. zhaozhejiang is extremely time-consuming. This is not just because there is 
already a vast body of Confucian classics. There is also an inexhaustible supply of in-
depth interpretations of these classics, as penned by generations of Confucian scholars 
from the time of Confucius until now. For today’s Confucian scholars, it can easily take 
a lifetime of study to gain a truly comprehensive understanding of just one Confucian 
classic. On the other hand, jiezhejiang provides an excellent opportunity to satisfy the 
desire of many contemporary Confucian philosophers. It offers every scholar the chance 
to make a serious contribution to the further development, revitalisation and creative 
reconstruction of Confucianism. It has the potential to assist researchers to discover some 
practical Confucian solutions for present-day social and political problems. 
 
Admittedly, Confucian scholars from history or classics departments often have concerns 
about the kind of creative reconstruction of Confucianism that is likely to result from 
research using jiezhejiang. They may worry that such reconstructions risk misinterpreting 
or distorting some of the core values of Confucianism; they believe that the end result of 
such reconstructions will be a reformed ‘Confucianism’ that is no longer Confucian in 
any meaningful sense of the word. Such scholars believe that only a reliable zhaozhejiang 





However, such a view rests on the premise that scholars are somehow in a position to 
study the ‘real and original’ Confucianism; in a manner independent of their way of 
thinking, cultural background and socio-political environment. It further assumes that 
there is a direct correspondence between how thoroughly one investigates the Confucian 
classics, and how well one understands the views of the early Confucians. In other words, 
by discovering and correcting the misunderstandings found in the interpretations of the 
Confucian classics made by earlier Confucian scholars, it is possible to overcome the 
distance between the scholar of today, and the ‘real and original’ ideas of early 
Confucians. However, these assumptions are limited both in their validity and in their 
applicability to this thesis. 
 
On the one hand, it is difficult to achieve a pure zhaozhejiang in reality. This is easy to 
understand when one considers how personal and cultural factors inevitably have 
influenced the generations of Confucian scholars that have interpreted the Confucian 
classics. Everyone who undertakes to interpret the Confucian classics must be more or 
less influenced by various conscious or unconscious presuppositions. Because of these 
presuppositions, every person’s reading of the Confucian classics is a culturally and 
personally conditioned interpretation. Therefore, it is extremely difficult for anyone to 
study the ‘real and original’ ideas of early Confucians in reality.  
 
On the other hand, it is impossible to use any standard to judge whether certain 
interpretations of Confucian classics are closer to the ‘real and original’ ideas of the 
Confucianism than others. According to Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy:  
 
The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not depend on 
the contingencies of the author and whom he originally wrote for. It is at least 
not exhausted by them, for it is partly also determined by the historical 
situation of the interpreter and hence by the totality of the objective course of 
history. (Gadamer 1990: 301)  
 
The Confucian classics were produced in a period where socio-political life was very 
different from that of the present day; so also was the general cultural environment. It is 
highly unlikely that anyone alive today could truly put oneself in the same situation as 
those chronologically distant early Confucians. Moreover, even if one could, any one 
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interpretation of Confucian classics cannot be considered as definitively close to the ‘real 
and original’ ideas of early Confucians.  
 
Jiezhejiang takes the problem of temporal distance seriously. It is therefore capable of 
providing many positive and productive opportunities for revealing the hidden meanings, 
values and ethical commitments that might otherwise remain undisclosed by the 
zhaozhejiang that were so typical of the Confucian scholars of times past. This thesis will 
use jiezhejiang not only because it is more philosophically creative, but also because it is 
of assistance in rendering classical Confucianism relevant to the globalised world of today. 
Moreover, jiezhejiang is a valuable means for uncovering novel approaches that are 
capable of deciphering the Confucian classics; texts which can often appear suggestive 
but obscure to the contemporary reader. 
 
1.42 New Text School  
 
The strategy of Jiezhejiang conducted in this thesis will treat Confucius as a political 
philosopher rather than a historian. The Confucian classics will be studied, first and 
foremost, as philosophical texts rather than historical records. Whether Confucius was a 
political philosopher or a historian has always been a controversial issue. Since the Han 
dynasties, this issue has been a critical marker of the debates between two Confucian 
interpretative schools: Old Text School (guwen jingxue古文經學) and New Text school 
(jinwen jingxue今文經學). 
 
The Old Text School suggests that Confucius is an established historian and that the 
classical texts that Confucius or his students wrote are historical texts; such texts faithfully 
convey and reflect upon ancient traditions. In the Analects, Confucius says, ‘I transmit 
(shu述) rather than innovate (or create, zuo作). I trust in and love the ancient ways’ 
(Analects 7.1).  Most scholars of the Old Text School treat this passage as obvious 
evidence that Confucius is a historian or a traditionalist. By contrast, the New Text School 
regards Confucius as a political philosopher or a semi-divine Philosopher-King. Most 
scholars of the New Text School believe that Confucius gave a specific imprimatur to the 




The earliest debates between these two schools were primarily focused on two important 
textual questions: which of the two competing versions of the Confucian classics were 
the true originals? Also, how ought one to interpret the Confucian classics? (Yao 2013: 
240-241, 305-307). It would be inappropriate to examine this debate in substantial detail 
here; what is most important to note is that this thesis follows the New Text School. This 
thesis is mainly concerned with the philosophical meaning and implicit values found in 
certain texts from the Confucian classics, and the various complex interrelations between 
such elements. The research is not orientated narrowing down the literal meaning of 
certain parts of a text, such as specific individual words or characters. 
 
This kind of approach offers substantial hope of solving some of the apparent 
contradictions found in classical Confucianism. This is a very important benefit of 
following the New Text School; because, in the Analects, Confucius does not always 
speak with a single or univocal voice. He often gives different answers to the same 
questions and expresses his ideas differently in different contexts; depending on which 
disciple he is talking to, and what situation he is dealing with.16  
 
When facing apparently confusing and contradictory passages in the Confucian classics, 
one ought not merely to take such contradictions seriously, but even to actively seek them 
out. Moreover, it is unreasonable to rush into frivolous claims such as ‘Confucius was not 
honest,’ ‘Mencius failed to see the contradictions in his thought,’ or ‘Xunzi’s thoughts 
changed over time.’ Rather, a cautious attitude towards such apparent contradictions is a 
strict necessity, as these contradictions are very likely the most significant parts of the 
classics. 
 
This cautious attitude is founded upon a basic principle of respect. Since pre-Qin China, 
there have not been many genuinely superlative thinkers in Chinese history; this is why 
Confucius is called ‘the great sage and teacher of ten thousand generations’ (wanshi 
shibiao萬世師表). Such an attitude of respect or hermeneutical charity is very different 
from a blind faith in authority. It requires that Confucian scholars should have a very 
reliable case before making potentially facile criticisms about the early Confucians being 
muddled thinkers or being somehow inconsistent in their own opinions. Instead, it is 
                                                          
16 See Analects (11.22, 8.13); (5.7, 11.25, 18.6); (3.22, 14.9, 14.15—14.17). 
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worth examining whether there may be a hidden and deeper coherence beneath the 
apparent discrepancies (weiyan dayi微言大意). 
 
1.43 Hermeneutic of Restoration  
 
In order to unveil the suggestive meanings and hidden values of the Confucian classics, 
this thesis employs the liujing zhuwo六經注我 (Hermeneutic of Restoration) rather than 
wozhu liujing我注六經 (Hermeneutic of Suspicion). The literal meaning of liujing zhuwo 
(Hermeneutic of Restoration) is ‘letting the text address my concerns.’ The corresponding 
literal meaning of wozhu liujing (Hermeneutic of Suspicion) means ‘I address the text.’ 
The prominent Neo-Confucian scholar Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139-1193) of the Song 
dynasty famously made this distinction between two kinds of approaches towards 
addressing the Confucian classics. 
 
Those following the Hermeneutic of Restoration endeavour to interpret a classic text by 
finding the subconscious motives that have apparently directed and influenced the 
composition of the text on the part of the ‘Master.’ The discussion of such motives is 
distinct from or even irrelevant to the question of how convincing or well-evidenced the 
interpretations of the previous commentator may be (Li 2006: 102).  
 
Most of the Confucian classics do not rely on step-by-step argumentation; instead, the 
use of aphorisms is a common structural feature. However, the textual analysis in this 
thesis is not conducted under the assumption that the authors themselves were unaware 
of the true intentions underlying the texts they were producing. The task of interpretation 
is to listen carefully to the message, while simultaneously treating the authors with respect.  
The message need not always be transparent or univocal; its claim to truth, whatever this 
may be, might easily appear to be absurd; yet it is nevertheless a message worth taking 
seriously (Zhang 2003: 6). 
 
To sum up: this thesis attempts to faithfully and respectfully explain the original meaning 
of some of the Confucian classics, while simultaneously conducting a philosophically 
creative transformation. This will facilitate the development of a political theory which is 
capable of critically and authentically conserving the treasures of Confucian moral 
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reasoning, while also shedding fresh light upon some modern political, philosophical 
theories. 
 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
 
The central argument of this thesis is that Confucian Meritocratic Democracy (CMD) is 
a viable form of government under certain conditions. CMD is founded upon Confucian 
conceptions of political authority, political equality and political rights. Such Confucian 
conceptions are compatible with the practical aims of their democratic counterparts while 
retaining the core moral, political principles derived from classical Confucianism.   
Chapter 2 explores Confucian meritocracy by clarifying some key terms in classical 
Confucianism; these terms include Junzi and Ren. There is an explanation of why this 
thesis translates Junzi as ‘Confucian Ren statesperson.’ This chapter argues that Ren plays 
a crucial role in shaping and integrating Confucian moral reasoning with Confucian 
political principles. This chapter contends that in classical Confucianism, Ren should be 
understood as the totality of the relationship-based virtues that are needed in order to 
make reasonable political decisions. In reality, very few human beings can know and 
practice Ren with perfection. However, for early Confucians, everyone has an equal 
potential to meet the requirements of Ren. The Confucian Ren statespersons are those 
who have made great achievements in their self-cultivation, and who are thereby more 
capable than others to meet the requirements of Ren. In CMD, they are responsible for 
making reasonable political decisions that serve the well-being of all citizens. After this, 
there is a discussion of the three Confucian meritocratic beliefs: CMB1, CMB2 and 
CMB3. This chapter then engages with some potential objections to CMB1 and CMB2, 
by elaborating upon various political and philosophical questions pertaining to the pursuit 
of the political truths. 
 
Chapter 3 elaborates upon CMB3 and develops a Confucian conception of political 
authority. CMB3 states that the political truths of Ren necessarily entail the kind of 
political authority of the Confucian Ren statesperson. This chapter argues that such 
political authority is indeed viable, despite its legitimacy being founded upon ‘service’ 
and ‘reciprocity,’ rather than upon the participation of all citizens in the political decision-
making process. This chapter explores some of the most obvious challenges to the 
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political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons, especially those regarding 
‘consent,’ ‘general acceptability,’ individual autonomy and paternalism.  
 
This chapter also demonstrates that the Confucian conception of political authority 
advocates non-coercive moral persuasion and helps all the citizens to make reasonable 
political decisions. Such a conception encourages a mutual commitment between political 
leaders and their fellow citizens, as well as mutual trust between citizens. Therefore, the 
Confucian conception of political authority is compatible with the practical aim of the 
democratic conception of political authority, which is to establish a responsive and 
harmonious state.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates the viability of a Confucian conception of political rights, arguing 
that early Confucians do not merely emphasise the reciprocal obligations of the citizens, 
but also respect their political rights. This chapter includes an exploration of some 
possible theoretical and practical problems with the individualistic assumptions of human 
nature. Such assumptions generally serve as a foundation for the normative democratic 
principle of political rights. The Confucian conception of political rights highlights the 
importance of the harmony found in local communities, and it is founded upon early 
Confucian views of human nature. Such views believe that human beings, by nature, are 
capable of being altruistic enough to sacrifice their own self-interest for the well-being of 
others. 
 
According to the Confucian conception of political rights, every citizen in CMD has 
political rights to participate in making political decisions about ‘strictly local’ matters. 
The Confucian conception of political rights does not endorse the view that all citizens 
must have political rights to directly participate in making political decisions that will 
have a profound influence on the entire country. Therefore, the Confucian conception of 
political rights risks reducing the depth of political participation. However, this chapter 
argues that such conception is still viable insofar as it bears a ‘family resemblance’ to the 
democratic conception of political rights. Both conceptions share the same practical aim, 
which is to protect the self-interest of the citizens from being infringed by those with 
political power. Moreover, with regard to the imperative of helping citizens to make 
reasonable political decisions and to promote their own self-interest reasonably, 





Chapter 5 elaborates upon a Confucian conception of political equality, which is mainly 
concerned with assuring equal participation in political reflections for all the citizens. 
This chapter argues that there are some theoretical and practical problems with the 
justification and operation of the democratic principle of political equality. The Confucian 
conception of political equality has the potential to avoid most of these problems. This is 
not only because such conception is founded upon the early Confucian ideas of the 
‘extension of love,’ but also because such conception highlights the importance of moral 
equality by presuming the equal potential capacities of all the citizens. In political practice, 
the Confucian conception of political equality aims at treating all citizens with equal 
respect, regardless of any inequality of social status, or any difference in actual capacities. 
Such an aim is also the practical aim of the democratic conception of political equality.  
 
This chapter further suggests that it is of great significance to help the citizens to realise 
their political values, and to promote equality of political influence. This being so, the 
equal participation of all the citizens in political reflections is more fundamental than the 
equal participation of all the citizens in the political decision-making process. This is 
because the former is more effective and efficient in helping citizens to realise their 
political values by assisting them in making reasonable political decisions as well as in 
treating one another as moral equals. 
  
Chapter 6 discusses the viability of CMD on a practical level, by envisioning some 
democratic and meritocratic institutional arrangements in a CMD polity. These 
arrangements include Confucian civic education, Confucian Academy, Confucian 
Examination and Confucian Parliament. The Confucian civic education is not intended to 
instil specific moral beliefs into the citizens; instead, it aims at helping citizens with their 
own self-cultivation, so that they can develop certain relationship-based virtues. Those 
who have already finished the Confucian civic education and who are willing to 
participate in politics will be sent to the Confucian Academy for further political training. 
This will enable them to attain the ‘merits’ necessary to become the Confucian Ren 
statespersons. Candidates who wish to become the Confucian Ren statespersons are 





This chapter contends that any attempt to rely solely on the selection of perfect Confucian 
Ren statespersons would undermine the viability of CMD in modern societies. Some 
democratic institutional arrangements are also necessary for checking and balancing the 
meritocratic institutional arrangement in CMD; including the Confucian Parliament.  It is 
acknowledged that the normative aim of CMD appears to be incompatible with modern 
democracy, as it advocates ‘rule by the reasonable’ rather than ‘rule by the people.’ This 
chapter argues that CMD and modern democracy both share the same practical aim, 
which is to serve the well-being of all citizens by preventing intellectually or morally 
incompetent political officials from assuming office. 
 
In the Conclusion chapter, this thesis revisits the main claims and arguments of the 
preceding chapters, inter-relating them in order to show that this thesis is capable of 
making theoretical contributions to modern democratic theories. The final section also 
explores how far the theory of CMD has the potential to facilitate the democratisation 






2. Confucian Meritocracy and Ren 
 
Early Confucians (Confucius孔子, Mencius 孟子 and Xunzi 荀子) argue that while the 
state ought to satisfy the basic material needs of the citizens, the state should also provide 
every citizen with opportunities to gain a high-quality education. 17  However, early 
Confucians do not believe that state should guarantee the equal participation of all citizens 
in the process of political decision-making. Only the Junzi君子 are supposed to acquire 
political authority.18  
 
Classical Confucianism establishes high ethical standards for the Junzi; they ought to be 
benevolent, virtuous and knowledgeable. They also need to be in a position to always 
make reasonable political decisions that adequately serve the well-being of their fellow 
citizens.19  If these Junzi exist and are willing to establish a ‘Ren government (Ren zheng 
仁政),’ there will be a harmonious society, in which everyone can live a flourishing life.20 
This Confucian political ideal is viewed by many as Confucian meritocracy (Bai 2012, 
Bell 2006, 2016, Bell and Li 2013, Fan 2010, 2013, Jiang 2013, Li 2012, 2013).  
 
This chapter will explore Confucian meritocracy, by philosophically illuminating and 
reconstructing some key notions in classical Confucianism, such as Junzi and Ren. It will 
also elaborate upon some Confucian meritocratic beliefs pertaining to the political truths 
embodied in Ren.  
 
2.1 The Junzi and the Confucian Ren Statesperson 
 
The term Junzi 君子 appears with considerable frequency in the Confucian classics. Much 
of the English literature on Confucianism translates this as ‘a gentleman,’ ‘an ideal man,’ 
                                                          
17 See Analects 13.9, 15.39; Mencius 1A7, 3A4; Xunzi 16.1, 27.52. 
18 See Analects 2.1, 15.32, 19.13; Mencius 2A3, 4A20, 7B32; Xunzi 6.9, 7.7, 23.18. 
19 See Analects 1.1, 1.2, 1.8, 1.14, 2.14, 3.7, 3.24, 4.5, 4.10, 4.11, 4.16, 4.24, 5.16, 6.18, 6.26, 6.27, 7.37, 
8.2, 8.4, 12.4, 12.4, 12.5, 12.8, 12.15, 12.16, 12.19, 12.24, 13.3, 13.23, 13.25, 13.26, 14.23, 14.27, 14.28, 
14.42, 15.8, 15.18, 15.19, 15.20, 15.21, 15. 22, 15.23, 15. 32, 15. 34, 15.37, 16.1, 16.6, 16.7, 16.8, 16.10, 
17.4, 17.7, 17.21, 17.23, 17.24, 18.10, 19.3, 19.4, 19.7, 19.9, 19.10, 19.25, 20.2, 20.3. Mencius 1A7, 1B14, 
2A9, 2B1, 2B3, 2B13, 3A2, 3B4, 3b7, 4b14, 4B18, 4B19, 4B22, 4B28, 5B7, 6B6, 6B8, 7A13, 7A20, 7A21, 
7A24, 7A32, 7A37, 7A40, 7A41, 7A45, 7B24, 7B29, 7B32, 7B33, 7B37.  Xunzi 1.1, 1.8, 1.13, 1.16, 2.12, 
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.9, 3.10, 4.9, 5.8, 5.9, 5.11, 6.14, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 9.3, 9.18, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.9, 
13.5, 13.8, 14.1, 14.2, 17.9, 17.10, 18.38, 19.17, 20.7, 21.10, 21.15, 23.2, 24, 25.1, 27.21, 27.103, 28.8, 
29.6, 30.3, 30.4, 30.7, 30.8, 31.6, 32.3. 
20 See Analects 8.2; Mencius 1A5, 2A3, 4A20, 7B32; the Book of Rites 禮記 Liyun禮運. 
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‘a superior man’ or ‘a person of virtue’ (Yao 2000: 214). However, these translations are 
not fully adequate, insofar as they ignore the political connotations of this term in classical 
Confucianism. 
 
In order to appreciate the significance of the term Junzi君子 in classical Confucianism, 
it is necessary to understand what each character (Jun君 and Zi子) actually meant at the 
time of Confucius. During the early Spring and Autumn period (770 - ca. 475 BCE), Jun 
was defined as a King or a ruler of a state. Zi was often literally translated as ‘son.’ Thus, 
etymologically, Junzi meant a ‘son of the ruler;’ thus referring to a prince or the male 
offspring of the aristocratic class. However, at the time of Confucius (ca. 551 - 479 BCE), 
most noble lineages were constantly at risk of being overthrown. In order to secure their 
positions, most rulers claimed that their political authority was founded upon virtue, 
rather than upon the pedigree of the rulers themselves. ‘Zi’ was commonly used as a 
respectful suffix for those with superior morality and intellectual ability. These new 
developments were partly responsible for a crucial convention found within the 
Confucian classics: the tendency to endow Junzi with an ethically-orientated significance, 
rather than a purely classed significance (Pines 2002: 156-171, 2,04).  
 
For Confucius, it is the Junzi alone who can fulfil the crucial function of governing the 
state, and of using their virtue to bring peace to the whole world (Analects 8.6, 8.7).  On 
the one hand, the attributes of Junzi are covered by Ren. Confucius says that ‘a Junzi who 
parts company with Ren does not fulfil that name. Never for a moment does a Junzi quit 
Ren’ (Analects 4.5). On the other hand, there is a certain degree of authority embodied in 
Ren. Because of this, David Hall and Roger Ames translate Ren as ‘authoritative humanity’ 
(Hall and Ames 1987: 52). Therefore, Junzi embodies a certain kind of authority that 
attaches to Ren. For early Confucians, such authority does not in itself entail exclusive 
privileges for its bearers. In other words, the attribution of the word Junzi does not entail 
the possession of any inherited status. As the following chapters will make clear, early 
Confucians believe that every citizen has an equal potential capacity for becoming a Junzi.   
 
Moreover, this thesis will investigate early Confucian ideas about the Junzi mainly in 
terms of Political Confucianism, as already stated in Chapter 1. In a Confucian political 
context, a good statesperson who successfully actualises his or her potential capacity to 
meet the requirements of Ren and to implement ‘Ren government (仁政),’ can be called 
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a Junzi. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘Confucian Ren statesperson’ may 
be a more appropriate option than other translations of Junzi, insofar as it reflects the 
political and ethical connotations of Junzi. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the Confucian Ren statesperson in this thesis should be 
understood not as an elite who is socially superior to others, but rather as a well-educated 
person who has already made considerable success in moral self-cultivation; someone 
who leads his or her fellow citizens by means of their own virtuous conduct, thereby 
setting a good example for everyone else (Analects 2.20, 3.26, 12.17, 12.18, 13.1, 13.13, 
13.6, Mencius 4A4, 4A20). This will be further discussed in the following chapters. 
 
2.2 Ren in Classical Confucianism  
 
It has been argued that Ren仁 is the most important notion in Confucianism. Ren occurs 
in the early Confucian classics many times; 109 times in the Analects, 158 times in 
Mencius and 134 times in Xunzi. No other well-known Confucian notion appears so many 
times, not even Li禮(rituals), Yi 義(righteousness) or Xiao孝 (filial piety). Some Chinese 
philosophers even go far as to characterise Confucianism as the study of Ren (Chen 2014: 
5). However, these occurrences of Ren ‘serve to intensify and complicate, rather than to 
clarify, its meaning’ (Olberding 2014: 83).  
 
Ren仁 has many existing renderings in English: such as ‘benevolence,’ ‘goodness,’ ‘love,’ 
‘authoritative person,’ ‘humanity’ and ‘manhood’ (Chan 1955: 295, Tu 1968: 31, 
Schwartz 2009: 75). However, none of these translations is truly satisfactory. This is 
because the significance of the word is highly context-dependent. Therefore, this thesis 
does not use any existing English translations of Ren, as the meaning of Ren is extremely 
difficult to encapsulate in a simple word or phrase.  
 
As shall be explained in this chapter, early Confucians often define Ren as a unified notion 
that encompasses almost all the virtues that were advocated by early Confucians; as well 
as the ability to actually put such virtues into action (Chan 1955: 295-296). This thesis 
will continually stress the important role of Ren in classical Confucianism. Ren is the 
crucible where Confucian moral reasoning and political principles are dynamically 
52 
 
shaped and integrated. In short, Ren refers to the totality of the relationship-based virtues 
that make it possible for citizens to make reasonable political decisions. 
 
2.21 The Meaning of Ren 
 
The Chinese character ‘Ren 仁’ is a literal graphic representation of the notion of ‘human 
relationships;’ it consists of two parts, ‘human人’ and ‘two 二.’ The word Ren originally 
denoted the kindness of rulers to their subjects, and Ren was employed in some Pre-
Confucian classics, such as the Book of Poetry (Shi Jing; a collection of ancient Chinese 
poetry and songs dating from the 11th to 7th centuries BCE). Ren was ‘introduced into 
the ethical discourse in the mid-Chunqiu period and grew in importance well before 
Confucius’s time’ (Pines 2002: 184).   
 
It was early Confucians who first made Ren the most significant virtue for human beings, 
as well as a key guiding principle in politics. There are numerous discussions of Ren in 
the Confucian classics; yet, there is no universally agreed definition of Ren among early 
Confucians. In the Analects, there are various occasions where Confucius’s disciples ask 
him about the meaning of Ren; however, Confucius gives different answers in different 
contexts or circumstances.  
 
In some contexts, Confucius simply explains Ren as being good or without evil. He says, 
‘truly set your mind on Ren, and you will be without evil’ (Analects 4.4). At other times, 
Ren refers to the ability to keep a peaceful mind. Confucius says, ‘A man without Ren 
cannot for long endure adversity, nor can he enjoy prosperity. The man with Ren rests 
content with Ren, the man with wisdom profits from Ren’ (Analects 4.2). 
 
Usually, Ren means to love others. When Confucius’ disciple Fanchi asks about the 
meaning of Ren, Confucius replies, ‘it is to love others’ (Analects 12.22). Confucius also 
says, ‘only those with Ren can actually love others and despise others’ (Analects 4.3).  
Mencius has similar statements. He says that ‘A man of Ren loves everyone and devotes 
his love to the relatives and the wise first’ (Mencius 7A46). Mencius also states that ‘A 
man of Ren loves others, and a man of Li respects others. One who loves others is always 
loved by others’ (Mencius 4B28). Arguably, early Confucians believe that ‘to love others’ 
is one of the most fundamental requirements of Ren. This will be further discussed in 




However, if one wishes to meet the requirements of Ren, it is not sufficient merely to love 
others. One might sincerely love one’s relatives, friends and even strangers. However, 
one might still hurt others or commit a crime, on account of moral ignorance. Therefore, 
in order to meet the requirements of Ren, it is necessary for one to have various virtues. 
 
When Fanchi asked about Ren, the Master said, ‘Conduct yourself with 
respect; perform your duties with reverence; treat others with complete 
sincerity. Even if you live with rude, uncultivated tribes (Yi and Di), you 
cannot give up these virtues. (Analects 13.19)  
 
The Master said, ‘to be able to practice five virtues (Courtesy, generosity, 
trustworthiness, diligence and kindness) everywhere under Heaven would be 
Ren… He who is courteous avoids being humiliated, he who is generous wins 
the multitude, he who is sincere is trusted by others, he who is diligent 
succeeds in his work, and he who is kind is able to get service from others.’ 
(Analects 17.6)  
 
It would appear that it is extremely difficult for any human being to have all the virtues 
discussed above; a point which Chapter 6 will elaborate upon further. Some Confucian 
scholars argue that meeting the requirements of Ren is unachievable in reality, as 
Confucius rarely praises anyone for being a man of Ren (Tu 1968: 31-32).  However, this 
is not strictly correct. This is because Confucius gives Guan Zhong 管仲  (a great 
statesperson during the Spring and Autumn period) such praise for his achievement in 
bringing peace to the world without using force (Analects 14.16, 14.17).  
 
It is debatable whether Confucius think that Guan Zhong is a real man of Ren, or merely 
exemplifies what a man of Ren might look like. Indeed, in quotations from the Analects, 
Confucius also criticises Guan Zhong’s pretentiousness (Analects 3.22). However, it is 
uncontroversial that Confucius does at least believe that Guan Zhong generally meets the 
requirements of Ren.  
 
Moreover, it should not be ignored that in the Analects, only Guan Zhong, who is a 
statesperson, is praised by Confucius as being a man of Ren; rather than any ‘moral 
exemplars’ such as Confucius’ most favourite disciple, Yan Yuan 顏淵. This fact is 
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suggestive of the possibility that a statesperson who make remarkable achievements in 
governing the state is highly likely to be viewed by Confucius as meeting the 
requirements of Ren. Because of this, it seems inappropriate to follow the approach of 
some Confucian scholars who have merely defined Ren as a group of moral virtues, or 
who have confined the discussion of Ren to Confucian ethical reasoning. The 
requirements of Ren generally entail the requirements of becoming a good statesperson; 
or more specifically, a Confucian Ren statesperson. 
 
2.22 Equal Potential Capacities to Become Confucian Ren Statespersons 
 
The early Confucians seem to suggest that a man of Ren, who can meet the requirements 
of Ren with perfection, is like a sage and is thus extremely rare in reality. However, they 
believe that it is possible for some citizens to become Confucian Ren statespersons (Junzi
君子) (Tu 1968: 33). For example, Confucius says, ‘I will never get to meet a sage; if I 
manage to meet a Confucian Ren statesperson, I suppose I would be content’ (Analects 
7.26). 
 
In classical Confucianism, a Confucian Ren statesperson (Junzi 君子) is different from a 
man of Ren (ren 仁人), even though both are supposed to meet the requirements of Ren.  
A man of Ren is a hypothetical agent who has the kind of cognitive and volitional 
capabilities necessary for him to be able to always meet all the requirements of Ren. 
Actual human beings lack such capacities; therefore, a man of Ren may only exist in ideal 
situations. A Confucian Ren statesperson is close to a man of Ren; or more precisely, is 
much more like a man of Ren than to most other citizens. However, a Confucian Ren 
statesperson is not a superman and does indeed exist in reality.  
  
As will be further explained in the following chapters, early Confucians believe that every 
citizen has an equal potential capacity to become a Confucian Ren statesperson.  Mencius 
insists that Ren should be considered as part of human nature; he states that Ren originates 
from ‘the sense of compassion’ (ce yin zhi xin惻隱之心) with which every citizen is born 
(Mencius 6A6).21 Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis will further elaborate on ‘the 
sense of compassion’ and on early Confucian views of human nature. 
                                                          




For early Confucians, Ren is found within the innate moral and intellectual capacities of 
all human beings; i.e., it is not an ability acquired from some external source. Tu Weiming 
argues that Ren, as ‘a principle of “inwardness,”’ is not ‘a product of biological, social, 
or political force’ from the outside (Tu 1968: 33-32). Confucius contends that ‘Ren is 
something that must have its source in oneself and cannot be got from others’ (Analects 
12.1).  Therefore, Confucius says: ‘Is Ren indeed so far away? If we really wanted Ren, 
Ren would be at our very side’ (Analects 7.30). Mencius also says that if a person fails to 
meet the requirements of Ren, ‘he should seek the cause of failure in himself’ (Mencius 
2A7).22  
 
Early Confucians believe that every citizen has the potential to become a Confucian Ren 
statesperson, and it is this potential that motivates them to pursue Ren. Here, ‘to pursue 
Ren’ means to endeavour to know more about Ren, and to meet more and more of the 
requirements of Ren over time. Mencius asserts that every citizen is willing to pursue Ren, 
and this is like ‘water flowing downwards, or wild animals heading for the wilds’ 
(Mencius 4A9).  Confucius also insists that ‘citizens need Ren more than either water or 
fire. I have seen citizens die from treading on water and fire, but I have never seen a 
citizen die from treading the course of Ren’ (Analects 15.35). For early Confucians, Ren 
is intrinsically valuable and that every citizen, by their very nature, is motivated to pursue 
Ren. The rest of this Chapter will further elaborate upon this topic. 
 
However, for those who wish to become Confucian Ren statespersons, merely pursuing 
Ren is not sufficient in itself. Confucius warns, ‘pursuing Ren without being fond of 
learning is liable to lead to foolishness’ (Analects 17.8). Early Confucians contend that a 
person ought to keep cultivating oneself throughout the entire course of one’s life, in order 
to realise one’s potential to become a Confucian Ren statesperson. Thus, early Confucians 
attach great importance to education and self-cultivation; both can assist the citizens to 
                                                          
Ren’ (Mencius 6A6). He also states that ‘all things are already complete in us. To examine ourselves and to 
be true to ourselves; there is no greater joy than this. To dedicate oneself in all earnestness to reciprocity; 
this is the most direct way to be Ren’ (Mencius 7A4). 
22 Mencius contends that ‘to be a man of Ren is like archery. An archer first assumes a correct stance and 
then shoots. If he misses, he does not complain against those who do better. He simply seeks the cause of 
failure in himself’ (Mencius 2A7).  
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develop their latent capacities to become men of Ren. This theme will be further discussed 
in Chapter 6.23 
 
More specifically, Mencius contends that every human being is born with equal potential 
intellectual and moral capacities to know and practice Ren. These innate capacities relate 
to the four virtues: benevolence, righteousness, decorum and wisdom (Mencius 6A6, 
7A21). 24  Mencius compares these potential capacities to ‘seeds’ of grain. Just as a 
successful ripening of grain depends on the maturity of its seeds, so also does becoming 
a Confucian Ren Statesperson depends on the actualisation of these potential capacities 
(Mencius 6A19).25 
 
In reality, these potential capacities admit of different degree of actualisation. Human 
beings are all capable of actualising their potential capacities, in order to meet the 
requirements of Ren to a certain extent. However, very few can fully actualise one’s 
potential capacities. This being so, very few citizens can actually meet all the 
requirements of Ren perfectly (Tu 1968: 32). This is why early Confucians believe that it 
is extremely difficult for someone to be a man of Ren. To possess all the virtues 
encompassed by Ren, and to fully achieve Ren, is almost impossible for the actual citizens. 
(This will be further explained in the last section of this chapter).  
 
Some Confucian scholars point out Ren is not merely a unified notion that covers all 
Confucian virtues, as well as the abilities to practice these virtues; in addition, it is a 
metaphysical reality (Chan 1955: 309).  Ren is highly unlikely to be achieved in reality, 
but it serves as a normative standard and aspiration for human beings (Tang 1962: 200). 
By endeavouring to meet all the requirements of Ren and to become a man of Ren, some 
citizens are finally in a position to become Confucian Ren statespersons. For the early 
Confucians, Confucian Ren statespersons are not born with any intellectual and moral 
superiority. Rather, they are well-educated individuals who have made substantial 
                                                          
23 Many passages in the Confucian Classics emphasise the importance of education. See Analects 1.1, 1.6, 
1.7, 1.8, 2.4, 2.15, 5.28, 7.2, 7.3, 7.25, 8.12, 8.17, 12.15, 13.9, 14.24, 15.31, 15.32, 15.39, 16.9, 16.13, 17.8, 
19.6, 19.7, 19.13, 19.22; Mencius 1A7, 1B3, 1B9, 2A2, 2b2, 3A3, 3A4, 5B4, 7A14, 7A20, 7A40; Xunzi 
1.3, 1.4, 1.13, 1.14, 1.15, 1.17, 9.1, 9.24, 10.14, 18.26, 16.1, 27.52. 
24 ‘Benevolence, righteousness, decorum and wisdom are not infused into us from without. We definitely 
possess them. It is just that we do not think about it, that is all. Therefore, it is said, “Seek and you will get 
it; let go and you will lose it”’ (Mencius 6A6). Chapter 4 of this thesis will discuss this topic further. 
25 ‘Of all seeds, the best are the five kinds of grain; yet, if they are not mature, they are not even as good as 
the weeds. So the value of Ren depends entirely on its being brought to maturity’ (Mencius 6A19). Chapter 
4 of this thesis will discuss Mencius’ ideas about virtuous ‘seeds’ further. 
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achievements in their moral self-cultivation, and who are thereby in a position to meet 
the requirements of Ren much better than others (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 will elaborate 
on this further). 
 
2.23 Self-cultivation and ‘Return to Li’ 
 
Confucius believes that if one wishes to cultivate oneself and to become a Confucian Ren 
statesperson, one’s most important priority is to exercise self-discipline, and to ‘return to 
Li禮 (rituals)’ (ke ji fu li 克己復禮). 
 
The Master said, ‘To exercise self-discipline and return to Li is Ren. If a man 
can for one day subdue himself and return to Li, all under Heaven will ascribe 
Ren to him.’ (Analects 12.1) 26 
 
Tu Weiming points out that the concept of self-discipline (ke ji克己) in the passage above 
is practically identical to the concept of self-cultivation (xiu shen修身) (Tu 1968: 30). 
As discussed earlier, Confucius holds that ‘Ren is something that must have its source in 
oneself and cannot be got from others’ (Analects 12.1). Also, citizens, by their very nature, 
are willing to pursue Ren. Thus, no one should be compelled to meet the requirements of 
Ren; one’s self-cultivation should be taken up of one’s own accord, rather than imposed 
by others.  
 
For early Confucians, self-cultivation means to act according to a series of interpersonal 
principles concerning how to treat others and how to contribute to the benefit of one’s 
fellow citizens. These principles are viewed by many as the Confucian ‘golden rules,’ 
which consist two ‘categorical imperatives:’ Zhong 忠 and Shu 恕. 
 
Zhong 忠: ‘Do not treat others the way you do not want to be treated.’ 
(Analects 12.2, 15.24) 
 
                                                          
26 ke ji fu li克己復禮 will be further discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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Shu 恕 : ‘You want to establish yourself; then help others to establish 
themselves. You want to be reasonable; then help others to be reasonable.’ 
(Analects 6.30) 
 
Shu 恕 has more positively active connotations than Zhong 忠. Because of this, it is often 
associated with the requirements of Ren; especially those which relate to becoming a 
Confucian Ren Statesperson. For early Confucians, the Confucian Ren statespersons are 
those who have made significant achievements in self-cultivation, and who are thereby in 
a position to attain to Shu恕; i.e., to make substantial positive contributions to the well-
being of other citizens.  
 
Besides Shu 恕, the ‘return to Li’ (Fu Li 複禮) also plays a prominent role in self-
cultivation. In the Confucian classics, Li encompasses a broad range of meanings; it has 
been translated as ‘rituals,’ ‘decorum,’ ‘manner,’ ‘propriety,’ and ‘ceremony.’ In classical 
Confucianism, Li is concerned with various rituals and abstract principles that relate to 
‘looking,’ ‘listening,’ ‘speaking,’ ‘moving’ and other behaviours involved in various 
relations, political activities and religious ceremonies. Confucius says, ‘One has no way 
of taking one’s stand unless one knows Li’ (Analects 20.3).  Yu Jiyuan餘紀元 explains 
Li as ‘the totality of socially acceptable behaviour patterns and lifestyles, including both 
moral and non-moral norms’ (Yu 1998: 326).  
 
By advocating a ‘return to Li’ (Fu Li 複禮), Confucius intends to constrain and channel 
the process of self-cultivation, through the practice of a collection of political and 
religious rituals and social regulations. 
 
The Master said, ‘If a man is without Ren, what has he to do with Li? If a man 
is without Ren, what has he to do with Yue?’ (Analects 3.3)  
 
The religious ceremonies of the Zhou dynasty (1046-256BCE) took the form Li禮 (rituals) 
and Yue 樂 (music). Throughout the history of Imperial China, religious rituals were a 
less costly alternative to war; they served the purposes of maintaining political authority 
and establishing the sacred legitimacy of the rulers. The harmony generated by shared 
traditions and customs was a key value underlying the practice of such rituals. Religious 




Confucius did acknowledge religious rituals as an important aspect of legitimate political 
authority; however, he was generally reluctant to justify any kind of divinely sanctioned 
political authority based on religious beliefs. On the contrary, Confucius stated that the 
citizens should recognise the practical limitations of their belief in supernatural beings. 
He proposes to ‘respect the ghosts and spirits while keeping them at a distance’ (Analects 
6.22). Confucius never denies the existence of supernatural beings; what he means here 
is that citizens should not rely on supernatural beings as the judges or agents of good and 
evil. 
 
One of the main reasons that Confucius attached great importance to Li 禮 was because 
Confucius intended to persuade the rulers at his time to resort to rituals, rather than to war 
or violence, in order to retain their political power. As Chapter 3 will make clear, early 
Confucians generally oppose using force to keep political order. They believed that during 
their time (ca. 551-221 BCE), war and violence were overused, and ritual-based political 
order was at risk. So, Confucius proposed a ‘return to Li’ which would bring peace and 
order to the whole world, without requiring any resort to political force or coercive power.   
 
Moreover, in classical Confucianism, Li is a series of customs and acts practised not just 
in religious ceremonies, but also in the daily lives of the citizens. Thus, early Confucians 
tend to direct Li towards regulating the behaviour of the citizens, as well as their 
interactions with others. As Yuri Pines says: at the time of Confucius, the term Li departed 
from ‘its original narrow meaning as religious rites and ceremonial demeanour, and 
became the ultimate guiding principle of political and social life’ (Pines 2002: 209).  
 
Tu Weiming appeals to a remark made by Mou Zongsan, and argues that Li are Ren’s 
windows, by which Ren ‘needs to expose itself to the outside world.’ Without Li, Ren will 
‘become suffocated.’ Similarly, without Ren, Li will ‘become empty formalism’ and 
further ‘degenerate into social coercion incapable of conscious improvement and liable 
to destroy any true human feelings’ (Tu 1968: 37).  
 
If in classical Confucianism, Ren is the highest moral ability about ‘what ought to be’ in 
ideal situations, then Li is a collection of moral and political principles about ‘what is’ in 
non-ideal situations. Li steers the self-cultivation of the citizens in their process of 
actualising their potential capacities to meet the requirements of Ren. In reality, no one 
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can know and practice Ren perfectly. However, by making significant progress in their 
self-cultivation, e.g. by getting an education, gaining knowledge and practising rituals, 
some citizens can better meet the requirements of Ren than others and eventually become 
Confucian Ren statespersons. 
 
Self-cultivation is the first step to become a Confucian Ren statesperson. The Great 
Learning (Daxue大學) describes this process: ‘one starts with self-cultivation, then one 
proceeds to have an orderly family, to govern a state, and at length, one is in a position to 
bring peace and order to the whole world through one’s moral virtues’ (The Book of Rites 
Liji禮記: Daxue大學 2). Self-cultivation should start at an early stage of life and be 
improved by constant self-cultivation. The process of self-cultivation is difficult and 
endless. In the beginning, one is required to exert great efforts in order to cultivate oneself, 
but over time, self-cultivation will become one’s true nature. By that point, one no longer 
needs to discipline one’s desires; or as Confucius says, ‘at seventy, I could follow the 
dictates of my own heart; for what I desired no longer overstepped the boundaries of right’ 
(Analects 2.4). 
 
The final goal of self-cultivation is to become a Confucian Ren statesperson and to ‘bring 
peace and order to the whole world’ (Mencius 7B32). In order to capture the essence of 
the process of achieving such final goal, many Confucian scholars prefer to use the phrase 
of ‘inner sagehood and outward kingliness’ (nei sheng wai wang 內聖外王).27 ‘Inner 
sagehood’ (nei sheng 內聖 ) refers to the Confucian emphasis on one’s moral self-
cultivation for the purpose of actualising one’s potential moral capacities to meet the 
requirements of Ren. Tu Weiming points out that ‘Inner Sagehood’ in Confucianism is 
‘defined as striving to become a genuine human being who through self-transformation, 
a kind of inner illumination, realises not only the moral goodness that is intrinsic to human 
nature but also the cosmic creativity that embraces the universe in its entirety’ (Tomei 
2008: 916). 
 
By making substantive achievements in one’s moral self-cultivation and developing 
‘Inner Sagehood,’ one is in a position to achieve ‘outward kingliness’ (wai wang外王); 
this means to become a Confucian Ren statesperson and to implement ‘Ren government’ 
                                                          
27 This paradigm first appeared in Zhuangzi. For a detailed discussion, see (Li 1991: 3-4, 2001b: 12).  
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(Ren zheng 仁政). ‘Ren government’ requires the rulers to govern according to the 
requirements of Ren, and most early Confucians view it as the best system of governance. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, early Confucians often defend the superiority of ‘Ren 
government’ against ‘Hegemonic Government’ (ba zheng 霸政) which proposes the rule 
by force, for the purposes of maintaining order (Analects 2.3, Mencius 2A3). 
 
2.3 Confucian Meritocratic Beliefs  
 
The idea of ‘Ren Government’ is the very core of Confucian meritocracy. It is founded 
upon a normative principle, which is roughly characterised as follows: wherever possible, 
the state should be ruled by Confucian Ren statespersons (Junzi 君子). As discussed 
above, the Confucian Ren Statespersons are those who have made substantial 
achievements in the process of self-cultivation; this process is guided by the Li, which 
helps the citizens to actualise their potential capacities, in order to meet the requirements 
of Ren. The Confucian Ren statespersons have the virtues that are necessary for making 
reasonable political decisions; they are also altruistic enough to sacrifice their own self-
interest for the promotion of the well-being of their fellow citizens. This will be further 
explained in Chapter 4.  
 
Confucian Meritocratic Democracy (CMD) is a form of government which can serve as 
a democratic version of the early Confucian programme of ‘Ren Government.’ It is 
founded upon three Confucian meritocratic beliefs (CMBs). 
 
CMB 1: There are substantive (procedure-independent) political truths embodied 
in Ren 仁, which are the criteria by which political decisions should be evaluated. 
 
CMB 2: Every citizen has equal innate capacities; these capacities can and ought to 
be cultivated in order that one might know and practise the political truths of Ren. 
Only a few citizens who have made great achievements in self-cultivation, actually 
know and practise the political truths of Ren much better than others. 
 
CMB 3: Knowing and practising the political truths of Ren much better than others 




Democratic theorists may object to these CMBs, which appear to be incompatible with 
some normative democratic principles. It is to be expected that their main concerns would 
be as follows: 
 
By appealing to substantive (procedure-independent) political truths, CMB 1 may risk 
tending towards a despotic or authoritarian kind of politics. 
 
If CMB2 is to be understood as suggesting that some citizens are more competent than 
others in knowing and practising the political truths of Ren, this belief has some 
exclusionary or elitist implications and therefore is incompatible with the moral equality 
of all citizens. 
 
Insofar as CMB 3 risks confusing expertise with political authority, it may lead to 
legitimising an overly technocratic ‘dictatorship by experts.’   
 
The following chapters will discuss these interrelated concerns, as well as some 
normative democratic principles that underlie them. The purpose of this thesis is not to 
prove that CMD is in a position to conclusively resolve all of these concerns. Rather, the 
objective is to argue, firstly, that some of the normative democratic principles upon which 
these concerns are founded may be contestable, rather than being self-evidently true and 
applicable in all cases. Secondly, even if one accepts these normative democratic 
principles, CMD is not intrinsically objectionable, as it is indeed compatible with the 
practical aims of such normative democratic principles.  
 
2.4 Political Truths of Ren 
 
Democratic theorists may be sceptical about the presence of substantive political truths 
in CMB1. In other words, they may be doubtful that there are any substantive (procedure-
independent) political truths of Ren 仁, by which political decisions should generally be 
judged. Some political philosophers worry about appeals to political truths; such truths 
may be perceived as having a despotic or authoritarian character. Some argue that there 
are no normative realities or truths independent of individual commitments or 
preferences.28 If for the sake of argument, this were assumed to be the case, then the 
                                                          
28 There is an important metaethical debate surrounding the semantics and metaphysics of normativity 
among constructivists, expressivists, subjectivists and realists. However, this is a topic which does not 
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logical consequence of this would be the impossibility of any political truths independent 
of individual preferences.29 
 
2.41 Truths in Normative Political Theories 
 
Hannah Arendt argues that politics, by its very nature, is contestable. She believes that 
disputes, contests and disagreements are of the very essence of normatively sound politics 
(Arendt 1961: 241). Thus, Arendt contends that political discussions should never begin 
by stating conclusions which are held to be political truths. She asserts that political truths, 
including presumptions about justice, have a despotic character. Therefore, Arendt 
believes that appeals to political truths risk precluding debate and contestation in the 
realm of politics (Estlund 2008: 21). 
 
John Rawls also worries about appeals to political truths in politics, but for an entirely 
different reason. He suggests that the purpose of politics is a practical agreement in the 
face of reasonable pluralism. Therefore, he argues that it is enough to come up with some 
principles that everyone could endorse from their own (reasonable) points of view. For 
Rawls, appeals to political truths are controversial and are thus unnecessary in politics. 
‘Holding a political conception as true, and for that reason alone the one suitable basis of 
public reason is exclusive, even sectarian, and so likely to foster political division’ (Rawls 
1996: 129). In his book Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, David 
Estlund summarises the view of both Arent and Rawls by saying that political truths ‘must 
play no role in the normative political theory’ on any basis whatsoever (Estlund 2008: 
23). 
 
However, Estlund’s conclusion is contestable. If the motivations of both philosophers are 
taken into consideration, the Arendtian and Rawlsian anxieties surrounding the pursuit of 
substantive truths in politics do not preclude the existence of political truths. For, these 
two philosophers merely contend that no one has reasonable grounds to make dogmatic 
claims that he or she has a perfect grasp of any political truths; but this is not to say that 
political truths do not exist at all. 
 
                                                          
require close examination for the purpose of this thesis. 
29 Arrow’s Theorem and its relative results show that all majority-winning methods based on ranking the 
preferences of individuals are flawed (Bouyssou 1992). 
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Both CMB1 and CMB2 presume the existence of political truths embodied in Ren and 
that those who have made substantial achievements in the process of self-cultivation can 
have significantly more knowledge of these political truths, as well as the capacity to 
practice them more consistently than others. This does not amount to the questionable 
presumption that any person can ever perfectly grasp the political truths embodied in Ren. 
Nor does it mean that Ren is entirely achievable in real political practice. Ren has the 
function of establishing the requirement of political practice. As discussed above, the 
requirements of Ren serve as normative standards that stimulate aspiration towards virtue 
in all political endeavours, even though very few citizens could ever perfectly meet such 
requirements in practice. 
 
It is thus clear that in this thesis, Ren is more like a ‘regulative’ ideal (in the Kantian 
sense), than an ideal that can be practised perfectly in reality. Immanuel Kant contends 
that the sage of the Stoics is itself an ideal and that such an ideal provides people with 
‘regulative principles.’ His discussion is worth quoting at length: 
 
As the idea provides a rule, so the ideal serves as an archetype for the perfect 
and complete determination of the copy. Thus, the conduct of this wise and 
divine man serves us as a standard of action, with which we may compare and 
judge ourselves, which may help us to reform ourselves, although the 
perfection it demands can never be attained by us. Although we cannot 
concede objective reality to these ideals, they are not to be considered as 
chimeras; on the contrary, they provide reason with a standard, which enables 
it to estimate, by comparison, the degree of incompleteness in the objects 
presented to it. (Kant 1855: 351) 
 
Drawing inspiration from Kant’s ‘regulative principles,’ some modern political 
philosophers ‘define a “regulative” ideal, unachievable in its full state, as an ideal to 
which, all else being equal, a practice should be judged as approaching more or less 
closely’ (Mansbridge 2010: 65).  
 
If Ren is to be understood as a Confucian regulative ideal, then the notion of the Confucian 
Ren statespersons knowing and practising the political truths of Ren better than others 
merely means that as far as is humanly possible, such statespersons ought to be closer to 




This being so, it would appear that the Arendtian and Rawlsian views alluded to above 
actually do not conflict with any CMBs about political truths at all. More precisely, CMBs 
have three main assumptions about political truths: 
 
Firstly, the existence of political truths. Arendt and Rawls do not deny this hypothesis.   
 
Secondly, even if it is assumed that such truths exist, they cannot necessarily be perfectly 
grasped by human beings.  Arendt and Rawls agree with this.   
 
Thirdly, even if the political truths of Ren cannot be perfectly grasped, they nevertheless 
ought to be pursued in political practice. 
 
Arendt and Rawls thus appear to only argue against the pursuit of political truths, insofar 
as there is a dogmatic assertion of political theories. However, there is no reason to believe 
they would be averse to engaging with political truths in actual political practice. And 
even if it were to be asserted that Arendt and Rawls have not specified any particular 
political truth relating to political practices, it would be still valid to contend that Arendt 
and Rawls are different from democratic proceduralists. This is because the latter school 
of thought suggests that there are no substantive (procedure-independent) political truths 
or standards at all.  
 
2.42 Proceduralist View of Political Truths 
 
Some proceduralists, e.g. Schumpeterians, advocate a kind of political nihilism. They 
believe that ‘normative truths’ in politics, such as the common good or public interest are 
all fantasies, and that the voters who think that they are voting for some political truths 
are actually promoting their personal values or preferences (Schumpeter [1943] 2003, 
Brennan and Lomasky 1997). Habermas has a similar view, stating that there are no 
political truths which exist independent of democratic procedures; he asserts that ‘the 
notion of higher law only belongs to the premodern world’ (Habermas 1996: 106).  
Habermas believes that normative truths cannot be treated as ‘an alien authority residing 




It appears that there are some theoretical and practical risks in denying the existence of 
any such substantive political truths. Theoretically speaking, such a proceduralist view 
necessitates denying there are any normative standards by which to evaluate political 
decisions. It also entails a denial that any political statements or affirmative actions are 
true or false. Hence, this kind of political nihilism risks rendering many valuable, 
admirable, normatively good or right components of political processes, such as the 
public interest and the common good, either profoundly deficient or nonsensical. This 
will be further explained in Chapter 5 
 
In practice, one ought to know that sacrificing one’s life for the common good is a 
miserable and yet sometimes unavoidable task for citizens from any state. If, as 
proceduralists hold, the common good and public interest are all fantasies, how can 
citizens be persuaded to serve their country?  Why do so many citizens wish to join the 
military, risking their own interests or the interests of their loved ones, in order to protect 
the interests of millions of strangers?  Why do they not choose to be free-riders instead? 
Moreover, even if they join the army, can such an army ever be capable of defeating an 
opposing state whose citizens generally celebrate patriotism and the common good?    
 
However, it seems that some democratic proceduralists are inclined to take the above 
theoretical and practical risks of denying substantive political truths, in order to defend 
the non-substantive political truths, they themselves prefer: procedural fairness 
(Schumpeter [1943] 2003: 4, Dahl 1979: 97-133). Proceduralists doubt that there are any 
political truths; they often argue even if there are such truths, they are merely procedural 
values which serve to subject ‘important matters to political control, not in any particular 
tendency of this to lead to supposedly good or just decisions’ (Estlund 2008: 26). Hence, 
for proceduralists, the only political truth is procedural fairness. There are no normative 
standards one can use to judge political decisions, except for these very same standards 
of ‘procedural rationality.’ 
 
Of course, not all schools of democratic theory believe that procedural fairness is the sole 
legitimate value of democracy. However, most do agree the essence of democracy is 
found in democratic procedures. The latest developments in democratic theories about 
social choice and deliberative democracy have come from those presenting their research 
purely as an application of procedural standards (Freeman 2000, Bohman 1997). The 
difference between social choice theorists and deliberative democrats is that social choice 
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theorists focus on the aggregation of individual preferences, while deliberative democrats 
emphasise the importance of the public employment of reason. However, they all agree 
with the proceduralists that procedural considerations are essential to democracy.30 
 
This purely procedural view carries the risk of undermining all political authority 
whatsoever. Moreover, its pronounced suspicion of the ruling elites and robust advocacy 
of the empowerment of the ordinary citizens may contribute to certain phenomena 
common in a Western democratic context; including an anti-elitist political culture, which 
risks resulting in a widespread lack of respect for the government (Bell 2006, Bai 2009).  
 
In recent times, democratic countries have seen a substantial decrease in respect for 
authority; especially since the rise of cynicism and populism. It appears that in democratic 
elections, the candidates have often pretended to be ignorant, in order to label themselves 
as ordinary citizens, rather than elites. This is intended to increase their ‘electability’ 
(Benedetto 2004). Jane Mansbridge points out that modern democracy has abandoned the 
traditional aristocratic view of representatives, and instead embraces a relatively 
egalitarian view. Voters are more willing to vote for candidates who are more like ‘one 
of them’ and who also ‘possess their sentiments and feelings’ (Mansbridge 2009: 387).  
 
According to Mansbridge’s view, many democratic representatives also ‘see themselves 
as “like” their constituents, in demographic characteristics, political attitudes, or both’ 
(Mansbridge 2011: 623). Moreover, politicians in democratic countries usually pretend 
to be a political outsider, in order to get elected. Some of them claim that their role is to 
reduce the scope of intervention on the part of the government. When the leaders of the 
government present themselves as ‘average Joes’ who want to practice the ideal of limited 
government, it is hard to believe that these leaders will be highly-respected, even by those 
who vote for them. Chapter 6 will discuss this topic further.   
 
If this form of proceduralism were to result in widespread cynicism towards the 
possibility of any normative truths, it is likely that such truths would be replaced by the 
invisible tyranny of capital or the free market. From a perspective of the free market, all 
citizens enjoy formal equality, insofar as each citizen is potentially a customer that is 
served by the seller. Therefore, with the influence exerted by the proceduralist view of 
                                                          




political truths, ‘one person, one vote’ might degenerate into ‘one dollar, one vote;’ a 
situation where political outcome depends more upon wealth than upon substantive 
political truths. In such a case, equality before capital or before the free market is the main 
equality enjoyed by most citizens (Chapter 5 will elaborate upon political equality). 
 
A large body of empirical and theoretical studies has shown that capital is indeed playing 
an increasingly significant role in modern democracies (Fiss 1997, Lessig 2011, 
Fukuyama 2011, 2014). Because of the disproportionate influence capital exerts upon the 
government, some scholars criticise democratic governments for failing to keep political 
leaders accountable and responsive to the general public; especially to members of the 
public who are not wealthy (McCormick 2011). 
 
In modern democracies, paying a bribe to a politician can be legal, as it is possible to be 
disguised as making a political contribution to the politician before the election. Francis 
Fukuyama contends that in American politics, it is extremely difficult to rule out bribery. 
He states: 
 
Criminalized bribery is narrowly defined in American law as a transaction in 
which a politician and a private party explicitly agree upon a specific quid pro 
quo exchange… The law bans only the market transaction but not the 
exchange of favours, and that is what the American lobbying industry is built 
around. (Fukuyama 2014:311)  
 
Lawrence Lessig claims that there are many legal ways to trade political influence for 
money. For example, some lobbying groups try to influence members of Congress by 
paying their overseas trips to attend an academic conference in a fancy resort. In most 
cases, interest groups simply make a campaign donation to a congressperson for an 
inexplicit favour in the future (Lessig 2011: 24-38). 
 
Those who acknowledge the above problems have the option of proposing limits on 
campaign financing during democratic elections. The scope of regulation might include 
restrictions on campaign donations and candidate expenditure; e.g. how much an 
individual can spend on media advertisements, on lobbying, and on supporting particular 
candidates or political decisions.  However, this proposal risks coming into conflict with 
freedom of speech. The U.S Supreme Court decisions of 2010 and 2014 struck down laws 
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that imposed limitations on campaign finance and expenditure. Some Supreme Court 
justices argued that all limits on election spending and contributions violate the First 
Amendment which protects free speech.31 
 
Even if it is possible to reduce the influence of wealth by introducing campaign finance 
regulation, rich individuals still have the option of seeking other ways to exert a 
disproportional influence on democratic procedures (Issacharoff and Karlan 1999). This 
misuse of wealth risks running contrary to the ideals of the Enlightenment and the 
capitalistic market economy that have traditionally played a major role in fostering 
modern democracy. Some democratic theorists, such as John Kean, have considered the 
problems outlined above. They propose that democratic procedures need to be 
supplemented by other political goods; such as social justice, forums for deliberation, 
education for voters, civil society and additional ways of monitoring power (Keane 2015).  
 
Some other democratic theorists advocate using meritocratic perspectives, in order to 
counterbalance any one-sidedly proceduralist view of democracy. For example, David 
Estlund criticises some purely proceduralist approaches, and proposes ‘epistemic 
proceduralism.’ His proposal appears to be a mix of both democratic procedural and 
meritocratic perspectives. It includes a meritocratic perspective, which recognises the 
importance of normative truths or procedural-independent standards in the evaluation of 
political decisions; as well as a procedural perspective, which is directed towards ensuring 
fair and equal political participation for all citizens.  
 
Estlund contends that procedural fairness alone is a rather weak justification for political 
systems; most citizens living in a democratic country would find it very difficult to accept 
that procedural fairness is the only consideration that can justify the authority or 
legitimacy of democracy.32 He argues that if the sole value of democracy is absolute 
fairness of procedure, i.e. ‘giving each person an equal chance of changing the outcome,’ 
then any random procedure, e.g. flipping a coin, should be just as good as the procedures 
                                                          
31 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, No. 08-205, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). McCutcheon v. 
Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S._ (2014) 
32 There are other arguments against the proceduralist view of the legitimacy of political authority. For 
example, some contemporary Confucian political philosophers contend that procedural value may not be 
in a position to be universalised; since some citizens, especially those living in East Asian countries, tend 
to understand political arrangements in consequential rather than procedural terms (Shin and Sin 2012, Bell 
2000). However, this argument is less convincing than Estlund’s arguments, as it is founded upon an 
intuitive assertion that has not been empirically verified. 
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commonly associated with democratic constitutions. ‘If that is right and if fairness is the 
main basis of democracy’s importance, then why not flip a coin instead?’ (Estlund 2008: 
6).33   
 
Moreover, Estlund criticises two approaches which may prove that democratic 
procedures are substantively reliable and thereby better than ‘just flipping a coin.’ The 
first approach borrows mathematical ideas from the Jury Theorem, which was first proven 
by Condorcet in 1785. The Jury Theorem states that if there are N alternatives, and an 
individual voter’s chance of getting the right answer is better than 1/N chance, then a 
democratic procedure is always better than a random procedure. Estlund points out that 
the Jury Theorem is not necessarily supportive of the view that democratic procedures 
are better than random procedures, in cases where there are indeed only a few alternatives.  
For instance, if N=2 which means that there are only two choices for voters to choose, 
then a better than random result requires the voter to have a better than 50% chance to 
choose the right answer. But this is not a common scenario in reality (Estlund 2008: 223-
225).  
 
The second approach is Contractualism which, briefly stated, is ‘a family of views that 
understand justice or rightness as constituted by facts about what would be agreed to in a 
certain imaginary collective choice situation’ (ibid. 16). The democratic procedure is 
better than a random process because it is generally similar to any hypothetical contractual 
procedure which is capable of producing just or right results. Estlund notes that the 
problem with this democracy/contractualism analogy is that there is no necessary 
connection between actual democratic procedures and any hypothetical contractual 
procedure; the resemblance is merely superficial. This is because contractualism is 
premised upon the assumption that its imaginary participants are only concerned with 
certain partial or narrow questions, derived from their partisan perspectives. This is a rare 
situation and is also morally implausible as an analogue of actual political practice.  
 
Estlund’s critiques of the strategy of pure proceduralism in contemporary democratic 
theories have one main purpose: to defend the importance of procedure-independent 
                                                          
33 Estlund contends that ‘democratic procedures (some of them anyway) might indeed be fair, but this will 
turn out to be morally too small of a matter to support an account of authority and legitimacy. Procedural 
fairness alone cannot explain most of the features of democratic institutions that we are likely to feel are 
crucial. To anticipate my argument with a one-liner, if what we want is a procedure that is fair to all, why 
not flip a coin? That is, why not choose a law or policy randomly?’ (Estlund 2008: 66). 
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standards in the evaluation of political decisions, by providing an account of ‘very general 
questions of authority and legitimacy in a political community’ (ibid. 2). Estlund believes 
that political expertise and political truths are crucial to the theoretical justification of any 
political system. Scholars who are in agreement with Estlund’s procedure-independent 
standards may be open to CMB1, i.e., the postulation of the existence of the procedure-
independent political truths that are embodied in Ren; as such truths have the potential to 
play a crucial role in the evaluation of political decisions as well as in the justification of 
political systems.  
 
2.43 Pursuing Ren 
 
After having considered CMB1, the next task is to explore CMB2: Every citizen has equal 
innate capacities; these capacities can and ought to be cultivated, in order that one might 
know and practise the political truths of Ren. Only a few citizens who have made 
significant progress in their self-cultivation, actually know and practise the political truths 
of Ren much better than others.  
 
One might argue that even if there are indeed substantive (procedure-independent) 
political truths embodied in Ren, and every citizen has potential to know and practice 
these political truths, this does not mean that every citizen ought to pursue the political 
truths of Ren. This is especially so if one considers how it is almost impossible for any 
human being to perfectly grasp these political truths. Confucians still need to provide an 
independent argument for why Ren is valuable and worth pursuing.  
 
One possible answer on the part of Confucians could be a regression argument; this would 
be a very similar approach taken by Immanuel Kant, when discussing virtues. Kant 
contends that some virtues are not merely of value for certain instrumental purposes, but 
also represent intrinsic values for human beings. He says: ‘Moderation in affects and 
passions, self-control, and calm reflection are not only good for all sorts of purpose but 
even seem to constitute a part of the inner worth of a person’ (Groundwork of the 
Metaphysic of Morals, Section I, 4: 394, Feinberg and Shafer-Landau 2013: 639). 
 
Similarly, Confucians may argue that Ren, which is the totality of the relationship-based 
virtues that make it possible for citizens to make reasonable decisions, is not only 
instrumentally valuable for all sorts of purpose but also intrinsically valuable for human 
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beings. This is because any valuable thing citizens may pursue has a value contingent 
upon its compatibility with Ren (Analects 12.1, 15.35, Mencius 2A7, 4A9). 
 
But what is the source of value of Ren itself? Early Confucians turn to Heaven (tian天) 
or the Mandate of Heaven (tianming 天命) as the external source (Zeng 2015: 63).34 
However, for many modern political philosophers, such metaphysical arguments appear 
philosophically questionable and unacceptable in practice.  
 
Zongsan Mou (牟宗三), one of the most prestigious modern Confucian philosopher, 
argues that Ren must be grounded in ‘Intellectual Intuition (zhi de zhi jue智的直覺)’ of 
human beings, and that this ‘Intellectual Intuition’ is the primary source or uncaused 
cause of all values (Mou 2000, 2013). 
 
Specifically, in his project of ‘Moral Metaphysics,’ Mou borrows the term ‘Intellectual 
Intuition’ from Kant. In Kant’s philosophy, only God has the capacity of ‘Intellectual 
Intuition’ (Bunnin 2008: 614). However, Mou attaches a slightly different meaning to this 
term than Kant did. He argues that traditional Chinese philosophy, including 
Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism, have contributed something very special 
to the world. I.e., a universalist belief that all human beings are born with the capacity of 
‘Intellectual Iintuition.’ Such capacity is an uncaused and direct knowledge of reality, and 
which does not depend on any particular external experiences of the senses (Mou 2000: 
89-93).  
 
Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism all have similar ideas about ‘Intellectual 
Intuition.’ However, Mou believes that the ‘Intellectual Intuition’ of Confucianism, 
which is identical with Ren, is superior to that of Daoism and Buddhism. This is because 
Ren is not only a supersensible mode of knowledge, but also a fundamentally moral and 
creative human potential. For Mou, pursuing Ren is a spontaneous human behaviour, 
which has nothing to do with any cause and effect; or any cognitive categories as space, 
time or number (Mou 2013: 113). Therefore, Mou establishes the ‘objectivity’ of Ren 
through his metaphysical explanation of ‘Intellectual Intuition.’ Moreover, Mou opens 
the possibility of the existence of sages who perfect their ‘intellectual intuition’ and who 
                                                          
34 Chapters 3 and 5 will further elaborate on ‘Heaven’ in classical Confucianism. 
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by virtue of this, know and practise Ren much better than others (Bunnin 2008: 619, 
Billioud 2006: 234).  
 
Some scholars have criticised Mou’s approach, especially his postulation of irrational 
‘Intellectual Intuition.’ It seems difficult to accept that without turning to external 
experiences or even to reasons, human beings can spontaneously apprehend any deeper 
reality which may underlie the mere phenomena that are measured and described by 
scientific methods. Moreover, Mou appears to provide insufficient evidence of his claim 
that all human beings possess the ‘Intellectual Intuitions’ (Billioud 2011: 113). 
 
Even if one does not resort to Mou’s ideas of ‘Intellectual Intuitions,’ Ren can nonetheless 
be treated as having an independent value in itself insofar as it is not considered as 
embodying a kind of interest which accrues to those who pursue Ren. The value of Ren 
lies in the fact that it ought to be respected as an end in itself; rather because it offers 
benefit for those who pursue Ren. The experience of pursuing Ren can be beneficial, as 
in the case of pursuing someone with whom you are falling in love. However, the value 
of Ren does not necessarily require those who pursue Ren to benefit from such an 
experience. Velleman argues that it is possible for something to be valuable, even if it 
does not benefit the specific individuals who value the thing in question. This long 
passage is worth quoting in full: 
 
Things can be venerable, for example, whether or not there is any benefit in 
venerating them; and they can be awesome whether or not one would gain by 
holding them in awe. So, the fact that value must be capable of registering 
with someone, who would thus appreciate it, does not mean that it must be 
capable of accruing to someone, who would thus gain by it. Value requires a 
potential valuer but not a potential beneficiary. (Velleman 1999: 609) 
  
People often equate what is valuable for someone with whatever it would be rational for 
someone to value. The ‘rationality’ at issues here implies a kind of self-interest. However, 
rational selflessness is also possible among human beings; this being so, it is necessary 
to acknowledge that there is something, such as Ren, whose value is not reducible to mere 
self-interest alone. As will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, those who meet the 
requirements of Ren must be altruistic enough to sacrifice their own self-interest for the 
well-being of their fellow citizens. In modern political philosophy, being rational and 
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being reasonable are distinct notions (Rawls 2001: 9, 81-82). Those who pursue Ren may 
not appear rational in terms of their self-interest, but they can nonetheless be understood 
as reasonable agents.  
 
To sum up: for early Confucians, Ren is valuable as an end, which every human being is 
capable of pursuing. Human beings are, naturally enough, willing to pursue Ren. But even 
so, Ren does not always benefit those who are actually pursuing it. No one can perfectly 
grasp all the political truths of Ren or meet all the requirements of Ren. However, some 
citizens, who have made great achievements in self-cultivation, can be closer to Ren, i.e., 
can know and practise the political truths of Ren much better than others. Such citizens 
can become Confucian Ren statespersons (Junzi君子), who are responsible for making 





3. Political Authority 
 
The question of whether or not the political truths of Ren entail the necessity of any 
particular kind of political authority is a complex one. This question may provoke a 
degree of doxubt about the validity of CMB3, which states that knowing and practising 
the political truths of Ren much better than others is a warrant for having political 
authority over others. For, CMB3 appears to be incompatible with the normative 
democratic principle of political authority. 
 
In order to engage with this issue, this chapter will attempt to develop a Confucian 
conception of political authority. This development is founded upon a critical and 
comparative analysis of the meritocratic views of political authority in classical 
Confucianism and some of the most influential contemporary democratic theories of 
political authority.35 
 
3.1 The Political Authority of the Confucian Ren Statespersons 
 
The meaning of ‘political authority’ in modern political philosophy overlaps to some 
degree with the analogous notion in classical Confucianism, but there are also some points 
of conflict.36 Normatively speaking, early Confucians would agree with most modern 
                                                          
35 This chapter touches contemporary democratic theories of a group of modern political philosophers, 
while mainly focusing on David Estlund’s discussions of political authority. This is because Estlund’s 
argument, which ‘weaves together thread from several of the preceding arguments,’ is one of the most 
important and widely discussed recent approaches for justifying democratic political authority (Kolodny 
2014a: 223). Thus, an examination of Estlund’s arguments will be of assistance for discussing Confucian 
political authority in the context of contemporary political philosophy. As discussed in the previous 
chapters, Estlund tries to preserve normative truths or procedure-independent standards in the evaluation 
of political decisions; while simultaneously securing and guaranteeing fair and equal political participation 
for all citizens. Estlund’s principle of ‘general acceptability,’ which relates to the legitimacy of judgements 
of political authority, is generally convincing; It also appears to many contemporary democratic theorists. 
On the other hand, Estlund clearly objects to meritocratic views of political authority. On accounts of his 
views both on ‘general acceptability’ and on meritocracy, Estlund’s theories are of particular relevance to 
the topics in this thesis; any detailed discussion of meritocratic political authority requires serious 
consideration of his writings. 
36 Some Confucian scholars may argue that there is no such thing as ‘political authority’ in classical 
Confucianism. They believe that all authority in Confucianism is fundamentally ethical, rather than political 
(Angle 2017). However, as discussed in Chapter 1, Confucianism has both ethical and political dimensions. 
Political Confucianism is actually a legitimate and widely accepted approach in contemporary Confucian 
studies. Thus, without ignoring the ethical dimension of Confucianism, this thesis intends to highlight the 
importance of Confucian political thought. Other Confucian scholars will agree that it is possible that early 
Confucian ideas of Ren reflect a particular view of political authority. Such political authority is relevant 
both to the ethical and the political context of Confucianism.  
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political philosophers that political authority is essentially the political power to morally 
constrain and direct others, by issuing them with directives with which they must comply. 
Thus, if a form of government has de jure political authority, its subjects are morally 
bound to obey its political decisions.  
 
In CMD, the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons is dependent upon the 
normative standing of their political decisions. In other words, if a Confucian Ren 
statesperson has de facto political authority in issuing directives, imposing duties, 
conferring rights and demanding compliance with them, it should give everyone who is 
subject to it a reason to comply with the political decisions made by the Confucian Ren 
statesperson. Such reasons should be compelling enough to rebut any objection to these 
political decisions on the part of the citizens subjected to CMD.   
 
However, early Confucians would disagree with a Lockean liberal understanding of 
political authority (Chan 2014: 19). As will be discussed in the rest of this chapter, the 
early Confucian view of political authority is founded upon ‘service’ and ‘reciprocity,’ 
rather than upon ‘consent,’ ‘popular sovereignty,’ or ‘general acceptability.’37  
 
The term ‘service’ means that serving the citizens is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for political authority to be legitimate. For the early Confucians, political 
authority exists for the purpose of serving citizens, and it can only be justified insofar as 
it is capable of promoting the benefit of the citizens. Joseph Chan, influenced by Joseph 
Raz, defines this Confucian conception of political authority as a ‘service conception’ of 
political authority (ibid.30).  
 
This thesis, adopting Chan’s ‘service conception,’ disagrees with his view that ‘the 
Mandate of Heaven (tianming 天命)’ is the ultimate source of the legitimacy of political 
authority in classical Confucianism (ibid. 28-29). Instead, this thesis argues that Ren, 
rather than the Mandate of Heaven, is the ultimate source of the legitimacy of political 
authority in classical Confucianism. Zeng Jinghan also points out that the Mandate of 
                                                          
37 Lockean Liberalism has exercised a profound influence on various sophisticated theories of political 
authority. Some argue that political authority is based on the will of the citizens. Some propose that the 
consent of the citizens is the source of all legitimate political authority. Others contend that political 
authority is justified by the principle of ‘general acceptability.’ This thesis will not discuss every such 




Heaven is merely the ‘symbolic foundation of legitimacy of traditional Chinese dynasties’ 
and that ‘according to Confucianism, a regime is legitimate if it practices benevolent(Ren) 
governance’ (Zeng 2015: 63).   
 
In classical Confucianism, Only Ren can serve as the ultimate criterion for answering 
questions such as ‘what are the social goods that can benefit citizens?’ ‘How can one 
promote the benefit of the citizens?’ or ‘What are the legitimate or reasonable means of 
promoting the benefit of the citizens?’ In other words, Ren is the standard for judging the 
‘the promotion of the benefit of the citizens.’ In turn, ‘the promotion of the benefit of the 
citizens’ is the standard for judging the legitimacy of political authority. In short, Ren 
serves as the ultimate authority over judging the legitimacy of political authority. 
 
The rest of this chapter will explain that in CMD, the government aims to serve its citizens. 
However, the government, as a service provider, is constrained by the requirements of 
Ren. This means that the government should not merely serve the rational desires of its 
citizens by catering for their material needs, but should also serve any reasonable 
aspirations of its citizens by helping them develop their potential intellectual and moral 
capacities. In CMD, the services of the government include ensuring that all citizens can 
enjoy a high-quality civic education, providing a socio-political environment which is 
conducive to the moral self-cultivation of the citizens, and which offers adequate 
resources, so as to assist every citizen to live a flourishing life. 
 
In addition to ‘service,’ another foundation of the legitimacy of the political authority of 
the Confucian Ren statespersons is ‘reciprocity.’ The term ‘reciprocity’ means that the 
presence of reciprocal relationships is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the 
existence of endurable and legitimate political authority. Specifically, there are two kinds 
of reciprocal relationship in CMD. One is the reciprocal relationship between the 
Confucian Ren statespersons and their fellow citizens. The Confucian Ren statespersons 
are committed to making political decisions for the benefit of all the citizens; while at the 
same time, the citizens accept and support the political decisions made by the Confucian 
Ren statespersons. The other reciprocal relationship is the one existing between citizens 
in CMD. The citizens are committed to promoting the benefit of their fellow citizens by 




The rest of this chapter will show that even though the Confucian conception of political 
authority differs from the liberal democratic understanding of political authority, such a 
conception is nonetheless compatible with the practical aim of the democratic conception 
of political authority. Indeed, it may be in certain respects even more fundamental than 
some democratic framings of political authority. For example, because of the legitimising 
influence of reciprocal relationships, the political authority of CMD has the potential to 
be ‘generally accepted’ by the reasonable points of view of the citizens. Without such 
reciprocal relationships, very few kinds of democratic political authority would meet the 
principle of ‘general acceptability’ (in Estlund’s sense).  
 
In the following sections, there are two points which will be further clarified about the 
political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons in CMD: 
 
Firstly, the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons merely means that they 
have the legitimate right to rule, rather than certain ownership rights that give them the 
prerogative of dominating and oppressing others, or any special privileges, or a superior 
social status. Here, it is necessary to distinguish the notion of a ‘superior person’ and ‘a 
person with superior judgment.’ Knowing and practising Ren better than others implies 
only that on account of their great achievements in the long process of moral self-
cultivation, the decisions that the Confucian Ren statespersons make in order to promote 
the benefit of all the citizens are likely (on the whole) to be superior to the judgements of 
most other citizens. This is not the same as saying that the Confucian Ren statespersons 
are intrinsically and infallibly superior to other citizens. 
 
Secondly, the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons is subject to Ren, 
which is the highest virtue in classical Confucianism. The political decisions made by the 
Confucian Ren statespersons derive their legitimacy from the requirements of Ren, rather 
than from the judgements of the Confucian Ren statespersons. Because the Confucian 
Ren statespersons have made significant achievements in their self-cultivation and thus 
meet the requirements of Ren much better than others, it is highly likely that they can 
make reasonable political decisions that serve the well-being of all citizens. Therefore, 
their political decisions are highly likely to be deemed roughly acceptable from the 
reasonable point of view of the citizens in CMD; even though most citizens do not directly 
participate in making these political decisions, nor do they directly consent to them. If the 
Confucian Ren statespersons fail to meet the requirements of Ren, which means that they 
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fail to make reasonable political decisions that promote the benefit of other citizens, they 
immediately lose their legitimacy to rule.  
 
Early Confucians contend that the ruler must fulfil his responsibility, which is to rule 
according to the requirements of Ren. A ruler loses his legitimacy to rule when he violates 
Ren. For example, Mencius not only explicitly endorses the removal of rulers who fail to 
meet the requirements of Ren, but even supports the killing of a notorious king who 
‘offends against Ren.’ 
 
When King Xuan of Qi asked Mencius, ‘is regicide permissible? (King Zhou 
was killed by one of his ministers)’ Mencius replied: ‘He who offends against 
Ren is a brigand; he who offends against righteousness is an outlaw.  A man 
who is both a brigand and an outlaw is a lone fellow (secluded from and 
abandoned by his fellow citizens). I have heard of killing the lone fellow Zhou, 
but have not heard of any regicide.’ (Mencius 1B8) 
 
For Mencius, the message is clear; the rulers should be held for responsible for a good 
state. If a ruler’s political decisions fail to meet the requirements of Ren, the political 
authority of the ruler cannot be justified. In such a case, the ruler is a ‘lone fellow,’ and 
therefore ought to be overthrown.  
  
3.2 The ‘General Acceptability’ Approach to Political Authority  
 
Many democratic theorists may argue against the political authority of the Confucian Ren 
statespersons, which is founded upon a meritocratic view of political authority, i.e., 
political truths entail political authority. As discussed in Chapter 2, David Estlund 
attaches substantial importance to political expertise and political truths. However, he 
objects the meritocratic view of political authority. Estlund believes that the fundamental 
standard in the judgement of political authority should be a ‘general acceptability 
condition,’ which is a ‘necessary condition on the legitimate exercise of political power’ 
(Estlund 2008: 41).   
 
Estlund contends that any legitimate political authority needs ‘a justification accepted by 
all qualified points of view’ (ibid. 33). Niko Kolodny further explains Estlund’s 




A decision to use coercion or force is legitimate—it is permissible to carry it 
out—only if it issues from a procedure that has a justification that no qualified 
judge could reject. The decision is authoritative—one is required to comply 
with it—if it would have been wrong to refuse to promise to obey the 
decisions that issue from that procedure. One reason why it is sometimes not 
wrong to refuse to promise to obey is that every justification for so promising 
is one that some qualified judge could reject. (Kolodny 2014a: 223) 
 
The primary theoretical purpose of Estlund’s acceptability principle is to bring in political 
truths without privileging any particular class of knowers. Just like Arendt and Rawls, 
Estlund also worries about the authoritarian character of political truths.  His strategy is 
to limit the political authority of ‘political truths,’ by keeping ‘political truths’ within the 
constraint of the ‘general acceptability condition.’   
 
Thus, if the justification of the meritocratic selection of the Confucian Ren statespersons 
were to be rejected by some qualified judge, the political authority of the Confucian Ren 
statespersons would fail to meet the ‘general acceptability condition,’ and would, 
therefore, be illegitimate, despite the intellectual and moral superiority the Confucian Ren 
statespersons possess. However, it seems that democratic authority can also fail to meet 
the ‘general acceptability condition,’ as it is also possible for the justification of 
democratic procedures to be rejected by some qualified judge.38 
 
A more sophisticated version of Estlund’s ‘general acceptability condition’ holds that not 
all grounds for objections can be counted as similarly ‘qualified’ or ‘reasonable.’ 
Estlund’s standard of the ‘general acceptability condition’ appears to conflict with his 
rejection of the proceduralist view of democracy (see Chapter 2 of this thesis). For it 
appears that in actual political practice, the only way to tell whether certain political 
decisions meet the ‘general acceptability condition’ is to hold a referendum under 
universal suffrage, which is precisely what proceduralists would do in practice.  
 
                                                          
38For other criticisms of Estlund on this point see Quong (2010) and Arneson (2009). This matter is 
discussed further in subsequent chapters. 
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One of the primary purposes of the various accepted democratic procedures is to test 
precisely whether a particular political proposal enjoys ‘general acceptability.’ Therefore, 
the effect of the standard of ‘general acceptability’ is very similar to that of the standard 
of ‘procedural rationality.’ In short, Estlund has not given us adequate reasons to believe 
that his ‘general acceptability condition,’ especially in real practice, is distinct from the 
democratic procedural principle to which he is objecting. 
 
Estlund’s strategy of using ‘general acceptability condition’ to object meritocratic view 
of political authority depends on three assumptions: 
 
EA1: It is possible that if those who are intellectually and morally superior become 
rulers, they will use coercive power to dictate what citizens should do, thus leaving 
no room for personal choices or liberties. 
 
EA2: In reality, there is a wide scope for reasonable disagreement on who possesses 
genuine political expertise. The question of who possesses authority as a genuine 
political expert is also highly contestable.  
 
EA3: When political decisions made by experts are substantively better, that is not 
in itself a positive reason to implement them, nor to trump any objections on the 
part of those affected by them. 
 
As will be made clearer in the following sections, Estlund’s assumptions (EA1, EA2 and 
EA3) are contestable, and are not in themselves sufficiently self-evident to serve as 
conclusive refutations of the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons. It is 
also argued that even if one accepts Estlund’s assumptions, these concerns are also 
applicable to democratic political authority; in which case a mutually exclusive choice 
between Confucian political authority and democratic political authority becomes a 
problematic perspective. 
 
3.21 Confucian Moral Persuasion 
 
EA1 is about the coercive power of the political decisions made by the Confucian Ren 
statespersons, which latter stem from their political authority. The application of the 
‘general acceptability condition,’ in Estlund’s view, is to make sure ‘no one has an 
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authority or legitimate coercive power over another without justification that could be 
accepted by all qualified points of view’ (Estlund 2008: 33). This resonates with Rawls’s 
‘liberal principle of legitimacy:’ 
 
Since political power is the coercive power of free and equal citizens as a 
corporate body, this power should be exercised when constitutional essentials 
and basic questions of justice are at stake, only in ways that all citizens can 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of their common human reason. 
(Rawls 1996: 139-140) 
 
Presumably, there are three characteristics of political decisions: firstly, political 
decisions are implemented in light of a compelling authority. Secondly, citizens are not 
subjected to political decisions on a merely voluntary basis. Thirdly, political decisions 
involve the use of coercive power (The characteristics of political decisions will be 
discussed in Chapter 5). Hence, some may worry about the unlimited use of coercive 
power by the Confucian Ren statespersons who make all the political decisions.39 It is 
possible that if those who are intellectually and morally superior become political leaders, 
they will resort to dictating what citizens should do, thus leaving no room for personal 
choices or liberties.  
 
Hence, Thomas Metzger uses the term ‘epistemological optimism,’ which is the opposite 
of the ‘epistemological fallibility (of human beings),’ to describe Confucian beliefs in the 
possibility of a utopian state run by ‘an infallible elite ruling class.’ He further implies 
that this infallible elite ruling class can then impose their moral beliefs on the masses, and 
dictate what citizens should do, thus leaving no room for personal choices or liberties, 
which inevitably leads to coercion (Metzger 2005). 
 
However, this implication is attributable to CMD only in a highly-qualified sense. For, 
even when the Confucian Ren statespersons make perfect and infallible decisions for the 
well-being of their fellow citizens, this does not mean that they will coerce the citizens to 
follow them in a blatantly direct manner. Indeed, in the Analects, Confucius objects to 
using coercive power in governance.  
                                                          
39 Almost all states in human history appeal to a certain degree of coercive power, with regard to certain 
matters of public interest. This being so, the unlimited use of coercive power is what is problematic, rather 




Ji Kangzi (the chief minister of the state of Lu) asked Confucius about 
governance, ‘If I slay those who do not follow the moral Way (Dao 道) in 
order to encourage those who do follow the moral Way (Dao 道), what do 
you think of this?’  
Confucius replied, ‘Your task is to govern, not to slay; is it not? If you desire 
goodness, the citizens will be good. The virtue of the Confucian Ren 
statespersons is like the wind; the virtue of the mean citizens is like the grass. 
When the wind blows over the grass, surely it will bend.’ (Analects 12.19) 
 
The Master said, ‘If a ruler used moral persuasion to govern for a hundred 
years, violence and killing would be utterly wiped out.’ (Analects 13.11) 
 
Therefore, the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons may not necessarily 
involve coercive power, as early Confucians favours moral persuasion, rather than 
political force, to rule the state. In classical Confucianism, the imperative of moral 
persuasion requires the rulers to first of all establish themselves as good examples for the 
citizens to follow (Analects 2.20, 3.26, 12.17, 12.18, 13.1, 13.13, 13.6, Mencius 4A4, 
4A20), and secondly, to rule by virtue, rather than by political force. It is well-known that 
Confucius advocates ‘the rule by virtue’ (Weizheng yide 為政以德), as he says, ‘He who 
rules by virtue is like the north polar star in the Heaven, which keeps its place and all stars 
turn towards to it’ (Analects 2.1). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, early Confucians distinguish two forms of government: 
‘Hegemonic Government (ba zheng 霸政)’ and ‘Ren Government (Ren zheng 仁政).’  
‘Hegemonic Government’ governs citizens by political power.  ‘Ren Government’ 
governs citizens by virtues. In classical Confucianism, moral persuasion is the most 
important attribute of the ‘Ren Government.’ Also, it is precisely what the ‘Hegemonic 
Government’ lacks.  
 
Mencius said, ‘He who uses forces under the guise of Ren is a hegemon, and 
a hegemon has to have a large state in the first place (then he is in a position 
to use force). He who uses virtues to practise Ren is a true King of the world, 




‘Hegemonic government’ promotes governance by coercive power. The state adopts a 
system of penalties, in order to keep political order and to enhance the efficacy of political 
directives. If the citizens do not comply with these directives, the state will impose 
penalties on them.  
 
Mencius points out that ‘Hegemonic government’ entraps its citizens; i.e., if a ruler 
focuses on governing citizens by legal punishments rather than providing the citizens with 
their basic material and spiritual needs, the citizens will not have a ‘fixed heart’ and will 
go astray. Thus, if the ruler punishes his citizens, despite their not having the ‘fixed heart’ 
that ought to have resulted from more benevolent governance on his part, he actually 
entraps the citizens (Mencius 1A5, 1A7). Therefore, Mencius advocates that the state 
should focus on governing citizens according to the requirements of Ren, in order to spare 
as many citizens as possible from legal punishments.  
 
Confucius contends that the negative result of this ‘Hegemonic Government’ is that 
whenever citizens commit crimes or fail to fulfil their civic duties, they merely feel afraid, 
rather than ashamed.  
 
The Master said, ‘Govern them by political power, regulate them with force, 
and the citizens will flee from you and have no sense of shame. Govern them 
by virtue, regulate them with ritual, and they will keep their self-respect and 
become upright.’ (Analects 2.3) 40 
 
‘Ren Government’ (Ren zheng仁政) promotes governance by moral persuasion. It uses 
virtue and rituals to keep political order, rather than coercive power or penalties. In order 
to make Confucian moral persuasion effective and efficient, the Confucian Ren 
statespersons must themselves meet the requirements of Ren in the first place. And in 
accordance with this, they are required to set a good example for their fellow citizens to 
follow.  
 
                                                          
40See also 12.19, 13.6 of the Analects and chapter 4 of the Great Learning. Here, Confucius investigates 
the ideal case, i.e., the one where certain penalties should not be necessary. 
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Compared with ‘Hegemonic Government,’ ‘Ren Government’ makes it more likely that 
citizens comply with political decisions of their own accord. This is because Confucian 
moral persuasion has the potential to make most citizens reasonable; so that most citizens 
will feel ashamed of failing to fulfil their civic duties rather than afraid of incurring the 
wrath of the rulers for thus neglecting their responsibilities. Early Confucians believes 
that most citizens would be willing to support political decisions made by their rulers if 
the rulers always appeal to moral persuasion, rather than to their political power.41  
 
Moreover, if moral persuasion works perfectly, i.e., the rulers set themselves as good 
examples, some institutional arrangements would no longer be necessary as a first resort; 
such as prisons, and police prosecutions. The political power of the government would 
thus be very limited, and some non-state agencies, such as the family or the school, can 
better fulfil the multiple functions of the government. 
 
For early Confucians, the primary purpose of moral persuasion is to win popular support. 
The only way to win popular support is to win the hearts of the citizens.  
 
Mencius said, ‘When one use force to make citizens submit, one does not win 
the hearts of the citizens. When one use moral persuasion to make citizens 
submit, citizens are pleased to the depth of their hearts, and they sincerely 
submit.’ (Mencius 2A3) 
 
Mencius said, ‘King Jie’s and King Zhou’s (both kings are tyrants) loss of the 
throne arose from their losing the support of the citizens, and to lose the 
support of the citizens means to lose their hearts. There is a way to rule: win 
citizens’ support, and you will win the state. There is a way to win citizens’ 
support: win their hearts, and you will win their support.  There is a way to 
win citizens’ hearts: it is to collect for them what you desire, and not to lay 
on them what you dislike. (Mencius 4A9)  
 
                                                          
41Some democrats may argue that convincing people to support political decisions can only be achieved 
democratically.  On the other hand, as Gerhard Overland, Christian Barry and Rinchard Wollheim argue, 
there may be other alternatives. For example, people may comply with a political decision based on a false 
belief that this decision is made democratically (Overland and Barry 2011: 113, Wollheim 2001: 83). 
86 
 
For early Confucians, besides setting themselves as good examples, the Confucian Ren 
statespersons are also responsible for the moral education of their fellow citizens. 
Mencius says, ‘The Confucian Ren statesperson has three delights, and being a ruler is 
not among them…educating citizens is his delight’ (Mencius 7A20). Appealing to legal 
punishments presupposes that some citizens are no longer willing to believe and study 
the political truths of Ren, and to develop their potential moral capacities. Because the 
use of legal enforcement potentially undermines the importance of moral education as a 
mechanism to maintain political order. Early Confucians are more concerned with using 
moral persuasion to ‘win the hearts of the citizens’ (De minxin得民心), in order to bring 
citizens into compliance with political decisions, rather than resorting either to force or 
to legal punishments (Mencius 7A14). 
 
However, this moral persuasion may conflict with some aspects of liberalism. In 
particular, there is a traditional liberal scepticism of the role of the government in moral 
persuasion, as well as in the moral education of the citizens. In this vein, one might argue 
that moral persuasion can also be coercive and that the stress early Confucians laid on the 
role of the government in moral persuasion itself may be a form of coercion. It is possible 
that the government or the Confucian Ren statespersons may coerce citizens into changing 
their moral beliefs. Why not just let citizens have their own moral beliefs, and act on them? 
  
Citizens often have different moral beliefs. However, the presence of certain settled 
common moral beliefs among the citizens, such as a common understanding of justice, 
may be necessary for effective and efficient governance. For example, if citizens have 
discordant understandings of the laws, their appeals to their own rights might be in 
conflict. This may lead to coercion, as one person may believe that he has a right to coerce 
others in order to protect his own rights.  
 
Jeremy Waldron argues in his Law and Disagreement that in our political lives, we not 
only disagree with others but also need to practice cooperation in order to achieve 
valuable ends (Waldron 1999: 102). If we simply act in accordance with our own 
understanding of justice, or with whatever kind of cooperation we think matches our own 
moral beliefs, we will always fail to cooperate successfully. Therefore, citizens may have 
a practical reason to refrain from merely acting on their own moral beliefs. For the 
purposes of successful cooperation, moral persuasion might be necessary; citizens are 
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more likely to accept and act in accordance with a common understanding of justice than 
a purely partisan understanding of such (The following chapters will discuss this further).  
 
Moreover, a deeper exploration of classical Confucianism will show that Confucian moral 
persuasion is not intrinsically coercive. 
 
Firstly, as discussed above, early Confucians believed that the nature of moral persuasion 
lies in the rulers establishing themselves as good examples for other citizens.  
 
Ji Kangzi (a powerful government official) asked Confucius about the art of 
politics. The Master said, ‘Politics is straightening. If you lead along a straight 
way, who will dare go by a crooked one?’  (Analects 12.17)  
 
The Master said, ‘When the ruler’s behaviours are moral, his government is 
effective, even without having to issue any orders. However, if the ruler’s 
behaviours are immoral, even he gives orders; citizens will not follow him.’ 
(Analects 13.6) 
 
The Master said, ‘If the ruler loves ritual, then none of the ordinary citizens 
will venture to be disrespectful. If the ruler loves righteousness, then none of 
the will venture to be disobedient. If the ruler loves trustworthiness, then none 
of the ordinary citizens will venture to act insincerely.’ (Analects 13.4) 42 
 
Early Confucians believe that for moral persuasion to be successful, the rulers must keep 
correcting and cultivating themselves, in order to meet the requirements of Ren. The rulers 
can thereby use their virtue to influence their fellow citizens.  
 
The Master said, ‘If you can learn to correct yourself, what trouble could you 
have in ruling a state? However, if you cannot correct yourself, how can you 
hope to criticise others?’ (Analects 13.13) 
 
                                                          




The Master said, ‘(the ruler) cultivates in himself the capacity to be diligent 
in his tasks… to ease other citizens… If he can do so, could even Yao or Shun 
(ancient sage Kings) find cause to criticise him?’ (Analects 14.42) 
 
Mencius said, ‘If your rule fails to make citizens follow you, examine your 
own wisdom…always examine yourself when you fail (to rule the state) ... If 
you are right in your own person, the whole world will pledge allegiance to 
your rule.’ (Mencius 4A4) 
 
For early Confucians, the essence of ‘moral persuasion’ is the Confucian Ren 
statespersons’ adherence to Ren. They begin with their own self-correction and self-
cultivation; they then set good examples for other citizens, and use their virtue to 
influence other citizens, and finally bringing ‘peace and order to the world’ (Mencius 
7B32). 
 
Mencius said, ‘When the ruler pursues Ren, every citizen pursues Ren…Once 
the ruler set himself as an upright example, the whole state will be stabilised.’ 
(Mencius 4A20) 
 
Secondly, early Confucians assume that there are certain potential virtues (benevolence, 
righteousness, decorum and wisdom) that are innate to every citizen. Every citizen is born 
with these potential virtues; early Confucians thus believe that moral education is 
important, as it helps citizens develop their innate capacities and actualise their potential 
virtues (Mencius 2A6, 6A6, 7A21). In CMD, moral education is not intended to directly 
and coercively instil static virtues into citizens who are merely receptacles of moral 
dogmas; for ultimately, everything still depends upon the judgements of the individual 
citizens, as derived from the exercise of their own free will and agency. Chapter 6 of this 
thesis will discuss this matter further. 
 
Therefore, even though early Confucians believe that the government should be in charge 
of moral persuasion, this does not necessarily mean that the government should be obliged 
to coerce citizens into changing their moral beliefs.  For example, in a famous allegory, 
Mencius says that farmers who assist seedlings to grow long by pulling them up not only 




Mencius uses this allegory to argue that moral persuasion would actually be 
counterproductive if it were coercive. The government only provides citizens with an 
equal opportunity to moral education and helps them develop their own potential 
intellectual and moral capacities to make reasonable judgements. Confucian moral 
persuasion leaves room for free choices, rather than merely coercing citizens into blindly 
following moral codes.  
 
However, one may still inquire about what happens to those who still refuse to comply 
with political decisions made by the Confucian Ren statespersons, even after moral 
persuasion. In reality, citizens often have different opinions about justice and the common 
good, and they generally disagree about which political decisions will correspond with 
their own moral beliefs, satisfy their political desires and promote their own benefit 
(Waldron 1999: 102). It is thus entirely possible that citizens may insist upon disagreeing, 
even after moral persuasion. This is because if moral persuasion is non-coercive, it may 
not be effective and efficient in fostering a widespread consensus among citizens; 
especially in real political practice, rather than in ideal situations. 
 
As discussed above, early Confucians advocate non-coercive moral persuasion, rather 
than coercive legal punishments, as a means of maintaining political order. However, this 
relates specifically to ideal situations, in which moral persuasion works perfectly, and in 
which certain legal punishments are no longer necessary. It seems that early Confucians 
only assume that every citizen has an equal potential to be reasonable; while early 
Confucians do not think that in reality, all citizens can become reasonable through moral 
persuasion alone. Hence, for early Confucians, in non-ideal situations, certain legal 
punishments are necessary for leading some citizens to follow the moral codes.  
 
Xunzi said, ‘If the ruler only reproves and does not instruct (those who 
commit a crime), then punishments will be numerous, but evil will still not 
be overcome. If one instructs but does not reprove, then criminals will not be 
chastened.’ (Xunzi 10.14) 
 
In other words, early Confucians never fully renounce the use of legal penalties or 
punishments; they merely treat it as a last resort. 43  
                                                          




The Master said, ‘I could try a civil suit as well as anyone. But better still to 
bring about that no one will ever resort to bringing a civil suit in the first 
place.’ (Analects 12.13)44  
 
Moreover, even when this last resort of legal punishments is used, it should be explained 
using ‘correct’ language and subordinated to a system of rituals and morality. Otherwise, 
the punishments will go astray from the intended purpose. 
 
The Master said, ‘If the language is incorrect, then what is said does not 
concord with what was meant. If what is said does not concord with what was 
meant, what is to be done will not succeed. If what is to be done do not 
succeed, then ritual and music (morality) will not flourish. If rituals and music 
do not flourish, then punishments and penalties will go astray. (Analects 13.3) 
 
In short, early Confucians always prioritise non-coercive moral persuasion over coercive 
legal punishments, in order to maintain political order. The use of moral persuasion means 
that the rulers keep correcting and cultivating themselves, in order to set good examples 
for their fellow citizens to follow. The purpose of moral persuasion is to win the hearts of 
the citizens, by assisting them to develop their own potential intellectual and moral 
capacities. Through moral persuasion, citizens are more likely to make reasonable 
judgements; they are thus more likely to endorse the political decisions made by the 
Confucian Ren statespersons who are morally and intellectually superior to other citizens. 
 
3.22 Acceptability and Acceptance 
 
One might argue that the above discussion about moral persuasion, may only be relevant 
to the question of the justification of widespread endorsement of the non-coercive 
political decisions made by the Confucian Ren statespersons. This would still leave some 
                                                          
positively influenced by the threat of punishments; therefore they treat legal punishments as a last resort, 
rather than denying outright that they may be necessary in some cases (Hsiao 2005: 114). 
44Xunzi has a similar view, as he argues that legal punishments should be strictly applied as a last resort, 
and restricted to as few citizens as possible. See Xunzi 16.2, 15.4. Xu Fuguan 徐複觀 also argues that the 
contempt early Confucians show for legal punishments does not mean that they opposed punishments on 




gaps in the argument for justifying the political authority of the Confucian Ren 
statespersons. For, in our political lives, citizens often disagree about who is intellectually 
and morally superior, in comparison to others. 
 
This concern resonates with EA2, which is the second assumption in Estlund’s objection 
to the meritocratic view of political authority; as Estlund contends that, in reality, there is 
a wide range of reasonable disagreement regarding the recognition of genuine political 
expertise; as also regarding the acceptance of the authority of genuine political experts.   
 
However, in his book, Estlund appears to be applying a ‘double standard’ as he conflates 
the context of real practices and with the context of ideal theories. When he criticises 
meritocratic authority by highlighting the problem of wide disagreement regarding both 
the acceptance of political expertise and the authority of such expertise, Estlund uses an 
‘actual acceptance’ view: political justifications must be acceptable to all,’ a phrase 
evocative of real and concrete political practice (Estlund 2008: 46). However, when he 
proposes his ‘general acceptability condition’ in order to defend democratic authority, 
Estlund uses ‘acceptability;’ this implies, by contrast, an ideal test or criterion. At the end 
of his book, Estlund himself acknowledges that his theory of ‘general acceptability’ is too 
abstract to be applied in political practice and that there are too many ideal conditions 
which are unlikely to be met in the context of the concrete reality of politics (ibid. 270-
275). 
 
In order to avoid such a ‘double standard,’ this thesis will attempt to compare CMD and 
modern democracy in the same context, instead of conflating ‘the ideal and abstract’ with 
‘the non-ideal and concrete.’ EA2 is mainly concerned with non-ideal situations. It is 
premised on the view that:  
 
EA2a: Even reasonable citizens could fail to recognise political expertise.  
 
EA2b: It is reasonable to withhold consent to the authority of political experts, 
because any group of decision-makers may make biased political decisions.45 
 
                                                          
45 Thomas Christiano points out that the inherent nature of human beings includes a favourable cognitive 
bias toward one’s own interests and background (Christiano 1996: Chapter 5). 
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However, this thesis argues that both EA2a and EA2b do not contribute towards the 
justification of the superiority of democratic political authority over meritocratic political 
authority.  
 
If proposition EA2a ‘even reasonable citizens could fail to recognise political expertise’ 
were true, then universal suffrage and elections in democracies would be problematic. 
This is because it is reasonable to assume a substantial proportion of voters cannot make 
reasonable judgements about what is to their own benefit, as well as how to actually seek 
their own benefit. The question of who is morally and intellectually competent to make 
political decisions in modern democratic societies can also be a topic where most voters 
are confused.  
 
Alexander Guerrero argues that in today’s representative democracies, any reasonable 
recognition and evaluation of popular representatives on the part of the citizens can be 
thwarted by various kinds of ignorance, such as: 
 
ignorance about what one’s representative is doing (‘conduct ignorance’), 
about a particular political issue (‘issue ignorance’), about whether what 
one’s representative is doing is a good thing in general (‘broad evaluative 
ignorance’), or about whether what one’s representative is doing will be good 
for oneself (‘narrow evaluative ignorance’). (Guerrero 2014: 140) 
 
Guerrero also points out that ‘issue ignorance’ and ‘conduct ignorance’ make it difficult 
for citizens to monitor the ‘meaningful accountability’ of their representatives (ibid.139-
140). 
 
A large body of empirical studies has shown that most voters in modern democratic 
countries are lack of basic political knowledge. 77% of British young adults cannot tell 
the difference between the political persuasions of the main political parties (Denver & 
Hands 1990). Nearly 70% of Americans believe that ‘from each according to his ability, 
to each according to his needs’ is from their constitution. 89% Americans do not know 
who is the chief justice of the Supreme Court (Somin 2010: 258). More than half of the 
Americans do not know whether federal taxes have increased or reduced.46 Almost half 
                                                          
46 Przybyla, H., & McCormick, J. (2010, October 10). Poll: Americans Don’t Know Economy Expanded 
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of Americans think that the Constitution can be suspended by the president (Bovard 2005: 
13). During the Cold War, 62% of Americans believed that the Soviet Union was a NATO 
country (Somin 1998). Moreover, Russell Hardin contends that voter ignorance is 
‘rational and moral.’ In modern democratic countries, voters would be irrational and 
immoral to spend time on improving their political competence, rather on things which 
are far more valuable and morally praiseworthy (Hardin 2009: 235). Arneson also argues 
that considering the costs and benefits of voting in a large democratic society, it is ‘at 
least morally permissible and very probably morally required’ for voters to remain 
ignorant (Arneson 2009: 202).  
  
Various responses have been given to the problem of voter ignorance since the nineteenth 
century. John Stuart Mill proposes the scheme of plural votes. On this scheme, at least 
one vote was assigned to each individual, but additional votes were assigned to those who 
proved their intellectual superiority (Mill [1861] 2010: chap.8). Some contemporary 
political philosophers hold similar notions. For example, Jason Brennan argues that 
suffrage should be restricted to citizens of sufficient political competence. He suggests 
that a properly administrated voting examination system could serve to implement this 
principle, as he proposes to ‘experiment with voter examination systems on a relatively 
small scale at first. For instance, perhaps it would be best if one state in the US tried the 
system first … If the experiment succeeds, then the rules could be scaled up’ (Brennan 
2011: 24).47  The ideas of Mill and Brennan resonate with the institutional arrangements 
of CMD, which will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 
If it were true that EA2b ‘it is reasonable to withhold the acceptance of the authority of 
political experts because any group of decision-makers may make biased political 
decisions,’ most democratically elected representatives or legislators could not be trusted. 
This is because that many legislators, who are meant to serve the voters of their 
constituencies, are highly likely to make biased decisions, as it is hard for them to be free 
from special interests, and in particular, from the immediate and narrow interests of their 
constituencies.  
 
                                                          
With Tax Cuts. Retrieved September 1, 2014, from Bloomberg: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/29/AR2010102901403.html accessed on June 15, 2015. 
47 Brennan’s proposal may be more appropriate for China, where the central government has the power to 




Moreover, if there is a severe conflict of interests between the needs of voters and the 
needs of non-voters, the former will almost always have priority. Democratically elected 
legislators may be ‘short-sighted,’ and democratic political arrangements usually fail to 
protect the interests of non-voters,48 including people’s ancestors (Qian 1982: 7, Jiang 
2012:chap.1), 49 future generations (Mulgan 2011, Berggruen and Gardels 2013), 50 and 
foreigners (Landler 2012). 51 
 
If, as Estlund argues, there are wide reasonable disagreements regarding the recognition 
of political expertise and on accepting the authority of political expertise, there should 
also be wide reasonable disagreements on the requirement of ‘general acceptability’ as 
well. Voters, especially those who lack basic knowledge of politics, may have a 
superficial understanding of ‘general acceptability,’ and they may fail to make reasonable 
judgements on which political decisions will best meet the condition of ‘general 
acceptability.’  
 
It seems even Estlund himself does not give a sufficiently clear definition of his ‘general 
acceptability condition.’ He claims that his condition does not amount to a kind of 
Rawlsian intolerance, whereby every qualified unacceptability should form part of 
political justification. For Estlund, the purpose of his acceptability condition is to take 
‘qualified’ objections ‘seriously.’ In light of this imperative, the objections need not be 
correct in order to be ‘qualified.’ 
 
                                                          
48 Some scholars believe that animals are also non-voters, who are affected by the policies of the voting 
community. Since humans often abuse animals for their own needs, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) argue 
for the need to appoint special legislators with the task of arguing on behalf of the interests of animals. 
49 In ancient China, the dead were considered at least as important as the living; an important part of political 
activity involved ceremonies connected with ancestor worship (Qian 1982: 7). Jiang Qing advocates that 
the government establish a house entrusted with the special task of maintaining the cultural continuity of a 
nation’s traditions. This is would, in a sense, ensure that the ancestors of the citizens, as well as the living, 
could enjoy political representation (Jiang 2012: Chapter1). 
50 Children and future generations, are both deprived of the vote. One negative consequence of this is 
‘consumer culture’ politics: ‘Voters constantly demand instant gratification and have no patience for long-
term structural reform or for politicians who impose pain, with the result that entitlement spending and 
public debt explodes to unsustainable levels’ (Berggruen and Gardels 2013: 9). Democratic voters rarely 
make significant personal sacrifices to the interests of future generations. The climate change issue is one 
example. Mulgan suggests that democratic voters’ ‘intergenerational compassion has been proved 
inadequate’ (Mulgan 2011: 213). 
51One example is the WTO laws suits and bans on products made in China by the American government, 
under various pretexts. For example, in 2012, the Obama administration filed a WTO lawsuit which was 
clearly intended to cater for American voters from in the ‘industrial battlegrounds’ of his presidential 
campaign (Landler 2012). 
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However, it is not clear at all what kind of objections/unacceptability should count as 
‘qualified.’ Further clarification of certain concepts is needed, such as ‘qualified,’ 
‘acceptable’ and other conceptions relevant to the criterion of ‘acceptability.’ It seems 
Estlund has not specified any of these conceptions; he admits that ‘We have not specified 
which points of view should count as qualified for this purpose, nor will we do so in any 
complete way’ (Estlund 2008: 36).52 
 
There is a risk that in democratic elections, a particular class of candidates may take 
advantage of their political expertise, as well as ignorance among the citizens, in order to 
persuade voters to change their current political opinions concerning the criterion of 
‘general acceptability,’ in the hope that the voters will eventually accept the candidates’ 
view of what kinds of political decisions are generally acceptable.53 It is thus possible that 
the political authority of democratically elected political leaders may still be founded 
upon their expertise in political matters, even when they already meet the precondition of 
‘general acceptability.’  
 
In short, EA2 is founded upon the consideration of certain ‘facts’ in non-ideal situations. 
However, if one limits oneself to considering non-ideal situations only, the concerns 
raised in EA2 challenge democratic political authority as well, and not meritocratic 
political authority alone. Thus, because of widespread political ignorance among citizens 
in modern societies, it is challenging for any kind of political authority to truly meet 
Estlund’s ‘general acceptability condition’ in reality.    
 
3.23 Expert/Boss Fallacy 
 
Compared with EA1, EA2, i.e., the third assumption in Estlund’s objection to meritocratic 
political authority is more convincing: when political decisions made by experts are 
                                                          
52At the end of his book, Estlund argues that his general acceptability conditions are ‘unlikely to be met, 
though that is no objection since they are apparently not impossible to meet.’ (Estlund 2008: 275). Estlund 
also claims that ‘originality and detail at the level of institutions and concrete practices are not the areas 
where I have tried to make my contribution. What I offer instead is a philosophical framework’ (ibid. 20). 
53 There is a vast literature discussing widespread evaluative ignorance within a number of constituencies 
(Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990, Lupia 1992, 1994). Some democratic theorists argue that even if constituents 
are ignorant concerning some issues, the voting is still meaningful; this is because the signals themselves 
are reliable (Grofman and Norrander 1990). However, as Arthur Lupia points out: ‘these arguments are of 
limited helpfulness when we attempt to understand voter decision-making in circumstances where 
information providers are not perfectly credible and may, in fact, have an incentive to mislead constituents’ 
(Lupia 1994: 67). 
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substantively better, this is not, in itself, a positive reason either to implement them or to 
trump the objections of those affected by them. 
 
EA3 is not so much concerned with any ‘facts’ in non-ideal situations, as with an 
Expert/Boss Fallacy: ‘To the person who knows better, the other might hope to say, “You 
might be right, but who made you the boss?”’ (ibid.40). It has become a dominant view 
in political philosophy that when political decisions are substantively better, that is not, 
in itself, a positive reason to implement them; nor is the purported superiority of the 
decision in question sufficient to trump citizens’ objections, as to how these decisions 
may impact on them.  
 
One might argue that even if the political decisions made by the Confucian Ren 
statespersons are good enough to satisfy everyone’s interests, it is still not possible to 
justify subjection to these political decisions without consent. To put it another way: if 
the authority of a political decision is objectionable, the reason may not be because there 
is an actual utilitarian reason to refrain from implementing the decision, but rather 
because someone’s disagreement serves as a barrier to the implementation of such 
decisions. Hence, the authority of any political decision needs to be founded either upon 
consent or upon being generally acceptable to ‘common human reason’ (in a Rawlsian 
sense),54 rather than upon expertise or correctness.  
 
However, there are some situations where it is indeed possible to justify the authority of 
experts, with or without consent have previously been given to the authority. For example, 
during a medical treatment, it is evident that expertise entails authority. Moreover, 
sometimes it is morally wrong to refuse to consent to the authority of experts. For example, 
if there is an adequate and effective public justice system, it is a moral necessity for 
citizens to consent to the authority of a system of judicial trial.  
                                                          
54 ‘Common human reason’ plays an important role in Rawls’s ‘liberal principle of legitimacy.’ Rawls 
argues that ‘our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in 
the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. This is the liberal principle of 
legitimacy.’ (Rawls 1996: 137). Rawls does not offer a clear definition of ‘common human reason.’ He 
only points out that there are certain common elements in all ways of reasoning. These elements include 
‘the concept of judgment, principles of inference, and rules of evidence, and much else.’ Thus, Rawls 
contends that ‘a way of reasoning, then, must incorporate the fundamental concepts and principles of reason, 
and include standards of correctness and criteria of justification. A capacity to master these ideas is part of 





Estlund points out that political authority is different from the authority of doctors or 
judges, since ‘most of us have never consented to the political authority of the government 
that rules over us’ (ibid. 3). However, Estlund’s view is not sufficiently convincing. For, 
it is still not clear where the difference lies between political decisions and judicial trials; 
since in general, people often do not consent to the authority of a judicial trial either.   
 
This appears to be a second example of a ‘double standard’. Whenever Estlund safeguards 
normative truths or procedure-independent standards in the evaluation of political 
decisions, he uses the analogy of a judicial trial. However, when justifying his ‘general 
acceptability’ criterion and explaining the expert/boss fallacy, Estlund uses the notion of 
‘consent’ to draw a clear line between judicial systems and the realm of politics. It is not 
obvious, how to determine cases where expertise entails authority, versus those where it 
does not.   
 
Even if it is assumed that politics is different from other cases such as medical treatment 
or judicial trials, it is unclear why ‘consent’ is a necessity in the justification of political 
authority. In other words, the problem is why it is unfair to implement a better political 
decision if others have not consented that the decision in question is indeed better 
(Shapiro 2000, Singer 2001, Waldron 1999). 
 
In non-ideal situations, as discussed in the previous section, the concerns pertinent to 
‘consent’ would make more problems for democratic political authority than for 
meritocratic political authority. This is because, in democratic societies, voters always 
disagree about which political decision or political leader is better than others. For 
example, nearly half of the British citizens have to comply with ‘Brexit,’ a decision to 
which they have not explicitly consented. More than half of Americans have to accept the 
presidential inauguration of Donald Trump, although they have not explicitly consented 
to his presidency. In such cases, if ‘consent’ were of great importance in the justification 
of political authority, the political authority of ‘Brexit’ and Donald Trump would be 
problematic. Moreover, if most citizens did not consent to the appropriateness of 
democratic procedures, the democratic political authority over them would be illegitimate 
for them. Such a scenario is easily conceivable in reality, as there is wide disagreement 
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about the value of democracy among citizens of some countries in the Middle East and 
East Asia.55 
 
In ideal situations, ‘consent’ is not so much a matter of the actual political opinions of 
voters, but rather with the fairness of the procedures orientated towards gaining the 
consent of the majority of voters. If the essence of consent lay in procedural fairness, 
rather than consequential justice, the political authority of political leaders selected by 
lottery (in which officials are selected randomly) would be less problematic than that of 
democratically elected political leaders. This is because a lottery embodies more 
procedural fairness than democratic elections do, and very few citizens do not consent to 
the results of a lottery. Chapter 5 of this thesis will include a more detailed discussion of 
this topic.  
  
To sum up, Estlund’s assumptions (EA1, EA2 and EA3) in his objection to the 
meritocratic view of political authority are not self-evidently true. As discussed in the 
preceding sections and will be further elaborated upon in the rest of this chapter, even if 
one accepts all these assumptions and insists that ‘consent’ is a necessity in the 
justification of political authority, it may still be problematic to apply Estlund’s approach 
as a criticism delegitimising the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons in 
CMD.  This is because that if one philosophically breaking down the role of ‘consent’ in 
the justification of political authority, one might find that the Confucian conception of 
political authority is compatible with the practical aim of the democratic conception of 
political authority.  
 
3.3 Serve the Well-being of the Citizens  
 
For those who attach great importance to ‘consent’ in the justification of political 
authority, what is objectionable may not be the existence of political decisions to which 
citizens could not actually consent; rather, what is really objectionable is the content of 
any political decisions to which citizens could not hypothetically consent. 56  For, it 
                                                          
55 In Rule of the Many and Constitution of Equality, Christiano argues that Singer’s view of consent is 
vulnerable to this kind of objection. See (Christiano 1996, 2008). Estlund also tries to avoid this problem. 
See (Estlund 2008: 60-61). 
56 This idea resonates with John Rawls’ ‘Liberal Principle of Legitimacy’ (1996). Many Western political 
philosophers share this view (Cohen 2009, Nagel 1995, Estlund 2008). 
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appears that whether citizens actually express their consent in the process of making 
political decisions does not matter, as long as the content of these political decisions is in 
a position to serve the material well-being and spiritual well-being of the citizens. Here, 
the spiritual well-being of the citizens relates to the attitudes of the citizens; including 
their philosophy of life, moral outlook, and religious convictions, as long as these are 
reasonable or compatible with ‘common human reason’ (in a Rawlsian sense).  
 
For the purposes of making political decisions to which, hypothetically speaking, citizens 
could reasonably consent, the content of the political decision in question needs to 
correspond with the attitudes of the citizens correctly. Therefore, the political decision 
should be in a position to not merely serve the material well-being of the citizens, but 
more importantly, to serve the spiritual well-being of the citizens also.  
 
Early Confucians insist that political authority should be founded upon serving the well-
being of the citizens. A well-known example is that Mencius, who explicitly argues that 
the well-being of the citizens is the essential concern of the state. 
 
Mencius said, ‘The citizens are of supreme importance; the next is the altars 
to the gods of earth and grain; last comes the ruler. Therefore, whoever enjoys 
the support of the citizens will be the ruler.’ (Mencius 14.14) 
 
Xunzi also explicitly argues that citizens are not for the well-being of their rulers, but, 
rulers are established for the sake of the well-being of their fellow citizens (Xunzi 27.66).  
 
Many Confucian scholars believe that in Confucian political thought, ‘the well-being of 
the citizens as the ruling foundation’ (minben民本) is the most fundamental principle of 
government (Chan 2007: 184-186).  
 
Moreover, early Confucians insist that government should be responsible not only for 
serving the material well-being of its citizens but also for serving their spiritual well-
being. This is the main reason why early Confucians attach great importance to education. 
Confucius claims that every citizen has an equal educational opportunity (Analects 15.39). 
Mencius even states that the rulers who provide citizens with a good education will get 




Mencius said, ‘Good government does not win the citizens as good education 
does. He who is good at governing is feared by the citizens; he who provides 
the citizens with a good education is loved by them. Good government 
delivers the wealth of the citizens; good education wins citizens’ hearts.’ 
(Mencius 7A14)57 
 
It seems that early Confucians have a belief in democracy, since most of them, especially 
Mencius, contend that the state should consider the citizens to be of supreme importance. 
However, some modern Confucian scholars compare Confucian political thought with 
modern democratic theories, and argue that early Confucians intend to propose a 
government ‘for the people’ or ‘of the people,’ but never ‘by the people’ (Hsiao 2005: 
161).58 A careful reading of the relevant paragraphs in Confucian classics reveals the fact 
that even if early Confucians claim that every citizen is of great importance, they do not 
endorse the notion that every citizen should have control over the political decision-
making (Tiwald 2008: 279).  
 
For example, Mencius claims that when employing a minister, the ruler should listen to 
the citizens. As he tells the King: 
       
When those (ministers) on your left and right all say that someone is worthy, 
you should not yet believe it. When the great officers all say he is worthy, you 
should not yet believe it. When all the citizens of the state say that he is worthy, 
then you should investigate, and if you find that he is worthy, only then should 
you employ him. (Mencius 1B7) 
 
For Mencius, the ruler should always take the opinions of the citizens seriously. However, 
it is still the ruler who makes the final decisions. If Mencius had been a democrat, he 
would have said that when citizens make a judgment, an action should be taken in 
accordance with such a popular judgement.   
                                                          
57 The Confucian Classics contain an abundance of passages discussing the importance of education. See 
Analects 1.1, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 2.4, 2.15, 5.28, 7.2, 7.3, 7.25, 8.12, 8.17, 12.15, 13.9, 14.24, 15.31, 15.32, 15.39, 
16.9, 16.13, 17.8, 19.6, 19.7, 19.13, 19.22; Mencius 1A7, 1B3, 1B9, 2A2, 2b2, 3A3, 3A4, 5B4, 7A14, 7A20, 
7A40 Xunzi 1.3, 1.4, 1.13, 1.14, 1.15, 1.17, 9.1, 9.24, 10.14, 18.26, 16.1, 27.52. Chapter 6 of this thesis will 
discuss this further. 
58 Tongdong Bai and Joseph Chan hold similar opinions. However, some Confucian scholars, such as 
Chenyang Li, believe that in Confucian political thought, the state is neither ‘of the people’ nor ‘by the 




Mencius believes that the rulers, rather than the majority of the common citizens, should 
make the final political decisions, as he emphasises the importance of the division of 
labour among citizens. Mencius contends that one person cannot produce everything and 
that there must be a distinction between the ‘great men’ (Confucian Ren statespersons) 
who make a living by using their mind and the ‘small men’ (common citizens) who make 
a living by using their physical strength. 
 
Mencius said, ‘Those who labour with their minds rule others; those who 
labour with their strength are ruled by others. Those who are ruled by others 
support them; those who rule others are supported by them. This is a universal 
principle.’ (Mencius 3A4) 
 
Moreover, Mencius claims that the task of ruling a state is more important than that of 
labour because the former task demands compassion and wisdom. The ‘great men’ should 
focus on promoting the well-being of ‘small men,’ and thus they cannot be distracted by 
any manual work. Mencius suggests that most common citizens have insufficient time, 
and lack knowledge of areas outside their specialisation; they cannot all participate in 
political affairs because they need to focus on their daily work. Thus, it appears that 
Mencius would not support the equal participation of all citizens in the process of political 
decision-making. 
 
It has been argued that although early Confucians assert that the rulers should take the 
attitudes of citizens into serious consideration when making political decisions, they 
cannot accept that common citizens should have a certain degree of control over the final 
political decisions (Analects 19.4, 19.7; Mencius 3B4). This is because early Confucians 
believe that most common citizens are lack of actual capacities to make reasonable 
political decisions, even though they insist that all citizens have equal potential capacities 
to do so. 
 
3.4 ‘Control View’ of Political Authority 
 
Some might argue that the authority of political decisions cannot be justified by merely 
taking the attitudes of the citizens into serious consideration when making such decisions. 
It would still be unfair if some or most citizens have very little control over the process 
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of political decision-making. Many democratic theorists contend that citizens ought to be 
in a position to make a difference in political activities. For example, Ronald Dworkin 
says： 
 
Demands of agency go beyond expression and commitment. We do not 
engage in politics as moral agents unless we sense that what we do can make 
a difference, and an adequate political process must strive, against formidable 
obstacles, to preserve that potential power for everyone. (Dworkin 2002: 202-
203) 
 
Dworkin appears to be referring to a ‘control view,’ i.e., citizens should have a degree of 
control over the political decisions to which they are subjected. In other words, whenever 
citizens change their political judgements or choices, the political decisions taken should 
also be different. However, why should citizens have a certain degree of control over 
political decisions? Those who favour this ‘control view’ usually have two concerns: 
autonomy and paternalism. Such concerns are at the core of the defences of the superiority 




Autonomy is understood as self-rule or having control over a life consistent with plans 
and objectives that one devises oneself, on an authentically reflexive basis. ‘Personal 
autonomy requires that agents give shape to their own life—exercise authorship over it—
by forming judgments and acting on them’ (Viehoff 2014: 350). 
 
Those who believe that the autonomous capacity of the citizens is of great importance 
contend that citizens should have control over their own lives, including their choices of 
food, their choices of career, or their choices of persons they love. Moreover, the state 
can only respect citizens as possessors of autonomous capacities by letting them 
determine not just their individual lives, but also how they all live together in 
community.59 
 
                                                          
59 Daniel Viehoff argues that there may be a conflict between one’s autonomy-based interests in determining 
how to live a collective life and one’s autonomy-based interests in determining how to live one’s own life 
(Viehoff 2014: 351). 
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Since political decisions affect choices that citizens make in their individual and 
collective lives, the protection of autonomy requires that political decisions should be 
controlled by those subjected to these decisions. It seems that Confucian political 
authority does not let all citizens have equal control over political decisions, as it 
subordinates the will of the common citizens to the will of the Confucian Ren 
statespersons. Therefore, Confucian political authority necessitates harming the 
autonomy of the citizens, and the Confucian Ren statespersons limit the autonomous 
capacity of their fellow citizens to pursue the life they wish to pursue, in light of their 
own judgement. 
 
It is further contended that, by contrast, democracy can successfully safeguard the 
autonomy of the citizens by assuring equal participation of the citizens in a political 
decision-making process.  Scott J. Shapiro suggests:  
 
Democratic decision procedures…distinguish themselves by the degree to 
which they empower the citizenry. In liberal democracies, citizens are granted 
the power to exert control over their lives by allowing them, through the 
franchise, to affect the terms of social cooperation and the direction of 
collective pursuits. They may affect the shape of the social landscape either 
directly, by plebiscite, or, more familiarly, indirectly, by the election of 
representatives…Democracy gives expression to, and create opportunities for 
the exercise of, the individual’s autonomous capacities. (Shapiro 2002: 436) 
  
Thus, one might argue that for the purpose of protecting the autonomy of the citizens or 
making citizens ‘the authors of their lives,’ modern democracy is a better form of 
government than CMD insofar as citizens living in a modern democratic country have a 
joint ‘authorship’ of political decisions to which the citizens subject. This seems to be a 
straightforward justification of the superiority of modern democracy, involving three 
main premises: 
 
(1) The autonomy of the citizens is of great importance.  
(2) A certain control over the political decision to which citizens subject is a 
prerequisite for the autonomy of the citizens. 
(3) Modern democracy lets citizens have control over the political decisions, and 




Whether the autonomy of the citizens is of great importance in itself is a contestable point. 
So is the question of whether it is much more valuable than other things, such as justice 
or the common good, regarding facilitating flourishing lives for all the citizens (Chapter 
4 and 6 of this thesis will elaborate on this). 
 
Even if we assume that (1) is true and that autonomy is vital to citizens, it may still be 
unclear why the autonomy of the citizens requires the citizens to have control over 
political decisions. In our daily lives, there are many non-political decisions concerned 
with our religious practices or relationships with others, which also substantially affect 
our autonomy or life choices. However, we generally do not feel the need for control over 
these non-political decisions in order to protect our autonomy; even though many of these 
decisions seem strictly personal or private. 
 
For example, the decision of marrying a woman I love will greatly influence my life 
choices in the future, but I do not and should not want to have control over this decision. 
This is because this decision is also of great importance to the woman’s own life choices. 
For, as people often say, true love somehow cannot be controlled. Likewise, in most 
religious practices, people cannot and should not want to have control over a decision of 
letting God or Buddha be their saviour. 
 
In order to evade this objection, it might be possible to revise the definition of ‘control,’ 
by arguing that what is required is proportional control rather than full control. In other 
words, one’s control over a decision should be proportional to its effects on one own life 
choices.60 However, it is almost practically impossible to compare the effects of the same 
decision on different life choices on the part of different citizens. There are too many 
complicated moral or psychological factors need to be taken into consideration, and most 
of these factors cannot be evaluated merely via a cost-benefit analysis. 
  
Moreover, if ‘control’ were defined in this ‘proportional’ way, it would be difficult to 
explain why all citizens should have an equal opportunity to participate in the political 
decision-making process. This is because very few political decisions have equal effects 
                                                          
60 Harry Brighouse and Marc Fleurbaey argue ‘that power should be distributed in proportion to the citizens’ 
stakes in the decision under consideration’ (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010: 137–55). 
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on everyone’s choice of life (Chapter 5 of this thesis will provide a specific discussion of 
political equality). 
  
Even if it is assumed that the autonomy of the citizens requires that they all have control 
over political decisions, and that therefore, such control is of great importance to citizens; 
it may be difficult to ensure the protection of the autonomy of the citizens in real political 
practices. For, in a real democratic process of political decision-making, the relative 
efficacy of one’s decision is dependent upon choices made by millions of one’s fellow 
citizens.  In applying his economic theory of knowledge, Russell Hardin contends that 
each individual vote makes no difference in a large state, especially when there are 
millions or more voters with the difference made by at least a few thousand votes (Hardin 
2002: 212). 61 
 
In some very unusual cases, such as when a majority wins by a single vote or when there 
is a tie, one vote does matter in terms of the final result. However, Hardin argues that 
‘merely for practical reasons of the impossibility of counting votes accurately,’ we still 
are not in a position to judge which part wins only based on one vote (Russell Hardin 
2002: 220). Tongdong Bai also points out that ‘the statistical error of counting a large 
number of votes is too significant for one vote difference to be considered meaningfully 
determining the outcome’ (Bell & Li 2013:84). 
 
Even if in some particular cases where one vote does exert much more influence than 
other votes, this merely means that one has shared a contributory influence with others; 
this does not entail that one has control over political decisions as such. This is not just 
the case for individuals, but also for the citizens as a whole (the collective). If one 
considers this from a ‘non-ideal situations’ perspectives, it is impossible for the citizens 
as whole to have control over political decisions, since it is extremely difficult in real 
practice to identify the will of the citizens as a whole. This is because in real political 
practices, the wills of individual voters are often divided and complicated, and the options 
they unite to vote for are often simplistic and limited. Therefore, the result of an election 
or referendum may not be regarded merely as what the citizens as a whole want 
(Schumpeter 2003, Riker 2008). 62 
                                                          
61 Russell Hardin further develops such claims in post-war public choice theory made by Mancur Olson, 
Anthony Downs and Kenneth Arrow (Hardin 2002).  




It is possible to put aside such practical matters and focus only on an ideal democracy 
where every citizen in the majority has control over political decision-making and where 
the will of the majority of the citizens as a whole can be identified via ‘one person, one 
vote.’ However, the superiority of such ideal democracy over CMD may not be justified 
merely based on the protection of the autonomy of the citizens. The reasons are as follows.  
 
Firstly, if only a few citizens (Confucian Ren statespersons) having control over political 
decisions is to be understood as harming the autonomy of other citizens, it may not be 
possible to avoid such a problem merely by letting many more citizens have control over 
political decisions.  This is because it is difficult to guarantee that the control exercised 
by a substantial number of citizens would be any less arbitrary than the control of a few 
citizens.  
 
Specifically, in ideal situations, if all citizens had the same intellectual and moral 
capacities, there would be no difference between the control of a large number of citizens 
and control of a few citizens. In non-ideal situations, if a few citizens were intellectually 
and morally superior to others, the control of such intellectually and morally superior 
citizens would bring about better results than the control of other citizens (Chapter 5 of 
this thesis will discuss this topic further). It is thus doubtful that incorporating a larger 
number of citizens would better protect the autonomy of all citizens; especially the 
autonomy of those citizens whose votes are in the minority.  
 
Secondly, the ‘individual autonomy’ of the citizens may be threatened by the ‘collective 
autonomy’ of the citizens.  In ‘one person, one vote,’ a citizen, to some extent, permits 
the majority of his or her fellow citizens to make decisions over his or her life.  Even 
when, in turn, the citizen in question is also permitted to make decisions relating to the 
lives of his or her fellow citizens, the citizen’s control over his or her own life remains 
incomplete and imperfect.  
 
Finally, in an ideal democracy, the collective autonomy of the minority is always 
threatened by the majority, since the majority always have control over the results of the 
political decision-making process. Moreover, the collective autonomy of the minority and 
                                                          
issue. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will further elaborate upon this. 
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the majority may be threatened by those who are outside the category of citizens as such; 
such as the ancestors of the citizens, who have made constitutions which exercise a high 
degree of control over the life choices of the citizens.  
 
One might ignore the problems discussed above regarding the ‘control view’ of autonomy, 
and merely assume that participation of citizens in making political decisions to which 
the citizens are subjected will protect their autonomy whether they have any actual control 
over these decisions or not. However, it is possible that democracy may not be a necessary 
condition for the protection of the autonomy of the citizens. This is because other forms 
of government, such as a colonial power, can also protect the autonomy of the citizens, 
by letting the citizens participate in rather than control over political decision-making.  
Nagel contends:  
 
If a colonial or occupying power claims political authority over a population, 
it purports not to rule by force alone. It is providing and enforcing a system 
of law that those subject to it are expected to uphold as participants, and which 
is intended to serve their interests even if they are not its legislators. Since 
their normative engagement is required, there is a sense in which it is being 
imposed in their name. (Nagel 2005) 
 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that in practice and in theory, democratic 
participation may not sufficiently guarantee the autonomy of the citizens. Moreover, in 
some situations, democratic procedures may not even be strictly necessary for such 
autonomy to be guaranteed. It is now possible to set aside this question of democracy and 
to return to CMD. Even though CMD is founded upon a Confucian conception of political 
authority and does not guarantee equal participation of all citizens in a political decision-
making process, it does not necessarily involve a lack of protection of the autonomy of 
the citizens.  
 
The political authority of the political decisions made by Confucian Ren statespersons 
does not in itself negate the autonomous capacities of their fellow citizens; nor is it 
premised upon any necessity to treat the Confucian Ren statespersons as having a better 
autonomous capacity; nor even does it claim that Confucian Ren statespersons have any 




This is because, in CMD, all political decisions should be made only in accordance with 
Ren, rather than in accordance with the will of any actual human beings. Thus, if Ren 
requires doing A, and the Confucian Ren statespersons give their fellow citizens 
directives to do A, then the citizens should do A purely because that is what Ren requires, 
and not because the Confucian Ren statespersons decide that such is indeed the case. Thus, 
the will of the citizens is not subordinated to the will of the Confucian Ren statespersons, 
but the political decisions made by the Confucian Ren statespersons are subordinated to 
the requirements of Ren. Hannah Arendt contends that ‘absolute power becomes despotic 
once it has lost its connection with a higher power than itself’ (Arendt 2006: 153). The 
political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons would not become despotic, as 
there is always a higher power: Ren. Ren compels and motivates Confucian Ren 
statespersons to always serve the well-being of all citizens. Ren as a higher power is 
guaranteed by ‘Heaven’ in theory (as shall be discussed in the rest of this chapter and 
Chapter 5), and by the institutional arrangements of CMD in practice (see Chapter 6).   
 
Moreover, the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons does not grant the 
Confucian Ren statespersons any superiority that would legitimise a privileged exercise 
of their autonomous capacities (This will be further elaborated in the following chapters). 
Therefore, the Confucian Ren statespersons do not and cannot limit the autonomous 
capacities of their fellow citizens. Hence, the political authority of the Confucian Ren 




Aside from CMD’s purported lack of protection of citizens’ autonomy, another potential 
reason for advocates of the ‘control view’ of political authority to object to CMD, is the 
necessity to avoid the paternalistic leadership Confucian Ren statespersons might bring. 
Those who are suspicious of the political authority of experts may argue that even if CMD 
does not subordinate the will of the citizens to the will of the Confucian Ren statespersons, 
CMD remains objectionable in its paternalism; insofar as it permits the Confucian Ren 
statespersons to make political decisions on behalf of other citizens. 
 
Classical Confucianism has been viewed by many as supporting a paternalistic 
government. This is because filial piety (xiao孝) is one of the highly valued virtues in 
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Confucianism, and is often regarded as the foundation or the source of the ‘loyalty to the 
rulers’ in the Confucian classics.    
 
The Master said, ‘Filial piety starts with serving our parents, then to serve the 
rulers and finally is achieved in establishing ourselves.’ (Book of Filial Piety 
Chapter 1)63 
 
For early Confucians, a good ruler is functionally analogous to a parent. Thus, the rulers 
should treat the citizens as their children.64  It is written in one of the most famous 
Confucian classics, The Great Learning (Daxue大學): ‘A ruler should take good care of 
his citizens as his children.’ Mencius argues that ‘if one rules as a “parent” of the citizens 
and yet fails to reduce hunger and poverty, in what sense is he the “parent” of the citizens?’ 
(Mencius 1A4). 65 Xunzi makes a clear statement: 
 
The Confucian Ren statesperson is the triadic partner of Heaven and Earth, 
the summation of the myriad of things, and the ‘parents’ of the citizens…. 
When a man of Ren becomes the ruler, citizens are as closely attached to him 
as to their own parents.  (Xunzi 9.18) 66 
 
Because of the influence of classical Confucianism, the emperors in Imperial China were 
often called ‘king-fathers (junfu 君父),’ and the government officials were sometimes 
called ‘parental-officials (fumu guan父母官)’ of the citizens and ‘official-sons (chenzi臣
子)’ of the emperors (Wei 1986: 51). 
 
This being so, some may criticise classical Confucianism for endorsing a paternalistic 
government. For Immanuel Kant, a paternalistic government is a government ‘established 
on the principle of benevolence towards the people, like that of a father towards his 
children.’ He points out (and it is worth quoting at length):  
                                                          
63 The Book of Filial Piety (Xiaojing 孝經) is one of the Confucian classics. For a detailed discussion of 
this book see Hu (1996). 
64 The Great Learning also says, ‘Those who are filial to their parents will be loyal to their burden…those 
who are kind to their children will take good care of other citizens.’ For more discussions about this passage 
see Johnston and Wang (2012). 
65 See also Mencius 1B 7, 2A 5, 3A3 




Under such a paternal government (imperium paternal), the subjects, as 
immature children who cannot distinguish what is truly useful or harmful to 
themselves, would be obliged to behave purely passively and to rely on the 
judgement of the head of state as to how they ought to be happy, and upon his 
kindness in willing their happiness at all.  Such a government is the greatest 
conceivable despotism, i.e., a constitution which suspends the entire freedom 
of its subjects, who thenceforth have no rights whatsoever.  (Kant 1991: 51) 
67  
 
Kant contends that paternalistic government is objectionable insofar as it deprives citizens’ 
freedom to behave in accordance with their own judgements about their own interests or 
happiness.  Seana Shiffrin makes this point clearer by providing his definition of 
paternalism: A makes judgements for B or deprives the effects of B’s judgements, on the 
ground that A’s judgements are superior to B’s, where B’s judgments concern either B’s 
interests or legitimate sphere of authority (Shiffrin 2000: 205-250). 
 
However, modern democracies may also be paternalistic in some respects. In most 
democratic elections, the citizens who are in the majority always deprive the effect of the 
judgements of other citizens. Of course, one might argue that this is actually not true, 
because in democracy, any judgement made by the minority is merely smaller in its 
practical effects; this is not at all the same as saying the minority is in any way inferior to 
the majority in terms of their capacity to make reasonable judgements about their own 
interests. 
 
However, in CMD, the ground for substituting a citizen’s political judgements for those 
of the Confucian Ren statespersons is not that the citizen’s judgement about his or her 
self-interest is inferior to that of the Confucian Ren statespersons, but rather that it is 
highly likely that the citizen’s judgement about the interests of his or her fellow citizens 
is intellectually or morally inferior to those made by the Confucian Ren statespersons.  
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, Ren requires that citizens must be altruistic enough to 
sacrifice their self-interest for the well-being of others, in order to make reasonable 
                                                          
67 For detailed commentary on this passage, see Bobbio (1987: 149). 
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political decisions. Most citizens might be right about their own self-interest, but it is 
much more challenging for them to make reasonable judgements about the interests of 
other citizens.  As Thomas Christiano points out:  
 
People’s understandings of other people’s interests are likely to be far more 
fallible and subject to arbitrary influences.  In many cases, people simply do 
not have the knowledge or understanding to come to anything more than an 
extremely crude and faulty grasp of other people’s interests…The more 
pluralistic a society is the more there will be disagreement, fallibility and the 
more the cognitive biases will distort their understanding of other people’s 
interests. (Christiano 2008: 57-59) 
 
Moreover, as discussed above, it is possible that some citizens will not merely be ignorant 
and short-sighted in their capacity to make judgements about the interests of other citizens; 
in addition, they may also be too selfish to care about the interests of other citizens (The 
following chapters will explore this possibility further).68 Therefore, it is possible that in 
CMD, the Confucian Ren statespersons, who are intellectually and morally superior,  are 
better than many citizens in terms of making reasonable political decisions about the 
interests of these citizens’ fellow citizens. 
 
Even if one is considering ideal situations alone, i.e., those in which most citizens can 
make reasonable political decisions about the interests of their fellow citizens, Confucian 
Ren statespersons could avoid being paternalistic by endeavouring not to make any 
political decisions based on false assumptions about the interests of any particular group 
of citizens; at least where such a group denied that their interests corresponded with such 
false assumptions.  
 
Moreover, the Confucian Ren statespersons could avoid being the kind of paternalism 
whereby powerholders make political decisions based on their own private and partisan 
judgement alone. Paternalistic government rests upon the assumption that the rulers’ 
political judgements are more reliable than that of their subjects. By contrast, in CMD, 
                                                          
68 When Hillary Clinton said that Donald Trump would make bad political decisions, the implication is not 
so much that Hillary Clinton thought that Donald Trump was ignorant of his own interests, but that Trump 




Confucian Ren statespersons make political decisions in accordance with the 
requirements of Ren, rather than their own judgements.  Therefore, what is reliable is not 
the judgements of the Confucian Ren statespersons, but the requirements of Ren. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2 and will be further elaborated in the following 
chapters, Ren is not interpreted by the Confucian Ren statespersons, as no one can fully 
grasp the political truths embodied in Ren. Early Confucians claim that Ren is made by 
Heaven, and that it is the attitudes of all citizens that ultimately reveal the acts and deeds 
of Heaven (Mencius 5A5).69  
 
In CMD, the legitimacy of the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons over 
a citizen is not founded on the superiority of the Confucian Ren statespersons’ judgements 
about the citizen’s interests. It is possible that the Confucian Ren statespersons’ 
judgements are worse than that of a citizen who is intelligent but not sufficiently altruistic, 
regarding the promotion of the citizen’s interests. However, the citizen in question is 
morally required to comply with the political decisions made by the Confucian Ren 
statespersons, as long as such political decisions are better than his or her own decisions 
in terms of meeting the requirements of Ren, which means such political decisions better 
promote the interests of his or her fellow citizens in a reasonable way. This will be further 
explained in the following chapters.  
 
According to the above discussions, the democratic assumptions of political authority, 
which are often deployed to prove that all citizens ought to have a certain degree of control 
over political decision-making, are not self-evident.  Moreover, these assumptions are 
inadequate as a refutation of the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons. 
On the one hand, the concerns in these assumptions, especially those about autonomy and 
paternalism, also leave modern democracy vulnerable to similar criticism. On the other 




It is now appropriate to return to the question discussed at the beginning of this chapter 
about CMB3: whether meeting the requirements of Ren much better than others provides 
                                                          
69 The Mandate of Heaven (tianming 天命) will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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sufficient warrant for having political authority over others?  Some might argue that in a 
democratic state, citizens have a moral duty to comply with democratically made political 
decisions because these decisions are the outcome of a procedure in which everyone has 
an equal say (Shapiro 2002, Dunn 2006, Christiano 2008, 2004, Singer 2001).  
 
However, in CMD, it seems that there is no such procedure. So, if a political decision has 
been made by Confucian Ren statespersons who can better meet the requirements of Ren, 
how is it possible that a citizen is thereby morally required to implement or comply with 
this political decision, despite lacking a say in the decision-making process that has 
resulted in such political decision with which the citizen may profoundly disagree? 
 
Here, a short answer to this question is possible: it is because the political authority of the 
Confucian Ren statespersons is based on ‘service’ and ‘reciprocity.’ 70   As will be 
explained in this section, in CMD, one’s acceptance of the political authority of the 
Confucian Ren statespersons is not grounded directly on one’s own judgements, nor is it 
founded upon the pursuit of one’s own benefit, but rather in an idea of ‘service’ and 
‘reciprocity’: everyone has reciprocal obligations towards the well-being of one’s fellow 
citizens, and these, in turn, contribute towards the flourishing of one’s own individual 
lives. Thus, one is morally required to implement or comply with the political decisions 
made by the Confucian Ren statespersons because such political decisions are better than 
one’s own decisions in terms of serving the well-being of one’s fellow citizens.  
 
The main purpose of developing this reciprocity-based Confucian political authority is to 
bring in meritocratic factors in justifying the legitimacy of the political authority of the 
Confucian Ren statespersons, without incurring the risks either of disrespecting individual 
autonomy, or of falling into paternalism. Compared with democratic political authority, 
the exercise of Confucian political authority may better support and maintain the state’s 
capacity to provide resources sufficient for every citizen to live a flourishing life (Some 
possible institutional arrangements in CMD will be discussed in Chapter 6).  
 
3.51 My Own Judgement  
 
                                                          
70 As the above sections have already discussed the ‘service’ aspect of Confucian political authority (the 
rest of this thesis will further elaborate on this), this section intends to explain ‘reciprocity’ further. 
114 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Ren is the totality of the relationship-based virtues that make 
it possible for citizens to make reasonable political decisions. Early Confucians believe 
that everyone has an equal potential to pursue Ren and that everyone is morally required 
to pursue Ren.  Ren helps citizens to recognise their reciprocal obligations towards others, 
as a well-known passage in the Analects says: 
 
As for the requirements of Ren: you want to establish yourself; then help 
others to establish themselves. You want to be reasonable; then help others to 
be reasonable. To view others’ interests as our own interests, this is called the 
direction of Ren. (Analects 6.30)71 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, in CMD, the Confucian Ren statespersons are 
close to Ren, and because of this, they always take the interests of all the citizens into 
consideration. Also, on account of their closeness to Ren, they themselves are in the best 
position to make reasonable political decisions that promote said interests. As a citizen 
living in CMD, I am morally required to subject to the political decisions made by the 
Confucian Ren statespersons is not because that the Confucian Ren statespersons are 
socially superior to me. Nor is it because they are absolutely correct about how to promote 
my own self-interest. Rather, it is because their political decisions better meet the 
requirements of Ren, and thus better promote the benefit of my fellow citizens.  My fellow 
citizens have claims on me to comply with these political decisions. In failing to do so, I 
would be wronging my fellow citizens. The benefit of my fellow citizens, rather than my 
own judgement or benefit, is the ultimate source of the Confucian Ren statespersons’ 
political authority over me. 
 
Some contemporary political philosophers have developed similar arguments that 
highlight the importance of ‘the interests of other citizens’ in political decision-making. 
For example, Jason Brennan argues that because political decisions ‘are enforced with 
violence and the threat of violence,’ then every citizen who is subject to such decisions 
should get some benefit from them and have a stake in them. Therefore, citizens should 
promote the ‘mutual advantage’ of all citizens, e.g. personal and physical integrity, health, 
and some other goods like economic and educational opportunities, rather than cynically 
                                                          




taking advantage of their political influence in order to pursue their own narrow self-
interest (Brennan 2012b: 119,114). 
 
Thomas Christiano also contends that the reason to comply with any political decisions 
should be to promote the benefit of others and ‘to treat others justly’ (Christiano 2008: 
237). For Christiano, political authority is based not on ‘my own judgement,’ but on 
respecting the judgements of others and treating others equally. He provides two reasons 
why ‘my own judgement’ does not matter:  
 
One, if I rely on my own judgment, I will often be mistaken about what a 
useful public rule will do. Others will not be able to rely on me if I follow my 
own judgment alone and I will not be able to rely on them... Two, I will also 
not be able to rely on my fellow citizens to treat me in accordance with the 
same rules by which I deal with them if they or all of us follow the rules each 
of us thinks are best. So the public rule maker enables us to treat each other 
in accord with a basic principle of equality. (ibid.55)  
 
If Christiano’s claims were true, and the political decisions made by the Confucian Ren 
statespersons were more reliable than my own judgements regarding the promotion of the 
benefit of my fellow citizens, it would be plausible to assert that I have a good reason to 
comply with the decisions made by the Confucian Ren statespersons, even if my own 
judgement disagrees with these decisions. Moreover, as these decisions are not based on 
any judgements about my own benefit, I am morally required to comply with these 
decisions not on the basis that the judgments of the Confucian Ren statespersons were 
somehow better than my own judgement in promoting my own benefit. Therefore, the 
political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons need not be paternalistic in 
character, nor would it necessarily lack respect for my autonomy.  
 
3.52 My Own Benefit   
 
One might argue that even if it is assumed that ‘my own judgement’ is not relevant to the 
political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons, this would not mean that ‘my own 
benefit’ does not matter. It is unclear that why the benefit of my fellow citizens, rather 
than my own benefit, is the ultimate source of political authority. Why should I care about 




It is true that ‘my own benefit’ is mainly related to of my own skills, choices and hard 
work; however, ‘my own benefit’ is also heavily dependent on my fellow citizens. For 
firstly, the evaluation of my own skills is primarily dependent upon the preferences of my 
fellow citizens in a stable and organised market; in which every participant is restrained 
by political orders and a system of law. Unless there were a state to administer and enforce 
laws to regulate contracts and protect my property rights, my own skills and efforts would 
be of no benefit to myself. Also, were my fellow citizens to change their preferences, or 
to break the laws that regulate the market, my skills might be valued very differently, or 
have no value at all.  
 
Secondly, the opportunities I develop my skills also depend upon the contributions of 
others. Without education, public security and other essential goods provided by my 
fellow citizens, I will not have the necessary support to develop my own skills. In today’s 
modern societies, my skills and efforts can only be beneficial to me by way of social 
cooperation. Without positions and offices in various institutions produced and 
maintained by others, it would not be possible for me to take advantage of my own talents.  
 
Thirdly, it is my fellow citizens who maintain and constitute the state through their 
fulfilment of their civic duties; such as paying tax, serving in the army, participating in 
various political activities and simply complying with laws and various regulations in our 
daily lives.  Without the contributions that my fellow citizens have made to the basic 
collective goods in my state, I would not be in a position to function as a human being in 
a modern society, let alone accruing any benefit from my own talents and capabilities.  
 
Therefore, it is legitimate to say that I actually benefit from the contributions of my fellow 
citizens, rather than from my own skills, efforts or other attributes. Therefore, my 
reciprocal obligation to benefiting others is not only a guarantee of my own benefit but is 
also a fair return for what my fellow citizens have done to benefit me.72 
 
                                                          
72 The author is indebted here to Andrea Sangiovanni’s lectures as well as to his many helpful supervisions. 
See Sangiovanni (2007). See also Barry (2004: 46-51), Nagel (1995: 113), Rawls (2001:76-77). 
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To sum up, in CMD, Confucian Ren statespersons are required by Ren to serve my benefit, 
but their political authority over me is justified not in terms of serving my benefit, but 
rather in serving the benefit of my fellow citizens.   
 
As discussed in preceding chapters and will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 4, early 
Confucians believe that most citizens do not always care about their own self-interest 
alone; nor should they. The Confucian conception of political authority leaves open the 
possibility that citizens care more about the interests of their fellow citizens than their 
own self-interest. Such conception is founded not upon the promotion of narrow self-
interest, but upon a reciprocal obligation to serve the interests of others: I have obligations 
to promote the interests of my fellow citizens as a fair return for what they have given me; 
just as my fellow citizens have obligations towards me, as a fair return for what I have 
given them.  
 
3.6 Confucian Political Authority: Service and Reciprocity 
 
This chapter has developed a Confucian conception of political authority. Such 
conception asserts that the legitimacy of political authority is founded upon ‘service’ and 
‘reciprocity’, rather than upon the equal participation of all citizens in political decision-
making. Therefore, it appears to be different from the democratic conception of political 
authority. However, from a theoretical point of view, the Confucian conception of 
political authority is not objectionable, as it enjoys a certain degree of ‘general 
acceptability.’ Moreover, the Confucian conception of political authority is compatible 
with the practical aims of the democratic conception of political authority. 
 
3.61 The General Acceptability of Confucian Political Authority 
 
In theory, the Confucian conception of political authority which is based on ‘reciprocity’ 
and ‘service’ is generally acceptable to the reasonable points of view of the citizens (in 
the Estlund’s sense). Specifically, as Estlund says, the general acceptability condition 
only applies to those citizens who are fulfilling their basic civic duties and contributing 
to the basic collective goods of the state (Estlund 2008: Chapter 3). However, it is difficult 
to imagine that citizens would be willing to fulfil their civic duties without being rooted 
in reciprocal relationships. Also, citizens often make reasonable political decisions and 
realise their political values when they are in reciprocal relationships (this will be further 
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explained in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). Therefore, reciprocity is logically prior to general 
acceptability condition; as well as being prior in importance in a more value-laden sense. 
As discussed above, the Confucian conception of political authority is founded upon 
reciprocity and attaches great importance to the reciprocal obligations of the citizens to 
others as a fair return for what they have received and have benefited from. Therefore, 
Confucian political authority is in a position to facilitate reciprocal relationships among 
citizens and is thereby highly likely to be generally acceptable.   
 
In addition, the Confucian conception of political authority is based on ‘service,’ which 
means that the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons in CMD is orientated 
towards serving the well-being of all citizens. Thus, CMD substantially resembles the 
‘welfare state’ advocated by many modern democratic theorists (Pestoff 2009, Palier 
2010, Hannesson 2015). 73 There are various definitions of the ‘welfare state’ in modern 
political theory; most of these emphasise the government’s provision of welfare services. 
For example, David Miller defines the welfare state as a concept of government which 
‘serves the direct link between what someone earns, or otherwise receives through market 
mechanisms, and his access to goods and services’ (Miller 2003: 95). CMD and the 
democratic welfare states all aim at serving the well-being of the citizens.  The democratic 
welfare states are more focused on distributing the well-being widely than generating it 
(Hannesson 2015: 99). However, as will be discussed in the following chapters, for early 
Confucians, the latter is just as important as the former. Also, most scholars agree that the 
welfare state is based on reciprocity, for example, Steffen Mau argues that welfare state 
is a political system of ‘organized and generalised reciprocity’ (Mau 2004: 53-74). 
Andrea Sangiovanni also points out (and it is worth again quoting at length):  
 
One of the main motivational sources supporting the welfare state is 
reciprocity rather than rational egoism, unconditional altruism, or, for that 
matter, the notion that we have a non-relational duty to compensate the 
unlucky…The basic idea is simple: individuals are more willing to grant their 
‘contingent consent’ to policies and institutions in which burdens and benefits 
are perceived to be widely and fairly shared—as in ‘universalist’ welfare 
                                                          
73 The modern welfare state was invented by the United Kingdom before the First World War (Emigh et al. 
2016: 49).The past few decades have witnessed the rise of the welfare state in prosperous, democratic 
countries, especially in Northern Europe (Hannesson 2015: 88-92). After the economic crisis, many 
democratic theorists have been discussing the possible reform of the modern welfare state; However, very 
few of them deny the desirability of the welfare state in modern democratic countries (Palier 2010).     
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states like Sweden—and less willing when public services are (perceived to 
be) inconsequential or inefficient and when free-riding and parasitism are 
(perceived to be) rife. (Sangiovanni 2007: 33) 
 
Some scholars highlight the importance of reciprocity in the welfare state from an 
economic point of view (Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull 1999, Fehr, Fischbacher, and 
Gächter 2002). Bowles and Gintis contend that ‘voters support the welfare state because 
it conforms to deeply held norms of reciprocity and conditional obligations to others’ 
(Bowles and Gintis 2000: 33). Therefore, it seems, at least in theory, the Confucian 
political authority enjoys a certain degree of ‘general acceptability’, i.e., it is generally 
acceptable to reasonable points of view of the citizens. 
  
3.62 The Practical Aim of Confucian Political Authority 
 
In practice, Confucian political authority and democratic political authority both aim at 
establishing a responsive and harmonious state.  In order to achieve such practical aim, 
early Confucians and many democratic theorists would all agree that the citizens have 
reciprocal obligations to make a positive contribution to certain structures that enable the 
state to serve the well-being of all citizens. However, early Confucians regard such 
contribution as a more fundamental consideration than the contribution made by citizens 
towards democratic procedures of political decision-making.74 The reasons are as follows. 
 
Firstly, early Confucians would think that the democratic procedures of political decision-
making are effective and efficient in the opportunities they offer for removing a bad 
government or impeaching an incompetent politician. However, compared with some 
Confucian meritocratic institutional arrangements which focus on selecting good 
statespersons (see Chapter 6), democratic procedures have less potential for establishing 
a good government that always serves the well-being of all citizens. 
 
Secondly, the justification of political rights to participate in democratic procedures of 
political decision-making is often based on individualism or individual autonomy which 
                                                          
74 Similar ideas can be found in communitarianism. For example, communitarian political philosophers, 
such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, have provided various 
justifications of the attractiveness of the Aristotelian ideal of a reciprocity-based community. This is a 
community where each member values their own social roles and attach substantial importance to the 
interests of the community (Sandel 1981, Walzer 1983, MacIntyre 1984, Taylor 1989).  
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does not prioritise the reciprocal relationship between the citizens (Political rights will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4). However, the reciprocal relationship is vital to 
democracy, as the egalitarian procedure-based democratic political authority is 
constrained ‘by a requirement of mutual concern without which our egalitarian 
relationships lack their distinctive value.’ (Viehoff 2014: 340) (Chapter 5 of this thesis 
will discuss this theme in more detail).  
 
Joseph Chan contends that ‘Confucian ideal political relationship is marked by mutual 
commitment and trust—the rulers are committed to governing the people in a trustworthy 
and caring manner, and the ruled, in return, express their willing endorsement and support 
of their rulers.’ He further points out that ‘democracy can also be understood as a political 
system that precisely expresses such an ideal political relationship’ (Chan 2014: 85). Here, 
Chan may need to further explain whether or not this ‘ideal political relationship’ plays 
different roles in classical Confucianism and democracy. As discussed above, the 
reciprocal relationship is embodied in the requirements of Ren and is thereby an intrinsic 
value of Confucian political authority. Democratic institutional arrangements also 
promote this reciprocal relationship. However, this relationship, as Sungmoon Kim points 
out, is ‘one of the democracy’s positive by-products, which makes democracy even more 
attractive, but it is not democracy’s intrinsic value’ (Kim 2017: 243).  
 
Thirdly, compared with the participation of all citizens in the democratic procedures of 
political decision-making, the concern with ‘service’ and ‘reciprocity’ is more 
fundamental to the legitimacy of political authority. This is because any procedures of 
political decision-making, no matter democratic or meritocratic such procedures may be, 
cannot even exist without a responsive and harmonious state; a responsive and 
harmonious state cannot exist without an ethos of ‘serving the well-being of the citizens’ 
as well as reciprocal relationships between the citizens.  
 
The Confucian conception of political authority, which attaches more importance to 
‘service’ and ‘reciprocity’ than to the participation of all citizens in the political decision-
making process, prioritises mutual contributions to the provision of the sufficient means 
for the flourishing lives of all citizens. 75  Moreover, the concern with ‘service’ and 
                                                          
75 There are some questions about the Confucian conception of political authority which are potentially 
relevant to the purposes of this thesis. For example, one might ask how it is possible to define such ‘mutual 
contributions.’ One might also ask about how the state might respond to those who refuse to contribute, 
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‘reciprocity’ facilitates mutual commitments between the Confucian Ren statespersons 
and their fellow citizens as well as the mutual trust between citizens; such concern thus 
helps all citizens to make reasonable political decisions. Therefore, compared with the 
democratic conception of political authority, the Confucian conception of political 
authority can better contribute to the achievement of the practical aim of the democratic 
conception of political authority, i.e., establishing a responsive and harmonious state. 
 
  
                                                          
despite being capable of doing so. One possible answer is that for person A to be a citizen of CDM 
necessarily entails adequate fulfilment of A’s basic civic duties; viewed in this light, the contributions A is 
making can be considered as being contributions to the maintenance of the state. A’s contributions, in turn, 
provide other citizens with the necessary means to promote the benefit of A as well. On the connection 
between welfare and reciprocity, see Stuart (1997: 312-326). 
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4. Political Rights 
 
One might argue that the Confucian political authority discussed in Chapter 3 appears to 
prioritise collective goods only. If this were so, then such kind of political authority may 
fail to adequately protect the self-interest of individuals. Moreover, if the political 
authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons in CMD only emphasises the reciprocal 
obligations of the citizens, which in turn necessitates compliance with the political 
decisions made by Confucian Ren statespersons, the political rights of all citizens to 
participate in the political decision-making process seem to be severely hindered and 
debilitated. Therefore, one might argue that CMD is objectionable as it only emphasises 
the political obligations of individuals while ignoring their political rights, which are no 
less important.    
 
This chapter intends to respond to this objection by developing a Confucian conception 
of political rights. This chapter will argue that there are theoretical and practical problems 
with some individualistic presumptions in the normative democratic principle of political 
rights. In order to avoid these problems, the Confucian conception of political rights is 
founded upon early Confucian views of self-interest and human nature. According to such 
conception, CMD only endorses the political rights of all citizens to participate in ‘strictly 
local’ matters. This chapter will show that the Confucian conception of political rights is 
compatible with the practical aim of the democratic conception of political rights, which 
is to protect the interests of the citizens from being infringed by those with political power. 
Moreover, the Confucian political rights help citizens to make reasonable political 
decisions and thus is capable of contributing towards resolving some problems in modern 
democratic societies that come about as the natural downsides of individualism. 
 
4.1 Political Rights and Classical Confucianism 
 
Most schools of modern political philosophy agree that political rights, as a subclass of 
human rights, are intrinsically valuable in terms of ensuring the flourishing lives of the 
citizens in modern societies. In his Democracy as a Universal Value, Amartya Sen states: 
 
Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention 
forcefully to general needs and to demand appropriate public action. The 
response of a government to the acute suffering of its people often depends 
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on the pressure that is put on it. The exercise of political rights (such as voting, 
criticising, protesting, and the like) can make a real difference to the political 
incentives that operate on a government…The positive role of political and 
civil rights applies to the prevention of economic and social disasters in 
general. (Sen 1999a: 7-8) 
 
It is widely accepted that political rights play an important role in ensuring that the 
citizens can flourish and prosper; such rights represent key practical and evaluative 
criteria for the administration of a given state. Therefore, a Confucian form of government 
which attaches great importance to the flourishing lives of its citizens must, to some extent, 
include a discussion of political rights.  
 
There is an ongoing debate about rights versus duties in Confucian political thought. 
Many Confucian scholars have discussed the possible compatibility between classical 
Confucianism and human rights (Ames 1988, Angle 2002, Bruun and Jacobsen 2004, 
Chan 1999, Chang 1995, Cheng 1997, De Bary 1998, De Bary and Tu 1997, Lee 1996, 
1992, Li 2017, Roetz 1999, Tiwald 2011, Weatherley 2002). Even though most of these 
scholars do not directly tackle political rights, they often ‘restrict the list of human rights 
only to the civil and political rights’ (Li 2017: 39, Chan 2014: 21).   
 
However, such discussions are often flawed, insofar as the arguments presented regarding 
the mutual compatibility or incompatibility of classical Confucianism and political rights 
are commonly founded upon problematic presumptions of political rights. This is not only 
because some Confucian scholars fail to make a clear distinction between human rights 
and political rights, but also because their comparisons of human rights discourse with 
Confucian political thought are often based on the misinterpretations of the liberal 
definition of human rights. For example, some Confucian scholars criticise the liberal 
definition of human rights for mistakenly assuming that there are ‘culturally independent 
human beings’ (Rosemont 1988, Ames 1988). However, these scholars themselves may 
make wrong assumptions about the liberal definition of human rights. The liberal 
definition of human rights assumes only that the differences in people’s cultural, gender, 
ethnic and social background are irrelevant to the justifications of human rights, rather 
than that human beings can be considered as culturally or socially independent individuals 




Some Confucian meritocrats confuse individualism with egoism when they argue against 
democratic political rights (Bai 2009, Rosemont 2015, Bell 2016). Moreover, in their 
efforts to construct a modern interpretation of classical Confucianism that is either 
incompatible or compatible with political rights, some scholars may misinterpret or over-
interpret some ideas drawn from the political thought of early Confucians. For example, 
some Confucian scholars confuse Li利 (interests) and Yi 義 (righteousness) in Confucian 
classics with quanli 權利 (rights), in order to prove that Confucian political thought is 
compatible with political rights (Li 2015:77-84). 
 
On the one hand, it is extremely difficult to give a clear, comprehensive and 
uncontroversial definition of political rights; there is no agreed list of political rights in 
political philosophy. On the other hand, in most Confucian classics, early Confucians 
rarely mention individual rights; there is no consensus among early Confucians regarding 
the issue of self-interest and human nature. Thus, both the ‘compatibility perspective’ and 
‘incompatibility perspective’ of the relationship between classical Confucianism and 
political rights may have certain limitations. On account of these limitations, this thesis 
will adopt a more fruitful strategy: instead of merely focusing on the compatibility 
between political rights and classical Confucianism, this chapter attempts to develop a 
Confucian conception of political rights based on a critical analysis of some key 
presumptions regarding democratic political rights and early Confucian view of human 
nature. Such conception is critically derived from classical Confucianism, while still 
remaining broadly compatible with the practical aim of the democratic conception of 
political rights. 
 
For most democratic theorists, the term ‘political rights’ refers to a class of rights, relating 
to some forms of equal political participation: all the citizens of a state participate on 
equal terms in a political decision-making process free of both discrimination and 
repression alike. It has been argued that political rights include but should not be limited 
to democratic political rights. However, for the purpose of this thesis, this chapter mainly 
focuses on democratic political rights, and the term ‘democratic political rights’ in this 
thesis will be confined to voting rights; i.e., the right to directly participate in making the 
political decisions that will deeply influence the whole state. Such political decisions 
include determining the laws and state policies in a referendum, or choosing the head of 




From a liberal democratic point of view, there are other rights can be included under the 
term ‘political rights,’ besides the voting rights; these rights include the right to assemble, 
the right to form a political party, and the right to political speech. However, for the 
purpose of this thesis, these rights are classified as civil rights. This chapter is not a 
conceptual analysis of political rights, nor does it intend to evaluate the merits of these 
civil rights. It only focuses on the democratic voting rights. This is because voting rights 
not only pertain to the core feature of modern democracy but also are distinct from 
Confucian political rights in CMD.  This chapter will argue that the democratic political 
rights or voting rights are indeed valuable to a degree. However, this chapter will further 
argue that with regard to the imperative of helping citizens to make reasonable political 
decisions, it is reasonable to claim that the democratic political rights of the citizens are 
less valuable than their Confucian political rights. Here, it is necessary to clarify two 
points about such claim. 
 
Firstly, the claim that the democratic political rights of the citizens are less valuable than 
their Confucian political rights should not be confused with the claim that the citizens 
value their Confucian political rights much more than their democratic political rights. It 
is common that citizens may value something which is not valuable to them. For example, 
in modern societies, many believe that love is less valuable to them than money and power, 
but very few would thus not value love. This chapter is only concerned with the question 
whether certain political rights of the citizens are valuable to them, rather than with the 
question whether the citizens actually value certain political rights. The latter question 
needs to be answered by empirical studies about psychological choices of the citizens, 
which is not the main concern of the philosophical arguments in this thesis. 
 
Secondly, the claim that the citizens’ democratic political rights are less valuable to them 
than their Confucian political rights should not be confused with the claim that the citizens 
are entitled to democratic political rights less than Confucian political rights. The latter 
claim may not be true, even if the former is justified. There is no straightforward 
relationship between these two claims. Jason Brennen points out that ‘whether someone 
is entitled to something is not decided by whether it is valuable to her. For instance, it 
would be disrespectful for someone to steal the unwanted junk out of my basement, even 
if that person knows I do not want the junk’ (Brennen 2012: 2). This thesis intends to 
argue that Confucian political rights are more valuable than democratic political rights in 
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terms of helping citizens to lead flourishing lives, putting aside the questions of whether 
or not citizens are entitled to the democratic political rights. 
  
In order to achieve the above objective, this chapter will start with clarifying some early 
Confucian views of self-interest and human nature. There will also be a discussion of 
some commonly encountered individualistic presumptions with regard to the normative 
democratic principle of political rights, most of which are often deployed but not 
adequately clarified in the demonstration of the compatibility and incompatibility 
between classical Confucianism and political rights.  
 
4.2 Early Confucian Views on Self-interest and Human Nature 
 
It is commonly argued that political rights aim at protecting the moral, political and 
material interests of individuals from infringement on the part of those with political 
power.  It seems, prima facie that classical Confucianism is incompatible with this aim. 
For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, Confucius requires people to ‘exercise self-
discipline and return to Li禮’ (ke ji fu li 克己復禮). Zhu Xi 朱熹, the most influential 
Neo-Confucian in the Song dynasty, further explains the requirement of ‘ke ji fu li克己
復禮’ as overcoming one’s private desires for pursuing self-interest and to act only 
according to the common good (Zhu [1190] 2010: 131-132). 76  Moreover, in their 
arguments about Yi 義（Righteousness /Obligations of Justice） vs  Li 利 （Self-interest） 
(yi li zhi bian義利之辨), early Confucians often advocate the priority of the public or 
national interest over the self-interest of individuals, especially when there is a conflict 
of interests in public affairs.  
 
Therefore, some may claim that classical Confucianism is incompatible with political 
rights, as it ignores the self-interest of the citizens and only emphasises the positive 
obligations of the citizens to accept the political authority of the Confucian Ren 
statespersons, in the name of helping all citizens to lead flourishing lives. However, this 
claim is problematic as it is based on some oversimplified or mistaken interpretations of 
early Confucian views regarding self-interest and human nature. 
 
                                                          
76 This topic will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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4.21 Li 利 (self-interest) vs. Yi義(righteousness)  
 
In the Analects, Confucius appears to prioritise ‘righteousness (moral obligations of 
justice)’ over ‘self-interest,’ as he famously states, ‘Junzi 君子  are concerned with 
righteousness, and xiaoren 小人 are concerned with self-interest’ (Analects 4.16). Here, 
Junzi君子 and xiaoren 小人 are often translated as ‘the noble person’ and ‘the petty 
person’ separately.  This well-known statement of Confucius is often quoted as the 
evidence that Confucius shows contempt for the self-interest of individuals.  
 
However, it is likely that Confucius’s view of self-interest in this statement has been 
misunderstood. Liu Baonan 劉寶楠, a prominent Confucian scholar of the Qing (清) 
dynasty, discusses Confucius’s view of self-interest in his book Interpretation of the 
Analects (Lunyu Zhengyi 論語正義). He points out that ‘this sentence (Analects 4.16) is 
especially for government officials.’ Liu contends that if one considers Confucius’s 
original intention carefully, Junzi 君子 in this sentence, should be understood as 
statespersons who govern the state, and Xiaoren 小人  should be understood as a 
commoner whose occupation is non-political in character (Liu [1865]1990: 154).  
Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is better to translate Junzi as ‘Confucian Ren 
statesperson,’ rather than ‘the noble person.’ In the Analects 4.16, Confucius only shows 
contempt for the self-interest of government officials, rather than that of the common 
citizens. 
 
Another sentence in the Confucian classics that is often quoted to prove that early 
Confucians denounce the pursuit of one’s own self-interest is at the beginning of Mencius: 
 
Mencius said, ‘Why must you Majesty (King Hui of Liang) speak of self-
interest? I only offer counsels about Ren and righteousness.’ (Mencius 1A1) 
 
However, it must be noted that in this context, once more, Mencius’s interlocutor is a 
ruler, rather than common citizens. So, for Mencius, it is not common citizens, but their 
rulers that should be concerned purely with Ren and with righteousness, rather than with 




Indeed, early Confucians believe the self-interest of common citizens should be promoted, 
as Confucius says, ‘The ruler should make the self-interest of the citizens more beneficial 
to the citizens’ (Analects 20.2). Confucius claims that self-interest, such as ‘wealth and 
eminence are what citizens desire,’ and ‘if one could get rich just by trying, then although 
it meant being a herald with a whip in hand, I would go along with that’ (Analects 4.5, 
7.11). However, Confucius also makes it clear that citizens should pursue their self-
interest in a reasonable way (Analects 7.11).  Mencius and Xunzi also endorse the citizens 
making a reasonable pursuit of their own self-interest (Mencius 5A1, 6A17, Xunzi 8.14, 
23.8). 
 
Therefore, what early Confucians oppose is the tendency for rulers to only care about 
their self-interest, rather than the self-interest of the common citizens. In early Confucian 
discussions of self-interest, citizens are certainly permitted to promote their self-interest, 
but they should only do so in a reasonable way (Chen 2012: 193-197).77  
 
4.22 Is Human Nature Good or Evil? 
 
The claim that classical Confucianism is incompatible with political rights is not only 
founded upon a problematic reading of early Confucian views of the self-interest of the 
citizens, but also based on some problematic understanding of Confucian views of human 
nature.  
 
In classical Confucianism, there is a well-known debate about human nature between 
Mencius and Xunzi. Both of these two influential early Confucians are viewed by many 
Confucian scholars as holding distinct and incompatible views of human nature.   
                                                                               
Mencius has a belief in the innate goodness of every human being.78 He contends that 
‘human nature is always good, just as water always flows downwards. There is no human 
                                                          
77 The meaning of ‘reasonable’ will be discussed in the following sections. 
78 Mencius’s ideas about innate goodness have criticised by some Confucians in the Han dynasty(206BCE-
220CE). For example, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒(179-109BCE) claims that goodness can only be the results 
of cultivation, rather than something with which human beings are born (Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 Chun 
Qiu Fan Lu 春秋繁露 Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals: 36.1). In the Song dynasty (960-
1279CE), many Confucian scholars of Neo-Confucianism also disagree with Mencius on his assumption 
about human nature, especially in Feng Xiu’s馮休 Shan Meng刪孟 Removing Mencius, Si Maguang’s司
馬光 Yi Meng疑孟 Questioning Mencius, Li Gou李覯 Fei Meng 非孟 A Critique of Mencius, Huang 
Yuezhi 晃說之 Chi Meng 诉孟 Challenging Mencius. For more discussions about Neo-Confucianism’s 
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being lacking in the tendency to do good, just as there is no water lacking in the tendency 
to flow downward’ (Mencius 6A2). In order to prove this belief, Mencius gives the well-
known example of a child falling into a well. All human beings, without exception, 
immediately feel a sense of alarm and compassion, when seeing a child who has fallen 
into a well, even if we have no personal relationship with the child (Mencius 2A6). Any 
person, no matter who he or she is, would be motivated by compassion to save the child; 
a compassion independent of any narrow personal interests. Such compassion originates 
from an innate sensitivity to the suffering of other human beings, and this is a moral 
capacity with which every human being is born. 79  
 
Xunzi disagrees with Mencius, ‘Mencius claims human nature is good. This is of course 
not so…Human nature is evil’ (Xunzi 23.11).80 Xunzi argues that human beings are born 
self-interested and concerned first and foremost with satisfying their own desires: 
 
Xunzi said, ‘Human nature is evil; any good in human beings is acquired by 
perceived exertion. The nature of man is such that he is born with a love of 
self-interest. Following this nature will cause its aggressiveness and greedy 
tendencies to grow, while courtesy and deference to disappear.’ (Xunzi 23.1)81 
 
Therefore, many Confucian scholars claim that Mencius and Xunzi have opposite views 
of human nature; i.e., for Mencius, human nature is good, but for Xunzi, human nature is 
evil. However, this widely accepted claim is problematic for two reasons.  
 
Firstly, to simply claim that Mencius believes that human nature is good or Xunzi holds 
the view that human nature is evil, is a superficial generalisation of the complex and 
comprehensive thought of Mencius and Xunzi. 
 
                                                          
view of Mencius, see Zhou (2007). 
79The modern primatologist Frans de Waal points out that some empirical evidence suggests that human 
beings have had seeds of compassion for others since the very beginning of the species (De Waal 2010). 
80 ‘Human nature is evil 性恶’ appears twenty times in Xunzi; all twenty appearances are in Chapter 23. 
Since Chapter 23 seems peculiar and does not resonate with other Chapters in Xunzi. Some scholars argue 
that Chapter 23 was not written by Xunzi and was added to the books by someone in the Han dynasty (Lin 
2012). 
81 Many Confucian scholars have criticised Xunzi’s views on human nature. For example, Cheng Yi 程頤 
(1033-1107), a prominent philosopher of Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty, points out that ‘Xunzi is 
too extreme, he is fundamentally wrong just because of his ideas on how human nature is evil’ (He nan 
cheng shi yi shu河南程氏遺書 Posthumous Writings of Cheng Brothers: Chapter 9), see Cheng (1981). 
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Mencius himself appears unsure whether human beings, by nature, are good. This is 
because Mencius also says, ‘Human beings are in their essence capable of becoming good. 
That is what I mean by saying human nature is good. That someone should become evil 
is not a question of his essence’ (Mencius: 11.6). Here, Mencius interprets the notion 
‘human nature is good’ in terms of the more precise notion ‘capable of becoming good,’ 
it thus appears that Mencius may not be certain about how far goodness is necessary and 
intrinsic to human nature. 
 
A careful reading of the relevant paragraphs shows that Xunzi not only claims that human 
nature is evil but also explains that human nature is something unadorned or raw (樸 pu). 
Xunzi says, ‘Human nature is the basis and beginning, the raw and unadorned material. 
Conscious activity is the form and principle of order and development’ (Xunzi 19.22). 
Xunzi also claims that ‘any man in the street can become Yu (an ancient Confucian Ren 
statesperson).’ This is because everyone ‘is capable of knowing (morality), and has the 
ability to practice’ (Xunzi 23.18). 
 
Some scholars argue that Xunzi may not believe that human nature is evil. For example, 
Liang Qichao 梁啟超 points out that according to Xunzi’s definition of ‘human nature,’ 
Xunzi intends to explain human nature as raw material (Liang 1999: 4971). Hou Wailu 
侯外廬 argues that Xunzi does not assume human nature is evil, but merely assumes that 
human nature is not good, or that it is impossible to know whether human nature is good 
or not (Hou 1950: 573). Some contemporary Confucian scholars contend that from the 
perspective of Xunzi, human nature is neither good nor evil, but is unadorned (xing pu 性
樸) (Lin 2012, Zhou 2016). 
 
Because of some complicated, ambiguous and contradictory paragraphs in the Confucian 
classics, any interpretation of early Confucian view of human nature will always prove 
debatable. However, it is valid to contend that Mencius and Xunzi do not appear to take 
an unambiguous stance on the question of whether human nature is good or evil.  
 
Secondly, even if one were to set aside the controversial interpretations above and assume 
that human nature is good in Mencius’s view and is evil in Xunzi’s view, one might 
eventually find that these two early Confucian views of human nature are different, but 
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not intrinsically irreconcilable; at least when one endeavours to take seriously the 
underlying intentions implicit in the arguments of Mencius and Xunzi. 
 
The purpose of Mencius is perhaps not so much to prove that human beings are born with 
certain kinds of goodness, and thus that human nature is good, but rather, to highlight the 
importance of the extension and comprehensive development of the innate intellectual 
and moral capacities of human beings.  For Mencius, all human beings have ‘four innate 
capacities (si de四端).’ These innate capacities are related to but different from the ‘four 
virtues (si de四德)’ of human beings: benevolence, righteousness, decorum and wisdom 
(Fu 2003: 637, Luo 1958: 378). 
 
Mencius said, ‘The sense of compassion is the innate capacity for 
benevolence; the sense of shame is the innate capacity for righteousness; the 
sense of modesty is the innate moral capacity for decorum; the sense of right 
and wrong is the innate moral capacity for wisdom. Human beings possess 
these four innate moral capacities just like they possess four limbs… When 
we know how to extend and fully develop these four innate moral capacities, 
it will be like the starting of a fire or the gushing out of a spring. If one fully 
develops all these four innate moral capacities, it would be sufficient to 
protect the state; if not, one would not even be able to serve his parents. 
(Mencius 2A6) 
 
Mencius intends to argue that if human beings extend and develop their four innate 
capacities fully, they can realise their ‘four virtues,’ this would be a sufficient again, in 
order for them to benefit the whole world.82  
  
Xunzi’s main argument is that if human beings, by nature, are good, then there is no need 
to ‘elucidate proprieties to transform human beings, establish laws and regulations to 
                                                          
82 Generations of Confucian scholars have elaborated on the relationship between ‘four innate capacities’ 
and ‘four virtues.’  Zhao qi 趙岐 (108-201) in Meng zi zhu孟子注 Commentary on Mencius claims that 
‘the four innate capacities’ are inside the human body, and can thus manifest themselves as the ‘four virtues.’  
Sun shi 孫奭 (962—1033) in Shu 疏 Commentary on Confucian Classics argues that the ‘four innate 
capacities’ are the starting point of the ‘four virtues.’ Thus, if people can further develop the ‘four innate 
capacities’, then they can also attain to the ‘four virtues.’ Zhu xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) in Meng zi ji zhu孟子
集注 collection of commentary on Mencius contends that the ‘four innate capacities’ are functional (yong
用), and the ‘four virtues’ are substantive (ti體). 
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bring human beings to order, attach importance to legal punishments to set human beings 
straight, and make sure the social order is secured and consistent with goodness.’ (Xunzi 
23.12) Therefore, the purpose of Xunzi’s assumption of human nature might not be to 
prove that human nature is evil, but merely to highlight the importance of the ‘conscious 
activities’ which he further explains as the activities of developing human nature through 
education, moral training and civilising influence of rituals (Li 禮).  
 
Human nature is the basis and beginning, the raw and unadorned material. 
Conscious activity is the form and principle of order, the process of 
development and completion. If there were no human nature, there would be 
nothing for conscious activity to work upon or develop, and if there were no 
conscious activity, then human nature would have no way to improve itself. 
Only when human nature and conscious activity combine does a true sage 
emerge and perform the task of uniting the world…When human nature and 
conscious activity are joined, the whole world is benefited.  (Xunzi 19.22)   
 
Mencius and Xunzi may have different views of human nature, but they both intend to 
highlight the importance of the process of refining human nature.  In other words, they 
both believe that every human being has innate capacities; whether these capacities be of 
positive, negative or neutral moral character, it is both possible and necessary to correctly 
develop such capacities, through education or moral self-cultivation, in order to meet the 
requirements of Ren and benefit the whole world. This is also reflected in CMB2: Every 
citizen has equal innate capacities; these capacities can and ought to be cultivated, in order 
that one might know and practise the political truths of Ren.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Generally speaking, according to early Confucian views on self-interest and human nature, 
every citizen should reasonably pursue their self-interest and every citizen, by nature, can 
be reasonable. More importantly, what early Confucians emphasise is that every citizen 
ought to be cultivated in order to be reasonable or to meet the requirements of Ren, i.e., 
they must be altruistic enough to sacrifice their self-interest for the well-being of their 
fellow citizens.  
 
Moreover, for most early Confucians, the main reason human beings are ‘the noblest 
beings in the world’ is that they have innate capacities rather than because of their 
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possession of any innate dignity or rights (Xunzi 9.16, Mencius 7B 14).83 This is resonant 
with some contemporary philosophical theories of human rights, i.e. the theories of basic 
human capabilities advocated differently by some political philosophers (Griffin 2008, 
Nussbaum 1997, 2000, Sen 2004, 2005, 2009). Most these philosophers would agree what 
Bernard Williams claims: 
 
The notion of a basic human right seems to me obscure enough, and I would 
rather come at it from the perspective of basic human capabilities. I would 
prefer capabilities to do the work, and if we are going to have a language or 
rhetoric of rights, to have it delivered from them, rather than the other way 
around. (Williams 1987:100) 
 
To sum up, early Confucian views of self-interest and human nature are indeed 
compatible with the practical aim of political rights, which is to protect the self-interest 
of the citizens from being infringed by those with political power. However, early 
Confucians believe that human beings by nature are capable of being reasonable (Mencius) 
or every human being has innate capacities which can and ought to be cultivated so that 
every human being will be reasonable (Mencius and Xunzi). Therefore, early Confucians 
would not agree with some of the individualistic presumptions to which most assertions 
of democratic political rights are beholden. 
 
4.3 Individualism and Modern Democracy 
 
It is uncontroversial that individualism, as a liberal doctrine, plays an important role in 
the justification of democratic political rights. This is because that the democratic political 
rights centre freedom and individual autonomy as key concerns. Furthermore, the 
normative democratic principle of political rights is premised upon the view that 
individuals are the ultimate authority in judging their own interests, rather than collectives, 
such as states, political institutions or social organisations. 
 
Less well understood is the justification and meaning of some individualistic 
presumptions which play a crucial role in the justification and formulation of democratic 
political rights. One of the most common individualistic presumptions in the normative 
                                                          
83 Chapter 5 will discuss this topic further.  
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democratic principle of political rights is an individualistic view of human nature: human 
beings, by nature, are only capable of being self-interested. However, upon closer 
examination, this assumption does not appear universally valid or self-evident a priori. If 
one takes a close look at this presumption, one may find it is neither absolute nor a priori.  
 
However, some Confucian scholars often confuse ‘being self-interested’ with ‘being 
selfish.’ Thus, they are critical of such individualistic presumption and choose to defend 
Confucian views of human nature instead (Rosemont 2015).  Therefore, it is necessary to 
make a distinction between ‘egoism’ and ‘individualism.’ Egoism means to pursue selfish 
interests, but individualism is about protecting self-interest; in this context, the latter term 
can be taken to refer merely to the minimal interests that are concerned with the most 
basic needs of human beings. For example, human beings have self-interest in not being 
harmed, and such a kind of interest is surely not selfish. When one protects oneself from 
being tortured, one is certainly not acting egoistically. 
 
It has been argued that an individualistic understanding of human nature would postulate 
not so much that human beings are selfish by nature, but rather that human beings are 
self-interested by nature. Or more precisely, human beings by nature are not altruistic 
enough to sacrifice their self-interest for the well-being of others. Often, such an 
individualistic view of human nature is verified by nothing more than a vague, imaginary 
and ahistorical explanation of human nature; or else a biological or behavioural prediction 
of the natural tendencies of human beings that is scientifically controversial.  In other 
words, what is unclear scientifically and historically is not the importance of the self-
interest of human beings, but the claim that human beings are only inclined towards 
pursuing their self-interest. 
 
Those who are generally sympathetic to early Confucian views of human nature may not 
accept the view that human beings are self-interested by nature. Even if this view were 
actually true, it would not follow from this that human beings are only capable of being 
self-interested, or that human beings ought to be self-interested. Of course, some may 
maintain a realistic view of normative theories and argue that human beings can only be 
exactly as they in fact already are (intrinsically or naturally); or, as Rousseau says, 
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‘“Propose what can be done,” they never stop repeating to me. It is as if I were told, 
“Propose doing what is done”’ (Rousseau 1979: 34).84 
 
However, a common error with regard to individualistic ideas is an illegitimate move 
from what human beings are to what human beings can be or ought to be. For, as 
Machiavelli says, ‘How one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live.’ Very few 
would believe that people ought to be what we are already (Machiavelli 2008: Chapter 
XV). For example, human beings are born ignorant of many things, but it is rarely argued 
that ignorance is the only possibility for human beings, or that human beings ought to 
remain ignorant. 
 
Admittedly, it is usually more controversial and complicated to defend ‘can be’ or ‘ought 
to be’ assumptions than ‘is’ ones. However, a view of human nature may not have any 
normative function if it only concerns certain attribute of human beings that cannot be 
either changed or replaced.  For instance, it is meaningless to develop a view of human 
nature based on the assumption that human beings by nature need to eat; this is because 
it is impossible for any human being to avoid eating. By contrast, it is commonly believed 
that human beings can be altruistic; this is an attribute which is not purely fixed and static. 
It is an innate moral capacity that one can develop over time. 
 
Certainly, if one wishes to encourage human beings to follow a certain norm, a certain 
‘can be’ or ‘ought to be,’ it is of great significance to study the natural tendencies of 
human beings.85 However, to ask ‘what are the natural tendencies of human beings’ is to 
ask a psychological or biological question which is lacking normative functions, and 
empirical studies or scientific experiments are supposed to be more reliable in providing 
an answer to such question than philosophical thought experiments. Therefore, the 
question about the natural tendencies of human beings is not the main focus of the moral 
and philosophical arguments in this thesis. The key concern here is the question of what 
                                                          
84 Rousseau might also hold an idealistic view of normative theory, as he says,’ taking men as they are, and 
laws as they might be’ (Rousseau 2012, para. 1).  For some discussions about realistic versus idealistic or 
‘Utopian’ views of normative theory, see Estlund (2014). John Rawls tries to combine both views by 
introducing his own ‘realistic utopianism,’ see Rawls (2000: 4). 
85 In this thesis, the concept ‘natural tendencies’ does not carry with it a sense of absolute and unqualified 
determinism and universality. It merely signifies whatever human beings are generally inclined to do, as 
abstracted from the particular cultural order they are socialised into/belong to. 
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human beings by nature can be or ought to be, not with the question of what human beings 
already are. 
 
As discussed above, in early Confucian views of human nature, every human being has 
equal innate capacities, whether these capacities be of positive, negative or neutral moral 
characters; such capacities can be and ought to be cultivated, so that one can become a 
reasonable citizen who meets the requirements of Ren, i.e., one who is altruistic enough 
to sacrifice their self-interest for the well-being of others. 
 
Therefore, according to early Confucian perspectives, what is problematic in the 
individualistic understanding of human nature is not the biological and descriptive 
presumption that human beings are not altruistic enough to sacrifice their self-interest for 
the well-being of others. The problem lies with the philosophical and normative 
presumption that human beings are not capable of being or ought not to be altruistic 
enough to sacrifice their self-interest for the well-being of others. Moreover, from the 
perspectives of some modern political theories, this presumption is also problematic in 
theory and in practice for the following reasons. 
 
Theoretically speaking, this assumption, which is derived from the ideals of the 
Enlightenment and of the capitalistic market economy, risks degenerating into a kind of 
egoism that celebrates narrowly-defined self-interest above all else (Bell and Li 2013). 
This superficial and problematic understanding of ‘self-interest’ may undermine the 
reasons for promoting the interests of others or pursuing the common good, thereby 
resulting in a tyranny of individual self-interest, rather than merely a protection of 
personal self-interest. Jacques Maritain senses a tension between person and individual: 
 
In the social order, the modern city sacrifices the person to the individual; it 
gives universal suffrage, equal rights, liberty of opinion, to the individual, and 
delivers the person, isolated, naked, with no social framework to support and 
protect it, to all the devouring powers which threaten the soul’s life, to the 
pitiless actions and reactions of conflicting interests and appetites, to the 
infinite demands of matter to manufacture and use. (Maritain 1950: 21) 
  
In practice, this individualistic presumption about human nature is often associated with 
some socio-political problems in modern democratic societies. This is because the view 
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that human beings are not capable of altruistic self-sacrifice may facilitate 
‘patrimonialism’ or ‘repatrimonialism’ which, as Francis Fukuyama contends, is resulted 
from a biologically rooted selfish impulse in every human being (Fukuyama 2011).86 In 
his latest book ‘Political Order and Political Decay,’ Fukuyama argues that that 
‘repatrimonialism’ is one of the main forces contributing to the decay of modern 
democratic states. Specifically, Fukuyama points out: 
 
The modern, impersonal state forces us to act in ways that are deeply in 
conflict with our own natures and is therefore constantly at risk of erosion and 
backsliding. Elites in any society will seek to use their superior access to the 
political system to further entrench themselves, their families, and their 
friends unless explicitly prevented from doing so by other organised forces in 
the political system. This is no less true in a developed liberal democracy than 
in other political orders, and one can make the argument that the process of 
repatrimonialization continues into the present. (Fukuyama 2014: 138) 
 
Moreover, the exercise of democratic political rights in modern democracy may 
exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflicting self-interest of individuals; while also, 
disadvantaging those who prefer harmonious strategies for solving social conflicts 
(Brunell and Buchler 2009). This is a result of the system of ‘one person, one vote’ 
deteriorating into partisan politics, as citizens with different interests and values coalesce 
into different sharply opposed and mutually antagonistic groupings. The political parties 
in many modern democratic countries mainly strive to promote their own partial interests 
rather than seeking a consensus on the common good. Therefore, ‘Negative Campaigning’ 
is very common in most democratic elections; this is the strategy whereby politicians and 
political parties ‘often taint electoral competitors with unsubstantiated and false 
allegations in order to saddle them with the disapprobation of the voters’ (Wiredu 
2001:228).  
 
In the United States, partisan animosity has already become much more serious than two 
decades ago. According to Pew Research Centre Report in 2014, twenty-seven percent of 
the Democrats and thirty-six percent of the Republicans regard the other party as a threat 
                                                          
86 Chapter 5 of this thesis will discuss Fukuyama’s ‘patrimonialism’ further. 
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to the well-being of Americans.87 Since the 2016 election, political opinions have been 
divided substantially in the USA. Many Americans tend to support relatively extreme 
political positions and are only prepared to live with or even talk with those who share 
the same political beliefs (Dan and Kirk 2017).   
 
4.4 Reasonable Citizens 
 
Many political philosophers have tried to solve the above theoretical and practical 
problems with the individualistic presumptions in the normative democratic principle of 
political rights. For example, Rawls’ solution is based on his consideration about 
‘reasonable citizens’ and ‘public reason’ as well as the ‘criterion of reciprocity.’ For 
Rawls, without its reasonable citizens’ reflective control, a democratic state is not just 
(Daniels 2000: 129). Therefore, Rawls pins his hopes on making a majority of citizens 
reasonable. He states:  
 
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a 
system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one 
another fair terms of social cooperation (defined by principles and ideals) and 
they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in 
particular situations, provided that others also accept those terms. For these 
terms to be fair terms, citizens offering them must reasonably think that those 
citizens to whom such terms are offered might also reasonably accept them. 
(Rawls 1996: xliv)  
 
In Rawls’s view, if most citizens in a democratic state vote purely based on their own 
‘comprehensive doctrine’ (a system of philosophical, moral and religious beliefs about 
good life), and reach an agreement simply based on their own self-interest in adhering to 
the treaty, rather than on the principle of justice, then only a ‘modus vivendi’ is achieved. 
This means such a democratic state is stable, but not just, and the stability of the state in 
question is thus unreasonable (Rawls 2000: 149-151). Many democratic theorists further 
develop this well-known Rawlsian view of reasonable citizens, and most of them agree 
that ‘citizens can and should seek public-spirited perspectives on public issues and 
                                                          
87 Pew Research Center. 2014. Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological 
Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise, and Everyday Life.’ http://www.people-
press.org /2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public accessed on July 25, 2016. 
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promote mutually respectful decision-making rather than flattening the political 
landscape into a low contest among interests and preferences’ (Bell 2016: 58, Gutmann 
and Thompson 2009).  
 
4.41 Political Participation 
 
There is a difficult problem here. How is it possible to make citizens reasonable, so that 
they will vote for the common good, rather than for their self-interest? One possible 
solution that is supported by many political philosophers is political participation. For 
example, John Stuart Mill suggests providing more opportunities for citizens to stand up 
for their rights, and to be exposed to other perspectives; in order to refine their views and 
to encourage them to seriously consider the interests of other citizens. All this has the 
potential to improve the moral and intellectual development of the citizens (Mill [1861] 
2010: Chapter 3). Similarly, Rawls claims that citizens should be assured of obtaining 
‘availability of public information on matters of policy,’ and other necessary means to 
‘take intelligent and effective advantage of their basic freedoms’ to participate in politics 
(Rawls 1996, lviii-lix).88   
 
Benjamin Barber proposes a series of institutional arrangements, such as ‘Neighbourhood 
Assemblies,’ ‘Television Town Meetings and a Civic Communications Cooperative,’ 
‘Civic Education and Equal Access to Information: A Civic Education Postal Act and a 
Civic Videotext Service’ and other ‘supplementary institutions,’ for the purpose of 
offering forms ‘for ongoing political talks,’ thus providing reliable information and 
instilling ‘civic competence’ (Barber 2004: 267-281).  
 
Some deliberative democrats, such as James Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman argue that there 
should be a state holiday: ‘the Deliberation Day.’ On this day, voters would discuss and 
debate about important political issues, and each voter would be paid a certain amount of 
money for ‘the day’s work of citizenship’ (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004a: 34).   
 
The next question is whether these institutional arrangements for providing citizens with 
more opportunities for political participation or political talk would be sufficiently 
                                                          
88 The democracy that Rawls is concerned with is ‘deliberative democracy,’ which is a ‘well-ordered 
constitutional democracy’ with various arrangements to make it easier for the citizens to be reasonable 
(Rawls 2000: 138). 
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efficient and effective in terms of its stated intention of making most citizens reasonable. 
Jane Mansbridge points out that political participation may result in antagonism and 
distrust if citizens are unreasonable and stubborn when discussing political issues 
(Mansbridge 1983, Parkinson & Mansbridge 2012). Diana Mutz contends that if a 
political talk is not conducted in the spirit of civility, it may lead to resentment, partisan 
animosity and polarisation of positions among participants holding different political 
beliefs (Mutz 2006: 62). Thus, the above institutional arrangements may not necessarily 
make participants reasonable. Rather, it is premised on the assumption that they are 
already substantially reasonable, to begin with. 
 
Many empirical studies also show that in long-established democratic countries, the more 
actively the voters participate in politics; the more frustrated, disillusioned and cynical 
the voters may be (Brennan 2011, Caplan 2007, Mansbridge 1983, Mutz 2006). Therefore, 
the political participation in democratic countries may not help citizens become 
reasonable, but may actually make them stubborn, and thus intolerant of views that are 
different from theirs.  
 
Some may argue that even if the above institutional arrangements may not help citizens 
become reasonable, they are still effective and valuable; insofar as they provide citizens 
with useful political information. However, it is highly likely that in modern societies, 
many citizens who are busy with their own work may lack the motivation to get high-
quality political information, as this kind of information is usually costly and time-
consuming to acquire (this will be further explained in the rest of this chapter). In addition, 
even if they have access to political information, they may still lack the capacity to 
analyse the information efficiently and effectively. 
 
4.42 Educative Programs  
 
Some other proposals for making the citizens reasonable are concerned with education, 
rather than with the kinds of problems just discussed above. As will become clear in 
Chapter 6, the education that many modern political philosophers propose is often a kind 
of liberal civic education which differs substantially from the Confucian civic education.  
 
In order to achieve the requirement of ‘being reasonable’ which he calls ‘civil friendship,’ 
Rawls argues that three things are necessary for social education: good leadership on the 
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part of political institutions, habituation by means of a liberal democratic environment, 
and good examples from statespersons (Rawls 1999: 15, 27, 44-45, 97-103, 112-113, 157). 
Rawls himself also realises that it is almost impossible for most citizens to be reasonable 
in real political practices, as he says, ‘In a liberal society, where each citizen has one vote, 
citizens’ interests tend to shrink and center on their private economic concerns to the 
detriment of the bonds of community’ (Rawls 2000: 73). 
 
Jamie Kelly also advocates some educative programs, such as public education, which 
may help voters become reasonable. However, he argues that cognitive biases lead 
citizens to propose substantively different solutions relating to similar political problems. 
Kelly further points out that there is no sufficient evidence that public education can 
eliminate most cognitive biases. Also, most educative programs require a huge amount 
of money and ‘some deference to expertise’ (Kelly 2012: 121). Therefore, only a limited 
number of citizens can participate in these programmes and actually be informed about 
various complicated political problems as well as about the political decisions that are 
going to solve these problems. Moreover, through public education, a citizen might 
understand political issues generally but not know enough to evaluate political decisions 
about these issues since there is an abundance of political issues, most of which are too 
complicated for the layperson.   
 
Some educative programs designed to remedy the effects of cognitive biases may not be 
financially expensive. However, it may be difficult to implement these programs widely 
in a democratic society with anti-elitist culture (Rogers and Norton 2012). Moreover, 
some empirical studies show that some biases related to religious beliefs or political 
beliefs are genetically rooted. The elimination of these biologically rooted biases requires 
enormous psychological efforts. And most citizens in modern societies may not have time 
and skills to do so.89  
 
4.43 A Large State 
 
Another reason why it is extremely difficult for most citizens in modern democratic states 
to make reasonable political decisions is that the size of the modern state is often too large. 
                                                          




Firstly, as discussed above, a large, democratic state often creates great opportunities for 
seeking one’s fortune; this tends to corrupt the virtue and public spirit that the citizens 
depend upon for reasonably fulfilling their civic duties. It is difficult for most citizens to 
resist the temptations of material wealth. Therefore, most citizens living in a large, 
democratic state may be short-sighted and selfish. The interests that most citizens believe 
they should protect may conflict with the interests of their state and their offspring, 
especially in light of current processes of globalisation; outsourcing is an obvious 
example of this phenomenon. 
 
Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 3, a single vote rarely has any significant influence on 
the final political decisions made in large democratic countries. Considering the costs and 
benefits of making reasonable political decisions in a large, democratic state, it would be 
irrational and immoral for most citizens to spend time on improving their political 
competence, rather than on things which are far more valuable and morally praiseworthy 
(Arneson 2009: 202, Hardin 2009: 235). 
 
Thirdly, in a large state, it is almost impossible for most citizens to spend a long period 
in contact with their leaders, and to know them well.  This being so, most citizens know 
and judge their political leaders by the influence of politically charged public 
communications, which potentially renders them vulnerable to the manipulation of their 
political judgement. By contrast, in a small community, citizens are more likely to be 
acquainted with public affairs in their daily lives, and they know the local citizens’ 
interests better than any ‘armchair bureaucrats’ in the distant central (federal) 
government.90 
 
Last but not the least, the ‘public good’ or ‘public wealth’ in a large state is so complicated 
that it is often beyond the comprehension of most citizens; on account of this, the majority 
of citizens are not adequately informed of all the intricacies of such debates. In order to 
promote his ‘small republic’ theory, Montesquieu points out that in a large state, the 
common good is too sophisticated for the citizens to grasp: 
 
In an extensive republic, there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of 
less moderation: there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single 
                                                          
90 This will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 6. 
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subject; he has interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be 
happy and glorious by oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise 
himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In an extensive republic, the 
public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it is subordinate to 
exceptions and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public 
is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; 
abuses have less extent, and of course are less protected. (De Montesquieu 
1989: 157) 91 
 
Compared with a large state, a small state is more likely to facilitate effective 
communication between citizens and their rulers; when such communication is 
functioning well, citizens are more likely to know what kinds of person their rulers are, 
and what they are doing. Early Confucians believe that the rulers should not be people 
with whom most of the citizens are not well acquainted. Mencius gives an example of the 
ancient sage ruler Shun. Before Shun became a ruler, most citizens had observed Shun 
through his twenty-eight years of service (Mencius 5A5). Also, in a small community, 
most citizens have relatively sufficient knowledge of relevant political problems which 
are ‘close to their lives.’92Therefore, early Confucians contend that citizens are more 
likely to make reasonable political decisions about the local community rather than about 
the whole state, unless the state is small. 
 
4.5 Harmonious Community 
 
According to the discussion above, it is highly unlikely that most citizens in a large state 
are in a position to make reasonable decisions about which policies would better benefit 
the whole state or who could make better policies regarding serving the well-being of all 
citizens. Therefore, in a large, democratic state, democratic political rights or voting rights 
may not help most citizens to promote their own self-interest in a reasonable manner.   
 
                                                          
91 Jean-Jacques Rousseau develops similar arguments in his On the Social Contract (book 3, chapter3, 4), 
and   Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men (‘To the Republic of Geneva’). 
92  Zhang Xianglong 張祥龍, a prominent contemporary Chinese philosopher, proposes a Confucian 
experiment for a small community (such as those who voluntarily live in a ‘preservation zone for 
Confucianism’ (Rujia baohu qu儒家保護區), see Zhang (2007).7 
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Early Confucians would only support citizens to participate in making political decisions 
about ‘strictly local’ matters. This is because these decisions are highly likely to be 
reasonable. However, the difficult question here is which matters should be judged as 
‘strictly local,’ and according to which standard. In today’s well-connected world, no 
local matters are purely local.  Thus, the matters which are ‘strictly local’ to a citizen 
seems to the matters that exert relatively little influence beyond the community or civil 
organisation of the citizen. Therefore, as regards local matters that do exert a higher 
degree of influence on the outside world, the attitudes of the citizen can only be one factor 
in the process of decision-making, and arrangements (such as those that will be discussed 
in the following chapters) need to be made in order to prevent local citizens from doing 
things in a short-sighted way. It is beyond the scope of this philosophical study to 
determine what criteria should be used to judge whether certain matters are ‘strictly local’ 
or not; this is more a topic for empirical studies and field research. However, it is 
nonetheless possible for a Confucian political philosopher to provide a single key guiding 
principle: 
 
The matter is strictly local, if and only if it is within the intellectual and moral 
capabilities of local citizens to make reasonable political decisions that will 
contribute to the harmony of the local community; such that the citizens will 
endeavour to promote the interests of other citizens in their local community, rather 
than perceiving said interests as limitations on one’s own self-interest.  
 
This guiding principle is consistent with how Ren requires citizens to behave in their 
community. Confucius says, ‘It is Ren that gives the beauty to the community you live. 
If you can choose but do not dwell among those with Ren, how can you be called wise?’ 
(Analects 4.1). As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, early Confucians believed that 
citizens should consider themselves as possessing certain roles involving specific 
reciprocal relationships; and that in keeping with this, they ought to prioritise mutual care 
within the community, rather than positioning themselves to make claims against others 
on account of their possessing certain rights.93 And only in this way, can citizens make 
reasonable decisions that will lead to a harmonious community.  
 
However, this, in turn, begs the question of:  
                                                          




‘What is harmony?’  
‘What is a harmonious community?’ 
 ‘Why should we pursue a harmonious community?’      
 
Harmony is the most valued concept in East Asian culture. In classical Confucianism, 
harmony, at the bottom, means the absence of conflict. Early Confucians prioritises a non-
violent and balanced way to deal with various conflicts, for the purpose of establishing a 
peaceful order, and of assuring harmonious relations of family, community, state and the 
whole world, as well as between human beings and nature (Li 2013, Angle 2009). 
 
For early Confucians, a harmonious community is primarily characterizable, by the 
existence of harmonious relations in the community. Daniel Bell points out that the early 
Confucian emphasis on the importance of harmonious relations is not just a ‘descriptive 
banality about how our identities are shaped by our communities, but is rather a normative 
claim that human flourishing is constituted by social relations of certain kinds so that we 
have an obligation to nourish those relations’ (Bell 2016: 55).   
 
In classical Confucianism, it is Ren that requires us to value our harmonious relations 
with the members of our family and community, our fellow citizens, the citizens of other 
states and our nature environment (Han 2013: 4-6). For early Confucians, harmonious 
relations among family members are the most important, since, without these relations, 
any harmonious relations between citizens and countries would be impossible. Mencius 
claims that rulers who implement Ren Government always first and foremost promote the 
interests of the worst-off citizens who are deprived of harmonious familial relations.  
 
Mencius said, ‘Old men without wives are called widowers; old women 
without husbands are called widows; the elderly without children are called 
desolates; the young without parents are called orphans—these four, the most 
destitute and the voiceless among the citizens, King Wen (an ancient 
Confucian Ren statesperson) implemented Ren Government and made these 
four his first concern.’ (Mencius 1B5)  
 
For Mencius, the government should be more concerned with the promotion of the 
material and spiritual interests of the worst-off, than with the interests of those who are 
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better-off. This is similar to Rawls’ second principle of justice: ‘Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity’ (Rawls, 1999: 72). 
 
The difference between Mencius and Rawls is that Rawls only focuses on ‘property-
owning’ or the material interests of the worst-off, and says very little about the least-
advantaged citizens, such as widows or orphans, who lack harmonious social or familial 
relations. However, for Mencius, the spiritual interests of the citizens (which are mainly 
reflected by their rich and harmonious relationships with others), are as important as their 
material interests.94  
 
In classical Confucianism, harmonious relations are necessary, but they are not sufficient, 
in themselves, to justify characterising a community as ‘a harmonious community.’  
Diversity is also important. One of the most famous lines in the Analects is that 
‘Confucian Ren statespersons should pursue harmony, rather than uniformity’ (Analects 
13.23). Mencius also says, ‘All that is expected of the Confucian Ren statespersons is that 
they should meet the requirements of Ren. Why must they all be the same?’ (Mencius 
6B6).  For the early Confucians, harmony does not require citizens to share the same 
moral beliefs, or political desires, or religious convictions. 
  
The Confucian view of harmony values diversity mainly for moral and political reasons: 
early Confucians emphasise that when the rulers seriously consider diverse political 
views, they can avoid being tyrannical, and correct their immoral or unreasonable 
political decisions.95 For example, Mencius argued that when rulers make decisions about 
whether an official can be promoted or punished, the ruler should not merely consult the 
ministers or those who are close to them; moreover, they should consider the diverse 
opinions of the citizens.   
 
                                                          
94 From the perspective of modern political theories, Mencius’s view is more like a combination of social 
conservatism and progressive liberalism, since he discusses the importance of a functioning family structure 
and income; both of these happen to be two of the main sources of modern middle-class anxiety (Brooks 
2001: 177-179). 
95 Daniel Bell claims that there are also some ‘aesthetic reasons to value diversity: an ingredient, such as 
salt, that tastes bland on its own becomes flavorful when mixed in a soup’ (Bell 2016: 55). However, Bell 
may need to provide evidence from the Confucian classics, in order to prove his assertion. 
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In conclusion, in classical Confucianism, a harmonious community is characterised by 
diverse and harmonious relations in the community. These relations play a crucial role in 
promoting the pursuit of a flourishing life among the citizens, as they matter not only on 
account of the political decisions which promote the material and spiritual interests of the 
citizens, but also generate social obligations and help citizens become reasonable, i.e., 
being able to care about others and especially those who are worst-off.96 Thus, in CMD, 
a harmonious community is worth pursuing, as it helps citizens and rulers meet the 
requirements of Ren and make reasonable political decisions. 
 
4.6 Confucian Political Rights: Making Political Decisions about Strictly Local Matters 
 
To sum up the findings of this chapter: early Confucian views about self-interest and 
human nature are compatible with political rights, but are in conflict with the 
individualistic presumption in the normative democratic principle of political rights — 
human beings, by nature, are not capable of being or ought not to be altruistic enough to 
sacrifice their own self-interest for the well-being of others. 
 
Such individualistic presumption is associated with some socio-political problems with 
the exercise of political rights in modern societies, as it is resonant with and often 
degenerates into a certain form of egoism that celebrates narrowly-defined self-interest; 
it facilitates ‘patrimonialism,’ i.e., a biologically rooted selfish impulse in every human 
being; it contributes to conflicting self-interest of individuals which further exacerbated 
by the exercise of democratic political rights in the system of ‘one person, one vote.’ To 
solve these problems, many political philosophers propose political participation, 
political talk and educative programs to make citizen reasonable. However, most of these 
proposals may not be effective and operative in terms of helping most citizens make 
reasonable political decisions when exercising their democratic political rights in a large, 
democratic state.  
 
In order to help citizens to make reasonable political decisions, a Confucian conception 
of political rights only supports citizens to participate in making political decisions about 
‘strictly local’ matters. On the one hand, it is highly likely that most citizens have 
                                                          
96 By ‘drawing on the philosophy of Xunzi and supported with examples from East Asian societies,’ Daniel  
Bell argues that it is not rationality, but a sense of harmonious community, that leads rich and powerful 
people to show consideration to the interests of the less fortunate (Bell 2016: 44, 212; 2008: Chapter 3) 
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intellectual and moral abilities to make reasonable political decisions about ‘strictly local’ 
matters and thus to contribute to the diverse and harmonious relationships in the local 
community. On the other hand, the diverse and harmonious relationships generate social 
obligations and thus help citizens to make reasonable decisions that promote the interests 
of their fellow citizens in the local community. Therefore, with regard to the imperative 
of helping citizens to make reasonable political decisions, democratic political rights 
which are founded upon individualism are less valuable than Confucian political rights 
which are based on early Confucian views of human nature and attaches great importance 
to the harmony of the local community. 
 
4.61 The Possibility of Confucian Political Rights  
 
As discussed in Section 4.2, classical Confucianism is compatible with the practical aim 
of political rights, which is to protect the interests of the citizens from being infringed by 
those with political power. Even so, one still might argue that it is impossible to draw out 
and develop a Confucian conception of political rights from a critical account of classical 
Confucianism. This is because political rights have been widely considered to be a liberal 
democratic concept founded upon individualism. In other words, one might argue that it 
is impossible to separate political rights from individualism. So, if classical Confucianism 
rejects individualism, it would be impossible to develop a Confucian conception of 
political rights. 
 
However, it is debatable whether or not political rights should be founded upon certain 
doctrines, like individualism. For, as John Rawls has pointed out if a political concept has 
to be based on certain comprehensive doctrines, the universal acceptability of this 
political concept is surely questionable (Rawls 1996:432-433, 2000:121-122). 
Specifically, John Rawls articulates ‘three general facts’ in the political culture of a 
democratic society (Rawls 1996: 36). Firstly, ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism,’ Rawls 
states that ‘the permanent feature of the public culture of democracy’ is a plurality of 
reasonable comprehensive, moral, religious and philosophical doctrines. Secondly, ‘the 
fact of oppression,’ i.e. ‘a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive 
religious, philosophical or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use 
of state power’ (ibid. 38). Rawls argues that comprehensive liberal doctrines, such as that 
of Mill and Kant, founded on autonomy and individualism, can only be universally and 
continually accepted through oppression. This is on account of the third fact: ‘an enduring 
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and secure democratic regime must be willingly and freely supported by at least a 
substantial majority of its politically active citizens’ (ibid. 38).  
 
These three general facts lead towards the most important question discussed in political 
liberalism: ‘How is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional 
regime?’ (Rawls 1996: xx). Rawls’s strategy to solve this problem is to establish 
freestanding political concepts detached from any comprehensive religious, philosophical 
or moral doctrines. From the perspective of Rawls, if we regard individualism as a part 
of a comprehensive doctrine, then ‘political rights’ as a universally accepted political 
concept should not be founded upon individualism only, i.e., it neither only validates 
individualism, nor is it only validated by individualism. In other words, the concept of 
‘political rights’ represents an overlapping consensus, endorsed and validated by different 
comprehensive doctrines; a consensus which is not derived from or predetermined by any 
a priori ideas. 97 
 
Rawls intends to make it easier to assist those who hold different comprehensive liberal 
or non-liberal doctrines to accept a common political principle or concept which does not 
exclude any of these doctrines. Moreover, it is possible for different comprehensive 
doctrines to legitimately endorse the same family of concepts in different ways, rather 
than in precisely the same way in all cases. 98   
 
Taking up an insight of Rawls, on the one hand, even if the early Confucian views of self-
interest and human is incompatible with certain liberal doctrines, this does not necessarily 
mean such views are incompatible with any political rights on principle. On the other 
hand, it is possible for a viable conception of political rights to both endorse, and to be 
validated by the early Confucian views of self-interest and human nature. In other words, 
it is possible that a viable conception of political rights does not have to be founded upon 
                                                          
97 Rawls carefully makes a distinction between modus vivendi and overlapping consensus (Rawls 1996: 
xxxix-xliii, 146-150, Rawls 2000: 149-150, 168-169), by stating that the fact of pluralism should be 
accepted by citizens with different comprehensive doctrines in accordance with all the fundamental liberal 
democratic principles. 
98What John Rawls’ political liberalism is meant to achieve is not a compromise among existing doctrines, 
for he believes that the basic principles of liberalism, such as equality, justice as fairness, or reciprocity 
cannot be compromised (Rawls 1996: xlvii, 39-40). For instance, Rawls (after 1980) argues that basic 
conceptions of person and society must be derived from the public political culture of society.  In Law of 
Peoples, he contends that principle of justice must be drawn from shared cultural practices and beliefs 
(Rawls 2000: 143). 
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certain liberal doctrines, such as autonomy and individualism, in order to advocate any 
political rights of the citizens; nor does it have to deny any political rights of the citizens, 
on account of its rejection of any individualistic presumptions.  
 
In CMD, the Confucian conception of political rights does not presume that every human 
being by nature is autonomous and only capable of seeking their self-interest. However, 
it can still endorse the right to political speech, the right to assemble and a limited version 
of the right to participate in the process of political decision-making, i.e., with regards to 
strictly local matters only, out of a concern with preventing political power from being 
abused. Therefore, it is possible that the Confucian conception of political rights is viable, 
even though such conception is founded upon basic tenets of classical Confucianism, 
rather than upon certain individualistic presumptions.  
 
4.62 Fidelity Desideratum and Universal Acceptability of Confucian Political Rights 
 
Joseph Chan argues that it is not only possible to provide a plurality of interpretations of 
human rights; it is also a strict necessity (Chen 1994: 25-38). He points out that even if 
the existence of human rights is justified by virtue of one’s being a human being, the 
concept of human rights nonetheless cannot be independent of culture and society (Chen 
1997:37-40). Tasioulas contends that a theory of human rights should satisfy the Fidelity 
Desideratum, i.e., fidelity to human rights culture. Here, the ‘fidelity’ is often interpreted 
as ‘sufficiently faithful.’ This means that human rights theories should not discuss 
something so alien to the specific practice of human rights in a particular context that it 
would count as not discussing human rights. Tasioulas also points out that Fidelity 
Desideratum is ‘crystallized in the International Bill of Human Rights: The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR) along with the International Covenants 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)’ (Tasioulas 2012: 18). 
 
Andrea Sangiovanni also endorses Fidelity Desideratum, as he highlights the importance 
of the ‘context’ in the discussion of human rights. Sangiovanni argues that ‘the evaluation 
of the truth of a human rights claim requires us first to specify a context, then a role that 
human rights are meant to play in that context, and finally the type of universal moral, 
legal and political concern that is envisaged given that role’ (Andrea 2007: 206). Thus, 
Sangiovanni agrees with Chan that there cannot be just one reading of human rights, since 
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‘it is a mistake to think that any single concept could pick out a single master list of human 
rights and correlated duties that meaningfully applies across all these different contexts’ 
(ibid. 202). 
 
If the above political philosophers who agree on the importance of fidelity to the human 
rights culture are right, then political rights, as a subclass of human rights, should also 
satisfy the Fidelity Desideratum. This means the content, scope and justification of 
political rights should be ‘loyal’ to the specific practices of a particular cultural 
background. In other words, for any master list of political rights to be justified, such a 
list should be adequately compatible with the cultural background within which these 
political rights are widely employed and understood. Here, it is necessary to stress that 
the issue of cultural background is itself a complicated matter. This is because any culture 
of political rights is multifaceted, and ‘harbours a multiplicity of rival self-
understandings’, as well as deficiencies of understandings of political rights. Therefore, 
the fidelity to a cultural background of political rights should not only grasp the normative 
ideas that underlie the culture but also be made compatible with any criticisms of that 
culture (Tasioulas 2012: 18). 
 
But, why is this fidelity to a given cultural background such a necessary consideration 
when discussing theories of political rights? One possible answer from those holding a 
‘relativist’ view of political rights could be: there are no universally shared political 
judgements beyond cultural and context (Benhabib 2013, Miller 2000, Macedo 2009, 
Young 1990, Walzer 1987). Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre contend that the 
interpretive framework within which individuals view their world, or the language of 
reasons should play an important role in political judgements (Taylor 1985, MacIntyre 
2001, 2008). In his arguments against universalism, Michael Walzer contends that 
effective political judgements must be drawn from, and be appropriate to, the customs of 
real people living in particular places and times (Walzer 1989). He states that ‘‘There is 
no single set of primary or basic goods conceivable across all moral and materials 
worlds—or any such set would have to be conceived in terms so abstract that they would 
be of little use in thinking about particular distributions’ (Walzer, 1983: 8). Walzer even 
argue that cultural factors determine what is necessary for human life (ibid.8) 
 
By contrast, those who hold an ‘universalist’ view of political rights might argue that 
there is a universal understanding of political rights beyond cultural background; if we 
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appeal to specific contexts, we may be unable to condemn some violations of political 
rights which may be justified by cultural factors (Pinto 2013: 31). Moreover, if the 
justification of the necessity of Confucian political rights is founded upon a kind of 
relativism, such conception may only be applied in a society with Confucian cultural 
background and thus may not be universally accepted. Therefore, it may be meaningless 
to compare Confucian political rights with democratic political rights, and it may even be 
illegitimate to describe Confucian political rights as a kind of political rights.  
 
This chapter will not elaborate on the debate between relativism and universalism, as the 
debate involves many sophisticated epistemological and deontological issues which 
would take us too far afield. Rather, this chapter will focus on the more specific ‘relativist’ 
and ‘universalist’ views of political rights. It may not be reasonable to side with one or 
the other view if it is possible to reconcile these two views which seem to be mutually 
exclusive. It helps to realise that the universalists believe that different cultural 
backgrounds are not of decisive importance for defining the meaning of political rights. 
However, they do believe that culturally contingent political practices are relevant to how 
such political rights should actually be applied.99 Thus, advocates of both ‘relativist’ and 
‘universalist’ views of political rights agree that the cultural background does indeed 
matter in the application of political rights. That is to say, the application of political rights 
must be to some reasonable degree consistent with the forms of life and traditions of a 
particular society; they are thus subject to legitimate variations when there are changes in 
the cultural background itself. Here, the variations in question are legitimate only when 
they are based on a universally shared concept of political rights which is beyond culture 
and context.   
 
Borrowing insights from John Rawls, the concept of political rights is distinct from 
various conceptions of political rights. Rawls points out that ‘the concept is the meaning 
of a term, while a particular conception includes as well the principles required to apply 
it’ (Rawls 1996: 14). The necessity of the fidelity to the cultural background of political 
rights presumes not only that different cultures are in a position to develop various 
conceptions of political rights in their own perspectives and terms, but also that an 
                                                          
99  This idea borrows the insights from Andrea Sangiovanni’s discussion of the distinction between 
internationalism and globalism, see Sangiovanni (2007: 3-39). 
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overlapping consensus on a broad concept of political rights ‘may emerge from self-
searching exercises as well as common dialogue’ (Chan 1999: Chap.9). 
 
Andrea Sangiovanni advocates a ‘broad construal of human rights,’ which is broad 
enough to include both of the dominant philosophical interpretations of human rights, i.e., 
Political and Orthodox views of human rights, without being meaningless or very 
indeterminant (Sangiovanni 2017: Chap.4). If Sangiovanni is right, it is also possible to 
develop a broad concept of political rights. This broad concept of political rights is 
defined by its practical aim which is to protect the basic interests of every citizen from 
infringement on the part of states, political institutions, and those with political power. 
These interests in question, including substantive interests as well as interests pertaining 
to political influence and political responsiveness, acquire meanings and values from real 
political practices within a particular cultural background and context.  These meanings 
and values, which are culturally contingent, condition the principles in applying the 
concept of political rights. Moreover, the nature of shared political institutions and civil 
organisations, which determines the roles and relationships of the citizens in a specific 
social-political context, also constraints and limits the application of the concept of 
political rights. Therefore, the formulation and justification of a conception of political 
rights cannot be independent of the political practices found in a particular cultural 
context or background.   
 
Thus, it is highly likely that the citizens with different religious, philosophical and moral 
beliefs hold different conceptions of political rights. The existence of these conceptions 
is also necessary for the fidelity to the cultural backgrounds of different societies in which 
the political rights of the citizens are protected. Each of these conceptions has the potential 
to be universally accepted insofar as it offers a different understanding of the principles 
in applying the same broad concept of political rights. 
 
4.63 Confucian Political Rights and Democratic Rights 
 
In conclusion, the Confucian conception of political rights bears a ‘family resemblance’ 
to the modern democratic conception of political rights. This is because both conceptions 
aim at protecting the self-interest of the citizens from the infringement on the part of states, 
political institutions, and those with political power. Therefore, the Confucian conception 
of political rights and democratic conception of political rights can be considered as 
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representing two distinct contextual applications of a broad concept of political rights, 
and such broad concept of political rights is defined by its practical aim of protecting the 
interests of the citizens from the abuse of political power.   
 
Unlike the democratic conception of political rights, the Confucian conception of political 
rights is only applied at the local community level, in order to avoid party politics and 
help most citizens make reasonable political decisions. In other words, such conception 
does not require that all citizens have the opportunity to directly participate in making 
political decisions that will deeply influence the whole state. Rather, the key imperative 
is that every citizen should only make political decisions about ‘strictly local’ matters.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a political matter is ‘strictly local’, if and only if it is 
within the intellectual and moral capabilities of the citizens to promote the self-interest of 
their fellow citizens and to contribute to the diverse and harmonious relations in their 
local community. In turn, such diverse and harmonious relations, which generate mutual 
social obligations, can assist the citizens in making reasonable political decisions that 
serve the well-being of their fellow citizens in their local communities. 
  
Therefore, the difference between the Confucian conception of political rights and the 
democratic conception of political rights is not merely the fact that the former only speaks 
about ‘strictly local’ matters, and the latter does not make such a distinction between the 
‘strictly local’ and the whole state. More importantly, the former conception is concerned 
not only with the self-interest of all citizens, but also reach the level of morality. That is 
to say, the Confucian conception of political rights also functions on the level of one’s 
obligations to promote the well-being of one’s fellow citizens; while the democratic 
conception of political rights is confined to the level of the individual self-interest.  
Moreover, even if one were to prioritise only the latter level, the Confucian conception 
of political rights would still have the potential to prove even more valuable than the 
democratic conception of political rights. This is because the Confucian conception of 
political rights can help citizens to promote their self-interest in a more reasonable 
manner.100   
                                                          
100 This will be further explained in Chapter 6. 
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5. Political Equality 
 
This thesis has attempted to justify the viability of the Confucian conceptions of political 
authority and political rights. Up to now, the justifications have centred upon helping 
citizens to make reasonable political decisions, so that they may be well disposed towards 
acknowledging and advancing the interests of others. However, it is important to 
recognise that most of these justifications are agent-relative and interpersonal. In other 
words, these justifications seem to be second-personal justifications. This means that they 
essentially refer to at least two persons who have obligations toward each other. As 
Stephen Darwall points out, ‘In seeing ourselves as mutually accountable, we accord one 
another the standing to demand certain conduct of each other as equal members of the 
moral community’ (Darwall 2006: 119). Therefore, one may argue that the above 
justifications based on mutual obligations might not be normatively valid, unless CMD 
can ensure that all citizens share an equal normative standing when fulfilling their 
obligations. 
 
Also, it appears that up to this point of the thesis, the only arguments provided for the 
purposes of justifying the viability of CMD have been purely instrumental. These 
arguments would be valid if the only justification for the viability of certain forms of 
government was that its political decisions would produce substantively good results in 
the long term for all citizens. However, there are also other alternative approaches for 
justifying a form of government. As discussed in Chapter 1, many political philosophers 
argue that the superiority of democracy is justified on the grounds of its ability to better 
promote political equality than other regimes. They contend that democracy is a good 
form of government, not only because it makes substantively good political decisions, but 
also because it gives every citizen an equal say in making political decisions (Buchanan 
2007, Shapiro 2002, Christiano 2008, Beitz 1989, Waldron 1999, Mansbridge 1983, 
Cohen 1997, Christiano 2004).  
 
Considering this, one might object the viability of CMD by arguing that it does not matter 
whether CMD promotes the interests of the citizens or not; because as long as it denies 
citizens an equal opportunity to participate in making political decisions, its legitimacy 
remains questionable. This critique is founded upon a normative democratic principle of 
political equality. This chapter will argue that there are theoretical and practical problems 
with the justification and operation of such principle. CMD may not be objectionable, 
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even if it appears to be incompatible with such principle. This chapter will elaborate upon 
the viability of a Confucian conception of political equality. Such conception is mainly 
concerned with the equal participation of citizens in political reflections, rather than the 
equal participation of citizens in the processes of political decision-making.  
 
5.1 Political Influence 
 
Ronald Dworkin, in Sovereign Virtue, describes political equality as the ‘virtue of 
Sovereigns.’ He contends that ‘a political community that exercises dominion over its 
own citizens, and demands from them allegiance and obedience to its laws, must take an 
impartial, objective attitude to them all.’ (Dworkin 2000: 6). It might appear that CMD 
does not have an impartial attitude to everyone, as it may treat Confucian Ren 
statespersons or those who are intellectually and morally superior with more respect than 
others.  
 
Moreover, Joshua Cohen claims that different philosophies of life all have a common 
ground which is as follows: ‘people sometimes have substantial, sometimes compelling 
reasons for addressing public affairs’ (Cohen 1999: 406-407). 101  CMB3 states that 
knowing and practising the political truths of Ren much better than others is a warrant for 
having political authority over others. On account of this belief, it would appear that CMD 
does not provide all citizens with an equal opportunity to address public affairs; especially 
those who are not in a position to make reasonable political decisions. As a result, 
Confucian Ren statespersons or those who always make reasonable political decisions 
may be able to exert a much higher degree of political influence than other citizens. 
However, in a democratic election or referendum, everyone has an equal degree of 
influence over political decisions. Thus, provided every citizen complies with political 
decisions that have been made in a democratic manner, every citizen will treat others 
equally, and will themselves be treated with equal respect. 
 
Hence, some may claim that compared with CMD, modern democracy is a superior form 
of government; since everyone in a modern democratic state has equal political influence 
in making political decisions, and are thereby treated with equal respect. However, this 
                                                          
101 Some scholars may suggest that Cohen’s view is based on an updated version of the Aristotelian 




claim may not be self-evident; as it confuses equal opportunity for direct participation in 
the process of political decision-making with equal political influence. Therefore, it is 
necessary to clarify the meaning of ‘political influence’.  
 
5.11 Absolute Political Influence 
 
It is true that providing much more opportunities for Confucian Ren statespersons to make 
political decisions, vis-à-vis other citizens, will decrease the opportunities of other 
citizens to directly participate in the process of political decision-making. However, it 
does not follow from this disparity that either some citizens enjoy less absolute political 
influence than others or that the distribution of opportunities for absolute political 
influence is unjust. 102 
 
It is possible for CMD to ensure the absolute political influence of most citizens without 
adopting ‘one person, one vote’ for the following reasons.  
 
Firstly, as discussed in the previous chapters, the only purpose of giving Confucian Ren 
statespersons more opportunities to make political decisions is to help all citizens achieve 
flourishing lives. For early Confucians, the interests of the common citizens are the most 
important consideration, rather than those of their rulers. Thus, Mencius said: 
 
The citizens are of supreme importance; the next are altars to the gods of earth 
and grain; the last comes the ruler… When the sacrificial animals are sleek, 
the offerings are clean, and the sacrifices are observed at due times, and yet 
floods and droughts come, then the altars should be replaced. (Mencius 7B14) 
 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 discuss how, in CMD, Confucian Ren statespersons make 
reasonable political decisions to promote the material well-being as well as the spiritual 
well-being of all citizens. The spiritual well-being of the citizens mainly depends on the 
satisfaction of the attitudes of the citizens, including their philosophy of life, political 
beliefs, moral outlook, and religious convictions as long as all these are reasonable or 
                                                          
102 In this thesis, the term ‘absolute political influence’ does not refer to unrestrained and unlimited political 
influence, but to political influence as the degree of power exerted by one individual in abstraction from 
any relational comparison with other individuals. As such, absolute political influence does admit of degree. 
Therefore, it is different from the relative political influence which is the main topic discussed in the rest 
of this chapter. 
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compatible with ‘common human reason’ (in a Rawlsian sense).103 It is thus possible for 
political decisions made by Confucian Ren statespersons to be constructively sensitive to 
the political attitudes of most citizens. Hence, Confucian Ren statespersons are capable 
of indirectly ensuring the absolute political influence of most citizens, at least in ideal 
situations. 
 
Secondly, if the Confucian political authority and the Confucian political rights discussed 
above were to result in the consistent enactment of reasonable political decisions, CMD 
would eventually ensure an overall increase of leisure and wealth. Thus, most citizens 
under CMD would have more leisure time. They would also have more means at their 
disposal to participate, directly or indirectly, in various political activities; such as gaining 
more political knowledge, getting better political information and discussing political 
issues with others. It is highly likely that this indirectly increases the absolute political 
influence of the citizens more broadly; as they are thereby better informed about politics 
and are in a better position to make reasonable judgements.  Moreover, an overall increase 
of leisure and wealth often leads to a more powerful and influential state. This would also 
enlarge the scope and importance of political decisions that most citizens can influence 
and would, thereby, to some extent, increase the absolute political influence of all citizens. 
 
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, CMD encourages citizens to actively participate in 
political decision-making in their local community; as fewer citizens will be involved in 
such matters especially when the local community is relatively small, the degree of 
absolute political influence they exercise will increase accordingly. Moreover, a citizen’s 
political decisions about ‘strictly local’ matters are highly likely to be reasonable, and 
thus are very likely to exert positive influence on public affairs.  
 
Moreover, as will be explained below, it is not adequately clear why promoting the 
absolute political influence of the citizens is purely a matter of ‘one person one vote.’  If 
what ultimately matters is the absolute political influence of the citizens; then, what is the 
most important may not be ‘one person one vote’, but rather an equal participation in 
political reflections; the latter can promote the absolute political influence of the citizens 
effectively and fundamentally, as it helps the citizens to realise their political values.  
 
                                                          
103 For a brief discussion of Rawls’s ‘common human reason,’ see Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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5.12 Realising Political Values 
 
It has been argued that the absolute political influence of the citizens depends, to a large 
extent, on the realisation of their political values. In other words, helping citizens better 
realise their political values will fundamentally increase their absolute political influence. 
There are at least two steps towards realising political values.  
 
The first step is to engage with political values. Such engagement is a matter of political 
reflections on what political values may exist, what reasonable political judgements can 
be made in light of these values, and how to act upon these judgements. In order to help 
citizens better engage with political values, it is necessary to provide citizens with more 
opportunities to participate in various forms of political reflections. These political 
reflections are capable of assisting citizens to make reasonable political judgements about 
what particular political decisions are under discussion; about whether certain political 
decisions correspond with their political attitudes and promote their individual political 
interests; as well as about whether certain political decisions are good or just in general. 
More importantly, through such political reflections, most citizens should be able to ‘treat 
politics as an extension of his moral life’ (Dworkin 2002: 202-203). 
 
The second step is to realise political values, which is possible only after sufficient 
engagement with political values. The political values of citizens are realised when 
political decisions actually match their political attitudes; this includes their political 
desires, moral outlook, and religious convictions. For most citizens, it would be more of 
a crucial imperative to realise their own individual political values, than to directly 
participate in political decision-making.  
 
On the one hand, it is possible to attain to the realisation of the political values of the 
citizens without providing every citizen with an equal opportunity to directly participate 
in the process of political decision-making. For example, a process of consultation at the 
stage of selecting members of Confucian Parliament in CMD would assist Confucian Ren 
statespersons in making political decisions that happen to be what most citizens believe 
and want most; even if these political decisions are not made in a liberal democratic 
manner.104 This process is similar to Rawls’s ‘decent consultation hierarchy’ (Rawls 2000: 
                                                          
104 The Confucian Parliament and other institutional arrangements in CMD will be further discussed in 
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71-73). Specifically, during this process, the Confucian Ren statespersons listen to their 
fellow citizens by holding public discussions. Every citizen has an equal opportunity to 
participate and to express their political dissent in these discussions. In such a scenario, 
the Confucian Ren statespersons are required to take every dissenter’s opinions seriously 
and give a detailed reply. They have an obligation to review the results of public 
discussions and to hear different voices, in order to verify whether the final political 
decisions would satisfy the moral beliefs, political desires and various substantive 
interests of their fellow citizens. This would, to some extent, prove that CMD is capable 
of attending the political values of the citizens. 
 
On the other hand, it is also conceivable that even when every citizen has an equal 
opportunity for direct participation in the process of political decision-making, the 
political values of some citizens will not be realised. For example, in most modern 
democratic societies, the citizens of persistent minorities are commonly outvoted in a 
referendum and have to accept results which do not correspond with their political 
attitudes. Thomas Christiano points out that what persistent minorities are deprived of is 
not only their substantive interests but also the satisfaction of their political beliefs 
(Christiano 2008: 92, 226-227). It is often said that in polarisation, the political values of 
the minority are not realised. The political decisions made by the majority tend to treat 
members of the minority badly both in political and substantive terms (Beitz 1989: 
Chap.7). In addition, the long-term presence of minorities may lead to substantively bad 
results which affect not only members of the minorities, but also those in the majority. 
 
It is highly likely that in many democratic countries it does not matter whether a voter is 
in the majority or minority; for, as long as the voter is powerless, his or her interests are 
often trumped by the interests of the more powerful and vocal. By way of an analogy: in 
a singing competition, every singer is asked to sing at the same time. However, if only 
one of the singers has a megaphone, it is appropriate to say that this competition gives 
every singer an equal opportunity to sing in front of the judges, but not an equal 
opportunity to be heard. When the singer with the megaphone sings, no other singers will 
have the opportunity to be heard by the judges. In a singing competition, having an equal 
opportunity to sing cannot ensure having an equal opportunity to be heard. Similarly, in 
real political practice, an equal opportunity to participate in the process of political 




decision-making does not entail an equal opportunity to realise one’s political values. 
‘One person, one vote’ may only guarantee the former opportunity, rather than the latter. 
 
There are also two worrying scenarios that may arise from ‘one person, one vote.’ One is 
that unreasonable majorities may take advantage of the democratic process, in order to 
enact policies which could result in suppression of the political values of the minorities.105 
Another situation is that some small wealthy and powerful groups may exert 
disproportionate influence on the process of making political decisions——either by 
blocking changes in accordance with their own partisan interests, or lobbying for policies 
that are only consistent with their own political values.106 Moreover, these powerful small 
groups may try to control the representatives, or those who are elected to occupy the 
political positions; Guerrero argues that the powerful can control the elections by deciding 
who can be potential candidates; or control those who are elected, by deciding which 
political positions are available, and arranging positional shifts (Guerrero 2014: 135-178).  
 
Many empirical studies show that nowadays, it is perfectly possible for a well-funded and 
organised minority to successfully pursue their agendas against relatively powerless 
majorities; this includes issues such as the regulation of financial institutions, 107 
environmental protection, gun control and other issues pertaining to the core political 
values of different groups of citizens.108 For example, Martin Gilen’s study shows that in 
the US, whenever there is a conflict between the preferences of the economic elites and 
the preferences of the middle class, the policies are more likely to satisfy the former than 
the latter (Gilens 2012: 20). 
 
                                                          
105Michael Mann argues that democratic voting rights often define voters as the ‘dominant ethnic group, 
generating organic conceptions of the nation and the state that encouraged the murderous cleansing of 
minorities’ (Bell 2015: 22, Mann 2005: 3). 
106 See Kay, John 2013. ‘A tyranny of the minority in an age of single-issue obsessives.’ The Financial 
Times, June 12, 7. Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro point out that elite groups have been taking 
advantage of their increasing incumbency advantages, in order to reduce the level of political 
responsiveness in democratic countries (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000: 75). 
107 Mark Blyth contends that since the 1960s, the most important financial institutions in the US have 
generally not been subject to democrat control; this makes responsive social democracy impossible (Blyth 
2005: 379-407). 
108 Colin Crouch notices that in the UK, the influence of trade unions is declining, while global companies 
are able to exercise more and more influence on democratic political institutions (Crouch 2004). Warren 
Buffett admits to this in the New York Times: ‘My friends and I have been coddled long enough by a 
billionaire-friendly Congress. It is time for our government to get serious about shared sacrifice. Billionaires 
like me should pay more taxes’ (Buffett 2011, Guerrero 2014: 148-151).  
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This thesis does not attempt to deny the desirability of equal participation of all citizens 
in political decision-making. ‘One person, one vote’ does give some citizens absolute 
political influence, and helps them realise their political values.  However, there has not 
been a clearly and unequivocally valid justification of the view that ‘one person, one vote’ 
is necessary or sufficient for helping most citizens to realise their political values. Many 
Western political philosophers merely assume that equal political participation is a self-
evident ‘fixed truth,’ but they rarely explain why. 109 For example, in A Theory of Justice, 
John Rawls claims that there are several basic liberties that cannot be compromised upon 
and that equal political participation is one of them. He states: 
 
It is essential to observe that the basic liberties are given by a list of such 
liberties. Important among these are political liberty (the right to vote and to 
hold public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience 
and freedom of thought… These liberties are to be equal by the first principle. 
(Rawls 1999: 53) 
 
Rawls contends that the first principle of justice (equal basic liberties) is prior to the 
second principle of justice (the difference principle). On account of this priority rulers, 
Rawls suggests basic liberties should not be sacrificed even for the purpose of generating 
fair equality of opportunity or benefiting the ‘least-advantaged members of society’ 
(Rawls 2001: 42-43). Rawls never gives a clear explanation for why ‘the right to vote and 
to hold public office’ might be a ‘basic liberty,’ just like liberty of conscience, or choice 
of occupation (Kolodny 2014a: 196). 
 
This thesis attempts to argue that ‘one person, one vote’ or equal opportunities to directly 
participate in political decision-making process are only symbols or by-products of equal 
opportunities for realising political values; rather than a necessary or sufficient condition 
for such a realisation. If a group of Christians who lived in Jerusalem or Bethlehem had 
more opportunities to visit holy sites than others, they would not necessarily have more 
opportunities for realising their religious values than Christians living in other parts of 
the world if what matters for religious practices is not ‘where the body is, but where the 
                                                          
109 Deliberative democrats might argue that the most reliable way of realising political values is to arrive at 
political decisions on the basis of a certain kind of public discussion, or some kind of deliberative 
democratic arrangement. However, it is reasonable to understand this purely as an argument for just such a 
kind of public discussion, or some other alternative deliberative democratic arrangements; i.e., it need not 
follow from such an argument, that equal political participation is a strict necessity in itself. 
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heart is?’  It is likewise not clear that equal opportunities to vote is any more a necessity 
for the realisation of political values than the equal opportunities to visit religious sites 
for the realisation of religious values. 
 
Some might argue that political activity is a zero-sum game which is different from 
religious practices (Brighouse 1996: 132, 1997: 165, Rawls 1996: 328). However, this 
view may be problematic since political practices and religious practices have many 
common characteristic features. For example, human beings are both active and passive 
actors in these practices; they both influence, and are influenced by, the results of political 
practices and religious practices. Human beings also enjoy a certain kind of psychological 
satisfaction from participating in such practices. This psychological satisfaction is not 
merely a question of acquiring a benefit of some kind, but also of realising certain values 
one believes in. 
 
Drawing an analogy between politics and religion here is understandable if one is to 
interpret the practical aim of ‘opportunities for absolute political influence’ in terms of 
the individual belief in certain political values, rather than the substantive results of such. 
Ronald Dworkin also uses a similar analogy: 
 
Just as someone denied opportunity to worship according to his or her own 
lights is denied a foundational part of religious life, so someone denied 
opportunity to bear witness to his concept of justice, as he understands what 
the concern requires, finds his political agency stultified. (Dworkin 2002: 
202-203)  
 
Dworkin seems to be suggesting an ‘individualist interpretation,’ which interprets 
opportunities for exerting political influence as opportunities for bringing one’s 
individual political beliefs to bear on political practices; just like having opportunities for 
bringing one’s individual religious beliefs to bear on one’s religious practices. 
  
To sum up, ‘one person, one vote’ may matter as a ‘symbol’ of equal opportunities for 
realising political values. This thesis does not intend to argue that this ‘symbol’ is 
dispensable; rather, it intends to argue that this ‘symbol’ is not a universal and 
unconditional necessity for helping citizens to realise their political values. It is not self-
evident a priori that it is an imperative in all conceivable historical circumstances; it 
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cannot be assumed that this ‘symbol’ is always a necessary objective for those who wish 
to promote the absolute political influence of most citizens. Although CMD appears to be 
incompatible with this ‘symbol,’ CMD can still provide citizens with opportunities to 
realise their own individual political values, and therefore, to promote the absolute 
political influence of the citizens. Therefore, it is possible for a Confucian conception of 
political equality to bestow a Confucian Ren statesperson the prerogative of asking his or 
her fellow citizens to cede a portion of their opportunities for direct participation in 
making political decisions to the Confucian Ren statespersons (the rest of this chapter 
will further elaborate on this). 
 
However, one might point out that CMD is only concerned with the absolute political 
influence of the citizens, rather than their relative political influence. It is reasonable to 
inquire why does CMD not ensure that all citizens have the same amount of absolute 
political influence so that political decisions are no less sensitive to one’s own political 
attitudes than to anyone else’s? This question is about relative political influence and will 
be discussed in the following sections. 
 
5.13 The Equality of Political Influence 
 
One might argue that it does not matter if some citizens do not have much absolute 
political influence, as long as no one citizen has more absolute political influence than 
everyone else. What matters is that every citizen has equal political influence de jure, if 
not necessarily de facto in all cases. It is highly likely that in a large, democratic state, the 
main concern of the majority of citizens is their relative political influence. Therefore, 
even if CMD can help most citizens realise their political values and bestow a high degree 
of absolute political influence on most citizens, CMD will still appear objectionable for 
ignoring the importance of the relative political influence of its citizens; as well as for not 
treating all citizens as equals in political practice. 
 
This unequal treatment, which most democratic theorists are against, often leads to 
asymmetries of political influence and violates the most valued principle in modern 
democracy: the normative democratic principle of political equality: if a process of 
political decision-making gives anyone a say, it should give everyone else an equal say. 
This principle is about equal opportunities for direct political participation, and it is 
mainly related to the interests of the citizens pertaining to political influence, rather than 
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the substantive interests of the citizens. Hence, for the sake of equality, the relative 
political influence of the citizens is the crucial concern for those who wish to promote the 
normative democratic principle of political equality; not so much the absolute political 
influence of the citizen. It is not of imperative importance whether the citizens can 
exercise a high degree of absolute political influence. For, the normative democratic 
principle of political equality is not violated as long as no one has more absolute political 
influence than others.   
 
For many political philosophers, the normative democratic principle of political equality 
is based on an ideal of social equality, i.e., as every citizen in a polity has ongoing social 
relationships with others, every citizen has compelling reasons to desire social equality 
as the basis of these social relationships with others. It is the social equality that gives one 
the power to be free of social subordination to others; the power to avoid being dominated 
by others. This reasonable desire is reflected in the hostility commonly directed towards 
certain relationships of subjection, such as slavery, and towards hierarchical social 
structures, such as class. 
 
Many scholars appeal to social equality in their justifications of the superiority of modern 
democracy. For example, George Kateb argues that the development of modern 
representative democracy shows that the requirement of equal relationship can be 
extended from social relationship to political relationship (Kateb 1981: 365).110 Elizabeth 
Anderson discusses a number of values related to social equality, which are promoted by 
modern democracy, such as treating the interests of others as being of equal importance 
to one’s own; this serves as a positive endorsement of self-government (Anderson 2009: 
229-243). The views of such scholars largely correspond with the view of Daniel Viehoof:  
 
We have a weighty interest in relationships to others in which we are not 
simply treated alike, but are being publicly respected as equals; such public 
equal respect is best (or perhaps only) shown by treating as authoritative the 
decisions of a procedure in which each citizen has an equal positive say. The 
authority of democratic procedures is based on the value of relating to others 
                                                          
110 Kateb points out that ‘the modern birth of representative democracy, in England, North America, and 
France, was itself facilitated by the urgencies of the private or domestic or neighbourly voice, or the voice 
of friendship or brotherhood or religious devotion. There was a passion to repudiate the claimed immunity 




as equal rulers: our interest in seeing others obey decisions in the making of 
which we participate as equals—an interest derived from our concern for 
being publicly respected—justifies each citizen’s duty to obey democratic 
decisions. (Viehoff 2014: 337-375)  
 
Therefore, one might argue that democratic process of political decision-making or ‘one 
person, one vote’ guarantees political equality and thus better promote social equality 
than the political decision-making process in CMD. Therefore, modern democracy is 
superior to CMD. Specifically, there are three main premises used to justify the 
superiority of modern democracy on the grounds of social equality:  
 
P1: Social equality is of great value to citizens. Equal social relationship(ESR) is 
worth pursuing and necessary for citizens. 
P2: The value of social equality applies to political equality. The equality of 
political influence is a sufficient and necessary condition for ESR.  
P3: Modern democracy ensures the equality of political influence among citizens.  
 
The rest of this chapter will argue that these three premises are not self-evidently true.   
 
5.2 Equal Social Relationship (ESR) 
 
P1 is based on a democratic view of social equality. As will be discussed below, there are 
practical and theoretical problems with P1. In theory, the definition of ESR is unclear; 
while in practice, ESR is rare, and will not necessarily be valued by most citizens of most 
polities as a necessity. Moreover, it is not so clear whether citizens are actually willing to 
or morally required to risk undermining social order and other goods to a substantial 
degree, in order to pursue ESR. Compared with the democratic view of social equality 
exemplified in P1, early Confucian views of social equality which is founded upon 
‘extension of love’ may be more realistic and morally acceptable. 
 
5.21 The Definition of ESR in Theory 
 
The definition of ESR appears to be somewhat unclear. One possible definition of this 
term is a ‘negative definition:’ ESR is not an unequal social relationship, i.e., ESR is not 
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a relationship of social inferiority or superiority. However, it would then be reasonable to 
ask what precisely is a relationship of social inferiority or superiority? One might try to 
explain that if one has substantially inferior means for obtaining substantive goods or for 
realising a flourishing life, then one is socially inferior to others. But if, for the sake of 
argument, I have better or more means of obtaining substantive goods than my 
grandfather, because I am younger and healthier; this surely cannot be taken to imply that 
I am in a position of social superiority to my grandfather. 
 
One might revise the above explanation by saying that the concept of social relationships 
of inferiority or superiority is only relevant when such a disparity in the means of 
obtaining substantive goods is the result of unequal distribution regarding need or 
contribution. However, there may also be some problems with this explanation. For 
example, it is possible to imagine that the money I earn by my contribution is stolen by a 
thief who is richer or needs less money than me. Because there are no meaningful social 
relationships between the thief and I, it is inconceivable that the thief is socially superior 
to me. 
 
One might continue to revise the above explanations by offering a tautological definition, 
i.e., if the existing unjust distribution of means towards the obtainment of substantive 
goods makes someone socially superior or inferior to others, then there are social 
relationships of inferiority or superiority. However, this tautological definition may also 
have some problems. This is because there are various kinds of substantive goods; the 
concept of ‘unjust’ in the allocation of substantive goods is too abstract and ambiguous. 
For example, if a state were governed by the Confucian Ren statespersons who are 
responsible for distributing the various means of obtaining substantive goods, then, to 
some extent, such Confucian Ren statespersons would have more means than others to 
obtain substantive goods. Thus, it would appear that such rulers are indeed socially 
superior to other citizens. However, on account of their moral virtue which has been 
approved in a series of examination and political practices, the Confucian Ren 
statespersons would voluntarily deprive themselves of many means to substantive goods, 
such as leisure time or wealth that other citizens enjoy. If it is assumed that all means to 
substantive goods are commensurable on account of this ‘trade-off,’ then on balance, the 
Confucian Ren statespersons actually have less or worse means of obtaining substantive 
goods than other citizens. In this context, it is unclear whether the Confucian Ren 
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statespersons are socially superior or inferior to their fellow citizens.111 In other words, 
the Confucian Ren statespersons may retain a higher degree of relative political influence 
over other citizens. However, as long as the Confucian Ren statespersons exercise their 
greater political influence purely for the purposes of securing a just allocation of 
substantive goods to which other citizens are entitled, the social superiority of the 
Confucian Ren statespersons is a highly debatable point. 
 
If one merely explains ‘equality’ as a just distribution, we may find it rather complicated 
to clarify the meaning of ESR. This is because a just distribution of substantive goods 
does not necessarily equal an equal distribution of substantive goods. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, most early Confucians believed that the government should be most concerned 
with promoting the interests of the worst-off. This is resonant with Rawls’s ‘the second 
principle of justice’: 
 
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are 
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of 
the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle). (Rawls 
2001: 42-43) 
 
Therefore, in certain situations, it may be just to distribute the means of obtaining 
substantive goods unequally, as long as this result in compensating benefit for every 
citizen, and in particular for those who are the worst-off.   
 
Among most political philosophers, it seems difficult to reach an agreement on the 
meaning of ‘just’ in the context of distributing substantive goods. There are many debates 
surrounding ‘social egalitarianism,’ ‘left-libertarianism’ or other related theories; such 
theories do provide various plausible arguments about just or fair distribution (Wolff 1998: 
97-122, Anderson 1999: 287-337, Scheffler 2003: 5-39, Satz 2010). It is unclear what 
kind of distribution can reasonably be considered just or fair. Some scholars, such as 
Philip Pettit and Nicholas Vrousalis, contend that the goal of avoiding social inequality 
                                                          




may conflict with the task of satisfying independent standards of just distribution (Pettit 
2012: chap.2, Vrousalis 2013: 131-157). 
 
Some might propose a ‘simple’ definition of ESR which is not dependent on the 
promotion of a just distribution of substantive goods. For example, according to David 
Miller’s view, ‘social equality’ is mainly concerned with equal social status rather than 
with ‘any distribution of rights or resources’ (Miller 1997: 224).  Miller further points out 
that this social equality: 
 
 Identifies a social ideal, the ideal of a society in which people regard and 
treat one another as equals, in other words, a society that is not marked by 
status divisions such that one can place different people in hierarchically 
ranked categories, in different classes for instance. (Miller 1997: 224) 
 
In Miller’s view, ESR is a kind of relationship among those who have equal social status. 
Compared with the above definitions, this ‘simple’ definition of ESR seems to be clearer 
and less controversial. However, if ESR is to be understood in this manner, then it is likely 
that ESR can only ever exist in ideal situations; its usefulness as a guide for concrete 
political practice is questionable. 
 
5.22 The Value of ESR in Practice  
 
When considering real relationships in modern society, it is a commonplace assumption 
that most citizens are unequal in terms of their social status. This is what many social 
scientists would describe as ‘hierarchy,’ ‘stratification,’ ‘subordination,’ or ‘distinctions 
in rank or status.’ In societies influenced by Confucian culture, it is widely accepted that 
many valuable and important relationships—— such as those between parents and 
children, teachers and students, generals and soldiers as well as the rulers and their fellow 
citizens—— are not and should not be relationships among equals. Even in modern 
democratic countries, some kinds of social superiority are acceptable to most citizens. For 
example, very few would deny that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has a higher 





Strictly equal social relationships are rare in reality. This is because everyone is attached 
to one’s own social roles, including roles pertaining to one’s family, school, company and 
various communities. Such attachments are heavily dependent upon the voluntary choices 
of individuals. Different citizens have different social roles, many of which are part of an 
unequal social relationship, and their social roles are generally representative of the 
characters of such relationships. These unequal relationships are usually valuable and 
acceptable to most citizens. This is because the citizens adopt their own preferred values 
when they live out their social roles. Although most of these social roles are hierarchical 
in character, they provide citizens with meaning, orientation, and the possibility of a 
fulfilling life. Therefore, on account of these benefit, these social roles are of great 
importance for the flourishing lives of the citizens. 
 
One of the essential ethical ideas of classical Confucianism is that citizens should attach 
tremendous importance to their social roles, which form part of a structured social order. 
An individual is habituated to play a particular role from infancy onwards. One begins by 
holding a position in one’s family as a son or daughter, and then as a parent; eventually, 
by extension, one holds an increasing number of positions in the world. For Confucius, 
one’s role reflects one’s true nature, and one is obliged to make one’s true nature 
correspond with one’s role in the family and the community to which one belongs. 
Confucius famously states: ‘Let the ruler be a true ruler, the ministers true ministers, the 
fathers true fathers, and the sons true sons’ (Analects 12.11).  
 
For early Confucians, no one can play a role as an isolated self that lacks meaningful 
connections with other citizens in one’s family and community. Henry Rosemont 
emphasises that Confucian ethical views are role/relation based and early Confucians 
oppose any assumption that human beings can live independently of society and culture:  
 
For early Confucians, there can be no me in isolation, to be abstracted; I am 
the totality of the roles I live with specific others. I do not play or perform 
these roles; I am these roles. When they have all been specified, I have been 
defined uniquely, fully, and altogether, with no remainder with which to piece 
together a free, autonomous self. (Rosemont Jr 1988: 177) 112 
                                                          
112Joseph Chan points out that Confucianism also has a non-relational understanding of human beings. He 
contends that Rosemont’s theories embody certain oversimplified presuppositions or misinterpretations of 




According to Confucian role ethics, every citizen plays a series of social roles; each of 
these is defined by a web of relationships. Thus, none of the dignities, duties, or virtue of 
the citizens can be separated from their social roles. 113 In classical Confucianism, most 
social roles are spoken of in relation to the social standing of a citizen, and the behaviours 
and attitudes required of that citizen by virtue of that very social standing. To a large 
degree, differences in social standings determine relationships among citizens of the state. 
Even though most of these relationships are not socially equal, they are in fact what some 
political philosophers might call ‘role-respectful.’ That is to say, such relationships are 
based on acknowledgement and affirmation of the values attached to the roles of every 
citizen. Hence, the values attached to the social roles of the citizen of inferior (superior) 
status is acknowledged and affirmed, as part of their relationship to those of superior 
(inferior) status. For example, a lieutenant affirms his own value in being a loyal and 
obedient soldier, by means of relationship with his captain; at the same time, the captain 
also affirms his value in being a respectful leader, by means of his relationship with his 
soldiers. 
 
One might argue that even if the abundance of hierarchical roles means that ESR is not 
common in everyday life, most citizens still believe ESR is good and worth pursuing. 
And since every citizen wants the values of his or her social roles to be acknowledged 
equally by everyone else, those who are social inferiors may feel that the values of their 
social roles are less acknowledged than the values pertaining to the social roles of others. 
If this is so, then ESR is good and deserves to be pursued, especially on behalf of those 
who hold a position of social inferiority. 
 
This thesis is not an attempt to deny the desirability of ESR; given that most citizens are 
motivated to place a positive value on equal social roles. However, there are other 
particular goods which may only exist in hierarchical social relationships among those 
who play different social roles. These particular goods include but are not limited to social 
order, role-respectful relationships, role-based harmony, stability, and the self-fulfilment 
derived from successfully fulfilling a highly esteemed role. It is possible that when 
                                                          
the view ‘Confucianism subscribes to a purely role-based view of morality’ (Chan 1999: 217). 
113 There was always some ambiguity on how early Confucians define social roles; this is discussed further 




citizens pursue ESR in reality, they may find that as regards serving the general well-
being of the citizens, some other particular goods, such as social order, are of more value; 
at least in some respects. For example, without social order, it would be impossible for 
some citizens to fulfil any social roles and to establish any social relationships whatsoever; 
let alone to acknowledge the values pertaining to their social relationships.  
 
In short, if one pursues ESR, one might eventually succeed in reaping the benefit of ESR. 
However, in the process of pursuing equal social status, one may also end up inadvertently 
undermining some particular goods. These particular goods may themselves be of value, 
and capable of bringing substantive benefit to the citizens. If this is so, then the citizens 
may have compelling reasons to promote such goods, and at the same time, to tolerate or 
even ignore the negative effects of losing ESR. 
 
However, one might argue that even if some particular goods are more valuable than ESR, 
ESR is still worth pursuing simply because unequal social relationship (USR) is a bad 
thing, and thus morally unacceptable. More precisely, one might give a straightforward 
argument for the inappropriateness of USR: USR is unacceptable because it leads to 
problems of social inferiority and superiority. However, at the very moment, one appeals 
to such problems of social inferiority and superiority, one is already presuming that USR 
is problematic.  
 
It is possible to provide some instrumental arguments, in order to prove that USR is 
problematic. For example, it might be implied that USR has a negative effect on the 
happiness of the citizens. Specifically, those who consider themselves to have an inferior 
social status may lack ‘confidence’ or ‘self-respect.’ 114 Hence, they do not have enough 
motivation to make their own reasonable plan of life and pursue their dreams. However, 
such a concern for ‘confidence’ or ‘self-respect’ can be independent of the concern for 
USR. Citizens can get or lose ‘confidence’ or ‘self-respect’ by education or simply by 
indoctrination, no matter whether they are social superiors or inferiors. 115 Similarly, in 
instrumental arguments about the negative effects of USR, there is generally a 
                                                          
114 One example is Rawls’s ‘social bases of self-respect.’ In his discussions of the ‘original position,’ Rawls 
argues that ‘social bases of self-respect’ is on the list of primary goods.  Without the ‘social bases of self-
respect,’ citizens may lack confidence regarding their social position and may fail to realise their conception 
of the good (Rawls 1999: 54, 2001: 59-60).  
115 The Confucian civic education may play a role in helping citizens get ‘confidence’ and ‘self-respect.’ 
This topic will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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presumption of the negative effects involved in a concern independent of the concern for 
USR. It may be difficult to prove that this independent concern sufficiently or necessarily 
implies a concern for USR. One might argue that ‘USR is a bad thing’ is simply symbolic. 
However, one is still required to explain the meaning of the ‘badness of USR.’ This issue 
is analogous to the problems discussed above regarding the difficulty in clarifying the 
meaning of ESR, i.e., in relation to the topic of a just distribution of substantive goods.  
 
5.23 Early Confucian Views of Social Equality 
 
Some may argue that ESR is valuable for its own sake, rather than as a means to 
substantive goods or some other things. In other words, the reason why ESR is worth 
pursuing is not that ESR brings people substantive goods, including psychological 
satisfaction, but rather because it is intrinsically valuable for people to treat one another 
as equals. Therefore, even if Confucian Ren statespersons are capable of bringing their 
citizens substantive goods, and they have less access to substantive goods than others, 
there are still some good reasons to avoid giving the Confucian Ren statespersons more 
political influence than others. CMD appears to fall short in its ability to facilitate the 
equal treatment of citizens, as CMBs assume differences in the actual quality of the 
citizens; such as intellectual and moral virtues. In CMD, those who have superior qualities, 
or better meet the requirements of Ren, are likely to benefit from especially favourable 
consideration of their opinions, goals and agendas 
 
However, even if people treating one another as equals is intrinsically valuable, this does 
not mean that ESR requires equality of capacity or virtue among the citizens, such as 
intelligence, knowledge, strength or beauty. Nor does it mean giving equal consideration 
to different personal qualities. Certainly, in one’s daily life, one is not morally required 
to treat everyone equally purely because it is intrinsically valuable to do so. Moreover, 
people do not generally think that everyone is equally attractive. An unknown film actor 
cannot blame being treated unequally, purely because his or her salary is less than that of 
Tom Cruise. Tom Cruise cannot blame the inequality that prevents him from competing 
at the Olympic Games. 
 
In reality, it is perfectly acceptable to acknowledge someone’s intellectual or physical 
superiority, and further respect or love them more than others because of such superiority. 
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What is more common in one’s daily life is that one generally shows more considerations 
to those with whom one shares close relationships, such as one’s children or parents. 
Francis Fukuyama uses the word ‘patrimonialism’ to refer to this biologically rooted 
‘human propensity to favour family and friends’ (Fukuyama 2011: 17). 
 
Fukuyama defines ‘patrimonialism’ as a kind of political recruitment based on two 
important principles: kin selection and reciprocal altruism. Natural human sociability is 
centred around these two principles. Fukuyama explains: 
 
The principle of kin selection or inclusive fitness states that human beings 
will act altruistically toward genetic relatives (or individuals believed to be 
genetic relatives) in rough proportion to their shared genes. The principle of 
reciprocal altruism said that human beings will tend to develop relationships 
of mutual benefit or mutual harm as they interact with other individuals over 
time. Reciprocal altruism, unlike kin selection, does not depend on genetic 
relatedness; it does, however, depend on repeated, direct personal interaction 
and the trust relationships generated out of such interactions. (Fukuyama 
2011: 439) 
 
Fukuyama contends that patrimonialism might be more common in traditional societies, 
but that as a natural form of social relationships, it will always re-emerge; especially when 
modern impersonal institutions decay. For Fukuyama, patrimonialism plays a negative 
role in the development of a better human society. However, for early Confucians, this 
natural human propensity to show more consideration to those with whom one shares a 
more intimate relationship, is a necessary requirement for a harmonious society. Early 
Confucians contend that this tendency is also one of the requirements of Ren. 
 
Mencius said, ‘The wise people know everything, but they first consider what 
is urgent at present.  The people of Ren love everyone, but they give priority 
to their relatives and to the virtuous. Even in the cases of Yao and Shun (Both 
ancient Confucian Ren statespersons), their wisdom did not extend to 
everything, but they earnestly attended first to whatever was of great 
importance. The Ren practices of Yao and Shun did not involve loving 
everyone equally, but they earnestly cared for their relatives and those who 




Early Confucians propose ‘ai you cha deng 愛有差等 (gradation of love)’ as the primary 
principle of practising Ren (Mencius 5A5). 116 This principle requires one to extend love 
and respect to one’s fellow citizens in different degrees; according to their different moral 
capacities, and the relationship one shares with them.   
 
Mencius said, ‘Confucian Ren statesperson cares about all living things 
without practising Ren toward all of them and practices Ren toward all human 
beings without being affectionate to all of them. Because he is affectionate 
toward his relatives, this is what allows him to practice Ren toward all other 
citizens, and then to further love all other creatures.’ (Mencius 7A45) 
 
Mencius distinguishes between ‘Ai 愛(caring),’ ‘Ren仁’ and ‘Qin親(affection).’ These 
three feelings or sentiments are all exercises of love, but they have each different degrees 
and objects. ‘Love’ in Confucianism is different from the ‘love’ in Western ideas of 
‘universal fraternity,’ even though both ‘love’ could mean love of all human beings. For 
early Confucians, love can be an exercise of caring, an exercise of Ren or an exercise of 
affection; depending on the specific situation. When love is an exercise of Ren to all 
human beings, it would be broader than when it is an exercise of Qin親 (affection) to 
relatives and narrower than when it is exercised as caring (Ai 愛) about all creatures in 
the world.  
 
Early Confucians believes that Confucian Ren statespersons should ultimately extend 
love to all human beings. Loving all human beings is the extension of and should start 
with loving one’s relatives (exercise of Qin親). Precisely on account of this extension of 
love, Confucian Ren statespersons should eventually be able to treat strangers as though 
they were their family members and love all creatures on earth.   
 
More precisely, on the one hand, this Confucian idea of ‘extension of love’ reflects the 
early Confucian acknowledgement of the natural sentiments of all human beings. This 
nature sentiment leads people to care more about those who have a close relationship with 
them. Here, it is important to emphasise that the concept ‘natural sentiment’ does not 
                                                          
116  There was a debate about ‘gradation of love’ between early Confucians and other early Chinese 
philosophers. For example, Mencius criticises Yang Zhu’s egoism and Mozi’s ‘universal love.’ 
176 
 
imply some kind of universality or determinism. This term merely alludes to the emotions 
human beings feel towards their relatives, regardless of any influence exerted by their 
own individual cultural background. 
 
On the other hand, this ‘extension of love’ also reflects the requirements of Ren, i.e., it 
requires people to extend their narrow ‘Qin親(affection)’ to universal love. In classical 
Confucianism, such ‘extension’ is one of the fundamental principles for ruling the state. 
Mencius famously advocates:  
  
Treat the elders with reverence in your own family, and extend it; so that the 
elders in other families shall be similarly treated. Treat the young with 
kindness in your own family and extend it; so the young in other families shall 
be similarly treated. Do this, and you will find it as easy to rule the world as 
to roll something on the palm of your hand. (Mencius 1A7) 
 
The Book of Poetry (Shijing 詩經) (one of the Five Confucian Classics) says,   
 
He (the sage ruler) set an example for his wife 
Then extended it to his brothers 
And from there to his fellow citizens, to protect the whole state. 
 
This poem shows that the sage ruler (King Wen of the Zhou dynasty) extended his love 
from his relatives to others.  
 
Mencius said, ‘If the ruler were to extend his love to his citizens, this would 
be enough for him to be able to protect the state; if not, one would not even 
be able to protect one’s own wife and children. The reason why the ancient 
sage rulers greatly surpassed others was for no other reason, but the fact they 
were good at extending their love.’ (Mencius 1A7)  
 
This Confucian idea of the ‘extension of love’ has influenced East Asian countries for 
more than two thousand years. It also plays a major role as an organising principle of the 
social structure in China and some other East Asian countries. A prominent Chinese social 
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scientist Fei Xiaotong 費孝通 describes Chinese society as ‘Cha Xu Ge Ju 差序格局,’ a 
term which is usually translated as ‘differential model of association.’ Fei points out: 
 
In Chinese society, the most important relationship-kinship is similar to the 
concentric circles formed when a stone is thrown into a lake. Kinship is a 
social relationship formed through marriage and reproduction. The networks 
woven by marriage and reproduction can be extended to embrace countless 
numbers of people in the past, present, and future…Despite the vastness, 
though, each network is like a spider’s web in the sense that it centres on 
oneself. Everyone has this kind of a kinship network, but the people covered 
by one network are not the same as those covered by any other…In our 
kinship system, we all have parents, but my parents are not your parents. No 
two people in the world can have entirely the same set of relatives. Two 
brothers certainly would have the same parents, but each brother would have 
his own wife and children. Therefore, the web of social relationships linked 
with kinship is specific to each person. Each web has a self as its centre, and 
every web has a different centre. (Fei 1992: 63)117 
 
Fei further argues that this characteristic of Chinese society is mainly the result of the 
influence of Confucian moral requirement of the practice of Ren——‘exercise self-
discipline and return to Li (rituals) (ke ji fu li 克己復禮)’ This term has been discussed in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 
 
The Master Said, ‘To exercise self-discipline and return to Li is Ren. If a man 
can for one day subdue himself and return to Li, all under Heaven will ascribe 
Ren to him. The practice of Ren is something that must have its source in a 
man himself and cannot be got from others.’ (Analects 12.1) 
 
Fei contends that ‘ke ji fu li 克己復禮,’ which is the key moral requirement of Ren for 
those who wish to exercise Ren, is ‘the starting point in the system of morality inherent 
                                                          
117 Fei’s discussions on kinship lineage resonate with the views of many other scholars, see Huang (1985), 
Burns (1988), Rawski (1979), Crook and Crook (1979). However, most of these scholars are more 
interested in the socioeconomic influence of the kinship lineage. As Esherick and Rankin say, ‘We see 
lineage not just as a kinship organisation but as a socioeconomic institution growing out of elite strategies 
to maintain local power’ (Esherick and Rankin 1990: 317).   
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in the Chinese social structure’ (Fei 1992: 74). As Zhu Xi 朱熹  (one of the most 
prominent Confucian scholars in the Song dynasty) explains, ‘ke ji fu li克己復禮’ 
requires one to overcome one’s private desires to assert one’s own self-interest and act 
only according to the common good, then one will consider not only the interests of 
oneself or one’s relatives or one’s friends, but also show consideration to the interests of 
other citizens (Zhu [1190]2010: 131-132). 118 
 
If this is so, then early Confucian ideas about ‘extension of love’ from one’s relatives to 
strangers are actually quite different from Fukuyama’s patrimonialism; even if they are 
both compatible with the view that human nature includes a biologically rooted selfish 
impulse. Patrimonialism is potentially objectionable as it may lead to cronyism or 
nepotism.  However, the ‘extension of love’ is focused on self-discipline, and is often 
understood as requiring everyone, especially the rulers to extend their love of their own 
family to the other citizens of the state. 
 
In addition, even though the ‘extension of love’ presumes that people always give priority 
to the interests of those with whom they have a close relationship, ‘extension of love’ is 
actually based on the early Confucians acknowledgement of the ‘empathetic or altruistic’ 
nature of human beings. As discussed in Chapter 4, early Confucian opinions on human 
nature include the view that every human being has equal innate capacities, and that every 
human being can and ought to be cultivated to be altruistic enough to sacrifice their self-
interest for the well-being of others. Mencius uses the example of a child falling down a 
well to prove that the potential capacities for empathy and altruism are part of human 
nature. When seeing a child falling down a well, any human being, without exception, 
immediately feels a sense of alarm and compassion, and wishes to save the child, even if 
he or she has no personal relationship with that child (Mencius 2A6).  
 
Early Confucians would agree that it is not necessary for citizens to enjoy equal social 
statuses. Nor is it any more necessary to treat one another as social equals. This is because   
in reality most citizens have different actual physical, intellectual and moral capacities, 
as well as different social roles. However, they would insist that all citizens should enjoy 
                                                          
118 There are many different interpretations of ‘Return to Ritual (Fu Li 複禮).’ This thesis adopts Zhu’s 
view and explains ‘Return to Ritual’ as obeying the nature of ritual which means that in all situations, one 




equal moral concern; since every citizen, in principle, is in possession of equal potential 
capacities. This will be further explained in the rest of this thesis. For now, it is sufficient 
to note that early Confucians believe that one ought to treat the morally legitimate 
interests of every human being equally, rather than focusing merely on the equality of 
less essential factors, such as social roles, social status or social relationships.  
 
For early Confucians, social equality is and ought to be ‘relational.’ Both as a fact and as 
a value judgement, the relational character of social equality means that citizens are social 
equals only when they all play the same social roles and share the similar social 
relationships with others. Therefore, social equality is rare in reality, and almost every 
citizen has social inferiors and social superiors. However, some of one’s less fortunate 
social inferiors are those who are worse off on account of brute luck, through no fault of 
their own. Everyone has a ‘non-relational’ duty to compensate them and to extend one’s 
love from one’s relatives to them, and finally to treat them similarly to those with whom 
one shares a close relationship. 
 
To sum up, P1 (see Section 5.13), which states that social equality is of great value to 
citizens and that equal social relationships are worth pursuing and necessary for citizens, 
is not self-evident. This is because P1 ignores the complexities involved in defining ESR, 
confuses the desirability of ESR in theory with the necessity of ESR in practice, and fails 
to consider the importance and value that people often attach to their various social roles.  
 
Early Confucian views of social equality which is founded upon the ‘extension of love’ 
may be practically and theoretically more acceptable than the views of social equality that 
is expressed by P1. In practice, early Confucian views of social equality respect the value 
that most citizens attach to their diverse social roles in their family, school, company and 
various communities. Although most of these social roles only exist in hierarchical social 
relationships, they provide citizens with meaning, orientation, and the possibility of a 
fulfilling life. From a more theoretical perspective, the early Confucian idea of ‘extension 
of love’ acknowledges that the natural sentiment of human beings, which includes both 
selfish impulses as well as potential capacities for empathy, deeply influences human 
behaviours in dealing with various social relationships. Therefore, such ‘extension of love’ 
encourages citizens, especially the rulers, to extend their love of their own family to other 
citizens in the state. Also, it treats citizens with unequal social status as moral equals by 
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recognising their equal potentiality (This will be further elaborated in the following 
sections). 
 
However, one possible way of defending P1 from the criticism above is to claim that ESR 
is only concerned with ‘agent-neutral’ relationships. By contrast, the ‘gradation of love’ 
and ‘extension of love’ in early Confucian views of social equality are all ‘agent-relative.’ 
One might further point out that even if the practice of ESR is related to some specific or 
accidental qualities or roles of the citizens, the meaning of ESR only considers the citizens 
and their qualities, roles or substantive interests in a general collective sense. The analysis 
of different attributes, roles and substantive goods of individuals in specific situations is 
thus of little relevance to the definition of ESR. 
 
Such an explanation appears to provide a free-standing and ‘thin’ account of the meaning 
of ESR, which may avoid most, if not all of the problems derivable from P1 that was 
discussed above. However, if the definition of ESR is only concerned with ‘agent-neutral’ 
relationships, and if it thereby avoids focusing on the various roles, interests and 
substantive goods of individuals in specific situations, it is less relevant and applicable to 
the arguments for some specific, ‘agent-relative’ situations. These situations include those 
where ‘rulers and ordinary citizens should not have unequal influence over the process of 
making political decisions.’ Any lack of clarity on this ‘agent-neutral’ account of the 
meaning of ESR would risk causing further confusion about the role ESR plays in the 
justification of the normative democratic principle of political equality. In other words, 
defining ESR in an ‘agent-neutral’ way does make P1 more clear and acceptable in theory. 
However, such an approach risks deriving the concern for ESR of any logical relationship 
to the concern for political equality. 
 
5.3 Social Equality and Political Equality 
 
Let us provisionally put aside any theoretical or practical problems with P1, including 
those about the meaning and importance of ESR, and merely assume that social equality 
is of great value to people and that there are compelling reasons to pursue ESR. The next 
question relates to whether P2 is self-evident: does the value of social equality apply to 
political equality? More precisely, does a concern for ESR imply a concern for equal 
influence over the process of making political decisions? Or is equality of political 




It is possible to immediately answer that political decisions do, to some degree, condition 
the social relationships of the citizens. Because of this, having more influence over the 
process of political decision-making means having greater influence over the social 
relationships of the citizens. Therefore, the ESR of the citizens is threatened by their 
unequal influence over the political decisions that affect them. However, the problem 
with this answer is that it is also possible that in some scenarios, such as in CMD, the 
creation and preservation of ESR are protected and promoted in the context of a 
substantial inequality of influence over political decisions. This will be discussed in detail 
below.   
 
Another possible answer is that political decisions, by their very nature, have an 
authoritative influence over citizens (as discussed in Chapter 3). Therefore, having more 
influence over the process of making political decisions means exercising a higher degree 
of authority over others; this logically leads to USR. 
 
However, in daily life, citizens often make many non-political decisions in their family, 
school or workplace. Any influence they exercise over these non-political decisions also 
entails authority over others and leads to certain kinds of USR. Most citizens generally 
do not feel that there is an analogous requirement for ESR to have an equal influence over 
the process of making such non-political decisions. Thus, even if unequal degrees of 
influence over some non-political decisions leads to USR, such influences and decisions 
are not in themselves objectionable, as long as most citizens feel such inequalities are 
acceptable for the sake of other goods. For example, it is not necessary for children to 
have as much influence on their own educational trajectory as their parents and teachers. 
It is also widely accepted that children need to be disciplined by their parents and teachers; 
otherwise, they will go astray. Very few would insist that workers and managers should 
exercise an equal degree of influence in the creation of production plans. Workers on 
production lines need to follow the instructions of their managers; otherwise, production 
will be less efficient, and the workers will lose their jobs. 
 
This being so, then it is necessary to inquire: what makes political decision-making a 
special and distinct form of decision-making? What is the difference between political 
decisions and non-political decisions?  Why is unequal influence over political decisions 
troubling to so many citizens, while unequal influence over many non-political decisions 
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does not? Especially if there are also many other citizens who are actually willing to 
accept unequal influence over political decisions, for the sake of other goods. 
 
One might firstly answer that political decisions have greater ongoing effects on the lives 
of the citizens than non-political decisions. Also, citizens cannot terminate the effects of 
such decisions as they wish, not unless they are prepared to pay an intolerable price. In 
other words, the difference between political decisions and non-political decisions is that 
people’s subjections to non-political decisions are often of voluntary nature; while 
people’s subjections to political decisions are not.  For example, workers often have less 
influence over regulations than their managers. If they feel this is disadvantageous to them, 
they may voluntarily quit their job, in order to avoid being continually exploited by their 
managers. By contrast, it would be much harder for citizens to voluntarily change 
nationalities in order to stop being oppressed by their government. It can thus be said that 
the requirement of ‘equal influence’ need not be as stringent for political decisions, as 
when applied to non-political decisions; this is because citizens usually have much more 
suitable options to easily terminate the effects of non-political decisions than that of 
political decisions.   
 
However, some voluntary non-political decisions, such as a voluntary abortion, may also 
carry significant costs for the citizens subject to them. Any attempt to distinguish political 
decisions and non-political decisions in terms of the relationship of such decisions to 
voluntariness and cost appears misguided.  Moreover, such a focus on voluntariness 
merely implies that it matters whether it costs a lot for citizens to voluntarily avoid the 
negative implications of some decisions. Thus, the higher degree of freedom one 
possesses to terminate the effects of a decision, the less trouble would one feel having 
less influence than others over such decision. So, the stringency of the requirement of 
equal influence is relevant to the issue of how far certain decisions engage or constrain 
the will of an individual, rather than of whether the decisions are political or non-political. 
Therefore, it seems that focusing purely on the issues of voluntariness and of the cost of 
exit or noncompliance may not suffice, in themselves, as means of making an adequately 
clear distinction between political and non-political decisions. What is required is a more 
compelling account of how degrees of voluntariness can be mapped into a distinction 




Another answer is possible, as to what the distinguishing features of political decisions 
may be. One might suggest that political decisions have a certain kind of final authority 
which non-political decisions do not have. If one disagrees with some non-political 
decisions, and one also lacks any meaningful influence over such decisions, one can 
always turn to the courts or governments to help issue political decisions which can 
nullify or override such non-political decisions. By contrast, if citizens disagree with 
some political decisions over which they have no influence, it is extremely difficult for 
them to get any help to make a change. On account of the ‘final authority’ status of 
political decisions, one might further argue that if citizens have equal influence over 
political decisions, they are in a position to indirectly moderate or even eliminate the USR 
caused by unequal influence over non-political decisions.119 
 
However, there may be a problem here. Most political decisions can also be overridden 
by other ‘higher’ political decisions which have more political authority. So, who or what 
institutions can issue the highest or the most authoritative political decisions?  In most, if 
not all, democratic societies, the Supreme Courts are in a position to do so. However, the 
Justices of the Supreme Courts are usually not democratically elected, but 
meritocratically selected, according to the various qualities and experiences of the 
candidates. 120Such a meritocratic selection process and the power or authority of the 
justices indicate that in some situations, certain kind of unequal political influence can 
even be exerted over a ‘one person, one vote’ system. For example, in 2000, the Justices 
of the Supreme Court of the United States made a decision which resolved a dispute over 
the result of the US presidential election.121 In this situation, the Justices have much more 
political influence than other American citizens. Such inequality of political influence, 
which establishes the Supreme Court as the ‘final authority,’ ultimately safeguards the 
‘one person, one vote’ system.122 
                                                          
119 Joshua Cohen and Rawls both argue for equal basic liberties and equal citizenship, which make other 
social inequalities more acceptable; as Rawls contends, ‘When the principle of participation is satisfied, all 
have the common status of equal citizen’ (Rawls 1999: 227, Cohen 1997: 120-121). 
120  In the US, the nomination of the Justices of the Supreme Courts needs to be approved by the 
representatives. The president and these elected representatives are able to exert a high degree of influence 
over the selection process used to pick the justices. In this process, merit is the primary consideration. In 
most cases, only judges with years of experience at various levels of the judiciary are considered to be 
qualified candidates for nomination. 
121  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The Supreme Court ruling was founded mainly on the ‘Equal 
Protection Clause.’ 
122 Some might argue that even the decisions of a constitutional court can be overruled by amending the 




One may assert that the difference between political decisions and non-political decisions 
is not about final ‘political authority,’ but about ‘political power.’ The implementation of 
political decisions is backed up by political power; while the implementation of non-
political decisions is not. Those who are not willing to comply with the political decisions 
may face the threats of coercive or oppressive force. This kind of force significantly 
affects interpersonal relationships and is the most obvious cause of USR. 
 
While, just like political authority, there are also different levels of political power. The 
key question to ask is: who or which institution has the highest degree of political power? 
Which institution has both the capacity and authority to control all other political power 
in the country? Especially from a practical point of view, it is unclear whether there are 
or should be equal degrees of influence over this highest political power.123 
 
It is now time to return to the question about P2 mentioned at the beginning of this section. 
Does a concern for ESR imply a concern for equality of political influence? In order to 
answer this question, it is necessary to sum up the findings so far. If one considers the 
commonplace realities of daily life, it is unclear why the pursuit of ESR should require 
equal political influence, rather than equal non-political influence. It appears that the 
equality of political influence is neither sufficient nor necessary for fulfilling the 
imperative of ESR.  On the one hand, it is unclear whether the equality of political 
influence can ensure ESR, if those who are politically equal to others have far greater 
influence in many non-political domains. Indeed, even an ideal democratic state which 
guarantees the equality of political influence among all citizens has the potential to end 
up in a USR scenario. This is because it is possible that voters, including many of the 
reasonable citizens, will vote for policies that preserve USR for the sake of some 
particular goods. Such goods include but are not limited to social order, the self-fulfilment 
found in serving in a high status social role, and the protection of the established interests 
from competition. All these goods can only exist in the context of social inequality. On 
the other hand, the controversial role of the Supreme Court in modern democracies shows 
                                                          
majority), which makes it rather difficult to change the constitution. Moreover, for the purpose of protecting 
social equality, the justices may play a more crucial role than those delegates. 
123 In the US political system, the three branches of government are supposed to check and balance one 
another, and the legislature was viewed as the most powerful branch (as described in the Constitution). 
However, in reality, the executive branch (especially since Abraham Lincoln) and the judicial branch (some 




that inequality of influence over the ‘highest’ political decisions can even contribute 
towards protecting ESR, rather than undermining it. 
 
5.4 Political Equality and Democracy 
 
Let us put aside the doubts expressed above regarding P2 and just assume that the value 
of social equality applies to political equality, and that the equality of political influence 
is a sufficient and necessary condition for ESR.  It is now P3 that awaits clarification: 
modern democracy ensures equality of political influence among the citizens. As will be 
discussed below, the institutional arrangements in modern democracy may not be 
sufficient to ensure that every citizen has an equal opportunity for direct or indirect 
political influence. 
 
5.41 Direct Political Influence 
 
It is often argued that ‘one person, one vote’ in a modern democracy gives every citizen 
an equal opportunity to directly participate in the process of political decision-making. 
Such a system precludes any kind of selective disenfranchisement, premised upon the 
differences of moral and intellectual capacities of the citizens. Thus, as far as the equality 
of direct political influence is concerned, it appears that in comparison with CMD, 
democracy does better ensure the equality of direct political influence among citizens. 
 
However, some scholars point out that in ‘one person, one vote,’ the citizens of persistent 
minorities have less political influence than others (Buchanan 2004: 361, Still 1981: 379-
380, Beitz 1989: 10-11). For example, Steven Lee argues that those in the voting minority 
only have potential political equality. ‘Given the particular constellation of interests 
among voters that results in certain individuals being constantly in the voting minority, 
the actual influence of those individuals is clearly not equal’ (Lee 2001: 124-136). 
 
Moreover, in political practice, there are various scenarios in which voters may lose their 
direct political influence (Estlund 2008: 182, Arneson 2009: 197-212, Wall 2007).  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, it may simply take too much leisure time for one to vote, or it may 
cost too much money. Some may not be willing to vote because they know that one’s 
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single vote is not of decisive importance in a large democracy. 124  In such case, one might 
not be adequately motivated to seriously participate in the process of political decision-
making; especially when it is difficult and costly to get informed in a fast-changing, 
complex modern society. Russell Hardin contends that if citizens are rational, they neither 
have, nor ought to, have any reason to vote (Hardin 2002: 220).  
 
5.42 Indirect Political Influence 
 
Leaving aside the question of direct political influence, it is also extremely difficult for 
modern democracies to ensure that most citizens enjoy an equal degree of indirect 
political influence. Many political philosophers believe that inequality of indirect political 
influence, which usually concealed behind the institutional arrangements of a country, is 
just as threatening to political equality as inequality of direct political influence (Rawls 
1999: 225-227, Rawls 1996: 12, Dahl 1998: chap.14, Singer 1973, Cohen 2001: 47-80, 
Christiano 1996: chap.3, Brighouse 1996: 118-141, 1997: 155-184).125 
 
Broadly speaking, equality of indirect political influence requires an equal availability of 
various resources, such as leisure time and wealth. As discussed in Chapter 3, these 
resources represent important ways of acquiring political information in countries 
governed by democratic procedures. Acquiring reliable and comprehensive political 
information comes at a very high cost in today’s large democratic countries. It may easily 
happen that rich and powerful citizens have more opportunities than the poor to get more 
reliable and comprehensive political information. If there exists a given disparity of 
political information about how to make political decisions that correspond with one’s 
own political attitudes, this is a clear case of inequality of indirect political influence. It 
is perfectly conceivable that a disparity of political information might partly explain the 
decision of many American citizens to elect Donald Trump as the president of United 
States. It is highly likely that Trump was in a position to know the political attitudes of 
most American citizens by buying information from consulting companies, such as 
Gallup, whereas most American citizens only had knowledge of their own political 
attitudes. 
                                                          
124 As discussed in Chapter 4 and will be further elaborated upon in the following chapters, one vote almost 
makes no difference in a large democratic state, especially when there are millions or more voters.   
125For most Western political philosophers, the formal inequality of political influence is more likely to 




Moreover, most citizens usually lack either the means or the incentives to search reliable 
and comprehensive information regarding which candidates or which political decisions 
would be best. At the same time, there may be easily available but distorted or low-quality 
political information, which makes the political decisions that are actually in the interests 
of the powerful look like the best choices for the worst-off.126 For example, it is possible 
for a figure like Donald Trump to influence the political preferences and beliefs of 
American citizens by interfering with the independent political broadcasts, publishing 
fake news on social media, or affecting the quality of the political information available 
to American citizens.  
 
This would result in another kind of inequality of indirect political influence, i.e., where 
one is in a position to indirectly manipulate the political judgements of other voters and 
delegates, because one possesses certain effective means of convincing them to change 
their mind.127 In other words, the reasons behind the political judgements of the voters 
and delegates are deliberately influenced by someone else’s political attitudes, and are 
not the result of free and autonomous political reflections on the part of the voters. For 
example, in modern democratic elections, it is possible for the rich and powerful to 
control the media presentation of candidates and the positions they run for, and to 
influence popular beliefs about these candidates and their political views. 128  By having 
more opportunities to influence either the votes of others or the decisions of delegates, 
the rich and powerful often have more indirect political influence than the poor.  
 
Martin Gilens has conducted a series of empirical studies about the policy preferences of 
American citizens at different income levels. These studies also consider how such 
preferences are connected to the actual policies enacted in Washington. Gilens has 
demonstrated that in most cases, the American government only respond to the 
preferences of the most affluent citizens. The preferences of the majority of Americans 
                                                          
126 In modern societies, it may not be easy to restrict access to political resources. However, politicians still 
have various means of distracting other citizens. Some of them even can inject distorted political 
information into public discourse. 
127 Aristotle recognised that the wealthy could abuse a corrupting power by tempting other citizens to 
embrace a life aimed at acquiring unlimited wealth, and the shallow pleasures that accompany wealth, at 
the expense of living well. This helps which helps to explain why he argued that the best possible regime 
would deprive traders of citizenship (Ober 2001). 
128 There are various means by which one might endeavour to ‘buy’ voters. For a discussion of ‘one dollar, 
one vote,’ see Satz (2010: 102).  
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appear to have almost no political influence on the policies adopted by Congress or the 
president (Gilens 2012: 1). Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson also notice that the policies in 
America always favour those with high income, because the rich can influence the public 
officials, and even determine the laws and regulations in corporate and financial sectors. 
Therefore, ‘the rules of American politics and the American economy in ways that have 
benefited the few at the expense of the many’ (Hacker and Pierson 2011:6). In his book, 
Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, Bartels claims that 
the past 35 years have witnessed a remarkable increase in equality, which is the result of 
political decisions made by a democratic system that is both deeply influenced by, and 
particularly receptive to, the will of the rich and partisan desires of the powerful (Bartels 
2009). 
 
Even if the above problems of the unequal indirect political influence of this kind are 
already widely recognised, it is extremely difficult to avoid these problems in a modern 
democratic society. On the one hand, the ever-increasing division of labour and 
deterioration in economic equality risks making it increasingly difficult for some citizens 
who are neither powerful nor wealthy to acquire opportunities for indirect political 
influence (Schumpeter [1943] 2003, Downs 1957). On the other hand, politicians who 
are aiming to sway votes will not have much of an incentive to help these citizens get 
such opportunities.129  
 
Therefore, in reality, the equality of indirect political influence may be unachievable, or 
at least impossible to be achieved at any tolerable cost. Because of such inequality of 
indirect political influence, many voters may actually lack any motivation for 
participating in public affairs. As Jason Brennan argues: 
 
Citizens are rationally ignorant. Individual citizens have almost no power 
over government, and individual votes have almost zero expected utility. 
Thus, political knowledge does voters little good. Acquiring knowledge is 
costly and difficult. If you knew that your vote is likely to be decisive, then 
you would invest time and effort into acquiring political knowledge. However, 
                                                          
129 In modern societies, it may not be easy to restrict access to the various political resources facilitating 
political reflections, in order to ensure that politicians alone possess these. 
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when you realise that your vote makes no difference, you probably decide not 
to bother. (Brennan 2011a: 165) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, some deliberative democrats may advocate political 
deliberation, by which citizens can become better educated, and more willing to 
participate in politics. However, Diana Mutz’s empirical studies show that certain 
conflicts exist between deliberative democracy and political participation. On the one 
hand, the citizens who are willing to participate in politics do not deliberate much. Since 
the source of the motivation for their political participation is usually the ‘conversation 
among like-minded people.’ This kind of conversion is detrimental to deliberation, as it 
encourages and reinforces the biases of the citizens, thus discouraging compromises. On 
the other hand, deliberation encourages compromise, while simultaneously dampening 
citizens’ enthusiasm for winning over the other side. Therefore, successful political 
deliberation generally makes citizens less willing to participate in politics (Mutz 2006: 
127-128).130 Brennan summaries Mutz’s points of view and argues that ‘the people who 
are most active in politics tend to be cartoon ideologues. The people who are most careful 
in formulating their own political views and who spend the most time considering 
contrary views tend not to participate in politics’ (Brennan 2012: 24). 
 
According to the discussions above, it is to some extent legitimate to say that it is 
extremely difficult for democratic procedures to ensure equal direct or indirect political 
influence of the citizens. This is either because most citizens lack the leisure time, 
political competence and motivation to make reasonable decisions in their direct political 
participation, or because they do not possess equal opportunities either to acquire reliable 
political information or to influence the votes of others. 
 
5.43 No Decisive Political Influence. 
 
One may argue that democracy can guarantee equality of political influence by giving no 
one any decisive political influence in the process of political decision-making. For, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, modern democratic elections or referenda usually 
involve millions or more voters, and the decisive difference usually lies in a few thousand 
                                                          
130 Mutz points out that ‘the prospects for deliberative democracy could be dwindling at the same time that 
prospects for participation and political activism are escalating’ (Mutz 2006: 127). 
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votes or more. Therefore, one single vote may not have any political decisiveness to make 
a difference. In some very unusual cases where the majority that wins by one single vote, 
one single vote does make a huge difference, but even here, every citizen from the 
majority only has contributory influence, rather than any decisive influence on the final 
political decisions.  
 
Therefore, some might argue that every citizen in a modern democratic society has equal 
political influence, exactly because no single citizen has a decisive influence on the final 
results of the democratic process of political decision-making. Some may further contend 
that political equality is kind of negative equality; every citizen does indeed have ‘equal’ 
political influence, insofar as he or she is not specifically discriminated against in the 
process of political decision-making. In such a case, the normative democratic principle 
of political equality is founded upon non-discrimination. This is distinct from a positive 
version of equality, which would imply an equal degree of access of resources that can 
assist one in exerting one’s political influence. This ‘negative’ understanding of political 
equality plays an important role in many modern political philosophers’ non-instrumental 
arguments for the superiority of democracy (Beitz 1989: 113, Rawls 1999: 221, Estlund 
2008: 20, 195-198).  However, there are some problems with this ‘negative’ 
understanding of political equality. 
 
Firstly, it appears that this ‘negative’ understanding of political equality only focuses on 
the intrinsic value of equal participation in making political decisions rather than any 
substantive results. It is thus unclear why ‘one person one vote’ would violate the value 
of political equality if it lets the minority win.131 For, if what matters to political equality 
is equal participation rather than the results of voting, every citizen has equal political 
influence so long as every citizen does indeed possess an equal opportunity for political 
participation. Thus, even if the minority won rather than the majority, the citizens in the 
minority would not accrue any greater degree of political influence than those in the 
majority. 
 
Moreover, this ‘negative’ understanding of political equality may make ‘the scheme of 
plural votes’ that John Stuart Mill proposes less anti-democratic (Mill [1861] 2010: chap 
                                                          
131Peter Jones contends that letting the minority win would violate political equality as it gives more ‘weight 




8). Even if those who are well-educated have one addition vote, they will not have a 
greater political influence than others. By way of Reductio ad absurdum, it can be said 
that rule by lottery was just as reasonable as democracy; since a system of making 
political decisions by lottery does not bestow any decisive political influence on any 
particular individual citizen either.  
 
Secondly, according to this ‘negative’ understanding of political equality, every citizen, 
no matter whether the citizen belongs to the majority or the minority, has an equal 
decisive political influence of zero. However, in practice, most citizens are not merely 
concerned with their own political influence, but also with the political influence 
exercised by the group to which they belong. In modern democracies, the minority as a 
whole has less decisive political influence than the majority. Thus, the citizens who 
belong to the minority may have reason to believe that they enjoy a lower degree of 
decisive political influence than others, regardless of whether or not this is indeed the 
case.  
 
Thirdly, such a ‘negative’ understanding of political equality risk conflicting with 
instrumental arguments for the superiority of democracy. For, the latter arguments entail 
the view the political influence of the majority of the citizens is highly likely to facilitate 
certain substantive good results. Now it seems that democracy would be a less reliable 
guardian of political equality where the results of democratic elections or referenda were 
the result of the decisive influence of a certain fraction of voters. 
 
5.44 Equality and Freedom 
 
One possible counterargument to the foregoing is that democracy does not meet the 
requirements of political equality merely by guaranteeing every citizen an equal chance 
to participate in the process of political decision-making. In addition, democracy also 
ensures that the political attitudes of every citizen have an equal chance to be satisfied by 
the democratic process of political decision-making or ‘one person, one vote.’ However, 
as already discussed above, it is much more difficult for democracy to accomplish the 
latter imperative than the former. Even if it is assumed that in an ideal democracy, all 
citizens enjoy an equal probability of getting satisfactory results that correspond with their 
political attitudes, one will find that many citizens are not fully free when they make their 




This problem can be clarified in a debate between Thomas Nagel and John Rawls about 
‘equality’ and ‘freedom.’  Nagel points out that those conceptions of the good in Rawls’s 
well-ordered society are not neutral. Some conceptions may be less preferable than others 
(Nagel 1973: 220-234). Rawls responds that this is absolutely fair to citizens since it is 
the result of the freedom of the citizens in pursuing their own conceptions of the good 
(Rawls 1975: 536-554).   
 
The political attitudes of the citizens are often influenced by different conceptions of the 
good. If such political attitudes all have an equal opportunity to be satisfied, then the 
citizens may be bound by some distinctive judgments or ideologies in their equal 
participation in the process of political decision-making. This is unfair, at least from 
Rawls’s perspective. For, if citizens are absolutely free when making political decisions 
in ‘one person one vote,’ then some political decisions that satisfy certain political 
attitudes will always enjoy the higher possibility of adoption than others. However, this 
may inevitably end up giving those citizens who favour such political attitudes a higher 
degree of political influence.132 
 
5.45 Rule of Law 
 
One might argue that in modern democracies, it is not the ‘one person one vote,’ but the 
‘rule of law’ that guarantees political equality because of the regularity and impersonality 
of the laws (Ripstein 2010). Nagel claims that only laws can justify equal treatment; 
because only by means of laws, is it possible to secure political conditions of equal 
opportunity, respect, and concern (Nagel 1995: Chapters 4, 7, 10). It is laws that have a 
decisive political influence. No citizen has more decisive political influence than others, 
as every citizen is supposed to obey the laws.  Every citizen is equal in the eyes of the 
laws. 
 
However, it is still necessary to have someone who can enact, interpret and enforce the 
laws.  For example, in today’s representative democracies, most laws are passed and 
implemented not by ‘one person, one vote,’ but by elected representatives and 
                                                          
132 The debate between Thomas Nagel and John Rawls about ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ will not be discussed 
in detail in this thesis. On this topic, see Cohen (1995).   
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government officials who often have greater influence over the enactment, interpretation 
and implementation of such laws than other citizens.  
 
One might attempt to defend representative democracies by arguing that even though 
representatives and government officials enjoy a higher degree of greater political 
influence in the legislature, they are not at all socially superior to their fellow citizens. 
Representatives and officials are merely delegates to the other citizens. Their power to 
make political decisions on behalf their fellow citizens need not entail social superiority; 
rather as doctors, financial advisers, lawyers, accountants and other agents, to whom 
people delegate various decisions, are not viewed as socially superior to others.  
 
However, further justification is required for the view discussed here: whether or not there 
is any absolute distinction between political contexts and non-political contexts may need 
further clarification. In non-political contexts, one often has control over the selection of 
one’s delegates. One can also decide which decisions one will delegate to others. 
Moreover, citizens always need to sign specific contracts which are protected by laws, 
with their delegates. By contrast, in political contexts, citizens do not need to sign such 
contracts, and a citizen alone cannot directly decide who his or her representatives are. 
Citizens often cannot decide what kinds of political decision they would like to delegate 
to their representatives. The political decisions, at issue, in addition, are usually too 
complicated to be under the control of the citizen. It is thus unclear whether the kind of 
delegation used in non-political contexts can be appropriately extended to political 
contexts as well. 
 
Moreover, even if we only consider ideal representative democracies where 
representatives do not just pretend to be ‘civil servants,’ but indeed only make political 
decisions according to the political attitudes of the citizens they represent and are socially 
equal to other citizens; there are other potential problems.  
 
Firstly, it may be difficult to explain why it is necessary to hold elections so often. For, if 
representatives only make political decisions based on the political attitudes of their 
constituents rather than their own judgements, then all the representatives who represent 
the same group of citizens should make the same political decision. Therefore, it should 





Secondly, it is not clear why voluntary candidates, who fail to be elected as 
representatives, should not be deemed as being socially inferior to other citizens. 
Candidates who fail to secure office are denied an opportunity to pursue their preferred 
career choice; to some extent, they forfeit the means of pursuing their own rational plans 
for a flourishing life. Thus, if one were to consider successfully elected candidates as 
being socially equal to others, then the candidates who fail may somehow risk being 
socially inferior to other citizens. 
 
Thirdly, the rule of law cannot fully guarantee the equality of political influence and social 
equality. It has been argued that the rule of law is actually the rule of those who have 
ultimate authority in the enactment, interpretation and enforcement of the laws. It seems 
that only when all citizens equally share this ultimate authority can the rule of law ensure 
the equality of political influence. However, this is almost impossible in modern societies 
as there is a significant division of labour in enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws. 
 
One might argue that laws are usually enacted and interpreted by one’s ancestors with 
whom one does not have ongoing and current relationships. Thus, one is not socially 
inferior to those who possess the ultimate legislative authority.133 However, even if all the 
laws have been made by one’s ancestors, which is never strictly possible in reality, those 
who enforce the laws are definitely one’s contemporaries. 
 
To sum up, it is plausible that P3 is problematic, as modern democracy is limited in its 
capacity to ensure equal political influence among the voters, both in theory and in 
practice. However, even if the above discussion of the problems with the three premises 
(P1, P2 and P3) is convincing, it is conceivable that there may be other plausible 
arguments, apart from the ones considered in this chapter, for the superiority of modern 
democracy on account of political equality.  
 
The discussion conducted in this chapter so far only argues that there are some problems 
with a particular argument for the superiority of modern democracy on the grounds of 
                                                          
133 Thomas Jefferson’s September 6, 1978 letter to James Madison says that every generation should draw 
up its own constitution, on the grounds that ‘the Earth belongs in usufruct to the living’ and that ‘the dead 
have neither powers nor rights over it’ http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-
thomas-jefferson/jefl81.php accessed on September 18, 2015. 
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social equality, as all the main premises (P1, P2 and P3) pertaining to this argument are 
not self-evidently true. Specifically, there are theoretical and practical problems with the 
democratic view of social equality that is expressed by P1. In theory, the meaning of equal 
social relationship (ESR) needs further clarification; while, in practice, the necessity of 
ESR may not be widely accepted. Early Confucian views of social equality which is 
founded upon ‘extension of love’ may be practically more acceptable and morally more 
desirable than the democratic view of social equality. This is because early Confucian 
views of social equality respect the value that most citizens attach to their social roles in 
a hierarchical relationship. Theoretically speaking, the early Confucian idea of ‘extension 
of love’ acknowledges that selfish impulses and empathy both exist in the natural 
sentiment of human beings; it treats citizens with unequal social status as moral equals 
by recognising their equal potentiality. According to early Confucian views of social 
equality, one ought to treat the morally legitimate interests of every citizen equally, rather 
than focusing merely on the equality of less essential factors, such as social roles, social 
status or social relationships. 
 
Even if all citizens agree that equal social relationships are of great importance and are 
necessary for their flourishing lives, they may not have compelling reasons to believe that 
every citizen should exert equal political influence over the process of political decision-
making. Moreover, the equality of political influence is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition for social equality. Therefore, it is problematic to justify the 
importance and necessity of political equality on the grounds of social equality. Even if 
the equality of political influence is of great value to citizens, the superiority of modern 
democracy is still unclear. This is because a democratic process of political decision-
making or ‘one person, one vote’ is not sufficient to ensure the equality of direct or 
indirect political influence among citizens, both in ideal and non-ideal situations. 
 
5.5 Confucian Political Equality: Equal Participation in Political Reflections 
  
Even if the above theoretical and practical problems with modern democracy can be 
solved and a democratic process of political decision-making or ‘one person, one vote’ is 
capable of ensuring equal political influence or meeting the requirements of political 
equality, it is still unclear why CMD must be either objectionable purely because it does 




5.51 Rule of Ren and Political Equality 
 
CMD does not entail equality of participation in the process of political decision-making, 
but this does not mean that CMD inevitably fails to meet the requirements of political 
equality. If someone were to criticise CMD for giving the Confucian Ren statespersons 
more political influence than other citizens, one possible response to such criticism is the 
early Confucian ideal of ‘rule of Ren.’ I.e., only Ren has decisive political influence. The 
Confucian Ren statespersons merely make political decisions in accordance with the 
requirements of Ren, rather than in keeping with their own political attitudes. So, in CMD, 
the Confucian Ren statespersons do not have more political influence because what they 
do in the process of political decision-making is just to obey the requirements of Ren like 
other citizens. The Confucian Ren statespersons and their fellow citizens are all equals 
before the compelling principle of Ren.  
 
One might claim that this answer is not convincing because the rule of Ren in CMD is 
very similar to the rule of law in a modern democracy. If the rule of law, as discussed 
above, cannot ensure the equality of political influence, how is it possible for the rule of 
Ren to perform this function? Early Confucians might answer that this is because Ren is 
made by Heaven, rather than by any human beings.   
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, in classical Confucianism, Ren is created by 
Heaven (Tian 天) and represents the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ (Tianming 天命). Dong 
Zhongshu, the most prominent Confucian political philosopher in the Han dynasty, states: 
 
The beauty of Ren lies in Heaven.  Heaven is Ren. Heaven nourishes, educates 
and establishes all things.  Heaven’s achievement is endless, and Heaven 
devotes itself to all human beings. If we consider the purpose of Heaven, we 
will know Ren. We accept the Mandate of Heaven, learn Ren from Heaven 
and become men of Ren. (Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals 
Chun qiu fan lu春秋繁露 44) 134  
 
                                                          




For early Confucians, the Confucian Ren statespersons should follow the Mandate of 
Heaven. Confucius claims that ‘without knowing the Mandate of Heaven, it is impossible 
to be a Confucian Ren statesperson’ (Analects 20.3). He also states that ‘there is no 
greatness like the greatness of Heaven, only Yao (ancient sage ruler) can follow the 
Mandate of Heaven’ (Analects 8.19). 
 
From the perspective of early Confucians, in CMD, the Mandate of Heaven, rather than 
the Confucian Ren statespersons, has the ultimate ‘political authority.’ That is to say: in 
CMD, the Confucian Ren statespersons are responsible for making political decisions that 
will influence the well-being of all citizens in the entire country. However, in doing so, 
they are merely following the Mandate of Heaven, and are making all political decisions 
in accordance with the requirements of Ren rather than with their own personal attitudes 
or judgements.  
 
It should be made clear at this point that, on the one hand, early Confucians treat the 
Mandate of Heaven as the primary source or ‘unmoved mover,’ in their justification of 
the legitimacy of ‘Ren government’ (仁政 ). On the other hand, early Confucians 
emphasise that in real political practice, the apparently complicated and ambiguous 
Mandate of Heaven is manifest in the will of the citizens.  
 
One example of this is a dialogue between Mencius and his student (Wan Zhang萬章). 
The topic of discussion was about that Shun (舜), an ancient Confucian Ren statesperson 
admired by early Confucians, was given the throne by his predecessor Yao (堯), who is 
another ancient Confucian Ren statesperson. Mencius states that the ruler cannot give the 
realm to someone else, but can only recommend a person to Heaven. It is Heaven, not 
Yao, that gave the realm to Shun. Mencius further explains that it is the attitudes of the 
citizens that ultimately reveal the acts and deeds of Heaven (Mencius 5A5).135 
 
                                                          
135 Wan Zhang asked, ‘Was it indeed the case that Yao gave the realm to Shun?’ Mencius answered that ‘the 
ruler cannot give the realm to someone,’ but can only ‘recommend a man to Heaven’ and ‘put the man in 
charge of affairs, and affairs were well ordered, and citizens were at peace.  This shows that the citizens 
accepted him.’ It is ‘Heaven that gave the realm to Shun. And citizens gave the world to Shun’ But ‘Heaven 
does not speak but reveals itself through its acts and deeds,’ and it is the attitudes of the common citizens 
that ultimately reveal the acts and deeds of Heaven; That is to say, ‘Heaven sees with the eyes of my fellow 
citizens; Heaven hears with the ears of my fellow citizens.’ (Mencius 5A5) 
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5.52 Requirements of Ren and Social Equality 
 
One might argue that in appealing to Heaven, the above argument about ‘rule of Ren’ is 
not convincing; because the meaning of Heaven in classical Confucianism is mysterious, 
vague and ambiguous.136  However, even if one were to assume that CMD fails either to 
ensure the equality of political influence or to meet the requirements of political equality, 
it is still possible that CMD may itself be unobjectionable. This is because CMD promotes 
social equality by pursuing moral equality.  
 
As discussed above, on the one hand, early Confucians believe that it is important to 
acknowledge that most citizens have unequal social status and different capacities. On 
the other hand, early Confucians also contends that Ren requires citizens to treat one 
another with equal respect.  Confucius says:  
 
As for the requirements of Ren: if you want to establish yourself; then help 
others to establish themselves. You want to be reasonable; then help others to 
be reasonable. To view the interests of others as your own interests, this is 
called the Direction of Ren. (Analects 6.30) 
 
To be more specific, this ‘Direction of Ren’(仁之方) implies three kinds of requirement 
for moral equality. The first can be called the requirement of equal concern: one should 
consider the interests of others to be just as important as one’s own, when one promotes 
one’s self-interest. 
 
The second is the requirement of equal rights and obligations: citizens all strive to achieve 
a flourishing life, during which every citizen should have an equal right to be helped by 
others as well as an equal obligation to help others.  
 
The final requirement, very briefly put here and to be elaborated upon later, is the 
requirement of equal innate capacities: citizens all have equal innate capacities, and every 
citizen should be provided with an equal opportunity to cultivate their innate capacities, 
so that every citizen has an equal opportunity to become reasonable.   
 
                                                          
136 For more detailed discussion about Heaven in Confucianism, see Yao (2000: 139-149). 
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In short, the ‘Direction of Ren’ requires one to assist others in cultivating their innate 
capacities and to refrain from taking advantage of unequal social status and different 
actual capacities for making any selfish gain. 
 
In CMD, if the Confucian Ren statespersons meet all the requirements of the ‘Direction 
of Ren,’ they are not socially superior to other citizens even though they are intellectually 
and morally superior, and have more political influence than other citizens. Therefore, 
CMD has the potential to promote social equality; even if it fails to meet the requirements 
of political equality.  
 
5.53 Two Insulting Notions 
 
One might insist that political equality, in its broadest sense, is an important category of 
equality. Thus, if CMD does not meet the requirements of political equality, it 
unavoidably results in certain kinds of unequal treatment of its citizens; this could 
reasonably be deemed insulting towards some citizens. Arguably, there are at least two 
kinds of insulting notions that are implicit in CMBs which treat the Confucian Ren 
statespersons and their fellow citizens differently in the process of political decision-
making (see Chapter 2).  
 
The first insult is that CMBs assume that some citizens make worse political decisions 
than others. However, this ‘insult’ is a common phenomenon in almost every society since 
citizens often disagree with each other about which political decision is worse and who 
makes worse political decisions. As we can see in most democratic countries, there are 
debates over policies among candidates, disagreements over qualifications for office in 
various committees, criticisms of politicians and civil servants on newspapers and social 
media, as well as differential grades in university political classes. 
 
The second insult is that CMBs assume that the political capacities of most citizens are 
inferior to those of the Confucian Ren statespersons. For early Confucians, if one’s 
political capacity is inferior to others, then one often fails to make the kinds of reasonable 
political judgements made by those who have made significant achievements in moral 
self-cultivation. This political capacity has been discussed by many modern political 
philosophers. John Rawls describes the political capacity as a capacity for a sense of 
justice (Rawls 2001: 45). In Thomas Christiano’s view, this political capacity is mainly 
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in ‘learning the truth about justice’ (Christiano 2008).137 For most democratic theorists, 
one’s political capacity is accepted as one’s basic moral personality; as a matter of justice, 
it should not be insulted.  
     
However, in reality, the political capacity of the citizens always comes in degrees. For 
example, infants may not have this kind of political capacity at all. Some individuals with 
certain kinds of psychological disabilities may also lack this capacity. In order to avoid 
the insult, many democratic theorists argue that those possessing unequal political 
capacities should be treated as moral equals. Rousseau contends that democracy can 
replace the ‘physical inequality nature’ of the citizens with ‘a moral and legitimate 
equality,’ and therefore, citizens who ‘may be unequal in force or in genius… all become 
equal by convention and by right’ (Viehoff 2014: 352).  
 
Many contemporary political philosophers appeal to ‘moral arbitrariness’ in their 
arguments for egalitarianism (Dworkin 2000, Cohen 1989, Arneson 1989, Scheffler 2003, 
Daniels 2003). Most of them argue that natural differences in political capacities among 
the citizens should be treated as arbitrary, i.e. as purely contingent, rather than as entailing 
any practical consequences (Dworkin 2000, Cohen 1989, Arneson 1989, Scheffler 2003, 
Daniels 2003). In other words, being born with better political capacities, or living in a 
natural and social environment which better facilitates the development of one’s political 
capacities, is merely the result of brute luck. This brute luck is morally arbitrary, rather 
than morally consequential. This being so, it is necessary to strive to ‘mitigate the 
influence of social contingencies and natural fortune’ (Rawls 1999:63). Phrased more 
simply, the underlying motivation to avoid the second insult is the idea that the possession 
of superior or inferior natural political capacities is the result of bad brute luck; thus, the 
unequal effects of bad brute luck should be either mitigated or eliminated. 
 
However, a close reading of Confucian classics will show that early Confucians only 
acknowledge actual differences of political capacities among the citizens; rather than 
assuming that all citizens, by nature, have different political capacities. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, in early Confucian views of human nature, every citizen has equal innate 
political capacities. 
                                                          
137Jeremy Waldron contends that in order to ensure people’s rights, it is necessary to first respect people’s 




5.54 Equal Participation in Political Reflection. 
 
Early Confucians contend that the innate political capacities of ordinary citizens are not 
inferior to those of the Confucian Ren statespersons and that every citizen has an equal 
potential capacity to become a Confucian Ren statesperson. As Mencius famously says, 
‘Things of the same kind are thus like one another. Why is it that we should doubt this 
only when it comes to human beings?  Sage Kings (ancient Confucian Ren statespersons) 
and we are of the same kind’ (Mencius 6A7).  
 
Early Confucians emphasise the equality of potential capacities, rather than of de facto 
capacities, and they do not think that the majority of the citizens in reality can fully realise 
their potential political capacities. As Confucius famously states, ‘by nature people are 
alike, by practice, people get to be wide apart’ (Analects 17.2). To be more specific, these 
potential political capacities of human beings should not be considered as an accidental 
attribute inherent to human beings, but rather a certain kind of substance pertaining to a 
particular kind of moral nature. All citizens have an equal potential to engage in the 
development of their equal innate political capacities. However, in reality, for different 
citizens, the results of the development of their innate political capacities may be different. 
Therefore, citizens often have different de facto political capacities which mainly depend 
on their efforts in self-cultivation. Yan Yuan (Confucius’s favourite disciple) said, ‘What 
kind of man was Shun (an ancient Confucian Ren statesperson)? What kind of man am I? 
One who exerts effort will also be like them’ (Mencius 3A1).  
 
Some citizens may have fewer means of developing their innate political capacities such 
as some who have certain psychological disabilities. But even if, for the sake of argument, 
such citizens were deemed ‘abnormal’ by some, they would undoubtedly have the same 
potential political capacities as other citizens deemed ‘normal.’ Here, the term ‘the same 
potential political capacities’ means that all citizens, whether they are deemed ‘abnormal’ 
or ‘normal’ by others, not only have equal innate capacities, but also an equal potential 




This is the reason why Xunzi believes that ‘any man in the street can become Yu (an 
ancient Confucian Ren statesperson)’ (Xunzi 23.18).138 Thus, for early Confucians, one 
ought to treat these supposedly ‘abnormal’ citizens the same as ‘normal’ citizens. It is 
necessary to make clear the only misfortunate for these purportedly ‘abnormal’ citizens 
is their not having developed certain potential political capacities that they should 
otherwise have developed.  
 
It should be noted that early Confucian views on the potential political capacities of 
human beings are not statistical generalisations; nor are they the results of an empirical 
or psychological study. Early Confucians were not scientists, and they only focused on 
the essential nature and normal practices of human beings.  Moreover, early Confucians 
spoke of the equal potential political capacities in a normative sense, rather than in a 
physical or metaphysical sense. Thus, for them, a citizen’s potential political capacities 
are not dependent on the citizen’s intellectual and emotional qualities, or personality, or 
any other biological attributes that the citizen is born with. 
 
Early Confucians insist the equality of potential political capacities among citizens, but 
more importantly, they attach great importance to the equality of opportunities in 
developing the potential political capacities of the citizens. More precisely, early 
Confucians believe that citizens need not only basic means of subsistence in order to keep 
a ‘fixed heart’, but also equal opportunities for education, which includes various kinds 
of cultivation, such as moral education, ritual practice and political training, in order to 
develop their potential political capacities.  
  
Mencius said, ‘Only sages are able to maintain a fixed heart without a certain 
livelihood. As for ordinary citizens, if they do not have a certain livelihood, 
they will not have a fixed heart. Moreover, if they do not have a fixed heart, 
they will go astray, in the way of self-abandonment, of moral deviation, of 
depravity, and of wild license. To punish them after they have been involved 
in crime is to entrap the citizens.’ (Mencius 1A7; see also 3A3) 
 
So, for early Confucians, it is the responsibility of the government to provide all the 
citizens with their basic material needs first. Otherwise, they will go morally astray and 




fail to keep a ‘fixed heart.’139 In CMD, the government is not only required to attend to 
the basic material needs of the citizens. In addition, it should also provide all the citizens 
with an equal opportunity to engage in political reflections; i.e. activities where the 
citizens reflect on political decisions, political values or justice. As discussed in the first 
section of this chapter, political reflections help citizens to make reasonable political 
judgements about which political decisions would better match their moral beliefs, satisfy 
their political desires and promote their own interests. Moreover, equal participation in 
political reflections generates a moral obligation of the citizens to respect one another’s 
equal potential capacities and to treat one another as moral equals.  
 
To sum up, the Confucian conception of political equality, which highlights the 
importance of moral equality and presumes the equality of potential political capacities 
among citizens, requires the equal participation of all citizens in political reflections. Such 
conception does not reject equal participation in political decision-making, but rather 
advocates that equal participation in political reflections is logically and morally prior to 
equal participation in the process of political decision-making or ‘one person, one vote.’ 
Many deliberative democrats hold a similar view. For example, Robert Goodin contends 
that political reflections of the voters are ‘internal acts that precede and underlie’ the 
system of ‘one person one vote’. Specifically, He argues: 
 
People’s votes ought to reflect their considered and settled judgements, not 
top-of-the-head or kneejerk reactions. Democratic citizens are supposed to act 
reflectively. They are supposed to ponder long and hard what they want and 
why, and what really is the right way for the larger community to assist them 
in achieving those goals. Democratic citizens are supposed to come to some 
joint determination of what they collectively ought to do. In the course of that, 
they are expected to reflect seriously on what others want and why, and how 
those others’ goals might articulate with their own. (Goodin 2003: 1) 
 
Equal participation of all citizens in political reflections provides every citizen with an 
equal opportunity to develop their equal potential political capacities. As discussed above, 
citizens who lack basic political capacities will have an inadequate understanding of 
                                                          
139Here the ‘fixed heart’ is similar to the ‘common human reason’ or a capacity for a sense of justice as John 
Rawls argues (Rawls 2001: 41, 84, 92). 
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political information; they may risk being easily influenced by demagogues; they may 
fail to make reasonable judgements which match their political attitudes and promote their 
political influence. Without having relatively equal political capacities, citizens are highly 
unlikely to exert equal political influence over the process of political decision-making 
even though they have equal opportunities to participate in such process. Therefore, 
considering the promotions of the equality of political influence, the equal participation 
of all citizens in political reflections is more fundamental and valuable than the equal 
participation of all citizens in the process of political decision-making. 
 
5.55 Possible Objections 
 
One might object to the Confucian conception of political equality by arguing that it is 
impossible, especially in CMD, to promote the equality of political influence among 
citizens, merely by providing every citizen with an equal opportunity for political 
reflections. This is because the political reflections of most citizens will be more or less 
influenced by the Confucian Ren statespersons. Specifically, as the Confucian Ren 
statespersons are supposed to be intellectually and morally superior in their capacities to 
make reasonable political judgements, it is highly likely that most citizens consider the 
judgements of the Confucian Ren statespersons to be more valid than their own 
judgements in political reflections. Hence, even if every citizen has an equal opportunity 
for political reflections, the Confucian Ren statespersons can still possess greater ‘indirect 
political influence.’ 
 
However, it is necessary to distinguish two kinds of ‘indirect political influence’ here. 
One is the phenomenon whereby some citizens take advantage of an unequal distribution 
of wealth, leisure time and other resources independent of any relevant political 
considerations, in order to deliberately persuade others to accept their own political 
judgements. As discussed above, this kind of indirect political influence is not uncommon 
in modern societies. 
 
The other kind of indirect political influence, exerted by the Confucian Ren statespersons 
in CMD, is the phenomenon where the opinions and reflections of the Confucian Ren 
statespersons are deemed convincing from the reasonable points of view of the citizens 
who participate in public debates. In other words, when the citizens are indirectly 
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influenced by the Confucian Ren statespersons, they are actually exercising their own 
political judgements, and their political reflections are free and autonomous. 
 
Moreover, any measures that are taken to avoid such an inequality of political influence 
may threaten other substantive goods, such as freedom of speech. Thus, as long as 
everyone’s political reflections are free and autonomous, it is not objectionable for the 
Confucian Ren statespersons to enjoy a greater degree of indirect political influence. Or 
at the very least, this is less objectionable than compromising freedom of expression for 
eliminating such inequality of indirect political influence.  
 
Even if in reality, the equal participation of citizens in political reflections cannot assist 
in securing the equality of political influence, the Confucian conception of political 
equality is still a desirable ideal. This is because political reflections help citizens to 
develop their own potential political capacities so that they are capable of making 
reasonable political judgements. This is of great value not only because it promotes the 
substantive interests of the citizens, but also because it opens up to the citizens a realm of 
political values that would otherwise be closed (see Section 5.12). In other words, the 
participation of citizens in political reflections is valuable, as it helps the citizens realise 
their political values. For most citizens, realising their own political values may be an 
even more crucial imperative than pursuing equal political influence.  
 
One might argue that the Confucian conception of political equality only highlights the 
importance of equal participation of all citizens in political reflections, rather than in 
making political decisions, and thus fail to meet the requirements of the democratic 
conception of political equality. But even if such were the case, the Confucian conception 
of political equality is compatible with the practical aim of the democratic conception of 
political equality; which is to treat all citizens with equal respect, despite any inequality 
of their social status, or any difference in their actual capacities. 
 
In CMD, some citizens may have fewer opportunities for direct political participation 
than the Confucian Ren statespersons can enjoy; nevertheless, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, every citizen has an equal opportunity for political reflections by means of 
Confucian civic education and other meritocratic institutional arrangements. Thus, the 
Confucian Ren statespersons and other citizens in CMD enjoy a similar range of 
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opportunities to realise their political values. When most citizens are in a position to make 
reasonable political decisions, they are highly likely to treat one another as moral equals 




6. Political Institutions 
 
The preceding chapters have provided a comparative and philosophical elaboration upon 
the Confucian conceptions of political authority, political rights and political equality. 
The discussion has been primarily conducted on a theoretical level, rather than on a 
practical level. CMD aims to establish an efficient, responsive and harmonious state, by 
helping citizens to make reasonable political decisions, and by putting the responsibility 
for political decision-making into the hands of the Confucian Ren statespersons, or those 
who are generally most reasonable.  
 
However, it is still necessary to ask: how can CMD actually assist the citizens in 
developing their equal potential capacities, so that most of them are able to make 
reasonable political decisions?  How can CMD appropriately facilitate the selection of 
the Confucian Ren statespersons, and thereby guarantee the promotion of the well-being 
of all the citizens in non-ideal situations? 
 
Admittedly, early Confucians rarely provide any guidance on the selection of the 
Confucian Ren statespersons, as they already appear to be well aware of the extreme 
difficulty involved in finding a true Confucian Ren statesperson in non-ideal situations.  
What these ancient Chinese philosophers often discuss, instead, is what virtues a good 
ruler should have and how to improve the virtues of the existing rulers. Early Confucians 
have few suggestions about how to solve actual problems in non-ideal situations. I.e., 
those in which the existing rulers are not virtuous, or fail to meet the requirements of Ren. 
Thus, if early Confucians failed to persuade the existing rulers to follow the Confucian 
way (dao 道), their only option was either to turn to the Mandate of Heaven (tianming天
命); or to sacrifice themselves in a perilous service to an arbitrary tyrant.  
 
The master said, ‘He loves learning with sincere faith and holds the dao 
(requirements of Ren) firm to death. Such a one never enters a tottering state, 
never dwells in a state where there is a disorder. When the dao prevails in the 
world, he appears; when the dao is lacking, he will keep concealed. When the 
state follows the dao, being poor and lowly is a cause for shame. When the 
state is without the dao, being rich and eminent is a cause for shame.’ 




When living in a society where the dao does not prevail, Confucius would propose a 
complete withdrawal from politics. It is possible that here, Confucius was influenced by 
political ideas from Daoism. He appears to suggest that, at least under certain conditions, 
Confucian Ren statespersons should only set a good example for other citizens and rule 
through wuwei (no-action); rather than through active intervention.  Mencius holds a 
similar view, as he says, ‘The Confucian Ren statesperson has three delights, and being a 
ruler is not among them’ (Mencius 7A20). 
 
However, wuwei (no-action) is not a main idea or theme in classical Confucianism. 
Arguably, wuwei may make many Confucian political ideas less inspiring and convincing 
in solving actual problems, or in achieving the Confucian political aims of establishing 
an efficient, responsive and harmonious state. Moreover, the idea of wuwei may make 
classical Confucian ‘dangerous,’ as John Dewey points out that ‘to profess to have an aim 
and then neglect the means of its execution is self-delusion of the most dangerous sort.’ 
He states: 
 
When we take ends without regard to means we degenerate into 
sentimentalism. In the name of the ideal we fall back upon mere luck and 
chance and magic or exhortation and preaching; or else upon a fanaticism that 
will force the realisation of preconceived ends at any cost. (Dewey 1920: 72–
73) 140 
 
In order to make CMD less fantastical, it is necessary to develop a Confucian perspective 
on political, institutional arrangements which has the potential to solve problems in real 
political practice, and to socially actualise its general aims; while still retaining Confucian 
political values as regulative ideals (see Section 2.41) and aspirations. 
 
This chapter will elaborate on a series of possible institutional arrangements for CMD. 
This elaboration represents a preliminary sketch of an answer. It is intended primarily as 
a philosophical thought experiment, which can only be put to the test in practice, by the 
future endeavours of social scientists. In other words, this chapter is merely devoted 
towards some hypothetical institutional arrangements in CMD; rather towards an 
exploration of the feasibility of CMD in modern societies.  However, even if CMD should 
                                                          
140 This is reprinted from Kim (2017: 39). 
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turn out to be unfeasible in practice, the discussion of such institutional arrangements in 
CMD can still provide theoretical tools to tackle real political problems, while also 
serving as normative standards and representations of the ideal aspirations of many 
citizens living in modern societies.  
 
6.1 Confucian Civic Education 
 
Confucian civic education is one of the most significant institutional arrangements in 
CMD.  There are several reasons for this. Firstly, as discussed in the preceding chapters, 
early Confucians attach great importance to education.141 They contend that every citizen 
has equal innate capacities, which can and ought to be further cultivated so that every 
citizen can meet the requirements of Ren and benefit the whole world. Therefore, in CMD, 
the Confucian civic education is necessary for citizens to lead flourishing lives; as it 
assists them to realise their political values, to make reasonable political decisions and to 
actualise their potential to become Confucian Ren statespersons (these topics are 
elaborated in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). 
 
Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 3, early Confucians make it clear that government is 
responsible not only for serving the material well-being of its citizens but also for 
providing every citizen with an equal opportunity to gain a good education (Analects 13.9, 
15.39, Mencius 1A7, 3A4; Xunzi 16.1, 27.52). Mencius argues that rulers who provide 
citizens with a good education will get more support from the citizens than rulers who are 
good at governing.   
 
Mencius said, ‘Good government does not win the citizens as good education 
does. He who is good at governing is feared by the citizens; he who provides 
the citizens with a good education is loved by them. Good government 
delivers the wealth of the citizens; good education wins the hearts of the 
citizens. (Mencius 7A14) 
 
Thirdly, Chapter 5 of this thesis has argued that in light of a Confucian conception of 
political equality, the key priority is safeguarding equal participation in political 
                                                          
141 See Analects 1.1, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 2.4, 2.15, 5.28, 7.2, 7.3, 7.25, 8.12, 8.17, 12.15, 13.9, 14.24, 15.31, 15.32, 
15.39, 16.9, 16.13, 17.8, 19.6, 19.7, 19.13, 19.22; Mencius 1A7, 1B3, 1B9, 2A2, 2b2, 3A3, 3A4, 5B4, 7A14, 
7A20, 7A40 Xunzi 1.3, 1.4, 1.13, 1.14, 1.15, 1.17, 9.1, 9.24, 10.14, 18.26, 16.1, 27.52 
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reflections, rather than equal participation in the process of political decision-making. 
Therefore, the Confucian civic education is of great importance in CMD, as it provides 
every citizen with an equal opportunity for political reflections, and thus promotes 
political equality among citizens.  
 
The Confucian civic education is a modern form of the Confucian education which has 
influenced China and other East Asian countries for thousands of years. As Yu Ying-shih
余英時 has pointed out with regards to the history of imperial China, ‘the Confucian 
education often inculcates into the minds of the young, along with other values, the sense 
of justice, social responsibility, human equality, the well-being of the people, which may 
be regarded as some of the closest Confucian equivalents to Western civic virtues’ (Yu 
1997: 206-207). 
 
There are similarities and differences between the Confucian civic education and the 
liberal civic education that many deliberative democrats endorse. Both kinds of civic 
education provide citizens with open forums for political reflection and aim to improve 
the political competence of the citizens, so that the citizens can make responsible 
judgements on public affairs. This is the objective shared by Confucian way of life and 
democratic way of life. As Joshua Cohen suggests, ‘a characteristic feature of different 
philosophies of life is that they each give us strong reasons for seeking to shape our 
political-social environment: for exercising responsible judgment about the proper 
conduct of collective life’ (Cohen 2001: 47-80). 
 
Liberal civic education often prioritises the cultivation of critical thinking abilities, and it 
mainly focuses on teaching political theories that are centred on the key themes of 
individual autonomy and rights. By contrast, the Confucian civic education is dynamic 
and active, emphasising on the cultivation of relationship-based virtues. It aims at helping 
citizens make reasonable decisions by nurturing reciprocal relationships. 
 
6.11 Cultivation of Relationship-based Virtues  
 
One of the principal purposes of the Confucian civic education is to assist citizens to 
actualise their potential relationship-based virtues. When the Duke of Teng asks Mencius 
about how to rule a state better, Mencius replies that a good ruler should establish various 
kinds of ‘educational institutions for the instruction of the citizens.’  The object of these 
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education institutions is ‘to clarify human relationships. When human relationships are 
clarified, citizens will show affection to each other’ (Mencius 3A3).  Mencius also points 
out that the responsibility of the Minister of Education is to ‘teach citizens about the 
human relationships: that between parents and children there is affection; between ruler 
and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, separate functions; between older 
and younger, proper order; and between friends, faithfulness’ (Mencius 3A4). 
 
More specifically, Confucius believe that education should aim at helping citizens to 
develop five relationship-centred virtues, all of which are derived from the requirements 
of Ren. 
 
The Master said, ‘To be able to practice five virtues (Courtesy, generosity, 
trustworthiness, diligence and kindness) everywhere under Heaven is to be 
considered as Ren…He who is courteous to others avoids being humiliated, 
he who is generous to others wins the multitude, he who is sincere to others 
is trusted by others, he who is diligent to help others succeeds in his work, 
and he who is kind to others can get service from others.’ (Analects 17.6)  
 
Most early Confucians regard these five relationship-based virtues not only as civic 
virtues but as human virtues also. These virtues not merely make people better citizens, 
but also better human beings (Xunzi 3.3, 3.4, 12.3, 14.5). Early Confucians believe that 
such relationship-centred virtues are deeply connected with the public and private spheres 
of life of every citizen. Because of this, all citizens can and should practice these virtues 
in all situations, so that they can cultivate an appropriate relationship with other members 
of their family, community and state, and to show consideration to the interests of their 
fellow citizens.  
 
In CMD, the intent of the Confucian civic education is to help citizens actualise these 
relationship-centred virtues and to develop the ability to reason empathetically; i.e., to 
think from the perspectives of others who have different beliefs that are derived from their 
own individual life experiences. Therefore, the Confucian civic education has 
considerable potential to assist in solving some of the problems that modern democratic 




As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the development of social media and of the free 
market have left their mark upon the society of today. The meanings and values citizens 
share mostly concern prestige and money, rather than morality. In many modern 
democratic countries, political opinion is increasingly divided; most citizens may lack 
either the motivation or the capacity to make the kind of reasonable political decisions 
that recognise the interests of others. As discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, voter 
ignorance and the multi-party system have the potential to exacerbate conflicts of material 
and spiritual interests among individuals, and to increase distrust and antagonism among 
citizens with different political views.   
 
Many contemporary political philosophers understand the above problems, and they 
suggest various institutional arrangements, such as civic education, in order to solve them. 
For example, Benjamin Barber proposes a ‘Civic Education and Equal Access to 
Information: A Civic Education Postal Act and a Civic Videotex Service.’ The purpose 
of such a service is to provide ‘wide access to pertinent economic and political 
information.’ Barber insists that ‘without civic education, democratic choice is little more 
than the expression and aggregation of private prejudices’ (Barber 2004: 278). Martha 
Nussbaum also contends that certain arrangements, like civic education in the humanities, 
can teach students to think critically and to endeavour to become knowledgeable and 
empathetic citizens (Nussbaum 2012).  
 
Most contemporary discussions about civic education are the development of John 
Dewey’s ideas of ‘public education’ in his influential educational philosophy (Dewey 
[1916] 2017). Civic education is widely viewed by many modern political philosophers 
as a school for democracy; focusing on developing the critical thinking abilities of the 
citizens and providing citizens with opportunities to gain basic political knowledge, 
which often centres upon core beliefs in individual autonomy and human rights (Dworkin 
2006: 147-150).   
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, such a civic education appears insufficient and not easily 
operative to solve all the problems discussed above. This is partly because such problems 
mainly result from a lack of the moral value of altruism, i.e., most citizens are not 
altruistic enough to sacrifice their own self-interest for the well-being of their fellow 




Moreover, leaning political theories about individual autonomy and human rights does 
help citizens understand and promote their own self-interest. However, in modern 
democracies, these theories, along with the cultivation of critical thinking abilities, may 
also lead to increasingly polarised politics and partisan animosity. 142 
 
When compared with liberal civic education, the Confucian civic education can be 
recognised as a more dynamic and active system; as its emphasis on relationship-based 
virtues enhances awareness of, as well as a commitment to the common good. It aims at 
helping citizens make reasonable decisions, by nurturing reciprocal relationships among 
them and getting them to view one another as moral equals. Therefore, the Confucian 
civic education is in a position to be a viable mechanism for solving the problems that 
modern democracies are facing, especially the increasingly serious distrust and 
antagonism among citizens whose political views are mutually incompatible.  
 
Moreover, most relationship-based virtues that the Confucian civic education intends to 
help citizens actualise, are deeply connected with their everyday personal and social lives. 
Therefore, compared with the liberal civic education, the Confucian civic education is 
more acceptable to most citizens and thus has the potential to serve as a more successful 
way of motivating citizens to cultivate their own potential moral capacities.  
 
6.12 The Legitimacy of Moral Cultivation 
 
Some liberals may question the legitimacy of the Confucian civic education as a kind of 
moral cultivation enforced by the state. In a pluralistic society, citizens often disagree 
with each other about various moral values, and every citizen has his or her own 
conception of good life. Therefore, one might argue that the Confucian civic education is 
illegitimate because the state cannot and should not coerce its citizens to accept a certain 
view about how to become a better person or how to live a better life.  
    
The Confucian civic education is the most important institutional arrangement in CMD 
for helping citizens to make reasonable political decisions. Therefore, according to the 
discussions in the preceding chapters, the question of the legitimacy of the Confucian 
                                                          
142  Here, this thesis does not intend to argue that liberal knowledge about autonomy and rights are 
meaningless, neither does this thesis plan to argue that Confucian ethics centred on human relationships are 
perfect. Both kinds of moral beliefs can be vital for the well-being of the citizens in certain situations.   
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civic education is of great significance for it is also related to the justification of 
Confucian political authority, the value of Confucian political rights and the protection of 
Confucian political equality in CMD. Because of this, the rest of this chapter will attempt 
to provide a detailed response to the question just posed. 
 
It is widely accepted that most citizens, other than heroic figures such as Mahatma Gandhi 
or Jesus Christ, will not behave morally towards strangers if they are in a situation that 
does not require moral behaviour to survive. Many empirical and theoretical studies have 
suggested that ‘people behave badly when they are not held personally accountable, when 
nobody raises a critical voice, and when human beings over whom they have power are 
dehumanized.’ (Nussbaum 2012: 36) 
 
Early Confucians also realise that citizens can become ruthlessly competitive and egoistic 
if they are placed in a social context which does not encourage the realisation of goodness.   
 
Mencius said, ‘(Even if citizens) are well fed, warmly clad, and comfortably 
lodged, but without being taught at the same time, they almost degenerate to 
the level of brutes, as they are allowed to lead idle lives, without education 
and discipline.’ (Mencius 3A4) 
 
Early Confucians hold the view the most important and effective way for citizens to 
behave morally is to study.  
 
The Master said, ‘The love of Ren without the love of study invites the flaw 
of foolishness. The love of knowing without the love of study invites the flaw 
of reckless-ness. The love of being sincere without the love of study invites 
the flaw of an injurious disregard of consequences. The love of uprightness 
without the love of study invites the flaw of rudeness. The love of bravery 
without the love of study invites the flaw of riotousness. The love of firmness 
without a love of study invites the flaw of extravagant action.’ (Analects 17.8) 
 
Therefore, early Confucians attach great importance to education, as education exerts a 
substantial influence on the moral behaviour of the citizens. However, this does not mean 
that early Confucians believe that education should aim at instilling a certain 
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understanding of ‘what is a good life’ and ‘how can citizens live good lives.’ Mencius 
makes this quite clear when he says: 
 
A Confucian Ren statesperson teaches in five ways. The first is by a 
transforming influence like that of timely rain. The second is by helping the 
citizens to actualise their potential moral capacities to the full. The third is by 
helping the citizens to develop their intellectual abilities. The fourth is by 
answering the questions of the citizens. And the fifth is by setting a good 
example so citizens can cultivate and correct themselves. These five are the 
ways a Confucian Ren statesperson teaches. (Mencius 7A40)  
 
None of these ‘five ways’ is intended to instil specific moral beliefs into the citizens. For 
early Confucians, the education should be like a ‘timely rain’ (rainwater needed by 
crops), for the purpose of helping the students to actualise their potential intellectual and 
moral capacities. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, early Confucians contend that 
rulers should not use coercive power, but should turn instead to moral persuasion, in 
which rulers establish themselves as good examples for their fellow citizens to emulate 
(Analects 2.20, 3.26, 12.17, 12.18, 13.1, 13.13, 13.6, Mencius 4A4, 4A20).  
 
For early Confucians, the purpose of education is to help citizens cultivate themselves. 
Through self-cultivation, citizens become reasonable, which means they are able to think 
from the point of view of their fellow citizens, respecting the beliefs of others, and helping 
others to live better lives. In short, the Confucian civic education aims at making citizens 
reasonable, so that they can make a positive contribution to the flourishing lives of other 
citizens.  However, one may ask why the Confucian civic education focuses on the 
cultivation of the abilities to benefit the way of life of others, rather than one’s own way 
of life? There are at least two possible answers to this question. 
 
One possible answer is that citizens all have their own views of good life, which are 
founded on their own beliefs and life experiences. The Confucian civic education cannot 
and should not teach citizens what ways of life are good for them or how they could live 
a good way of life. Otherwise, the Confucian civic education may take the risks of 
instilling certain moral beliefs into its citizens and diminishing their abilities to take 




Another possible answer has been discussed in Chapter 3. It lies in the simple fact that 
one cannot live a good way of life alone. The ways of life of other citizens living in one’s 
family, community and country may enter into the meaning of one’s life so profoundly 
that they cannot be separated from one’s own way of life. One’s own way of life is thus 
inseparably bound up with the ways of life of other citizens in one’s society. The 
relationship between the ways of life of one’s fellow citizens and one’s own way of life 
is web-like, mutually shaping and mutually supporting. Therefore, being reasonable, i.e. 
being able to benefit the ways of life chosen by others, is a necessary condition of being 
able to benefit one’s own way of life. 
 
Therefore, the Confucian civic education helps citizens live good lives, not directly 
through instilling a certain comprehensive doctrine of a good way of life in them, but 
indirectly through enhancing their abilities to respect and to benefit the ways of life 
chosen by others. 
  
6.13 Confucian Academy 
 
The opportunities Confucian civic education offers for political reflections and for the 
cultivation of relationship-centred virtues are a strict necessity for those who want to 
participate in public affairs. This is because such opportunities help citizens to develop 
their potential capacities, so that they can make reasonable political decisions. In CMD, 
in order to provide every citizen with equal and fair opportunities to become a Confucian 
Ren statesperson, the state will ensure that the Confucian civic education is free and open 
to every citizen. If a citizen is willing to participate in political matters after completing 
the Confucian civic education, the citizen will receive further political training by 
studying at the Confucian Academy.  
 
In CMD, the Confucian Academy is the highest education institution which specifically 
trains potential Confucian Ren statespersons by providing them with opportunities to be 
highly informed, to discuss sophisticated political issues and to gain practical experience 
at politics. Such Confucian Academy is a similar idea to the Imperial College (taixue太
學) that Huang Zongxi proposes. Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲(1610-1695), an influential 
Confucian philosopher in the early Qing dynasty, strives to reassert the political 
importance of Imperial College, which was the highest institution for Confucian 
education in Imperial China. Huang contends that the teachers at the Imperial College, 
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who were selected from the established Confucians of the day, should be as important as 
the ministers. In Huang’s view, the teachers and students at the Imperial College should 
participate in open discussions of main political issues in public affairs, without having 
to worry about condemnation from the powerful. Moreover, the emperor, along with the 
ministers, should be questioned by students and teachers at the Imperial Academy at least 
once a month (Huang [1663] 2016: 51-52).143 
 
In keeping with Huang’s ideas, the Confucian Academy would require all senior officials 
in CMD to be questioned at the academy, so that the students would have access to 
comprehensive and highly reliable political information. The Confucian Academy would 
hold political debates about various public issues. Since the students who participate in 
those debates have already finished the Confucian civic education, it would be safe to 
assume that most debate participants are able to make relatively reasonable judgments on 
public issues, to empathise with the perspectives of others, and to exemplify a relatively 
strong commitment to the common good. Because of this, the debate would be of high 
quality and provide the students with the opportunity to participate in high-quality 
political reflections. 
 
Besides political debates, the Confucian Academy would also offer the students 
opportunities to gain practical experience, by letting them work as interns at the local and 
central government for a certain period. Then after a series of theoretical education and 
practical training, some students could finally attain the ‘merits’ necessary to become a 
Confucian Ren statesperson. The possession of such ‘merits’ will greatly increase the 
probability that the citizens who become the Confucian Ren statespersons will 
consistently make reasonable political decisions that are based on the common good, 
rather than their own self-interest. 
 
6.2 The Merits of the Confucian Ren statespersons 
 
At this point, one might ask what kinds of ‘merits’ the Confucian Ren statespersons 
should have, or how is it possible to tell whether someone is morally, intellectually and 
practically capable of making reasonable political decisions. In other words, in CMD, 
                                                          
143 The contemporary Confucian thinker Jiang Qing has advocated reviving this practice in contemporary 
China, see (Bell and de-Shalit 2011: 160). 
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what particular ‘merits’ should a qualified Confucian Ren statesperson have, in order to 
equip them for making reasonable judgements on public affairs?  
 
The early Confucian views on the merits of a good statesperson first appeared in the 
disintegration of the pedigree-based order of the Spring and Autumn period (770-453 
BCE) and flourished throughout the Warring States period (453-221 BCE).144  Later 
Confucians emphasised providing concrete institutional basis for the evaluation of 
personal merits, as well as a selection and promotion mechanism for the purpose of 
choosing government official who are morally and intellectually superior to others.  
 
There is no agreed list of ‘merits’ among the early Confucians; even though early 
Confucians warn that ‘merits’ should be precisely defined, otherwise they could be 
manipulated by hypocrites instead of being used as a set of criteria for selecting truly 
capable Confucian Ren statespersons (Analects 6.13, 17.4, 17.23, Mencius 6A15, Xunzi 
4.5, 4.9). For most early Confucians, rulers are required to have certain ‘merits’ in order 
to implement ‘Ren government (Ren zheng 仁政).’ As discussed in Chapter 2, such 
‘merits’ are subject to and defined by Ren (Pines 2013). The purpose of having these 
merits is to serve the requirements of Ren. Here, the meaning of Ren resonates with the 
‘cause’ in Max Weber’s discussions of the qualities of a good politician. Weber contends 
that faults and shortcomings in politics begin where ‘striving for power loses its 
objectivity and becomes a matter of purely personal self-intoxication, instead of being 
employed solely in the service of the “cause”’ (Weber 2008: 194). 
 
In his essay, Politics as a Vocation, Weber says, ‘three qualities are chiefly decisive for 
the politician: passion, responsibility, and a sense of proportion’ (Weber 2008: 192). The 
connection between these three qualities is founded upon the ‘cause.’ Good politicians 
should have a sense of responsibility to the ‘cause’ to which they are passionately devoted. 
                                                          
144 See Analects 1.1, 1.2, 1.8, 1.14, 2.14, 3.7, 3.24, 4.5, 4.10, 4.11, 4.16, 4.24, 5.16, 6.18, 6.26, 6.27, 7.37, 
8.2, 8.4, 12.4, 12.5, 12.8, 12.15, 12.16, 12.19, 12.24, 13.3, 13.23, 13.25, 13.26, 14.23, 14.27, 14.28, 14.42, 
15.8, 15.18, 15.19, 15.20, 15.21, 15. 22, 15.23, 15. 32, 15. 34, 15.37, 16.1, 16.6, 16.7, 16.8, 16.10, 17.4, 
17.7, 17.21, 17.23, 17.24, 18.10, 19.3, 19.4, 19.7, 19.9, 19.10, 19.25, 20.2, 20.3; Mencius 1A7, 1B14, 2A9, 
2B1, 2B3, 2B13, 3A2, 3B4, 3b7, 4b14, 4B18, 4B19, 4B22, 4B28, 5B7, 6B6, 6B8, 7A13, 7A20, 7A21, 
7A24, 7A32, 7A37, 7A40, 7A41, 7A45, 7B24, 7B29, 7B32, 7B33, 7B37;  Xunzi 1.1, 1.8, 1.13, 1.16, 2.12, 
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.9, 3.10, 4.9, 5.8, 5.9, 5.11, 6.14, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 9.3, 9.18, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.9, 
13.5, 13.8, 14.1, 14.2, 17.9, 17.10, 18.38, 19.17, 20.7, 21.10, 21.15, 23.2, 24, 25.1, 27.21, 27.103, 28.8, 
29.6, 30.3, 30.4, 30.7, 30.8, 31.6, 32.3 
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And a sense of proportion means that the good politicians should be realistic and rational 
during their devotion to the ‘cause.’ 145  
 
More precisely, in Weber’s view, good politicians should not only be full of passion, and 
thereby place a high value upon their good intentions. Moreover, they should be ‘realistic,’ 
and consider carefully the potential and actual results of their own actions in the service 
of the ‘cause.’146 In short, good politicians will have moral beliefs which are the source 
of their passion and their devotion to the ‘cause,’ but they will also manifest a calm 
utilitarian rationality which facilitates an appropriate implementation of the given 
institutional instruments, including the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence, in order 
to deal with the political problems in reality.147  Here, the relationship between the ‘cause’ 
and the qualities of Weber’s good politicians, is very similar to that between ‘Ren’ and 
the merits of the Confucian Ren statespersons. No matter what the particular merits and 
virtues are at issue for a Confucian Ren statesperson, ‘Ren’ is the ultimate cause of all 
merits and the guiding star of all actions (Analects 2.1). 
 
It is difficult to provide a specific list of ‘merits’ that Confucian Ren statespersons would 
have, as the list would be too long and vary according to different political contexts.  
However, these ‘merits’ do not include those which may be more useful for politicians in 
modern democratic societies, such as ‘the ability to foretell what is going to happen 
tomorrow, next week, next month, and next year. And to have the ability afterwards to 
explain why it does not happen’ (Winston Churchill). Another ‘useful’ ability of many 
modern democratic politicians is to exaggerate the drawbacks of political opponents and 
to make promises that will not be delivered after the election victory, as well as the ability 
to make passionate speeches while campaigning (Kane and Patapan 2012). Gutman and 
Thompson argue that the merits of democratic politicians are mainly election oriented, 
                                                          
145 Weber further argues that ‘there are only two kinds of deadly sin in the field of politics: lack of objectivity 
and— often, although not invariably, identical with it— irresponsibility. Vanity: the need to push oneself 
into the foreground as prominently as possible, leads the politician most strongly into the temptation of 
committing one or both of these sins’ (Weber 2008: 194). 
146 For Weber, the question about the quality of a good ruler is ‘How do we force burning passion and a 
cool sense of proportion to come together in the same soul?’ (Weber 2008: 193). For Weber, a good ruler 
must be prepared to use morally dubious means for good results. ‘The world was governed by demons, and 
that those who threw in their lot with power and force as means were making a pact with diabolical powers, 
and that as far as one’s actions are concerned it is not true that ‘from good only good comes, and from evil 
only evil comes, but that the opposite is often the case’ (Weber 2008: 200-201). 
147 ‘Whoever seeks the salvation of his own soul and the rescue of other souls does not do so by means of 
politics, which has quite different tasks: those that can only be solved by force’ (Weber 2008: 204). 
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such as various abilities for campaigning, or the desire to stand for positions that are 
different from their opponents regardless of whether such positions are good for 
governing or not (Gutmann and Thompson 2009). 
 
Generally speaking, there are three fundamental merits of the Confucian Ren 
statespersons. These merits are first and foremost compatible with the requirements of 
Ren in classical Confucianism as well as with Confucian conceptions of political authority, 
political rights and political equality, as will be discussed in detail in the preceding 
sections. 
 
6.21 Intellectual Ability  
 
For early Confucians, moral virtues are the most important merits of a good ruler. 
However, intellectual ability is what matters most, if one wishes to evaluate the merits of 
the Confucian Ren statespersons in CMD. The idea of selecting political officials 
according to their intellectual ability has deep roots in Confucianism. For over 1300 years 
in Imperial China, political officials were mostly selected on the basis of their academic 
performance in Keju 科舉 (Imperial civil examination). Keju is roughly analogous to 
today’s civil service examination. However, it must be noted that in Imperial China, there 
is no distinction between political officials and civil servants. 
 
It has been argued that in a large state, government officials at different levels of the state 
need to meet different requirements, in terms of their intellectual ability. Certain 
intellectual capabilities may be much more important for officials in the central 
government than those in the local administration; as government officials at a higher 
level often need to deal with more complex issues and to provide insightful solutions to 
long-term problems.148 For village rulers, the executive and technical ability to implement 
political decision might be more crucial.149 In CMD, the Confucian Ren statespersons 
should be equipped with several basic skills in order to demonstrate that they have 
                                                          
148 The national civil service examination syllabus in many countries appears to provide evidence for this 
assertion. For example, the 2013 Chinese National Public Service Examination Syllabus for Central-Level 
Organs and Direct Subordinate Organizations. 
149 In the Ming dynasty, officials in the capital needed to have greater intellectual ability than other officials. 
See Chen (1993: 92-96). 
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superior intellectual abilities.  First and foremost, a Confucian Ren statesperson should 
be a good learner, as Confucius attaches great importance to learning.  
 
The Master said, ‘In a village of ten families, there are certainly some who 
are as honourable and sincere as I am, but none my equal in love of learning!’ 
(Analects 5.28) 
 
The Master said, ‘The silent treasuring up of knowledge, learning without 
satiety and teaching others without being wearied – this much I can do.’ 
(Analects 7.2) 
 
It may not be necessary for Confucian Ren statespersons to have expertise in any 
particular fields. However, they need to be effective and efficient learners, in order to 
successfully gain and implement knowledge from various policy-related disciplines, such 
as politics, economics, psychology, science and philosophy. All of these have a bearing 
on reasonable political decision-making. In order to analyse complicated information and 
to understand complex arguments from various angles, the Confucian Ren statespersons 
also need analytical skills; so they can avoid looking at matters through an inflexible 
ideological lens.   
 
In addition, the ability to respond to problems quickly in an increasingly interconnected 
and fast-changing world is also necessary, so that the Confucian Ren statespersons can 
make reasonable predictions about ambiguous and contradictory affairs in the future. 
Because of the influence of globalisation, the Confucian Ren statespersons also need to 
speak a second or even a third language. Moreover, the Confucian Ren statespersons 
should be familiar with history, so that they have basic knowledge of the strengths and 
weaknesses of past political decisions, which may still be relevant today.  
 
Last but not least, the Confucian Ren statespersons should be adequately acquainted with 
the Confucian classics, which are full of insights about the qualities of a good statesperson. 
Studying these classics can assist the Confucian Ren statespersons in establishing their 
understanding of Confucian moral beliefs; these beliefs can motivate them to meet the 
requirements of Ren and to act in a virtuous and competent manner in their social and 
political lives. In a Chinese context, it is important for good statespersons to study 
Confucianism, so they can develop a sense of being part of a great historical tradition and 
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improve their rhetorical and communicative skills, by drawing from the rich literary and 
philosophical tradition of Confucianism. 
  
6.22 Emotional Intelligence 
 
It is necessary for a Confucian Ren statesperson to have a high degree of intellectual 
ability, but such intelligence, on its own, is not sufficient. Modern political scientists 
contend that high emotional intelligence is also necessary for a good politician. For 
example, Oliver Wendell Holmes points out that American President Roosevelt had ‘a 
second-class intellect’ but ‘a first-class temperament.’ He argues that for political success, 
a first-class temperament is more important than a first-class intellect (Powell 2010: 32). 
It is not uncommon to see intellectually capable but socially insensitive individuals, who 
have achieved outstanding academic results. A common phenomenon in modern history 
is that statespersons who have high emotional intelligence usually surround themselves 
with talented advisers who know more than the statespersons do.   
 
Early Confucians also believe that good rulers should have high emotional intelligence 
which is reflected in their treatment of others. Specifically, good rulers should engage 
their ministers in accordance with Li (rituals), so that the ministers will be devoted to 
helping the rulers make the best political decisions (Analects 3.19). Only by meeting the 
requirements of Li (rituals) can rulers unite their fellow citizens to achieve specific 
political goals (Analects 14.41). As discussed in Chapter 3, early Confucians contend that 
rulers should always use moral persuasion to ‘win the hearts of the citizens,’ in order to 
bring citizens into compliance with political decisions, rather than resorting either to force 
or to legal punishments (Mencius 7A14). Rulers who are capable of making brilliant 
political decisions, but whose temperament alienates others will find it extremely difficult 
to persuade their fellow citizens to accept and implement their decisions. 
 
Therefore, in CMD, Confucian Ren statespersons cannot rely solely on their superior 
intellectual abilities; high emotional intelligence is also a strict necessity so that they can 
communicate with their fellow citizens effectively and efficiently. Daniel Goleman’s 
empirical studies confirm that most effective leaders have a high degree of emotional 
intelligence. Goleman also points out that emotional intelligence is of particular 
importance for those who rule at a higher level, and who are required to engage with a 
larger and more comprehensive group of citizens (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2013, 
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Goleman 2004). A high degree of emotional intelligence enables the Confucian Ren 
statespersons to be aware of their own strengths and weaknesses; to control their positive 
and negative moods; to be continually motivated by noble aims, to fully understand the 
feelings and emotions of others, and to encourage others to improve their own 
performance.  
 
In classical Confucianism, one’s emotional intelligence capabilities can be developed by 
gaining experience of different social roles and by dealing with various relationships with 
different citizens. Older adults who have more life experiences, and who have retained 
their desire for social interactions usually have a higher degree of emotional intelligence 
than younger adults; or as Confucius says that he becomes a good listener and no longer 
needs to struggle to control his emotions after he turns seventy years old. 
 
The Master said, ‘At fifteen, I made up my mind to study hard. At thirty, I 
stood on my own two feet. At forty, I was free of perplexities. At fifty, I knew 
my destiny. At sixty, I was good at listening to different opinions. At seventy, 
I could follow the dictates of my emotions without overstepping the 
boundaries of the right.’ (Analects 2.4) 
 
Confucius suggests that when citizens become old, they are more likely to have higher 
emotional intelligence. Because of this, they are able to do whatever they desire without 
having to worry about violating Li (rituals). Many modern empirical studies also show 
that ‘emotional intelligence increases with age’ (Goleman 2014: 8)150 Fredda Blanchard-
Fields argues: 
 
Older adults are more socially astute…they are better able to make decisions 
that preserve an interpersonal relationship…And as we grow older, we grow 
more emotionally supple—we are able to adjust to changing situations on the 
basis of our emotional intelligence and prior experience, and therefore make 
better decisions (on average) than do young people. (Hall 2010: 229) 
 
                                                          
150 Some researchers contend that older people quickly let go of negative emotions because they value social 
relationships more than the ego satisfaction that comes from rupturing them (Vaillant 2015, Bell 2016). 
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Therefore, in CMD, older citizens are more likely to become Confucian Ren statespersons, 
as they usually have superior emotional intelligence.  
 
One might point out that it is extremely difficult, in real and concrete political practice, 
to gauge one’s emotional intelligence via examinations, or any other kinds of systematic 
testing strategy. The modern Confucian scholar Qian Mu 錢穆 has also noticed this 
challenge. He contends that this problem was generally avoided in the history of Imperial 
China, especially in the Han dynasty; insofar as most of the candidates who participated 
in imperial examinations were born into political families. Thus, these candidates were 
already familiar with the real-life political practice. They had already availed of numerous 
opportunities to improve their emotional intelligence before they even took the imperial 
examinations (Qian 2004: 249). 
 
However, even if the political system of Imperial China was able to ensure that successful 
Keju candidates had a high capacity for emotional intelligence, such system surely 
undermine political equality. In CMD, the solution would be as follows: successful 
examination candidates will undergo further training and testing by working as interns at 
different levels of government, over a substantial period of time. This is something they 
all required to do before assuming the role of a Confucian Ren statesperson. The rest of 
the chapter will discuss this topic further.  
 
6.23 Moral Ability 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, Ren is characterised as the highest moral ability 
in classical Confucianism. Early Confucians always propose a ‘Ren government,’ in 
which the rulers use their moral abilities to promote the benefit of the citizens. They 
always condemn the opposite of ‘Ren Government,’ i.e., ‘Hegemonic Government’ where 
the rulers use immoral abilities to promote the benefit of the ruling class. Therefore, in 
CMD, moral abilities are the most significant merits of the Confucian Ren statespersons.   
 
According to Confucius, a good ruler’s moral abilities are characterised by Ren (Chan 
1955), and anyone who is in possession of these moral abilities is altruistic enough to 
sacrifice one’s own self-interest for the well-being of others (Analects 6.30, 13.19, 15.9). 
Mencius contends that rulers should employ their moral abilities to govern the state, as 
he says, ‘If a ruler were to employ the moral ability in order to implement Ren government, 
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he would find bringing the entire state into order to be simple, as though he were turning 
the world in his hand’ (Mencius 2A6). 
 
Moreover, early Confucians believe that rulers should have superior moral abilities so 
that they can set good examples for other citizens and thus facilitate the moral cultivation 
of other citizens. However, El Amine, in her latest book Classical Confucian Political 
Thought, points out that for early Confucians, political order is the end, rather than moral 
cultivation. Based on her reading of the work of early Confucians, El Amine argues that 
‘a virtuous ruler is important because he knows what policies to pursue to achieve long-
lasting political order, not because he governs through the force of his example to promote 
virtue in society’ (Amine 2015: 15). 
 
El Amine appears to overemphasise the importance of political order in classical 
Confucianism.  Mencius and Xunzi indeed argue that, at times, a certain degree of 
punishment and force is a necessity of governance, in order to maintain good social and 
political order. However, they both treat legal punishment as a last resort which should 
be restricted to as few citizens as possible (Xunzi 16.2, 15.4, Hsiao 2005: 114).  Confucius 
even claims that legal punishments can only be used for the purpose avoiding using such 
legal punishments in the future (Analects 12.13).  He says, ‘if a moral man were to govern 
for a hundred years, violence and killing could be wiped out’ (Analects 13.11). 
 
The ultimate purpose of maintaining political order is to serve the well-being of all 
citizens. As discussed in the preceding chapters, early Confucians believe that serving the 
well-being of the citizens does not only means fulfilling the material needs of the citizens. 
Rather, it is also necessary to satisfy the spiritual needs of the citizens, i.e., to help citizens 
develop their potential moral capacities to become reasonable. Therefore, this thesis 
dissents a little from El Amine’s arguments, and insists that in classical Confucianism, 
political order is just a by-product of moral cultivation, rather than its end. In other words, 
moral cultivation is an end in itself, and not merely a means of maintaining political order. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Confucian Ren statespersons are not born with superior moral 
abilities; their moral abilities are superior to others is because that they have made great 
achievements in their moral self-cultivation.  According to Mencius’s view of human 
nature (see Chapter 4), every citizen has equal potential moral abilities; all of these 
originate from ‘the sense of compassion (ce yin zhi xin惻隱之心)’ with which every 
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citizen is born (Mencius 6A6). Citizens need moral cultivation in order to actualise their 
potential moral abilities. Specifically, moral cultivation helps citizens develop ‘inner 
sagehood’ (nei sheng內聖), i.e. self-cultivation of one’s true humanity and nature in order 
to become a moral person. It also helps citizens develop ‘outward kingliness’ (wai wang
外王 ), i.e. ruling the world by morality in order to keep the peace and to benefit 
everything in the world. 
 
There are many ways to develop the moral abilities of the citizens. Besides moral 
education, some Confucians advocate studying the Confucian classics. This is because 
the Confucian classics have recorded the behaviours and sayings of some of the most 
intelligent and moral people in ancient China; as well as ‘the affairs that were possible 
for the sages; with them, one can make heaven-and-earth constant, regulate yin and yang, 
rectify social norms, and promote morality’ (Bol 2008: 47-48, Bell 2016: 102).  
 
To sum up, the preceding sections have discussed three kinds of merits that Confucian 
Ren statespersons should have: intellectual ability, emotional intelligence and moral 
ability. These three merits can also be expressed in the words of early Confucians: 
benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. These terms appear many times in the 
Confucian classics. For early Confucians, these merits should be rooted in the ‘heart’ of 
the Confucian Ren statespersons.  
 
Mencius said, ‘An extensive territory and a huge population are things a 
Confucian Ren statesperson desires, but what he delights in lies elsewhere. 
To stand in the centre of the state and bring peace to the people within the 
whole world is what a Confucian delight in, but that which he follows as his 
nature lies elsewhere …That which a Confucian Ren statesperson follows as 
his nature, that is to say, benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, 
is rooted in his heart.’ (Mencius 7A21) 
 
Generally speaking, in CMD, the Confucian Ren statespersons should not merely have 
intellectual abilities and emotional intelligence, but more importantly, they should have 
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cultivated their moral abilities to an exceedingly high degree, in order to use all their 
abilities to serve the well-being of all citizens ‘under Heaven’ (tian xia天下).151  
  
6.3 Confucian Examination  
 
In CMD, another institutional arrangement for evaluating the merits of the Confucian Ren 
statespersons is the Confucian Examination. While this kind of examination seems to be 
a modern form of the Keju 科舉, it is different from the Keju in many respects. The Keju 
was used for recruiting political officials in Imperial China for more than 1300 years, 152 
and for linking Confucianism to pre-modern socio-political life in some East Asian 
countries (Elman 2000, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
6.31 The Development of the Keju 
 
Early Confucians during the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BCE) made the argument, 
unprecedented up to then, that government officials should be appointed based on the 
consideration of their merits, rather than race or birth. In the Western Han Dynasty (206 
BCE-9CE), Emperor Wu of Han (141-87 BCE) issued an early form of the Keju. Some 
of the candidates for membership of the ruling class were required to participate in a series 
of examinations. A certain proportion of the officials who were to serve in the local and 
central governments were to be selected and promoted on the basis of their performances 
in the examinations. Therefore, since the time of Emperor Wu of Han, many families 
were motivated to provide their young boys with appropriate resources and tools for 
studying the Confucian classics. During the Eastern Han dynasty (25 BCE-220CE), the 
examinations were designed to test the political competence of candidates in more 
specific areas, such as foreign policy and flood control.   
 
In the Han dynasty, there were other channels for the selection and promotion of officials. 
Among them, the most influential one was the so-called ‘recommending the filial and the 
                                                          
151 Gan Chunsong contends that the conception of ‘all under Heaven’ (tian xia 天下) in Confucian political 
thought means that the Confucian Ren statespersons should be concerned with the welfare of all human 
beings in the world rather than the citizens in their country alone (Gan 2012, Fan 2013). 
152As Max Weber points out, ‘For twelve centuries social rank in China has been determined more by 
qualification for office than by wealth. This qualification, in turn, has been determined by education, and 
especially by examination’ (Weber 1946: 416). 
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incorruptible’ (juxiaolian 舉孝廉). In this form of selection, each district recommended 
two students to the Imperial College, one who was filial, and one who was incorruptible. 
The recommendation was primarily based on the opinions of the neighbours of the 
students. Any recommendations made were then approved by local officials. After several 
years’ training, some of the students were appointed as local governors, according to their 
academic performance in the Imperial College. After this, any further selection for higher 
offices was decided on the basis of the political achievements of these local governors. 
 
The main purpose of this method of selection is to highlight the importance of moral 
virtues of government officials. Most citizens living in a small community are generally 
more familiar with the moral characters of their neighbours than with outsiders. Hence, 
this ‘recommending the filial and the incorruptible’ method of selection, to some extent, 
could verify the candidates, in terms of their morality, communication skills and other 
abilities which are difficult to measure by means of examinations.  
 
There are many obvious problems with this method of selection. For example, most 
citizens are not rational enough to always make objective and correct judgements on the 
moral characters of other citizens. And when considering the virtue of political candidates, 
most citizens risks falling into bias, on account of the positive or negative characters of 
their personal relationships with the candidates. Therefore, this ‘recommending the filial 
and the incorruptible’ system may arbitrarily favour a certain group of citizens over others. 
It risks leading to cronyism, nepotism and hereditary aristocracy. This is especially so in 
a Chinese political context that attaches great importance to human relationships or 
connections (guanxi 關係). 
 
Xu Fuguan 徐複觀 points out that ‘recommending the filial and the incorruptible’ system 
leads to autocracy which conflicts with the original ideas of Confucianism; even though 
Confucianism was the state philosophy at that time (Liu 2001). After the Han dynasty, 
this ‘filial and incorrupt’ selection process was abandoned and replaced by the Keju. 
 
The Keju was first established during the Sui (581-618CE) and Tang (618-907CE) 
dynasties. At that time, the emperors still had the ultimate authority over the selection and 
promotion of government officials, but in practice, one’s performance in the Keju was 
largely decisive for one’s final rank in the government (Elman 2000: 7). Even so, for most 
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of the period leading up to the end of Tang dynasty, the Keju failed to establish a society 
substantially premised upon authentically meritocratic norms and practices; since 
studying Confucian classics and participating in examinations were generally the 
privilege of aristocrats and wealthy businessmen. According to Elman, “over 90%” of the 
Chinese population are not eligible to take the imperial examination system because of 
the unequal distribution of social and educational resources (Elman 1991: 17). 
 
During the Ming dynasty (1368-1644CE), the Keju was further revised and extended, in 
order to be both fairer and more open to ordinary people. Additional levels of 
examinations were added to the Keju. Candidates who passed their examinations at 
provincial or higher levels gained the opportunity to hold office or assume practical duties 
at different levels of the government. In addition, policy-related knowledge was tested in 
more specific areas, such as the mathematics of economic transactions, calculation of the 
official calendar, astrology and even in the explanation of natural anomalies. However, 
as an intellectual orthodoxy, Neo-Confucian political thought regarding morality and 
statecraft played a dominant role in the Keju curriculum during both the Ming (1368-
1644CE) and the Qing (1644-1912CE) dynasties (Elman 2013a). 
 
6.32 Practicality of Confucian Examination 
 
The primary purpose of the Keju was to select officials for the emperors of Imperial China. 
Such emperors were the only rulers who had decisive control over the selection process. 
Because of this, it is tempting to argue that the Keju should be blamed for lending support 
and legitimacy to imperial rule, and for contributing to the authoritarian forms of 
government that were typical of Imperial China.  If one were to pursue this line of 
argument, it would appear that the Keju is no longer relevant to modern times. Indeed, it 
is mainly for these reasons that the Keju was severely challenged in the late nineteenth 
century when Imperial China was defeated by the Western powers. In 1905, the Keju was 
abandoned in China, on account of its incompatibility with the quest for a strong and 
modernised state.153   
 
                                                          
153 There was deep frustration, and even desperation among the Chinese during the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904–5, which was fought in north-east China. Ever since then, the Keju has been treated as a scapegoat 
for China’s problems and has generally been perceived as one of the main reasons for the weakness of the 
imperial Chinese government. In the early 20th century, the Keju was viewed as an obstacle to the 
implementation of a truly modern and universal educational system. 
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It is true that in Imperial China, the practice of the Keju served imperial rule, and was 
supported by the political power of the emperors. However, this should not be seen as in 
intrinsically negative phenomenon. For, even if some emperors used their political power 
in an evil manner, the political power of the emperors was not evil in itself. Jiang Qing 
contends that the Keju played a positive role in Imperial China, even it did serve imperial 
rule; this is because the Keju was appropriate for China at that time, and it was crucial to 
keeping social order and promoting the benefit of the citizens (Jiang 2003: 96-249). 
Elman also points out that the Keju was ‘an effective cultural, social, political, and 
educational construction that met the needs of the dynastic bureaucracy while 
simultaneously supporting late imperial social structure.’ (Elman 2013a).  
 
Moreover, it is obvious that despite the anachronistic role of the emperor in the Keju, 
those who performed well in this examination system become government officials who 
had the political power to make decisions on public affairs. 154 Even though these political 
rulers were ‘in principle subjected to the authority of the monarch,’ it is nonetheless 
important to remember that ‘the monarch, if only for reasons of lack of time, more often 
than not reigned rather than ruled’ (Bell 2016: 224, Pine 2012: Chapter 2). 
 
Some contemporary Confucian scholars, especially those in mainland China, claim that 
the Keju and other experiments with selecting talented leaders in Imperial China serve as 
evidence that the selection of government officials by means of Confucian examinations 
is not a purely idle and idealised invention. Rather, it still retains considerable value for 
the modern age. For example, Jiang Qing 蔣慶, Chen Ming 陳明, Daniel Bell and many 
other Mainland New Confucians have advocated reviving this practice in contemporary 
China (Bell and de-Shalit 2011: 160).  
 
The Keju is a system designed not only to assist in the selection and promotion of officials 
for the emperors but also to evaluate the merits of the candidates in various areas, in a 
relatively objective and impartial manner. Therefore, the Keju did, to some extent, 
contribute to social equality and social mobility in Imperial China (this will be further 
discussed in the rest of this chapter). It is true that the Keju had many flaws. Mark Elliott 
                                                          
154 In today’s China, the civil service examination plays a similar role to the Keju. There are no separate 
tracks for civil servants and politicians. Those who pass the civil service examination are in a position to 
become civil servants and to seek future opportunities to gain the status of political rulers whose decisions 
may influence millions of Chinese citizens.  
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argues that “family connections and material resources” rather than merit are the keys to 
political success for “a majority” of Chinese imperial political elites who passed the Keju 
(Elliott 2012).  At the end of the Qing dynasty, many official positions were bought by 
the rich and powerful, whether or not they succeeded or failed in the Keju examination. 
Lawrence Lok Cheung Zhang points out that this flawed Keju system led to an 
increasingly unstable political system, especially towards the end of the Qing dynasty 
(Zhang 2010). It would be surely inappropriate to revive the Keju in modern societies. 
But even so, the idea of the Keju and all the successes and failures associated with its 
implementation in the history of Imperial China are rich sources. Such resources can help 
people today to design a modern exam-based way to select political rulers (Qian 1996).    
 
As a merit-based bureaucratic institution, the Keju is not feasible in modern societies 
partly because it relied on an authoritarian system of governance in which the emperors 
have the final say in the selection and promotion of government officials. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, CMD is not an authoritarian system. The only 
purpose of the Confucian Examination in CMD is to select the Confucian Ren 
statespersons who are subjected to Ren rather than to any emperors. It is thus possible for 
the Confucian Examination, as a modernised form of the Keju, to retain Confucian values 
and to make a positive contribution to modern societies. 
 
Some might doubt the fairness of the Confucian Examination in reality. They might argue 
that the results of a process of exam-based selection are more or less arbitrary, especially 
when there are far more citizens taking the exams than there are positions available. The 
Confucian examination may not guarantee an objective and comprehensive evaluation of 
the various merits of the candidates. Those who pass the examination might be book-
smart only and lack of practical wisdom requisite to political service. 
 
However, it has been argued that it is impossible for any examination or exam-based 
selection method to be perfectly objective and comprehensive. There is a degree of 
unfairness with almost every examination which intends to identify the talented 
candidates, such as A-levels in the UK, SATs in the USA and national college entrance 
exams (Gaokao 高考) in today’s China. Some trade-off is an unfortunate inevitability. 
This being so, what is required is a relatively fair and uncontroversial process for 




In CMD, the Confucian Examination and other institutional arrangements, such as the 
Confucian civic education and the Confucian Academy all make a positive contribution 
to a relatively fair and impartial process of identifying Confucian Ren statespersons. As 
discussed above, the Confucian civic education, which helps citizens prepare for the 
Confucian Examination, is free, and it is open to every citizen. Those who finish the 
Confucian civic education and who are willing to participate in politics will be sent to the 
Confucian Academy for further training. They are also required to take up some practical 
duties at different levels of government to test their real-world political experiences, 
thereby, preventing any merely book-smart candidates from assuming office.  
 
It is necessary to hold a further democratic election, featuring those who have passed the 
Confucian Examination. This would make it possible to see whether the potential 
Confucian Ren statespersons are ‘popular’ among the citizens. Moreover, because of the 
phenomenon of specialisation in the contemporary world, there will be different 
examination tracks, such as the economics track, the political science track and the natural 
sciences track in the Confucian Examination system, in order to make the process of 
identifying the Confucian Ren statespersons as impartial and fair as possible.  
 
6.33 Evaluating Morality 
 
One possible objection to the Confucian Examinations is that this kind of examination 
does not appear to be a reliable means of testing the moral abilities of the candidates. In 
Imperial China, the moral abilities of the government officials were deemed more 
important than their intellectual abilities. Thus, most of the Keju test material was focused 
on Confucian ethics; the implementation of the Keju was continually reassessed and 
modified, in order to better evaluate the moral abilities of the candidates. The Keju 
facilitated the connection between politics and Confucian ethics in Imperial China. This 
is because the imperial political institutions were heavily influenced by Confucian ethics, 
by means of the Confucian curriculum for selecting government officials (Elman 2000). 
 
However, many prominent Confucian scholars in Imperial China criticised the Keju for 
failing to select candidates with superior moral abilities. For example, Lu Zhi陸贄 (754-
805 CE) argues that the Keju risks incentivising hypocrisy. Some of the shrewder 
candidates might decide to hypocritically provide morally correct answers in the 




Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200 CE) also asserts that the Keju makes studying the Confucian 
classics a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Thus, the Keju was biased towards 
the selection of the book-smart candidates, rather than the virtuous (Zhu 1990: 19). Zhu 
suggests that what the Keju should be test is not the candidate’s knowledge of the 
Confucian classics, but the value of the candidate’s own interpretations of the Confucian 
classics (Xiao and Li 2013: 354). 155  
 
Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610-1695 CE) holds a similar view. He points out that the Keju 
merely tests the ability of the candidates to memorise the Confucian classics and the 
subsequent commentaries; it does not help to assess the capacity for independent thought. 
Thus, Huang advocates that Keju should require the candidates to provide their own 
opinions, and to let their own individual personalities shine through; instead of restating 
the opinion of established authorities (Huang [1663] 2016: 71). Huang condemns the Keju 
of his day for rewarding superficiality and plagiarism. It fails to evaluate the moral 
abilities of the candidates. (ibid. 67) 
 
It seems extremely difficult to objectively evaluate the moral behaviour of the Confucian 
Examination candidates. There is no way to systematically measure someone’s virtues, 
e.g., their willingness to sacrifice their own self-interest for the well-being of others, 
purely by analysing the answer they have provided in an examination. However, even if 
the Confucian Examination cannot guarantee a perfect test of the moral abilities of the 
candidates, each candidate’s performance in the Confucian Examination does reflect 
some of the moral virtues of the candidates.  
 
Firstly, as discussed above, the candidates who are preparing for the Confucian 
Examination are motivated to study the texts in the Confucian classics. These texts 
represent a comprehensive body of knowledge about ethics. These texts also furnish many 
positive moral examples from a vast array of role models. The process of gaining 
knowledge from these texts has the potential to exercise a very positive effect on the 
moral cultivation of the candidates.  
 
                                                          
155 Although he recognised many problems with the Keju, Zhu Xi still believed that the Imperial civil 
examination systems were a necessary method for selecting officials (De Weerdt 2007: 385). 
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Secondly, in order to pass the Confucian Examination, the candidates need to try their 
best to internalise Confucian ethics on an intuitive level. If they succeed in doing this, 
these ethics will profoundly influence their moral characters.  So, to some extent, it is 
possible to evaluate one’s moral abilities by testing one’s knowledge of Confucian ethics.  
 
Thirdly, in order to perform better in the Confucian examinations, a candidate should not 
only have superior intellectual abilities, but also certain virtues, such as persistence and 
self-discipline. These are relevant considerations in the assessment of the moral abilities 
of the candidate.156  Therefore, the Confucian Examination has the potential to test some 
of the moral abilities of the candidates, even if such moral abilities are not tested in a 
perfectly comprehensive and rigorous manner. 
 
There are some other institutional arrangements in CMD which also provide opportunities 
to assess the real moral virtue of the candidates. In the Song dynasty (960–1279), those 
who successfully passed the Keju received further tests and evaluations, before being 
appointed to government posts. An outstanding academic performance in the Keju was 
not in itself a guarantee of a good official career in the Song dynasty. Similarly, in CMD, 
candidates for the Confucian Ren statespersons are required to undergo a period of further 
assessment after they pass the Confucian Examinations. Only by observing the 
behaviours and motives of the candidates in a practical socio-political context, is it 
possible to assess their moral abilities; as Confucius says, ‘See what a man does. Watch 
his motives. Examine on what things he rests. How can a man conceal his character?’ 
(Analects 2.10).  
  
6.34 Possible Dissatisfactions  
 
Another possible objection to the Confucian Examination is that even though the 
Confucian Examination might be a good way of selecting and evaluating the merits of the 
Confucian Ren statespersons, it could still serve as an excuse for the elites to exclude a 
certain proportion of the citizens from direct participation in the political decision-making 
process. In other words, the Confucian Examination may deprive some citizens of their 
                                                          
156 The moral abilities of the candidates can be exemplified in many ways; not just in their examination 
answers.  In Imperial China, when making judgements on the moral ability of the candidates, the Keju 
examiners even took the handwriting of the candidates into consideration (Xiao and Li 2013: 354). 
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‘positive liberty’ of direct political participation; this will eventually result in an 
entrenched hierarchy (Berlin 1958).  
 
However, the preceding chapters have argued that in real political practice, the direct 
political participation of the citizens is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
improving their well-being. In theory, if Confucian Ren statespersons meet the 
requirements of Ren, i. e., if they always make reasonable political decisions to serve the 
well-being of all citizens, CMD is not illegitimate. Provided the Confucian Ren 
statespersons scrupulously follow Ren, they do not necessarily fail to promote political 
equality, even though most of the citizens in CMD can only participate in political 
decision-making about ‘strictly local’ matters. 
 
Nevertheless, it might be argued in response that it is highly likely that the 
disenfranchisement of some citizens will breed misunderstanding and hatred. 157 
Therefore, the Confucian Examination is objectionable as it fails to protect the spiritual 
well-being of the citizens. Moreover, if, as argued above, the Confucian Examination is 
capable of evaluating the merits of the candidates in a relatively objective manner, then 
those who pass the examination will surely enjoy high social status and prestige, 
regardless of whether they become the Confucian Ren statespersons or not. Therefore, 
many citizens in CMD would be motivated to participate in the examination especially 
when the Confucian civic education is free and open to every citizen. However, if there 
is an ever-increasing number of candidates participating in the Confucian examination, 
this will inevitably exert a high degree of pressure on the examination system (Elman 
2013a). The increasingly tough competition associated with the Confucian Examination 
risks causing widespread dissatisfaction among the citizens, especially among those who 
fail the examination, and who thereby do not succeed in becoming Confucian Ren 
statespersons. Therefore, some may object to the prospect of the Confucian Examination 
by arguing that such mass dissatisfaction may threaten the legitimacy and stability of the 
state.  
 
The rest of this section will answer the above objections from three different angles.  
 
                                                          
157 Benjamin Olken has conducted some research in Indonesia. He concluded that popular participation 
usually leads to policies similar to those made without direct participation but make citizens feel much 
happier about the policies undertaken (Olken 2010).  
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Firstly, these problems relating to the exam-based selection of political officials exist 
mainly on account of lacking channels for diverting the talents of the various candidates 
into appropriate and relevant forms of socio-political engagement (Qian 1996: 156-157). 
So, in CMD, it is possible to solve these problems by providing more professional 
opportunities for those who fail the Confucian Examination, rather than merely 
abandoning the examination.  Moreover, as discussed above, the Confucian Examination 
serves the purpose of selecting Confucian Ren statespersons and improving the various 
abilities of most citizens; rather than keeping non-elites out of politics. In CMD, even 
though only a few citizens can become the Confucian Ren statespersons, every citizen 
can participate in making political decisions about ‘strictly local’ matters. Those 
unsuccessful Confucian Examination candidates, who may not be fully capable of making 
reasonable political decisions about the entire state, can successfully pursue an alternative 
career by taking advantage of the skills and knowledge they gained during their 
preparations for the Confucian Examination. In Imperial China, Confucian classical 
learning was the main curriculum undergirding the Keju; most of the candidates had 
outstanding literary talent because they spent years preparing for the Keju. So even if 
some of them failed in their quest to become government officials, they were still able to 
make their fortune and gain prestige by other means: such as by writing poems, dramas, 
novels and even medical handbooks.  
 
Secondly, the Confucian civic education and the Confucian Examination in CMD help 
citizens develop a sense of respect for the Confucian Ren statespersons. The reason that 
Confucian Ren statespersons have opportunities to participate in the political decision-
making directly is that they have made great achievements in moral self-cultivation and 
finished the Confucian civic education successfully. They have already proved their 
intellectual and moral superiority through the Confucian Examinations and other 
complementary institutional arrangements in CMD. By valuing such excellence and 
achievements, CMD helps citizens to understand that any opportunities to make the 
influential political decisions that concerned the entire country should be earned, and not 
demanded as of right. Political decision-making should be considered a deeply prestigious 
vocation, which confers honour and respect on those involved in it. Daniel Bell used a 
similar argument to defend his Confucian political blueprint; he advocates respect for the 





Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, early Confucians do not prioritise the use of political 
force. Instead, moral persuasion is the key tool of statecraft. In CMD, the imperative of 
moral persuasion requires the Confucian Ren statespersons to, firstly, establish 
themselves as good examples for the citizens to follow, before insisting that others behave 
virtuously. Because of this, it is perfectly possible for most citizens in CMD to respect 
the Confucian Ren statespersons. This respect could eventually lead those who fail the 
Confucian Examination to willingly permit the Confucian Ren statespersons to make 
some important political decisions on their behalf.   
 
Thirdly, in CMD, the most obvious difference between the Confucian Examination in 
CMD and the Keju in Imperial China is that the Confucian Examination is free and open 
to every citizen. No citizen in CMD, even if they are rich or powerful, is to have any 
privileges in the Confucian Examination. As discussed in the previous chapters, modern 
democratic societies often have disparities in access to positions of political authority, 
regarding difficulty and cost. One of the main purposes of the Confucian Examination is 
to broaden access to government positions among citizens from many different classes 
backgrounds. This will help a relatively high number of citizens to seek the opportunity 
to become respected political officials. Therefore, in CMD, there are no unequal legal or 
structural barriers for citizens to acquire the information, education or training that are 
relevant to the Confucian Examination. And there are no property qualifications or 
arbitrary prerequisites for citizens who wish to participate in the Confucian Examination. 
All of this suggests that under a well-regulated CMD system, every citizen has an equal 
opportunity to become a Confucian Ren statesperson; thus, an encrusted hierarchy of 
privileged powerhouses is less likely to develop. Even if a lack of opportunities to directly 
participate in making some important political decisions gives rise dissatisfaction among 
some citizens, such discontentment is highly likely to be dispelled by the upward mobility 
to which the Confucian Examination contributes. 
  
In Imperial China, social mobility was not a goal of the emperors and ministers. However, 
one unexpected consequence of the Keju system was that it motivated the citizens to seek 
upward mobility. The citizens knew that regardless of their class background, they all had 
the opportunity to become government officials, by means of the Keju, as long as they 
studied hard. As a poem by one early Confucian scholar says, ‘one can be a farmer in the 
morning, and a minister in the emperor’s palace in the evening (if he passes the Keju).’ 
Qian Mu points out that the Keju helped to cultivate the citizens, by motivating them to 
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study the Confucian classics. But besides this, it has a potential to alleviate the problem 
of social classes, by making the hierarchy mobile, rather than fixed and static (Qian 1996: 
405-406). 
 
To sum up, the Confucian civic education and the Confucian Examination are valuable, 
as they make it possible to select Confucian Ren statespersons in a relatively fair and 
impartial manner. Besides this, they facilitate the development of the intellectual and 
moral abilities of the citizens, who are then in a position to utilise their abilities, for 
various political or non-political purposes. Because of this, citizens can avail of a wide 
range of opportunities to gain a higher place in the social hierarchy. This encourages 
upward mobility and contributes to a healthy ‘social circulation,’ which has the potential 
to mitigate any dissatisfaction felt by those who have failed in becoming Confucian Ren 
statespersons, and who have thereby lost their opportunity to directly participate in 
making some influential political decisions that concerned the entire state. 
 
6.4 Confucian Parliament 
 
Some may point out that even if one were to prove one’s own intellectual and moral 
superiority by means of the Confucian Examination and other meritocratic selection 
processes, it is still possible that one’s characters may change, and one may end up 
abusing one’s power after taking office. Montesquieu states that ‘constant experience 
shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority 
as far as it will go’ (Montesquieu 1949: 150).  
 
It has been argued that even a moral leader needs to be restrained. For, as Arendt argues, 
virtue is also a form of power, which should be kept in check, in order to avoid being 
abused (Arendt 2006: 143). In non-ideal situations, if the rulers are unconstrained, there 
is always a distinct risk that they may fall victims to their own self-interest. John Stuart 
Mill contends that there are extraordinary faculties and energies required for a good ruler, 
and so we can hardly imagine anyone as consenting to undertake it (Mill [1861] 2010: 
Chap.3).158 
                                                          
158 Mill is against the saying that ‘if a good despot could be ensured, despotic monarchy would be the best 
form of government.’ He believes that good despots are extremely rare, and that despots inevitably derive 
their subjects of necessary opportunities for the development of their thinking and active faculties (Mill 
[1861] 2010: Chapter 3).  However, Mill also claims that ‘despotism is a legitimate form of government 




Therefore, in modern societies, relying on a group of good statespersons alone cannot 
guarantee a good government. In other words, purely focusing on the selection of the 
Confucian Ren statespersons would undermine the viability of CMD in modern societies, 
as it would show such system to be incapable of managing the challenges in reality. 
Therefore, CMD requires certain democratic institutional arrangements, such as a 
‘Confucian Parliament,’ which are capable of checking and balancing the meritocratic 
institutional arrangements discussed above. 
 
Huang Zongxi proposes a ‘parliament of scholars,’ composed of established Confucian 
scholars who have been selected on the grounds of their examination success (Huang 
[1663] 2016: 42-64). Daniel Bell modifies Huang’s proposal, and suggests that there can 
be two houses: a Huang-style Confucian meritocratic house composed of members 
selected by competitive examinations and ‘a democratic house composed of 
representatives selected by competitive elections.’ For Bell, the democratic house 
represents the interests of voters, while the members of the meritocratic house protect the 
interests of non-voters by having ‘veto power over any policies that it judges harm the 
interests of future generations’ (Bell 2016: 51). 
 
In CMD, the Confucian Parliament combines Bell’s two houses. Half of the members of 
the Confucian Parliament are made up of those who did not pass the Confucian 
examination, or who failed to achieve the level of attainment expected of the Confucian 
Ren statesperson, but who nonetheless possess the second-best level of moral and 
intellectual abilities.  
 
The other half of the members of the Confucian Parliament should be democratically 
elected representatives from different communities. In order to avoid the problems of 
partisanship in modern democratic societies, as discussed in the previous chapters, an 
agreed number of democratically elected representatives in the Confucian Parliament 
shall be assigned to different civil organisations and communities. 159  Chapter 4 has 
                                                          
East Indian Company’s management of Indian affairs (Ryan 2012: 358-359). Mill does not offer any clear 
explanation about why Indian people are barbarians and do not know how to govern themselves like British 
people. It seems ‘a good despot’ is legitimate as long as he facilitates the improvement of his subjects.   
159 The philosopher Kwasi Wiredu also argues that a consensus system without a party arrangement is a 
form of government better than the one with competing political parties.  a better form of democratic 
government To avoid multi-party competition, Wiredu further proposes assigning a certain number of 
representatives to different civil organisations (Wiredu 2001: 227-244). 
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argued that according to the Confucian conception of political rights, citizens in CMD 
should only participate in making political decisions about ‘strictly local’ matters in their 
own communities. These communities must be relatively small in scale, to increase the 
likelihood that they can make reasonable political decisions when voting for their 
representatives, and to improve the chances of fostering a community-based consensus 
about who will make a suitable representative in the Confucian Parliament.   
 
Thus, even though there is a large gap between the ideal and the reality, it is not unrealistic 
to strive for such ‘democracy by consensus’ in relatively small communities where the 
political issues are not complex, most citizens are familiar with the candidates, and there 
is a strong sense of community. To avoid partisan politics, competitive elections should 
be held only within local communities. Outside of this arrangement, any open competition 
by political parties would be forbidden.  
  
CMD requires fair and free democratic elections at the local community level. This is 
because democratic elections have a very important symbolic and ritual effect, and have 
thus played an important civilising role in modern societies. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, an early Confucian living in the world today might appear to have one major 
concern about the civilising role of democratic elections, i.e., that citizens, through direct 
participation in politics, may lose respect and trust for the experienced and the 
knowledgeable.  
 
For example, in the British EU membership referendum, the ‘Remain campaign’ was 
supported by most political, economic and security experts and authorities; however, a 
large proportion of the British citizens who voted in the referendum still believed they 
would make better decisions than those experts and authorities, with regard to whether 
remaining or leaving the EU would promote their own interests. The result of this 
referendum, which disappointed most British cabinet ministers (including the prime 
minister, and a majority of MPs), implies that many British citizens do not trust the 
judgement of their political leaders on most of the economic, foreign policy and security 
issues discussed in the campaign, even though many of these issues are complicated and 
beyond the comprehension of most citizens.  
 
Therefore, CMD not merely needs the Confucian Parliament. In addition to this, it is 
necessary to have the Confucian civic education for all, further training for potential 
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Confucian Ren state statespersons in the Confucian Academy, as well as a fair selection 
process for Confucian Ren statespersons on the basis of the Confucian Examination. This 
is because, as discussed above, these meritocratic institutional arrangements motivate 
citizens to improve their moral and political competence and to participate in public 
affairs. On account of this, such meritocratic institutional arrangements help citizens to 
make reasonable political decisions and thus have the potential to create social and 
political conditions that are conducive to a constructive democratic election process in 
local communities.  
 
The selected and elected members of the Confucian Parliament are responsible for 
scrutinising political decisions made by the Confucian Ren statespersons. They are 
obliged to ask the Confucian Ren statespersons questions, to meet with them, and to 
debate important social and political issues. Any changes to the political decisions made 
by the Confucian Ren statespersons require a simple majority of those present and voting 
in the Confucian Parliament. Impeaching a Confucian Ren statesperson requires the votes 
of two-thirds of members of the Confucian Parliament.  
 
The Confucian Parliament serves as an important institutional arrangement for preventing 
the Confucian Ren statespersons from abusing power and also for weeding out 
incompetent statespersons. It also helps motivate the Confucian Ren statespersons to 
always make reasonable political decisions for the well-being of all the citizens. In 
addition, it provides the elected and selected members of the Confucian parliament with 
opportunities to express their political opinions, especially political dissent. The 
Confucian Ren statespersons are required to address objections, and they cannot merely 
charge those who object them with not being reasonable, for then CMD would be a 
paternalistic regime.  The Confucian Ren statespersons have obligations to treat dissent 
seriously and to provide a conscientious reply. This gives the Confucian Parliament 
members a chance to constructively influence the political decisions made by the 
Confucian Ren statespersons.  
 
It may also make the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons more 
acceptable, as citizens in CMD will feel that their opinions do matter and that the power 
of their political leaders is limited and constrained by the Confucian Parliament. The 
Confucian Parliament also serves as a major recall mechanism; as the parliament 




6.5 The Normative and Practical Aim of Confucian Meritocratic Democracy 
 
The democratic institutional arrangements of CMD are founded upon the assumption that 
it is extremely difficult for someone to become a perfect Confucian Ren statesperson in 
reality. Therefore, the democratic institutional arrangements of CMD, such as the 
Confucian Parliament, discussed in the previous section appear to be in conflict with the 
aim of CMD. Specifically, as discussed in the previous chapters, the theory of CMD is 
founded upon the Confucian conceptions of political authority, political rights and 
political equality; such conceptions aim to construct a vision of how a state should be 
ruled by the Confucian Ren statespersons, who can always make reasonable political 
decisions to promote the interests of others, rather than their own self-interest.  
 
Here, it is necessary to make a distinction between the normative theory and the practical 
theory in classical Confucianism. Early Confucians suggest that there are normative 
principles, which are fact-free and abstract, as well as practical principles, which are 
context-sensitive and are bound by facts. When these two types of principles conflict with 
each other, early Confucians are not inclined to insist upon a strict adherence to normative 
principles alone. Because of this, two themes, jing 經 and quan 權, are commonly found 
throughout the Confucian classics.  
 
For example, Mencius says: 
 
If a man’s sister-in-law were drowning and the man did not save her, he would 
be a beast. That men and women should not touch in handing something to 
one another is the ritual, but to save his sister-in-law from drowning by using 
his hand is discretion (quan 權). (Mencius 4A17) 
 
Here, quan 權 is contrasted with the rituals or jing 經 (core codes) which require a man 
not to touch his sister-in-law’s hands. Jing 經 refers to normative principles which are not 
bound by facts. While quan 權 means discretion in a particular context. In most early 
Confucians’ discussions about specific situations in reality, jing is always subject to quan 




Accordingly, there are normative and practical aims of CMD. The normative aim is to 
serve the well-being of all citizens by putting the responsibility for political decision-
making into the hands of the Confucian Ren statespersons. The practical aim is to help all 
citizens to make reasonable political decisions in order to prevent unreasonable political 
officials from taking office.  
 
The normative aim of CMD appears to be incompatible with modern democracy, as it 
advocates ‘rule by the reasonable’ rather than ‘rule by the people.’ However, the practical 
aim of CMD is absolutely compatible with the practical aim of modern democracy, which 
is to serve the well-being of all citizens, by preventing intellectually or morally 
incompetent politicians from taking offices.  
 
In non-ideal situations, it is much more likely to fulfil the practical aim of CMD, in 
comparison to its normative aim. This is because, in non-ideal situations, it is exceedingly 
difficult to find a perfect Confucian Ren statesperson possessing all the merits needed to 
implement ‘Ren government.’ Even if there were some citizens who are qualified to be 
Confucian Ren statespersons, it would be highly unlikely to guarantee that their characters 
will not change after taking office. 
 
Therefore, when considering the practice of CMD in reality, Confucians would agree that 
the normative aim (jing 經) of CMD is subject to its practical aim (quan 權). On account 
of this, the democratic institutional arrangements discussed above do not conflict with 
CMD, but rather helps to achieve the practical aim of CMD. 
 
Now the question is ‘is the normative aim of CMD false or invaluable if a flawless 
achievement of such aim in reality seems an unlikely prospect?’ The words of Machiavelli 
offer a compelling characterisation of this doubt:  
 
It appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than 
the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities 
which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is so far 
distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what 
ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation.’ (Machiavelli 




The normative aim of CMD, i.e., ‘rule by the reasonable’ is not something people have 
seen, and it might even appear unlikely to ever see it. Therefore, at least from 
Machiavelli’s perspective, the CMD might not be ‘the real truth of the matter.’ Some 
modern political theorists are also concerned with the feasibility of political theories and 
impose likelihood constraints on normative political theories (Räikkä 1998: 27-40, 
Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012: 809-825). On the basis of this ‘likelihood constraints,’ 
they object to any normative political theories, which ‘does not represent an ideal of 
political life that is achievable under even the most favourable circumstances possible’ 
(Galston 2010:385). 
 
However, some political philosophers hold a different opinion. For example, David 
Estlund argues that the truth about political theories is not constrained by considerations 
about whether or not the theories are likely to be successfully realised. A political theory 
can be valuable and important; even it is not feasible, even under the most favourable 
circumstances (Estlund 2014: 113-134).  
 
In his examination of the Rawlsian view of the comprehensive fact-sensitivity of 
principles, G.A. Cohen makes a clear distinction between ‘the fact-bound principles and 
the fact-free principles’ (Cohen 2008: 20). He argues that the fact-bound principles are 
founded upon the ‘fundamental principles’ that do not reflect facts (ibid. 268-270). 
 
Taking up an insight of Estlund and Cohen, the normative aim of CMD is valuable, even 
though it is not bound by any facts. This is because such normative aim is the 
‘fundamental principle’ on which the practical aim of CMD rests. Moreover, the 
normative aim of CMD is an abstract conception that sheds light on the nature of 
Confucian political thought. Many modern political philosophers attach great importance 
to abstraction in political theories. For example, Rawls contends that the work of 
abstraction: 
 
Is a way of continuing public discussion when shared understandings of lesser 
generality have broken down… formulating idealized, which is to say abstract, 
conceptions of society and person connected with those fundamental ideas is 





Onora O’Neill defends the necessity of abstraction in normative theorising by 
distinguishing ‘abstraction’ from ‘idealisation.’ She points out that abstract principles 
omit ‘much that is true of human agents,’ while idealised principles add ‘much that is 
false of human agents’ (O’Neill 1987: 56). O’Neill argues that those who object to 
abstraction often confuse abstraction with idealisation. Political philosophers should 
reject idealisation rather than abstraction, as the idealised principles assume capacities 
that actual human beings lack and thus are ‘irrelevant to human choosing’ (ibid.56). 
O’Neill indicates that abstraction is ‘theoretically and practically unavoidable’ (O’Neill 
1996: 40). This is because: 
 
First, abstraction is, taken strictly, unavoidable in all reasoning: no use of 
language can be fully determinate. Second, abstraction is not always objected 
to in practical reasoning…Third, only abstract principles are likely to have 
wide scope: if ethical principles are to be relevant to a wide range of situations 
or of agents, they surely not merely may but must be abstract. (O’Neill 
1987:55) 
 
Taking an insight from O’Neill, the normative aim of CMD is an abstract aim and thus is 
not objectionable. Such aim might be a ‘false’ idealised aim if early Confucians had ever 
claimed that actual citizens have the capacity to become Confucian Ren statespersons. 
But they did not say that (see Chapter 2). As discussed in Chapter 2, early Confucians 
also suggest that a good ruler who can always meet the requirements of Ren is extremely 
rare in reality, and has not been found to exist since Ancient Three Dynasties (San Dai 三
代 Xia, Shang, and Zhou) (ca.2100BCE-256BCE). Mencius once stated that a good ruler 
should arise every five hundred years, but he then complained that ‘it had been seven 
hundred years without a good ruler since the dawn of the Zhou dynasty till now’ (Mencius 
2B13). 
 
The normative aim of CMD might be an unachievable idealised aim or ‘irrelevant to 
human choosing,’ if becoming a Confucian Ren statesperson were somehow beyond the 
potential capacities of human beings. However, as already stated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 
4, this is not the case. Early Confucians claimed that every citizen has equal potential to 
become a Confucian Ren statesperson. It is certain that there are many potentialities 




To sum up, the main purpose of all the institutional arrangements in CMD discussed 
above is to enable a mutual checking and balancing of the principles of ‘rule by the 
reasonable’ and ‘rule by the people,’ and to thus achieve the practical aim of CMD. The 
practical aim of CMD is founded upon the normative aim of CMD and is essentially 
compatible with the practical aim of modern democracy. Therefore, CMD is more like a 
middle way between Confucian meritocracy and excessive democracy.  
 
Some may object the viability of CMD by arguing that the history of democratisation has 
shown the difficulty of standing still on a desirable middle ground without sliding to the 
extreme. This possibility cannot be dismissed outright, but such an intuitive insight must 
ultimately await rigorous empirical investigation. Thus, it is better to provisionally 
bracket this controversial historical speculation.  If one holds a positive view of the role 
of the state in helping citizens to make reasonable political decisions, one ought to see 
clearly that the institutional arrangements of CMD have the potential to assist addressing 






It is useful to summarise the key points of this thesis, by way of conclusion. Drawing on 
perspectives from classical Confucianism and academic democratic theories, this thesis 
envisions a Confucian meritocratic form of democratic government: Confucian 
Meritocratic Democracy, or CMD. This thesis began by tackling various philosophical 
questions concerning the pursuit of the political truths that are embodied in Ren; the 
source of the political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons; the political right to 
participate in making political decisions about ‘strictly local’ matters; equal participation 
of all citizens in political reflections. Finally, it has delved into some hypothetical 
institutional arrangements of CMD.   
 
In order to argue that CMD is viable in certain situations, this thesis develops two paths 
of theorising. One path reveals the theoretical and practical problems facing the 
justification and operation of certain normative democratic principles pertaining to 
political authority, political rights and political equality. Another path demonstrates that 
the Confucian conceptions of political authority, political rights and political equality are 
compatible with the practical aim of democracy.  
 
7.1 Theoretical Contributions to Modern Democracy 
 
This thesis has made two main theoretical contributions.  
 
Firstly, this thesis raises doubts about the purely normative approach towards justifying 
the superiority of democracy over other plausible forms of government. According to 
such an approach, the question of whether or not democracy is effective and efficient in 
achieving its practical aim of serving the well-being of all citizens is not relevant to the 
justification of the superiority of democracy. What matters are not the instrumental values 
of democracy, but the intrinsic values of democracy. Democracy is better than other 
plausible forms of government, insofar as it meets the requirements of certain core 
normative democratic principles upon which the intrinsic values of democracy are 
founded. Such intrinsic values include procedural fairness; political authority that is 
justified by general acceptability or ‘consent;’ political rights that safeguard individual 





However, this thesis has sought to show that these core normative democratic principles 
are not self-evidently valid and applicable in all cases. Even if these principles are 
universal truths, it is extremely difficult for modern democracies to meet the requirements 
of these normative democratic principles; both in ideal and non-ideal situations. Even if 
modern democracies are in a position to fulfil the requirements set by these normative 
democratic principles, this cannot in itself guarantee the promotion of the intrinsic values 
of democracy that are embodied in such normative principles. Therefore, the superiority 
of democracy is not necessarily dependent upon the normative democratic principles that 
are often used to justify the intrinsic values of democracy.  
 
Moreover, considering the real political situation in modern democratic societies, equal 
participation of all the citizens in the democratic procedures of political decision-making 
is best understood as the means by which citizens can express their opinions about which 
political decisions are reasonable enough to serve the well-being of all the citizens. It is 
not always necessary to understand such participation in terms of self-expression of 
individual preferences for certain normative democratic principles. Nor does such 
participation imply that the citizens necessarily hold any particular beliefs in the intrinsic 
values of democracy. It is plausible that in modern societies, citizens are more likely to 
care about the instrumental values of democracy much more than its intrinsic values; 
when facing economic crises, political uncertainties and terrorism. This is especially so, 
if the citizens do not have a Western cultural background, or are not very familiar with 
the ideals of the Enlightenment. Therefore, it is possible for citizens to endorse democracy 
without even acknowledging the underlying normative democratic principles. 
  
It has been argued that the normative democratic principles are capable of representing 
the intrinsic values of democracy, and they also offer opportunities for rectifying 
democratic institutional arrangements for the purposes of achieving particular practical 
aims of democracy. However, it is problematic to justify the superiority of democracy in 
theory by purely appealing to the normative democratic principles; nor can these 
principles constitute a conclusive endorsement of democracy in practice. 
 
Secondly, this thesis facilitates awareness of the democratic and meritocratic political 
proposals of early Confucians; these proposals are capable of providing alternative 
conceptions of political authority, political rights and political equality. This thesis has 
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argued that while these conceptions are not founded upon certain normative democratic 
principles, they are nonetheless compatible with the practical aims that such normative 
democratic principles intend to achieve. Moreover, these Confucian conceptions have the 
potential to offer theoretical tools for tackling some political problems in modern 
democracies, such as ‘voter ignorance’ and partisan politics; these Confucian conceptions 
can also serve as an inspiration for constructing reliable and acceptable normative 
standards for evaluating political decisions in modern democratic societies.  
 
Specifically, in classical Confucianism, Ren 仁 refers to the totality of relationship-based 
virtues that make it possible for citizens to make reasonable political decisions. No one 
can fully grasp the political truths embodied in Ren, nor can anyone meet all the 
requirements of Ren with perfection. However, for early Confucians, every citizen has an 
equal innate capacity to know and to practice Ren; every citizen has an equal potential to 
engage in the development of their equal innate capacities. In reality, citizens often have 
different actual capacities, and this is mainly dependent upon their own individual process 
of self-cultivation. Early Confucian views of social equality treat every citizen with 
unequal social status and different actual capacities as moral equals, by recognising their 
equal potentiality in principle. Moreover, such views require that state should provide 
every citizen with an equal opportunity for political reflections, in order to develop their 
equal innate political capacities. 
 
Some citizens, who are well-educated and have made great achievements in self-
cultivation, can be closer to Ren. This means that they know and are capable of practising 
the political truths embodied in Ren much better than others. Such citizens are then able 
to become Confucian Ren statespersons (Junzi君子). They are responsible for making 
political decisions that will influence the well-being of all citizens in the entire country; 
However, in doing so, they are supposed to make all political decisions in accordance 
with the requirements of Ren rather than with their own personal attitudes or judgements. 
Early Confucians claim that Ren is created and interpreted by the Mandate of Heaven 
(tianming 天命). They also insist that in real political practice, the apparently complicated 
and ambiguous Mandate of Heaven (tianming 天命) is ultimately revealed by the attitudes 




The implementation of the political decisions made by the Confucian Ren statespersons 
relies upon Confucian moral persuasion, rather than upon coercive political power. 
According to the Confucian conception of political authority, the legitimacy of the 
political authority of the Confucian Ren statespersons is founded upon ‘service’ and 
‘reciprocity.’ ‘Service’ means that serving the well-being of all citizens is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the legitimacy of the political authority. ‘Reciprocity’ means 
that the existence of reciprocal relationships between the Confucian Ren statespersons 
and their fellow citizens and between the citizens is a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for the legitimacy of the political authority. Therefore, unlike the democratic 
conception of political authority which rests on the equal participation of all citizens in 
the political decision-making process, the Confucian conception of political authority 
prioritises mutual contribution towards the existence of sufficient means to enable 
flourishing lives for all the citizens. Moreover, the Confucian concern with ‘service’ and 
‘reciprocity’ facilitates mutual trust between all the citizens, and thus helps the citizens 
to make reasonable political decisions that serve the interests of their fellow citizens; 
rather than their self-interest alone. 
 
In early Confucian views of self-interest and human nature, every citizen should 
reasonably pursue their own self-interest, and every citizen, by nature, can be reasonable; 
i.e., they can all be altruistic enough to sacrifice their self-interest for the well-being of 
their fellow citizens. Thus, the Confucian conception of political rights, which is founded 
upon early Confucian views of self-interest, endorses the political rights of all citizens to 
participate in making political decisions about ‘strictly local’ matters. The matter is 
strictly local if and only if it is within the intellectual and moral capabilities of local 
citizens to make reasonable political decisions that promote the self-interest of others and 
to contribute towards maintaining diverse and harmonious relations in the local 
communities. Unlike the democratic conception of political rights, the Confucian 
conception of political rights is only applied to the local community level, in order to 
avoid party politics and to help most citizens to make reasonable political decisions. Both 
the Confucian conception of political rights and the democratic conception of political 
rights aim at protecting the self-interest of the citizens from any infringement on the part 
of those with political power. 
 
In order to help most citizens to make reasonable political decisions, the Confucian 
conception of political equality is mainly concerned with ensuring all citizens can engage 
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in political reflections on an equal basis. Such a conception does not entail a rejection of 
the equal participation in political decision-making processes. Rather, it advocates that 
the equal participation in political reflections is both practically and morally prior to the 
equal participation in political decision-making, or ‘one person, one vote.’ Specifically, 
political reflections help citizens to develop their potential capacities to make reasonable 
judgements about which political decisions will in a better position to correspond with 
their own moral beliefs, to satisfy their political aspirations, and to promote their own 
substantive interests. The citizens who have unequal capacities to make reasonable 
political decisions are highly unlikely to exert equal political influence over the process 
of political decision-making, even though they had equal opportunities to participate in 
such process. Moreover, equal participation in political reflections generates a moral 
obligation for the citizens to respect one another’s equal potential capacities, and to treat 
one another as moral equals.  
 
By offering the alternative conceptions of political authority, political rights and political 
equality, and stressing the importance of helping citizens to make reasonable political 
decisions, the theory of CMD is capable of making positive contributions to the 
justification of the superiority of modern democracy and to address some particular 
challenges faced by modern democratic societies.   
 
7.2 Potential Contribution to Political Reform in Mainland China 
 
This thesis has argued that while CMD is compatible with the practical aims of democracy, 
it retains some core moral and political principles, which are derived from classical 
Confucianism. The theory of CMD presents the instrumental and intrinsic values of 
democracy in a way that would be intelligible and acceptable to Chinese citizens, who 
have generally been deeply influenced by Confucianism. Thus, in terms of real political 
practice, the theory of CMD has considerable potential to play a constructive role in the 
future democratisation in mainland China. 
 
Some may argue that the theory of CMD, which integrates classical Confucianism with 
academic democratic theories, will not facilitate the process of democratisation in 
mainland China. This is because the theory of democracy and the promotion of 
democracy in human history are two different things. The latter embodies many features 
that are quite contingent, and proper to Western culture specifically. However, the 
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traditional China, which had been under the influence of classical Confucianism for so 
long, never developed a real democracy. Because of this, some scholars believe that even 
if classical Confucianism is potentially reconcilable with the theory of democracy, it is 
not in a position to facilitate the promotion of democracy in modern China. However, this 
view is problematic for several reasons. 
 
Firstly, it is unclear whether the promotion of democracy is a culturally-relative concern. 
There are many complicated issues in the process of promoting democracy, all of which 
involve various social, economic and political factors. These problems cannot be all 
explained away purely by cultural factors. The process of promoting democracy does not 
have to be conducted in accordance with a particular kind of culture (Hall 2005). Even if 
a Western culture has traditionally played a fundamental role in the promotion of 
democracy, this only means that this culture has succeeded in promoting democracy more 
effectively than other cultures in specific contexts. As already discussed in Chapter 6 of 
this thesis, an endorsement of democratic institutional arrangements needs not necessarily 
be premised upon a particular Western culture. Moreover, any particular endorsement of 
democratic institutional arrangements that is derived from a Western cultural background 
need not rigidly determine the manner in which citizens influenced by Confucian culture 
should understand and endorse democracy.  
 
Secondly, the history of modern democracy shows that many processes of promoting 
democracy are not democratic and that many undemocratic actions against democracy 
are tolerated and even endorsed by the pro-democracy camp (McGuire and Dittmer 2011). 
In modern Chinese history, many activists who support democratic institutional 
arrangement are Confucians (Wang 2003: 68–89). The distinguished sinologist Ying-shih 
Yu余英時 contends that many Confucian scholars in the late Qing dynasty endorsed 
democracy; he suggests that Confucian culture at that time was ‘more receptive than 
hostile to the idea of democracy’ (Yu 1997: 207). In Joseph Chan’s view, the endorsement 
of democracy on the part of such Confucian scholars demonstrates that some Confucian 
scholars have indeed believed that democratic institutional arrangements were capable of 
promoting their Confucian values more effectively than their own traditional political 
system (Chan 2007: 189). 
 
Thirdly, a careful consideration of the reality of some East Asian Countries and regions 
will show that Confucianism may be of assistance in promoting democracy. For example, 
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the contemporary democratic political systems in South Korea and Taiwan are profoundly 
influenced by Confucian culture. Many political scholars from South Korea and Taiwan 
argue that Confucian political thought, especially those about ‘Ren government,’ are 
consistent with democratic institutional arrangements and are therefore of assistance in 
promoting modern democracy (Cheng and Chu 2017, Kim 2017, 2016, 2014, Shin and 
Sin 2012, Tu 2002, 1996) 
 
One might also argue that even if classical Confucianism has the potential to promote 
democracy in practice, it may not be of much help in aiding the process of democratisation 
in mainland China today. This is because classical Confucianism is no longer the 
dominant culture in contemporary China.  
Demonised during the ‘May Fourth Movement’ (1919) as the crown jewel of feudalism, 
Confucianism in China was systematically targeted after the end of the Qing dynasty. It 
was also severely suppressed after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and 
even purged during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Today, because of the influence 
of modernisation and Western Culture, most Chinese people do not have a belief in 
Confucianism; this is especially true of young people (Huang 1999). Ying-shih Yu余英
時 states that in modern days, ‘Confucianism has become a “wandering soul (youhun 遊
魂)” since its death’（Yu 1998:233）. 
 
However, it is important to recognise that Yu is only discussing the ‘death’ of institutional 
Confucianism rather than social Confucianism. Even though institutional Confucianism 
has perished since the late Qing dynasty, social Confucianism still exists in the form of 
moral principles and norms which govern social behaviours in the daily lives of Chinese 
and other citizens in many East Asian countries and regions (Gan 2003, King 1992).  
 
Contemporary Confucian scholar Li Minghui李明輝 argues that Confucianism survives 
at a ‘deep-level’ (Li 2001b: 8). Some prominent empirical studies from social scientists 
also points out that even though most modern Chinese citizens do not admit to a belief in 
Confucianism, their way of life is nevertheless heavily influenced by Confucianism 
(Hwang 1998, 1999, 2001, 2012, Liu, Li & Yue 2010, Liu 2014). Sungmoon Kim states 
that ‘citizens of East Asia who no longer subscribe to fully comprehensive Confucian 
philosophies and/or moral doctrines but nonetheless live by a certain aspect of 
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Confucianism, which is partially comprehensive, as a crucial part of their shared civic 
culture’ (Kim 2017: 246). 
 
It is also highly likely that some meritocratic process of political decision-making from 
the theory of CMD would be attractive to Chinese citizens. Many empirical studies have 
shown that because of the influence of Confucian culture, many Chinese citizens maintain 
a high degree of respect for the ruling elites. For example, David Y. F. Ho 何友輝 
contends that the modern Chinese pattern of socialisation is characterised by 
‘authoritarian moralism’ which is derived from Confucian filial piety (Ho 1989: 149-163, 
1994: 347-365, 1996: 155-165). Some social psychologists also indicate that many 
Chinese citizens have found it entirely acceptable that those who play certain legitimate 
roles in the government, and who have already proved their competence in governing the 
state, should naturally possess more authority in political decision-making (Hwang 1999: 
163-183, 2001: 179-204, 2012, Liu 2014: 83-87). At the same time, Chinese citizens have 
generally been willing to obey authority, rather than to challenge those in authority, and 
to insist upon their own rights (Liu, Li & Yue, 2010: 579-597). 
 
Another attractive characteristic of the theory of CMD is that such a theory seeks 
consensus on practical aims, rather than uniformity among different normative principles. 
The theory of CMD is political, and it is not dependent on any particular metaphysical 
doctrines. Because of this, the theory of CMD has high potential to appeal to ‘Liberal 
Democrats,’ ‘New Leftists,’ and ‘Confucian Constitutionalists’ in today’s mainland 
China. 
 
All three groups are influenced, whether consciously or subconsciously, by Confucianism. 
They all believe that certain Confucian values and democratic values are valuable in 
today’s Chinese societies, despite holding to different interpretations of certain normative 
principles pertaining to good governance. Among most scholars of these three groups, the 
dispute is not so much over the desirability of some democratic practices, but more over 
what kinds of democracy would be best for the Chinese, or when they should be 
implemented (Yu 2009, Yu 2012, Gao 2013).  
 
More specifically, most Liberal Democrats argue that the fundamental building block of 
democracy is competitive multi-candidate elections – whether at the local or the central 
level of government – and that it is meaningless to talk about other forms of democracy 
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(such as intra-party democracy or local level democracy) without this foundation (Yu 
2012). Their main reason for promoting democracy is that the contemporary political 
system in China is unfair, especially for the citizens who are not powerful.  
 
An often-heard argument among the Confucian Constitutionalists is that some Chinese 
citizens, such as poor rural farmers or illiterate citizens, lack the capacity to make 
reasonable political decisions; and that because of this, these ‘low quality’ citizens should 
not be allowed to participate in political decision-making processes (Zeng and Guo 2014, 
Ren 2012). For the Confucian Constitutionalists, democracy will become more viable 
once Chinese citizens become more educated (Shue 1992).   
 
Many New Leftists share certain views in common with the Confucian Constitutionalists; 
such as the priority of the public interests over private interests, and basic moral education 
for every citizen. They also maintain that the state should regulate the selection processes 
of political officials in order to guarantee that those who assume leadership positions in 
key political institutions are reasonable (Wang 2008). 
 
What is often neglected in this debate is that all three groups agree with the opinion of 
the American sociologist Daniel Bell; as Bell says, ‘the quality of life in any society is 
determined, in considerable measure, by the quality of leadership. A society that does not 
have its best men at the head of its leading institutions is a sociological and moral 
absurdity’ (Bell 1972).160 All three groups believe that the practical aim of political reform 
in modern China is to select political officials on the grounds of their capability to serve 
the well-being of all citizens and that the process of selecting such political officials must 
be fair and impartial. All three groups would agree that in order to achieve such practical 
aim, it is of great importance to help all Chinese citizens to make reasonable political 
decisions. This suggests that a Confucian meritocratic view of democracy has the 
potential to enjoy widespread acceptability in the ongoing debate about political reform 
in contemporary mainland China. 
  
                                                          
160 This research project discusses two scholars named Daniel Bell. The Daniel Bell in question here (1919-
2011) is one of the few major American thinkers in the post-World War II era to defend the idea of political 
meritocracy. He also proposed a ‘House of Counsellors’ composed of disinterested and experienced 
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